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[syzbot] memory leak in mgmt_cmd_status #1
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May 7, 2021
struct firmware::data is marked const, and when the firmware is compressed with xz (default at least with Fedora) it's mapped read-only which results in a crash: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffae57c0ca5047 PGD 100000067 P4D 100000067 PUD 1001ce067 PMD 10165a067 PTE 8000000112bba161 Oops: 0003 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 3 PID: 204 Comm: kworker/u17:0 Not tainted 5.12.1-test+ #1 Hardware name: Dell Inc. XPS 13 9310/0F7M4C, BIOS 1.2.5 12/10/2020 Workqueue: hci0 hci_power_on [bluetooth] RIP: 0010:qca_download_firmware+0x27c/0x4e0 [btqca] Code: 1b 75 04 80 48 0c 01 0f b7 c6 8d 54 02 0c 41 39 d7 0f 8e 62 fe ff ff 48 63 c2 4c 01 e8 0f b7 38 0f b7 70 02 66 83 ff 11 75 d3 <80> 48 0c 80 41 83 fc 03 7e 6e 88 58 0d eb ce 41 0f b6 45 0e 48 8b RSP: 0018:ffffae57c08dfc68 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: ffffae57c0ca503b RBX: 000000000000000e RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000037 RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI: 0000000000000011 RBP: ffff978d9949e000 R08: ffff978d84ed7540 R09: ffffae57c0ca5000 R10: 000000000010cd00 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000005 R13: ffffae57c0ca5004 R14: ffff978d98ca8680 R15: 00000000000016a9 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9794ef6c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffae57c0ca5047 CR3: 0000000113d5a004 CR4: 0000000000770ee0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: qca_uart_setup+0x2cb/0x1390 [btqca] ? qca_read_soc_version+0x136/0x220 [btqca] qca_setup+0x288/0xab0 [hci_uart] hci_dev_do_open+0x1f3/0x780 [bluetooth] ? try_to_wake_up+0x1c1/0x4f0 hci_power_on+0x3f/0x200 [bluetooth] process_one_work+0x1ec/0x380 worker_thread+0x53/0x3e0 ? process_one_work+0x380/0x380 kthread+0x11b/0x140 ? kthread_associate_blkcg+0xa0/0xa0 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 Modules linked in: llc ip_set nf_tables nfnetlink snd_soc_skl_hda_dsp(+) ip6table_filter snd_soc_hdac_hdmi ip6_tables qrtr_mhi iptable_filter snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic s> dell_wmi_sysman(+) dell_smbios snd dcdbas mhi vfat videobuf2_vmalloc i2c_i801 videobuf2_memops videobuf2_v4l2 dell_wmi_descriptor fat wmi_bmof soundcore i2c_smbus videobuf2_common libarc4 mei_me mei hid_se> i2c_hid_acpi i2c_hid video pinctrl_tigerlake fuse CR2: ffffae57c0ca5047 This also seems to fix a failure to suspend due to the firmware download on bootup getting interrupted by the crash: Bluetooth: hci0: SSR or FW download time out PM: dpm_run_callback(): acpi_subsys_suspend+0x0/0x60 returns -110 PM: Device serial0-0 failed to suspend: error -110 PM: Some devices failed to suspend, or early wake event detected Fixes: 83e8196 ("Bluetooth: btqca: Introduce generic QCA ROME support") Cc: Venkata Lakshmi Narayana Gubba <gubbaven@codeaurora.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Connor Abbott <cwabbott0@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
BluezTestBot
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struct firmware::data is marked const, and when the firmware is compressed with xz (default at least with Fedora) it's mapped read-only which results in a crash: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffae57c0ca5047 PGD 100000067 P4D 100000067 PUD 1001ce067 PMD 10165a067 PTE 8000000112bba161 Oops: 0003 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 3 PID: 204 Comm: kworker/u17:0 Not tainted 5.12.1-test+ #1 Hardware name: Dell Inc. XPS 13 9310/0F7M4C, BIOS 1.2.5 12/10/2020 Workqueue: hci0 hci_power_on [bluetooth] RIP: 0010:qca_download_firmware+0x27c/0x4e0 [btqca] Code: 1b 75 04 80 48 0c 01 0f b7 c6 8d 54 02 0c 41 39 d7 0f 8e 62 fe ff ff 48 63 c2 4c 01 e8 0f b7 38 0f b7 70 02 66 83 ff 11 75 d3 <80> 48 0c 80 41 83 fc 03 7e 6e 88 58 0d eb ce 41 0f b6 45 0e 48 8b RSP: 0018:ffffae57c08dfc68 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: ffffae57c0ca503b RBX: 000000000000000e RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000037 RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI: 0000000000000011 RBP: ffff978d9949e000 R08: ffff978d84ed7540 R09: ffffae57c0ca5000 R10: 000000000010cd00 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000005 R13: ffffae57c0ca5004 R14: ffff978d98ca8680 R15: 00000000000016a9 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9794ef6c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffae57c0ca5047 CR3: 0000000113d5a004 CR4: 0000000000770ee0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: qca_uart_setup+0x2cb/0x1390 [btqca] ? qca_read_soc_version+0x136/0x220 [btqca] qca_setup+0x288/0xab0 [hci_uart] hci_dev_do_open+0x1f3/0x780 [bluetooth] ? try_to_wake_up+0x1c1/0x4f0 hci_power_on+0x3f/0x200 [bluetooth] process_one_work+0x1ec/0x380 worker_thread+0x53/0x3e0 ? process_one_work+0x380/0x380 kthread+0x11b/0x140 ? kthread_associate_blkcg+0xa0/0xa0 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 Modules linked in: llc ip_set nf_tables nfnetlink snd_soc_skl_hda_dsp(+) ip6table_filter snd_soc_hdac_hdmi ip6_tables qrtr_mhi iptable_filter snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic s> dell_wmi_sysman(+) dell_smbios snd dcdbas mhi vfat videobuf2_vmalloc i2c_i801 videobuf2_memops videobuf2_v4l2 dell_wmi_descriptor fat wmi_bmof soundcore i2c_smbus videobuf2_common libarc4 mei_me mei hid_se> i2c_hid_acpi i2c_hid video pinctrl_tigerlake fuse CR2: ffffae57c0ca5047 This also seems to fix a failure to suspend due to the firmware download on bootup getting interrupted by the crash: Bluetooth: hci0: SSR or FW download time out PM: dpm_run_callback(): acpi_subsys_suspend+0x0/0x60 returns -110 PM: Device serial0-0 failed to suspend: error -110 PM: Some devices failed to suspend, or early wake event detected Fixes: 83e8196 ("Bluetooth: btqca: Introduce generic QCA ROME support") Cc: Venkata Lakshmi Narayana Gubba <gubbaven@codeaurora.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Connor Abbott <cwabbott0@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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struct firmware::data is marked const, and when the firmware is compressed with xz (default at least with Fedora) it's mapped read-only which results in a crash: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffae57c0ca5047 PGD 100000067 P4D 100000067 PUD 1001ce067 PMD 10165a067 PTE 8000000112bba161 Oops: 0003 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 3 PID: 204 Comm: kworker/u17:0 Not tainted 5.12.1-test+ #1 Hardware name: Dell Inc. XPS 13 9310/0F7M4C, BIOS 1.2.5 12/10/2020 Workqueue: hci0 hci_power_on [bluetooth] RIP: 0010:qca_download_firmware+0x27c/0x4e0 [btqca] Code: 1b 75 04 80 48 0c 01 0f b7 c6 8d 54 02 0c 41 39 d7 0f 8e 62 fe ff ff 48 63 c2 4c 01 e8 0f b7 38 0f b7 70 02 66 83 ff 11 75 d3 <80> 48 0c 80 41 83 fc 03 7e 6e 88 58 0d eb ce 41 0f b6 45 0e 48 8b RSP: 0018:ffffae57c08dfc68 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: ffffae57c0ca503b RBX: 000000000000000e RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000037 RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI: 0000000000000011 RBP: ffff978d9949e000 R08: ffff978d84ed7540 R09: ffffae57c0ca5000 R10: 000000000010cd00 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000005 R13: ffffae57c0ca5004 R14: ffff978d98ca8680 R15: 00000000000016a9 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9794ef6c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffae57c0ca5047 CR3: 0000000113d5a004 CR4: 0000000000770ee0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: qca_uart_setup+0x2cb/0x1390 [btqca] ? qca_read_soc_version+0x136/0x220 [btqca] qca_setup+0x288/0xab0 [hci_uart] hci_dev_do_open+0x1f3/0x780 [bluetooth] ? try_to_wake_up+0x1c1/0x4f0 hci_power_on+0x3f/0x200 [bluetooth] process_one_work+0x1ec/0x380 worker_thread+0x53/0x3e0 ? process_one_work+0x380/0x380 kthread+0x11b/0x140 ? kthread_associate_blkcg+0xa0/0xa0 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 Modules linked in: llc ip_set nf_tables nfnetlink snd_soc_skl_hda_dsp(+) ip6table_filter snd_soc_hdac_hdmi ip6_tables qrtr_mhi iptable_filter snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic s> dell_wmi_sysman(+) dell_smbios snd dcdbas mhi vfat videobuf2_vmalloc i2c_i801 videobuf2_memops videobuf2_v4l2 dell_wmi_descriptor fat wmi_bmof soundcore i2c_smbus videobuf2_common libarc4 mei_me mei hid_se> i2c_hid_acpi i2c_hid video pinctrl_tigerlake fuse CR2: ffffae57c0ca5047 This also seems to fix a failure to suspend due to the firmware download on bootup getting interrupted by the crash: Bluetooth: hci0: SSR or FW download time out PM: dpm_run_callback(): acpi_subsys_suspend+0x0/0x60 returns -110 PM: Device serial0-0 failed to suspend: error -110 PM: Some devices failed to suspend, or early wake event detected Fixes: 83e8196 ("Bluetooth: btqca: Introduce generic QCA ROME support") Cc: Venkata Lakshmi Narayana Gubba <gubbaven@codeaurora.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Connor Abbott <cwabbott0@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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Rfkill block and unblock Intel USB Bluetooth [8087:0026] may make it stops working: [ 509.691509] Bluetooth: hci0: HCI reset during shutdown failed [ 514.897584] Bluetooth: hci0: MSFT filter_enable is already on [ 530.044751] usb 3-10: reset full-speed USB device number 5 using xhci_hcd [ 545.660350] usb 3-10: device descriptor read/64, error -110 [ 561.283530] usb 3-10: device descriptor read/64, error -110 [ 561.519682] usb 3-10: reset full-speed USB device number 5 using xhci_hcd [ 566.686650] Bluetooth: hci0: unexpected event for opcode 0x0500 [ 568.752452] Bluetooth: hci0: urb 0000000096cd309b failed to resubmit (113) [ 578.797955] Bluetooth: hci0: Failed to read MSFT supported features (-110) [ 586.286565] Bluetooth: hci0: urb 00000000c522f633 failed to resubmit (113) [ 596.215302] Bluetooth: hci0: Failed to read MSFT supported features (-110) Or kernel panics because other workqueues already freed skb: [ 2048.663763] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [ 2048.663775] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 2048.663779] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 2048.663782] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 2048.663787] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 2048.663793] CPU: 3 PID: 4491 Comm: rfkill Tainted: G W 5.13.0-rc1-next-20210510+ #20 [ 2048.663799] Hardware name: HP HP EliteBook 850 G8 Notebook PC/8846, BIOS T76 Ver. 01.01.04 12/02/2020 [ 2048.663801] RIP: 0010:__skb_ext_put+0x6/0x50 [ 2048.663814] Code: 8b 1b 48 85 db 75 db 5b 41 5c 5d c3 be 01 00 00 00 e8 de 13 c0 ff eb e7 be 02 00 00 00 e8 d2 13 c0 ff eb db 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 <8b> 07 48 89 e5 83 f8 01 74 14 b8 ff ff ff ff f0 0f c1 07 83 f8 01 [ 2048.663819] RSP: 0018:ffffc1d105b6fd80 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 2048.663824] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9d9ac5649000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 2048.663827] RDX: ffffffffc0d1daf6 RSI: 0000000000000206 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 2048.663830] RBP: ffffc1d105b6fd98 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff9d9ace8ceac0 [ 2048.663834] R10: ffff9d9ace8ceac0 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff9d9ac5649000 [ 2048.663838] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffe0354d650 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 2048.663843] FS: 00007fe02ab19740(0000) GS:ffff9d9e5f8c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 2048.663849] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 2048.663853] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000111a52004 CR4: 0000000000770ee0 [ 2048.663856] PKRU: 55555554 [ 2048.663859] Call Trace: [ 2048.663865] ? skb_release_head_state+0x5e/0x80 [ 2048.663873] kfree_skb+0x2f/0xb0 [ 2048.663881] btusb_shutdown_intel_new+0x36/0x60 [btusb] [ 2048.663905] hci_dev_do_close+0x48c/0x5e0 [bluetooth] [ 2048.663954] ? __cond_resched+0x1a/0x50 [ 2048.663962] hci_rfkill_set_block+0x56/0xa0 [bluetooth] [ 2048.664007] rfkill_set_block+0x98/0x170 [ 2048.664016] rfkill_fop_write+0x136/0x1e0 [ 2048.664022] vfs_write+0xc7/0x260 [ 2048.664030] ksys_write+0xb1/0xe0 [ 2048.664035] ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x37/0x1c0 [ 2048.664042] __x64_sys_write+0x1a/0x20 [ 2048.664048] do_syscall_64+0x40/0xb0 [ 2048.664055] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 2048.664060] RIP: 0033:0x7fe02ac23c27 [ 2048.664066] Code: 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24 18 48 89 74 24 [ 2048.664070] RSP: 002b:00007ffe0354d638 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 [ 2048.664075] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 00007fe02ac23c27 [ 2048.664078] RDX: 0000000000000008 RSI: 00007ffe0354d650 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 2048.664081] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000559b05998440 R09: 0000559b05998440 [ 2048.664084] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000003 [ 2048.664086] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffffff00000000 R15: 00000000ffffffff So move the shutdown callback to a place where workqueues are either flushed or cancelled to resolve the issue. Signed-off-by: Kai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
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When 'nicstar_init_one' fails, 'ns_init_card_error' will be executed for error handling, but the correct memory free function should be used, otherwise it will cause an error. Since 'card->rsq.org' and 'card->tsq.org' are allocated using 'dma_alloc_coherent' function, they should be freed using 'dma_free_coherent'. Fix this by using 'dma_free_coherent' instead of 'kfree' This log reveals it: [ 3.440294] kernel BUG at mm/slub.c:4206! [ 3.441059] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI [ 3.441430] CPU: 2 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.12.4-g70e7f0549188-dirty #141 [ 3.441986] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.12.0-59-gc9ba5276e321-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 3.442780] RIP: 0010:kfree+0x26a/0x300 [ 3.443065] Code: e8 3a c3 b9 ff e9 d6 fd ff ff 49 8b 45 00 31 db a9 00 00 01 00 75 4d 49 8b 45 00 a9 00 00 01 00 75 0a 49 8b 45 08 a8 01 75 02 <0f> 0b 89 d9 b8 00 10 00 00 be 06 00 00 00 48 d3 e0 f7 d8 48 63 d0 [ 3.443396] RSP: 0000:ffffc90000017b70 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 3.443396] RAX: dead000000000100 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 3.443396] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff85d3df94 RDI: ffffffff85df38e6 [ 3.443396] RBP: ffffc90000017b90 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001 [ 3.443396] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff888107dc0000 [ 3.443396] R13: ffffea00001f0100 R14: ffff888101a8bf00 R15: ffff888107dc0160 [ 3.443396] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88817bc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 3.443396] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 3.443396] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000000642e000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 [ 3.443396] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 3.443396] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 3.443396] Call Trace: [ 3.443396] ns_init_card_error+0x12c/0x220 [ 3.443396] nicstar_init_one+0x10d2/0x1130 [ 3.443396] local_pci_probe+0x4a/0xb0 [ 3.443396] pci_device_probe+0x126/0x1d0 [ 3.443396] ? pci_device_remove+0x100/0x100 [ 3.443396] really_probe+0x27e/0x650 [ 3.443396] driver_probe_device+0x84/0x1d0 [ 3.443396] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x16/0x20 [ 3.443396] device_driver_attach+0x63/0x70 [ 3.443396] __driver_attach+0x117/0x1a0 [ 3.443396] ? device_driver_attach+0x70/0x70 [ 3.443396] bus_for_each_dev+0xb6/0x110 [ 3.443396] ? rdinit_setup+0x40/0x40 [ 3.443396] driver_attach+0x22/0x30 [ 3.443396] bus_add_driver+0x1e6/0x2a0 [ 3.443396] driver_register+0xa4/0x180 [ 3.443396] __pci_register_driver+0x77/0x80 [ 3.443396] ? uPD98402_module_init+0xd/0xd [ 3.443396] nicstar_init+0x1f/0x75 [ 3.443396] do_one_initcall+0x7a/0x3d0 [ 3.443396] ? rdinit_setup+0x40/0x40 [ 3.443396] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x4a/0x70 [ 3.443396] kernel_init_freeable+0x2a7/0x2f9 [ 3.443396] ? rest_init+0x2c0/0x2c0 [ 3.443396] kernel_init+0x13/0x180 [ 3.443396] ? rest_init+0x2c0/0x2c0 [ 3.443396] ? rest_init+0x2c0/0x2c0 [ 3.443396] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 3.443396] Modules linked in: [ 3.443396] Dumping ftrace buffer: [ 3.443396] (ftrace buffer empty) [ 3.458593] ---[ end trace 3c6f8f0d8ef59bcd ]--- [ 3.458922] RIP: 0010:kfree+0x26a/0x300 [ 3.459198] Code: e8 3a c3 b9 ff e9 d6 fd ff ff 49 8b 45 00 31 db a9 00 00 01 00 75 4d 49 8b 45 00 a9 00 00 01 00 75 0a 49 8b 45 08 a8 01 75 02 <0f> 0b 89 d9 b8 00 10 00 00 be 06 00 00 00 48 d3 e0 f7 d8 48 63 d0 [ 3.460499] RSP: 0000:ffffc90000017b70 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 3.460870] RAX: dead000000000100 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 3.461371] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff85d3df94 RDI: ffffffff85df38e6 [ 3.461873] RBP: ffffc90000017b90 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001 [ 3.462372] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff888107dc0000 [ 3.462871] R13: ffffea00001f0100 R14: ffff888101a8bf00 R15: ffff888107dc0160 [ 3.463368] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88817bc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 3.463949] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 3.464356] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000000642e000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 [ 3.464856] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 3.465356] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 3.465860] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception [ 3.466370] Dumping ftrace buffer: [ 3.466616] (ftrace buffer empty) [ 3.466871] Kernel Offset: disabled [ 3.467122] Rebooting in 1 seconds.. Signed-off-by: Zheyu Ma <zheyuma97@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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syzbot complained in neigh_reduce(), because rcu_read_lock_bh() is treated differently than rcu_read_lock() WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 5.13.0-rc6-syzkaller #0 Not tainted ----------------------------- include/net/addrconf.h:313 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 3 locks held by kworker/0:0/5: #0: ffff888011064d38 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: arch_atomic64_set arch/x86/include/asm/atomic64_64.h:34 [inline] #0: ffff888011064d38 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: atomic64_set include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h:856 [inline] #0: ffff888011064d38 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: atomic_long_set include/asm-generic/atomic-long.h:41 [inline] #0: ffff888011064d38 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: set_work_data kernel/workqueue.c:617 [inline] #0: ffff888011064d38 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: set_work_pool_and_clear_pending kernel/workqueue.c:644 [inline] #0: ffff888011064d38 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x871/0x1600 kernel/workqueue.c:2247 #1: ffffc90000ca7da8 ((work_completion)(&port->wq)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x8a5/0x1600 kernel/workqueue.c:2251 #2: ffffffff8bf795c0 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x1da/0x3130 net/core/dev.c:4180 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 5 Comm: kworker/0:0 Not tainted 5.13.0-rc6-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Workqueue: events ipvlan_process_multicast Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline] dump_stack+0x141/0x1d7 lib/dump_stack.c:120 __in6_dev_get include/net/addrconf.h:313 [inline] __in6_dev_get include/net/addrconf.h:311 [inline] neigh_reduce drivers/net/vxlan.c:2167 [inline] vxlan_xmit+0x34d5/0x4c30 drivers/net/vxlan.c:2919 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4944 [inline] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4958 [inline] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3654 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x1eb/0x920 net/core/dev.c:3670 __dev_queue_xmit+0x2133/0x3130 net/core/dev.c:4246 ipvlan_process_multicast+0xa99/0xd70 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:287 process_one_work+0x98d/0x1600 kernel/workqueue.c:2276 worker_thread+0x64c/0x1120 kernel/workqueue.c:2422 kthread+0x3b1/0x4a0 kernel/kthread.c:313 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:294 Fixes: f564f45 ("vxlan: add ipv6 proxy support") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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In a future patch, calls to bh_lock_sock in sco.c should be replaced by lock_sock now that none of the functions are run in IRQ context. However, doing so results in a circular locking dependency: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.14.0-rc4-syzkaller #0 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ syz-executor.2/14867 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88803e3c1120 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_SCO){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1613 [inline] ffff88803e3c1120 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_SCO){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: sco_conn_del+0x12a/0x2a0 net/bluetooth/sco.c:191 but task is already holding lock: ffffffff8d2dc7c8 (hci_cb_list_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: hci_disconn_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:1497 [inline] ffffffff8d2dc7c8 (hci_cb_list_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: hci_conn_hash_flush+0xda/0x260 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1608 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (hci_cb_list_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:959 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x12a/0x10a0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1104 hci_connect_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:1482 [inline] hci_remote_features_evt net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:3263 [inline] hci_event_packet+0x2f4d/0x7c50 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:6240 hci_rx_work+0x4f8/0xd30 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:5122 process_one_work+0x98d/0x1630 kernel/workqueue.c:2276 worker_thread+0x658/0x11f0 kernel/workqueue.c:2422 kthread+0x3e5/0x4d0 kernel/kthread.c:319 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:295 -> #1 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:959 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x12a/0x10a0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1104 sco_connect net/bluetooth/sco.c:245 [inline] sco_sock_connect+0x227/0xa10 net/bluetooth/sco.c:601 __sys_connect_file+0x155/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1879 __sys_connect+0x161/0x190 net/socket.c:1896 __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:1906 [inline] __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:1903 [inline] __x64_sys_connect+0x6f/0xb0 net/socket.c:1903 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #0 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_SCO){+.+.}-{0:0}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3051 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3174 [inline] validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3789 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x2a07/0x54a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5015 lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5625 [inline] lock_acquire+0x1ab/0x510 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5590 lock_sock_nested+0xca/0x120 net/core/sock.c:3170 lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1613 [inline] sco_conn_del+0x12a/0x2a0 net/bluetooth/sco.c:191 sco_disconn_cfm+0x71/0xb0 net/bluetooth/sco.c:1202 hci_disconn_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:1500 [inline] hci_conn_hash_flush+0x127/0x260 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1608 hci_dev_do_close+0x528/0x1130 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:1778 hci_unregister_dev+0x1c0/0x5a0 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4015 vhci_release+0x70/0xe0 drivers/bluetooth/hci_vhci.c:340 __fput+0x288/0x920 fs/file_table.c:280 task_work_run+0xdd/0x1a0 kernel/task_work.c:164 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:32 [inline] do_exit+0xbd4/0x2a60 kernel/exit.c:825 do_group_exit+0x125/0x310 kernel/exit.c:922 get_signal+0x47f/0x2160 kernel/signal.c:2808 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x2a9/0x1c40 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:865 handle_signal_work kernel/entry/common.c:148 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:172 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x17d/0x290 kernel/entry/common.c:209 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:291 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x19/0x60 kernel/entry/common.c:302 ret_from_fork+0x15/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:288 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_SCO --> &hdev->lock --> hci_cb_list_lock Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(hci_cb_list_lock); lock(&hdev->lock); lock(hci_cb_list_lock); lock(sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_SCO); *** DEADLOCK *** The issue is that the lock hierarchy should go from &hdev->lock --> hci_cb_list_lock --> sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_SCO. For example, one such call trace is: hci_dev_do_close(): hci_dev_lock(); hci_conn_hash_flush(): hci_disconn_cfm(): mutex_lock(&hci_cb_list_lock); sco_disconn_cfm(): sco_conn_del(): lock_sock(sk); However, in sco_sock_connect, we call lock_sock before calling hci_dev_lock inside sco_connect, thus inverting the lock hierarchy. We fix this by pulling the call to hci_dev_lock out from sco_connect. Signed-off-by: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi <desmondcheongzx@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
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We use inline_dentry which requires to allocate dentry page when adding a link. If we allow to reclaim memory from filesystem, we do down_read(&sbi->cp_rwsem) twice by f2fs_lock_op(). I think this should be okay, but how about stopping the lockdep complaint [1]? f2fs_create() - f2fs_lock_op() - f2fs_do_add_link() - __f2fs_find_entry - f2fs_get_read_data_page() -> kswapd - shrink_node - f2fs_evict_inode - f2fs_lock_op() [1] fs_reclaim ){+.+.}-{0:0} : kswapd0: lock_acquire+0x114/0x394 kswapd0: __fs_reclaim_acquire+0x40/0x50 kswapd0: prepare_alloc_pages+0x94/0x1ec kswapd0: __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x78/0x1b0 kswapd0: pagecache_get_page+0x2e0/0x57c kswapd0: f2fs_get_read_data_page+0xc0/0x394 kswapd0: f2fs_find_data_page+0xa4/0x23c kswapd0: find_in_level+0x1a8/0x36c kswapd0: __f2fs_find_entry+0x70/0x100 kswapd0: f2fs_do_add_link+0x84/0x1ec kswapd0: f2fs_mkdir+0xe4/0x1e4 kswapd0: vfs_mkdir+0x110/0x1c0 kswapd0: do_mkdirat+0xa4/0x160 kswapd0: __arm64_sys_mkdirat+0x24/0x34 kswapd0: el0_svc_common.llvm.17258447499513131576+0xc4/0x1e8 kswapd0: do_el0_svc+0x28/0xa0 kswapd0: el0_svc+0x24/0x38 kswapd0: el0_sync_handler+0x88/0xec kswapd0: el0_sync+0x1c0/0x200 kswapd0: -> #1 ( &sbi->cp_rwsem ){++++}-{3:3} : kswapd0: lock_acquire+0x114/0x394 kswapd0: down_read+0x7c/0x98 kswapd0: f2fs_do_truncate_blocks+0x78/0x3dc kswapd0: f2fs_truncate+0xc8/0x128 kswapd0: f2fs_evict_inode+0x2b8/0x8b8 kswapd0: evict+0xd4/0x2f8 kswapd0: iput+0x1c0/0x258 kswapd0: do_unlinkat+0x170/0x2a0 kswapd0: __arm64_sys_unlinkat+0x4c/0x68 kswapd0: el0_svc_common.llvm.17258447499513131576+0xc4/0x1e8 kswapd0: do_el0_svc+0x28/0xa0 kswapd0: el0_svc+0x24/0x38 kswapd0: el0_sync_handler+0x88/0xec kswapd0: el0_sync+0x1c0/0x200 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: bdbc90f ("f2fs: don't put dentry page in pagecache into highmem") Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Stanley Chu <stanley.chu@mediatek.com> Reviewed-by: Light Hsieh <light.hsieh@mediatek.com> Tested-by: Light Hsieh <light.hsieh@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
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…/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into kvm-master KVM/arm64 fixes for 5.16, take #1 - Fix the host S2 finalization by solely iterating over the memblocks instead of the whole IPA space - Tighten the return value of kvm_vcpu_preferred_target() now that 32bit support is long gone - Make sure the extraction of ESR_ELx.EC is limited to the architected bits - Comment fixups
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kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com> writes[1]: > > Greeting, > > FYI, we noticed the following commit (built with gcc-9): > > commit: 1a4d21a ("signal/vm86_32: Replace open coded BUG_ON with an actual BUG_ON") > https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git master > > in testcase: trinity > version: trinity-static-i386-x86_64-1c734c75-1_2020-01-06 > with following parameters: > > > [ 70.645554][ T3747] kernel BUG at arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c:109! > [ 70.646185][ T3747] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP > [ 70.646682][ T3747] CPU: 0 PID: 3747 Comm: trinity-c6 Not tainted 5.15.0-rc1-00009-g1a4d21a23c4c #1 > [ 70.647598][ T3747] EIP: save_v86_state (arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c:109 (discriminator 3)) > [ 70.648113][ T3747] Code: 89 c3 64 8b 35 60 b8 25 c2 83 ec 08 89 55 f0 8b 96 10 19 00 00 89 55 ec e8 c6 2d 0c 00 fb 8b 55 ec 85 d2 74 05 83 3a 00 75 02 <0f> 0b 8b 86 10 19 00 00 8b 4b 38 8b 78 48 31 cf 89 f8 8b 7a 4c 81 > [ 70.650136][ T3747] EAX: 00000001 EBX: f5f49fac ECX: 0000000b EDX: f610b600 > [ 70.650852][ T3747] ESI: f5f79cc0 EDI: f5f79cc0 EBP: f5f49f04 ESP: f5f49ef0 > [ 70.651593][ T3747] DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0000 SS: 0068 EFLAGS: 00010246 > [ 70.652413][ T3747] CR0: 80050033 CR2: 00004000 CR3: 35fc7000 CR4: 000406d0 > [ 70.653169][ T3747] DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000 > [ 70.653897][ T3747] DR6: fffe0ff0 DR7: 00000400 > [ 70.654382][ T3747] Call Trace: > [ 70.654719][ T3747] arch_do_signal_or_restart (arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:792 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:867) > [ 70.655288][ T3747] exit_to_user_mode_prepare (kernel/entry/common.c:174 kernel/entry/common.c:209) > [ 70.655854][ T3747] irqentry_exit_to_user_mode (kernel/entry/common.c:126 kernel/entry/common.c:317) > [ 70.656450][ T3747] irqentry_exit (kernel/entry/common.c:406) > [ 70.656897][ T3747] exc_page_fault (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1535) > [ 70.657369][ T3747] ? sysvec_kvm_asyncpf_interrupt (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1488) > [ 70.657989][ T3747] handle_exception (arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S:1085) vm86_32.c:109 is: "BUG_ON(!vm86 || !vm86->user_vm86)" When trying to understand the failure Brian Gerst pointed out[2] that the code does not need protection against vm86->user_vm86 being NULL. The copy_from_user code will already handles that case if the address is going to fault. Looking futher I realized that if we care about not allowing struct vm86plus_struct at address 0 it should be do_sys_vm86 (the system call) that does the filtering. Not way down deep when the emulation has completed in save_v86_state. So let's just remove the silly case of attempting to filter a userspace address with a BUG_ON. Existing userspace can't break and it won't make the kernel any more attackable as the userspace access helpers will handle it, if it isn't a good userspace pointer. I have run the reproducer the fuzzer gave me before I made this change and it reproduced, and after I made this change and I have not seen the reported failure. So it does looks like this fixes the reported issue. [1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211112074030.GB19820@xsang-OptiPlex-9020 [2] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAMzpN2jkK5sAv-Kg_kVnCEyVySiqeTdUORcC=AdG1gV6r8nUew@mail.gmail.com Suggested-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com> Tested-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
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The exit function fixes a memory leak with the src field as detected by leak sanitizer. An example of which is: Indirect leak of 25133184 byte(s) in 207 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f199ecfe987 in __interceptor_calloc libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154 #1 0x55defe638224 in annotated_source__alloc_histograms util/annotate.c:803 #2 0x55defe6397e4 in symbol__hists util/annotate.c:952 #3 0x55defe639908 in symbol__inc_addr_samples util/annotate.c:968 #4 0x55defe63aa29 in hist_entry__inc_addr_samples util/annotate.c:1119 #5 0x55defe499a79 in hist_iter__report_callback tools/perf/builtin-report.c:182 #6 0x55defe7a859d in hist_entry_iter__add util/hist.c:1236 #7 0x55defe49aa63 in process_sample_event tools/perf/builtin-report.c:315 #8 0x55defe731bc8 in evlist__deliver_sample util/session.c:1473 #9 0x55defe731e38 in machines__deliver_event util/session.c:1510 #10 0x55defe732a23 in perf_session__deliver_event util/session.c:1590 #11 0x55defe72951e in ordered_events__deliver_event util/session.c:183 #12 0x55defe740082 in do_flush util/ordered-events.c:244 #13 0x55defe7407cb in __ordered_events__flush util/ordered-events.c:323 #14 0x55defe740a61 in ordered_events__flush util/ordered-events.c:341 #15 0x55defe73837f in __perf_session__process_events util/session.c:2390 #16 0x55defe7385ff in perf_session__process_events util/session.c:2420 ... Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Acked-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Kajol Jain <kjain@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Martin Liška <mliska@suse.cz> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211112035124.94327-3-irogers@google.com Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
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…fails Check for a valid hv_vp_index array prior to derefencing hv_vp_index when setting Hyper-V's TSC change callback. If Hyper-V setup failed in hyperv_init(), the kernel will still report that it's running under Hyper-V, but will have silently disabled nearly all functionality. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000010 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU: 4 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.15.0-rc2+ #75 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:set_hv_tscchange_cb+0x15/0xa0 Code: <8b> 04 82 8b 15 12 17 85 01 48 c1 e0 20 48 0d ee 00 01 00 f6 c6 08 ... Call Trace: kvm_arch_init+0x17c/0x280 kvm_init+0x31/0x330 vmx_init+0xba/0x13a do_one_initcall+0x41/0x1c0 kernel_init_freeable+0x1f2/0x23b kernel_init+0x16/0x120 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 Fixes: 9328626 ("x86/hyperv: Reenlightenment notifications support") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211104182239.1302956-2-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
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This bug report shows up when running our research tools. The reports is SOOB read, but it seems SOOB write is also possible a few lines below. In details, fw.len and sw.len are inputs coming from io. A len over the size of self->rpc triggers SOOB. The patch fixes the bugs by adding sanity checks. The bugs are triggerable with compromised/malfunctioning devices. They are potentially exploitable given they first leak up to 0xffff bytes and able to overwrite the region later. The patch is tested with QEMU emulater. This is NOT tested with a real device. Attached is the log we found by fuzzing. BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in hw_atl_utils_fw_upload_dwords+0x393/0x3c0 [atlantic] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888016260b08 by task modprobe/213 CPU: 0 PID: 213 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 5.6.0 #1 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x76/0xa0 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x16/0x200 ? hw_atl_utils_fw_upload_dwords+0x393/0x3c0 [atlantic] ? hw_atl_utils_fw_upload_dwords+0x393/0x3c0 [atlantic] __kasan_report.cold+0x37/0x7c ? aq_hw_read_reg_bit+0x60/0x70 [atlantic] ? hw_atl_utils_fw_upload_dwords+0x393/0x3c0 [atlantic] kasan_report+0xe/0x20 hw_atl_utils_fw_upload_dwords+0x393/0x3c0 [atlantic] hw_atl_utils_fw_rpc_call+0x95/0x130 [atlantic] hw_atl_utils_fw_rpc_wait+0x176/0x210 [atlantic] hw_atl_utils_mpi_create+0x229/0x2e0 [atlantic] ? hw_atl_utils_fw_rpc_wait+0x210/0x210 [atlantic] ? hw_atl_utils_initfw+0x9f/0x1c8 [atlantic] hw_atl_utils_initfw+0x12a/0x1c8 [atlantic] aq_nic_ndev_register+0x88/0x650 [atlantic] ? aq_nic_ndev_init+0x235/0x3c0 [atlantic] aq_pci_probe+0x731/0x9b0 [atlantic] ? aq_pci_func_init+0xc0/0xc0 [atlantic] local_pci_probe+0xd3/0x160 pci_device_probe+0x23f/0x3e0 Reported-by: Brendan Dolan-Gavitt <brendandg@nyu.edu> Signed-off-by: Zekun Shen <bruceshenzk@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Use of bpf_ktime_get_coarse_ns() and bpf_timer_* helpers in tracing progs may result in locking issues. bpf_ktime_get_coarse_ns() uses ktime_get_coarse_ns() time accessor that isn't safe for any context: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.15.0-syzkaller #0 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ syz-executor.4/14877 is trying to acquire lock: ffffffff8cb30008 (tk_core.seq.seqcount){----}-{0:0}, at: ktime_get_coarse_ts64+0x25/0x110 kernel/time/timekeeping.c:2255 but task is already holding lock: ffffffff90dbf200 (&obj_hash[i].lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: debug_object_deactivate+0x61/0x400 lib/debugobjects.c:735 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&obj_hash[i].lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: lock_acquire+0x19f/0x4d0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5625 __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xd1/0x120 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162 __debug_object_init+0xd9/0x1860 lib/debugobjects.c:569 debug_hrtimer_init kernel/time/hrtimer.c:414 [inline] debug_init kernel/time/hrtimer.c:468 [inline] hrtimer_init+0x20/0x40 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1592 ntp_init_cmos_sync kernel/time/ntp.c:676 [inline] ntp_init+0xa1/0xad kernel/time/ntp.c:1095 timekeeping_init+0x512/0x6bf kernel/time/timekeeping.c:1639 start_kernel+0x267/0x56e init/main.c:1030 secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xb1/0xbb -> #0 (tk_core.seq.seqcount){----}-{0:0}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3051 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3174 [inline] validate_chain+0x1dfb/0x8240 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3789 __lock_acquire+0x1382/0x2b00 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5015 lock_acquire+0x19f/0x4d0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5625 seqcount_lockdep_reader_access+0xfe/0x230 include/linux/seqlock.h:103 ktime_get_coarse_ts64+0x25/0x110 kernel/time/timekeeping.c:2255 ktime_get_coarse include/linux/timekeeping.h:120 [inline] ktime_get_coarse_ns include/linux/timekeeping.h:126 [inline] ____bpf_ktime_get_coarse_ns kernel/bpf/helpers.c:173 [inline] bpf_ktime_get_coarse_ns+0x7e/0x130 kernel/bpf/helpers.c:171 bpf_prog_a99735ebafdda2f1+0x10/0xb50 bpf_dispatcher_nop_func include/linux/bpf.h:721 [inline] __bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:626 [inline] bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:633 [inline] BPF_PROG_RUN_ARRAY include/linux/bpf.h:1294 [inline] trace_call_bpf+0x2cf/0x5d0 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:127 perf_trace_run_bpf_submit+0x7b/0x1d0 kernel/events/core.c:9708 perf_trace_lock+0x37c/0x440 include/trace/events/lock.h:39 trace_lock_release+0x128/0x150 include/trace/events/lock.h:58 lock_release+0x82/0x810 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5636 __raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:149 [inline] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x75/0x130 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:194 debug_hrtimer_deactivate kernel/time/hrtimer.c:425 [inline] debug_deactivate kernel/time/hrtimer.c:481 [inline] __run_hrtimer kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1653 [inline] __hrtimer_run_queues+0x2f9/0xa60 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1749 hrtimer_interrupt+0x3b3/0x1040 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1811 local_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1086 [inline] __sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xf9/0x270 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1103 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x8c/0xb0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1097 asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x12/0x20 __raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:152 [inline] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0xd4/0x130 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:194 try_to_wake_up+0x702/0xd20 kernel/sched/core.c:4118 wake_up_process kernel/sched/core.c:4200 [inline] wake_up_q+0x9a/0xf0 kernel/sched/core.c:953 futex_wake+0x50f/0x5b0 kernel/futex/waitwake.c:184 do_futex+0x367/0x560 kernel/futex/syscalls.c:127 __do_sys_futex kernel/futex/syscalls.c:199 [inline] __se_sys_futex+0x401/0x4b0 kernel/futex/syscalls.c:180 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae There is a possible deadlock with bpf_timer_* set of helpers: hrtimer_start() lock_base(); trace_hrtimer...() perf_event() bpf_run() bpf_timer_start() hrtimer_start() lock_base() <- DEADLOCK Forbid use of bpf_ktime_get_coarse_ns() and bpf_timer_* helpers in BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE, BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT, BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT and BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT prog types. Fixes: d055126 ("bpf: Add bpf_ktime_get_coarse_ns helper") Fixes: b00628b ("bpf: Introduce bpf timers.") Reported-by: syzbot+43fd005b5a1b4d10781e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Dmitrii Banshchikov <me@ubique.spb.ru> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20211113142227.566439-2-me@ubique.spb.ru
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[BUG] The following script can cause btrfs to crash: $ mount -o compress-force=lzo $DEV /mnt $ dd if=/dev/urandom of=/mnt/foo bs=4k count=1 $ sync The call trace looks like this: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xe04b37fccce3b000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 5 PID: 164 Comm: kworker/u20:3 Not tainted 5.15.0-rc7-custom+ #4 Workqueue: btrfs-delalloc btrfs_work_helper [btrfs] RIP: 0010:__memcpy+0x12/0x20 Call Trace: lzo_compress_pages+0x236/0x540 [btrfs] btrfs_compress_pages+0xaa/0xf0 [btrfs] compress_file_range+0x431/0x8e0 [btrfs] async_cow_start+0x12/0x30 [btrfs] btrfs_work_helper+0xf6/0x3e0 [btrfs] process_one_work+0x294/0x5d0 worker_thread+0x55/0x3c0 kthread+0x140/0x170 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 ---[ end trace 63c3c0f131e61982 ]--- [CAUSE] In lzo_compress_pages(), parameter @out_pages is not only an output parameter (for the number of compressed pages), but also an input parameter, as the upper limit of compressed pages we can utilize. In commit d408880 ("btrfs: subpage: make lzo_compress_pages() compatible"), the refactoring doesn't take @out_pages as an input, thus completely ignoring the limit. And for compress-force case, we could hit incompressible data that compressed size would go beyond the page limit, and cause the above crash. [FIX] Save @out_pages as @max_nr_page, and pass it to lzo_compress_pages(), and check if we're beyond the limit before accessing the pages. Note: this also fixes crash on 32bit architectures that was suspected to be caused by merge of btrfs patches to 5.16-rc1. Reported in https://lore.kernel.org/all/20211104115001.GU20319@twin.jikos.cz/ . Reported-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com> Fixes: d408880 ("btrfs: subpage: make lzo_compress_pages() compatible") Reviewed-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> [ add note ] Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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Often some test cases like btrfs/161 trigger lockdep splats that complain about possible unsafe lock scenario due to the fact that during mount, when reading the chunk tree we end up calling blkdev_get_by_path() while holding a read lock on a leaf of the chunk tree. That produces a lockdep splat like the following: [ 3653.683975] ====================================================== [ 3653.685148] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 3653.686301] 5.15.0-rc7-btrfs-next-103 #1 Not tainted [ 3653.687239] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 3653.688400] mount/447465 is trying to acquire lock: [ 3653.689320] ffff8c6b0c76e528 (&disk->open_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: blkdev_get_by_dev.part.0+0xe7/0x320 [ 3653.691054] but task is already holding lock: [ 3653.692155] ffff8c6b0a9f39e0 (btrfs-chunk-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x24/0x110 [btrfs] [ 3653.693978] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 3653.695510] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 3653.696915] -> #3 (btrfs-chunk-00){++++}-{3:3}: [ 3653.698053] down_read_nested+0x4b/0x140 [ 3653.698893] __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x24/0x110 [btrfs] [ 3653.699988] btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x31/0x40 [btrfs] [ 3653.701205] btrfs_search_slot+0x537/0xc00 [btrfs] [ 3653.702234] btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x32/0x70 [btrfs] [ 3653.703332] btrfs_init_new_device+0x563/0x15b0 [btrfs] [ 3653.704439] btrfs_ioctl+0x2110/0x3530 [btrfs] [ 3653.705405] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0 [ 3653.706215] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 [ 3653.706990] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 3653.708040] -> #2 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}: [ 3653.708994] lock_release+0x13d/0x4a0 [ 3653.709533] up_write+0x18/0x160 [ 3653.710017] btrfs_sync_file+0x3f3/0x5b0 [btrfs] [ 3653.710699] __loop_update_dio+0xbd/0x170 [loop] [ 3653.711360] lo_ioctl+0x3b1/0x8a0 [loop] [ 3653.711929] block_ioctl+0x48/0x50 [ 3653.712442] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0 [ 3653.712991] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 [ 3653.713519] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 3653.714233] -> #1 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 3653.715026] __mutex_lock+0x92/0x900 [ 3653.715648] lo_open+0x28/0x60 [loop] [ 3653.716275] blkdev_get_whole+0x28/0x90 [ 3653.716867] blkdev_get_by_dev.part.0+0x142/0x320 [ 3653.717537] blkdev_open+0x5e/0xa0 [ 3653.718043] do_dentry_open+0x163/0x390 [ 3653.718604] path_openat+0x3f0/0xa80 [ 3653.719128] do_filp_open+0xa9/0x150 [ 3653.719652] do_sys_openat2+0x97/0x160 [ 3653.720197] __x64_sys_openat+0x54/0x90 [ 3653.720766] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 [ 3653.721285] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 3653.721986] -> #0 (&disk->open_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 3653.722775] __lock_acquire+0x130e/0x2210 [ 3653.723348] lock_acquire+0xd7/0x310 [ 3653.723867] __mutex_lock+0x92/0x900 [ 3653.724394] blkdev_get_by_dev.part.0+0xe7/0x320 [ 3653.725041] blkdev_get_by_path+0xb8/0xd0 [ 3653.725614] btrfs_get_bdev_and_sb+0x1b/0xb0 [btrfs] [ 3653.726332] open_fs_devices+0xd7/0x2c0 [btrfs] [ 3653.726999] btrfs_read_chunk_tree+0x3ad/0x870 [btrfs] [ 3653.727739] open_ctree+0xb8e/0x17bf [btrfs] [ 3653.728384] btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x12/0xde [btrfs] [ 3653.729130] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 [ 3653.729676] vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 [ 3653.730192] vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0xb0 [ 3653.730800] btrfs_mount+0x11d/0x3a0 [btrfs] [ 3653.731427] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 [ 3653.731970] vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 [ 3653.732486] path_mount+0x2d4/0xbe0 [ 3653.732997] __x64_sys_mount+0x103/0x140 [ 3653.733560] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 [ 3653.734080] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 3653.734782] other info that might help us debug this: [ 3653.735784] Chain exists of: &disk->open_mutex --> sb_internal#2 --> btrfs-chunk-00 [ 3653.737123] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 3653.737865] CPU0 CPU1 [ 3653.738435] ---- ---- [ 3653.739007] lock(btrfs-chunk-00); [ 3653.739449] lock(sb_internal#2); [ 3653.740193] lock(btrfs-chunk-00); [ 3653.740955] lock(&disk->open_mutex); [ 3653.741431] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 3653.742176] 3 locks held by mount/447465: [ 3653.742739] #0: ffff8c6acf85c0e8 (&type->s_umount_key#44/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: alloc_super+0xd5/0x3b0 [ 3653.744114] #1: ffffffffc0b28f70 (uuid_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_read_chunk_tree+0x59/0x870 [btrfs] [ 3653.745563] #2: ffff8c6b0a9f39e0 (btrfs-chunk-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x24/0x110 [btrfs] [ 3653.747066] stack backtrace: [ 3653.747723] CPU: 4 PID: 447465 Comm: mount Not tainted 5.15.0-rc7-btrfs-next-103 #1 [ 3653.748873] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 3653.750592] Call Trace: [ 3653.750967] dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x72 [ 3653.751526] check_noncircular+0xf3/0x110 [ 3653.752136] ? stack_trace_save+0x4b/0x70 [ 3653.752748] __lock_acquire+0x130e/0x2210 [ 3653.753356] lock_acquire+0xd7/0x310 [ 3653.753898] ? blkdev_get_by_dev.part.0+0xe7/0x320 [ 3653.754596] ? lock_is_held_type+0xe8/0x140 [ 3653.755125] ? blkdev_get_by_dev.part.0+0xe7/0x320 [ 3653.755729] ? blkdev_get_by_dev.part.0+0xe7/0x320 [ 3653.756338] __mutex_lock+0x92/0x900 [ 3653.756794] ? blkdev_get_by_dev.part.0+0xe7/0x320 [ 3653.757400] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x4b/0xa0 [ 3653.757930] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x29/0x40 [ 3653.758437] ? bd_prepare_to_claim+0x129/0x150 [ 3653.758999] ? trace_module_get+0x2b/0xd0 [ 3653.759508] ? try_module_get.part.0+0x50/0x80 [ 3653.760072] blkdev_get_by_dev.part.0+0xe7/0x320 [ 3653.760661] ? devcgroup_check_permission+0xc1/0x1f0 [ 3653.761288] blkdev_get_by_path+0xb8/0xd0 [ 3653.761797] btrfs_get_bdev_and_sb+0x1b/0xb0 [btrfs] [ 3653.762454] open_fs_devices+0xd7/0x2c0 [btrfs] [ 3653.763055] ? clone_fs_devices+0x8f/0x170 [btrfs] [ 3653.763689] btrfs_read_chunk_tree+0x3ad/0x870 [btrfs] [ 3653.764370] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x14/0x40 [ 3653.764922] open_ctree+0xb8e/0x17bf [btrfs] [ 3653.765493] ? super_setup_bdi_name+0x79/0xd0 [ 3653.766043] btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x12/0xde [btrfs] [ 3653.766780] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x80 [ 3653.767488] ? kfree+0x1f2/0x3c0 [ 3653.767979] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 [ 3653.768548] vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 [ 3653.769076] vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0xb0 [ 3653.769718] btrfs_mount+0x11d/0x3a0 [btrfs] [ 3653.770381] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x80 [ 3653.771086] ? kfree+0x1f2/0x3c0 [ 3653.771574] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 [ 3653.772136] vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 [ 3653.772673] path_mount+0x2d4/0xbe0 [ 3653.773201] __x64_sys_mount+0x103/0x140 [ 3653.773793] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 [ 3653.774333] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 3653.775094] RIP: 0033:0x7f648bc45aaa This happens because through btrfs_read_chunk_tree(), which is called only during mount, ends up acquiring the mutex open_mutex of a block device while holding a read lock on a leaf of the chunk tree while other paths need to acquire other locks before locking extent buffers of the chunk tree. Since at mount time when we call btrfs_read_chunk_tree() we know that we don't have other tasks running in parallel and modifying the chunk tree, we can simply skip locking of chunk tree extent buffers. So do that and move the assertion that checks the fs is not yet mounted to the top block of btrfs_read_chunk_tree(), with a comment before doing it. Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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When a disk has write caching disabled, we skip submission of a bio with flush and sync requests before writing the superblock, since it's not needed. However when the integrity checker is enabled, this results in reports that there are metadata blocks referred by a superblock that were not properly flushed. So don't skip the bio submission only when the integrity checker is enabled for the sake of simplicity, since this is a debug tool and not meant for use in non-debug builds. fstests/btrfs/220 trigger a check-integrity warning like the following when CONFIG_BTRFS_FS_CHECK_INTEGRITY=y and the disk with WCE=0. btrfs: attempt to write superblock which references block M @5242880 (sdb2/5242880/0) which is not flushed out of disk's write cache (block flush_gen=1, dev->flush_gen=0)! ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 28 PID: 843680 at fs/btrfs/check-integrity.c:2196 btrfsic_process_written_superblock+0x22a/0x2a0 [btrfs] CPU: 28 PID: 843680 Comm: umount Not tainted 5.15.0-0.rc5.39.el8.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: Dell Inc. Precision T7610/0NK70N, BIOS A18 09/11/2019 RIP: 0010:btrfsic_process_written_superblock+0x22a/0x2a0 [btrfs] RSP: 0018:ffffb642afb47940 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 00000000ffffffff RSI: ffff8b722fc97d00 RDI: ffff8b722fc97d00 RBP: ffff8b5601c00000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: c0000000ffff7fff R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffb642afb476f8 R12: ffffffffffffffff R13: ffffb642afb47974 R14: ffff8b5499254c00 R15: 0000000000000003 FS: 00007f00a06d4080(0000) GS:ffff8b722fc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fff5cff5ff0 CR3: 00000001c0c2a006 CR4: 00000000001706e0 Call Trace: btrfsic_process_written_block+0x2f7/0x850 [btrfs] __btrfsic_submit_bio.part.19+0x310/0x330 [btrfs] ? bio_associate_blkg_from_css+0xa4/0x2c0 btrfsic_submit_bio+0x18/0x30 [btrfs] write_dev_supers+0x81/0x2a0 [btrfs] ? find_get_pages_range_tag+0x219/0x280 ? pagevec_lookup_range_tag+0x24/0x30 ? __filemap_fdatawait_range+0x6d/0xf0 ? __raw_callee_save___native_queued_spin_unlock+0x11/0x1e ? find_first_extent_bit+0x9b/0x160 [btrfs] ? __raw_callee_save___native_queued_spin_unlock+0x11/0x1e write_all_supers+0x1b3/0xa70 [btrfs] ? __raw_callee_save___native_queued_spin_unlock+0x11/0x1e btrfs_commit_transaction+0x59d/0xac0 [btrfs] close_ctree+0x11d/0x339 [btrfs] generic_shutdown_super+0x71/0x110 kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 [btrfs] deactivate_locked_super+0x31/0x70 cleanup_mnt+0xb8/0x140 task_work_run+0x6d/0xb0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1f0/0x200 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x12/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x46/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f009f711dfb RSP: 002b:00007fff5cff7928 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a6 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 000055b68c6c9970 RCX: 00007f009f711dfb RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 000055b68c6c9b50 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 000055b68c6ca900 R09: 00007f009f795580 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055b68c6c9b50 R13: 00007f00a04bf184 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00000000ffffffff ---[ end trace 2c4b82abcef9eec4 ]--- S-65536(sdb2/65536/1) --> M-1064960(sdb2/1064960/1) Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Wang Yugui <wangyugui@e16-tech.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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Prior to this patch in case mlx5_core_destroy_cq() failed it proceeds to rest of destroy operations. mlx5_core_destroy_cq() could be called again by user and cause additional call of mlx5_debug_cq_remove(). cq->dbg was not nullify in previous call and cause the crash. Fix it by nullify cq->dbg pointer after removal. Also proceed to destroy operations only if FW return 0 for MLX5_CMD_OP_DESTROY_CQ command. general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x2000300004058: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 5 PID: 1228 Comm: python Not tainted 5.15.0-rc5_for_upstream_min_debug_2021_10_14_11_06 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:lockref_get+0x1/0x60 Code: 5d e9 53 ff ff ff 48 8d 7f 70 e8 0a 2e 48 00 c7 85 d0 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 c6 45 70 00 fb 5d c3 c3 cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc 53 <48> 8b 17 48 89 fb 85 d2 75 3d 48 89 d0 bf 64 00 00 00 48 89 c1 48 RSP: 0018:ffff888137dd7a38 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888107d5f458 RCX: 00000000fffffffe RDX: 000000000002c2b0 RSI: ffffffff8155e2e0 RDI: 0002000300004058 RBP: ffff888137dd7a88 R08: 0002000300004058 R09: ffff8881144a9f88 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8881141d4000 R13: ffff888137dd7c68 R14: ffff888137dd7d58 R15: ffff888137dd7cc0 FS: 00007f4644f2a4c0(0000) GS:ffff8887a2d40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000055b4500f4380 CR3: 0000000114f7a003 CR4: 0000000000170ea0 Call Trace: simple_recursive_removal+0x33/0x2e0 ? debugfs_remove+0x60/0x60 debugfs_remove+0x40/0x60 mlx5_debug_cq_remove+0x32/0x70 [mlx5_core] mlx5_core_destroy_cq+0x41/0x1d0 [mlx5_core] devx_obj_cleanup+0x151/0x330 [mlx5_ib] ? __pollwait+0xd0/0xd0 ? xas_load+0x5/0x70 ? xa_load+0x62/0xa0 destroy_hw_idr_uobject+0x20/0x80 [ib_uverbs] uverbs_destroy_uobject+0x3b/0x360 [ib_uverbs] uobj_destroy+0x54/0xa0 [ib_uverbs] ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs+0xaf2/0x1160 [ib_uverbs] ? uverbs_finalize_object+0xd0/0xd0 [ib_uverbs] ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xc4/0x1b0 [ib_uverbs] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x3e4/0x8e0 Fixes: 94b960b ("net/mlx5e: Fix memory leak in mlx5_core_destroy_cq() error path") Signed-off-by: Valentine Fatiev <valentinef@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com>
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Ido Schimmel says: ==================== mlxsw: Various updates Patch #1 removes deadcode reported by Coverity. Patch #2 adds a shutdown method in the PCI driver to ensure the kexeced kernel starts working with a device that is in a sane state. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Tony Lu says: ==================== net/smc: Improvements for TCP_CORK and sendfile() Currently, SMC use default implement for syscall sendfile() [1], which is wildly used in nginx and big data sences. Usually, applications use sendfile() with TCP_CORK: fstat(20, {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=4096, ...}) = 0 setsockopt(19, SOL_TCP, TCP_CORK, [1], 4) = 0 writev(19, [{iov_base="HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\nServer: nginx/1"..., iov_len=240}], 1) = 240 sendfile(19, 20, [0] => [4096], 4096) = 4096 close(20) = 0 setsockopt(19, SOL_TCP, TCP_CORK, [0], 4) = 0 The above is an example of Nginx, when sendfile() on, Nginx first enables TCP_CORK, write headers, the data will not be sent. Then call sendfile(), it reads file and write to sndbuf. When TCP_CORK is cleared, all pending data is sent out. The performance of the default implement of sendfile is lower than when it is off. After investigation, it shows two parts to improve: - unnecessary lock contention of delayed work - less data per send than when sendfile off Patch #1 tries to reduce lock_sock() contention in smc_tx_work(). Patch #2 removes timed work for corking, and let applications control it. See TCP_CORK [2] MSG_MORE [3]. Patch #3 adds MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST for corking more data when sendfile(). Test environments: - CPU Intel Xeon Platinum 8 core, mem 32 GiB, nic Mellanox CX4 - socket sndbuf / rcvbuf: 16384 / 131072 bytes - server: smc_run nginx - client: smc_run ./wrk -c 100 -t 2 -d 30 http://192.168.100.1:8080/4k.html - payload: 4KB local disk file Items QPS sendfile off 272477.10 sendfile on (orig) 223622.79 sendfile on (this) 395847.21 This benchmark shows +45.28% improvement compared with sendfile off, and +77.02% compared with original sendfile implement. [1] https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/sendfile.2.html [2] https://linux.die.net/man/7/tcp [3] https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/send.2.html ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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…ux/kernel/git/arm64/linux Will Deacon says: ==================== On Tue, Feb 22, 2022 at 10:38:02PM +0000, Will Deacon wrote: > On Thu, 17 Feb 2022 15:22:28 +0800, Hou Tao wrote: > > Atomics support in bpf has already been done by "Atomics for eBPF" > > patch series [1], but it only adds support for x86, and this patchset > > adds support for arm64. > > > > Patch #1 & patch #2 are arm64 related. Patch #1 moves the common used > > macro AARCH64_BREAK_FAULT into insn-def.h for insn.h. Patch #2 adds > > necessary encoder helpers for atomic operations. > > > > [...] > > Applied to arm64 (for-next/insn), thanks! > > [1/4] arm64: move AARCH64_BREAK_FAULT into insn-def.h > https://git.kernel.org/arm64/c/97e58e395e9c > [2/4] arm64: insn: add encoders for atomic operations > https://git.kernel.org/arm64/c/fa1114d9eba5 Daniel -- let's give this a day or so in -next, then if nothing catches fire you're more than welcome to pull this branch as a base for the rest of the series. ==================== Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220222224211.GB16976@willie-the-truck
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Fix PCI-E clock related kernel oops that are caused by a missing clock parent. pcie0_rchng_clk_src has num_parents set to 2 but only one parent is actually set via parent_hws, it should also have "XO" defined. This will cause the kernel to panic on a NULL pointer in clk_core_get_parent_by_index(). So, to fix this utilize clk_parent_data to provide gcc_xo_gpll0 parent data. Since there is already an existing static const char * const gcc_xo_gpll0[] used to provide the same parents via parent_names convert those users to clk_parent_data as well. Without this earlycon is needed to even catch the OOPS as it will reset the board before serial is initialized with the following: [ 0.232279] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000a00000000000 [ 0.232322] Mem abort info: [ 0.239094] ESR = 0x96000004 [ 0.241778] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 0.244908] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 0.250377] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 0.253236] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault [ 0.256277] Data abort info: [ 0.261141] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004 [ 0.264262] CM = 0, WnR = 0 [ 0.267820] [0000a00000000000] address between user and kernel address ranges [ 0.270954] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP [ 0.278067] Modules linked in: [ 0.282751] CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.15.10 #0 [ 0.285882] Hardware name: Xiaomi AX3600 (DT) [ 0.292043] pstate: 20400005 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 0.296299] pc : clk_core_get_parent_by_index+0x68/0xec [ 0.303067] lr : __clk_register+0x1d8/0x820 [ 0.308273] sp : ffffffc01111b7d0 [ 0.312438] x29: ffffffc01111b7d0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000040 [ 0.315919] x26: 0000000000000002 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffffff8000308800 [ 0.323037] x23: ffffff8000308850 x22: ffffff8000308880 x21: ffffff8000308828 [ 0.330155] x20: 0000000000000028 x19: ffffff8000309700 x18: 0000000000000020 [ 0.337272] x17: 000000005cc86990 x16: 0000000000000004 x15: ffffff80001d9d0a [ 0.344391] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000006 [ 0.351508] x11: 0000000000000003 x10: 0101010101010101 x9 : 0000000000000000 [ 0.358626] x8 : 7f7f7f7f7f7f7f7f x7 : 6468626f5e626266 x6 : 17000a3a403c1b06 [ 0.365744] x5 : 061b3c403a0a0017 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000001 [ 0.372863] x2 : 0000a00000000000 x1 : 0000000000000001 x0 : ffffff8000309700 [ 0.379982] Call trace: [ 0.387091] clk_core_get_parent_by_index+0x68/0xec [ 0.389351] __clk_register+0x1d8/0x820 [ 0.394210] devm_clk_hw_register+0x5c/0xe0 [ 0.398030] devm_clk_register_regmap+0x44/0x8c [ 0.402198] qcom_cc_really_probe+0x17c/0x1d0 [ 0.406711] qcom_cc_probe+0x34/0x44 [ 0.411224] gcc_ipq8074_probe+0x18/0x30 [ 0.414869] platform_probe+0x68/0xe0 [ 0.418776] really_probe.part.0+0x9c/0x30c [ 0.422336] __driver_probe_device+0x98/0x144 [ 0.426329] driver_probe_device+0x44/0x11c [ 0.430842] __device_attach_driver+0xb4/0x120 [ 0.434836] bus_for_each_drv+0x68/0xb0 [ 0.439349] __device_attach+0xb0/0x170 [ 0.443081] device_initial_probe+0x14/0x20 [ 0.446901] bus_probe_device+0x9c/0xa4 [ 0.451067] device_add+0x35c/0x834 [ 0.454886] of_device_add+0x54/0x64 [ 0.458360] of_platform_device_create_pdata+0xc0/0x100 [ 0.462181] of_platform_bus_create+0x114/0x370 [ 0.467128] of_platform_bus_create+0x15c/0x370 [ 0.471641] of_platform_populate+0x50/0xcc [ 0.476155] of_platform_default_populate_init+0xa8/0xc8 [ 0.480324] do_one_initcall+0x50/0x1b0 [ 0.485877] kernel_init_freeable+0x234/0x29c [ 0.489436] kernel_init+0x24/0x120 [ 0.493948] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 0.497253] Code: d50323bf d65f03c0 f94002a2 b4000302 (f9400042) [ 0.501079] ---[ end trace 4ca7e1129da2abce ]--- Fixes: f0cfcf1 ("clk: qcom: ipq8074: Add missing clocks for pcie") Signed-off-by: Robert Marko <robimarko@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211220114119.465247-1-robimarko@gmail.com
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Some function calls are not implemented in rxrpc_no_security, there are preparse_server_key, free_preparse_server_key and destroy_server_key. When rxrpc security type is rxrpc_no_security, user can easily trigger a null-ptr-deref bug via ioctl. So judgment should be added to prevent it The crash log: user@syzkaller:~$ ./rxrpc_preparse_s [ 37.956878][T15626] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [ 37.957645][T15626] #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode [ 37.958229][T15626] #PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page [ 37.958762][T15626] PGD 4aadf067 P4D 4aadf067 PUD 4aade067 PMD 0 [ 37.959321][T15626] Oops: 0010 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 37.959739][T15626] CPU: 0 PID: 15626 Comm: rxrpc_preparse_ Not tainted 5.17.0-01442-gb47d5a4f6b8d #43 [ 37.960588][T15626] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 [ 37.961474][T15626] RIP: 0010:0x0 [ 37.961787][T15626] Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0xffffffffffffffd6. [ 37.962480][T15626] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000d9abdc0 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 37.963018][T15626] RAX: ffffffff84335200 RBX: ffff888012a1ce80 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 37.963727][T15626] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff84a736dc RDI: ffffc9000d9abe48 [ 37.964425][T15626] RBP: ffffc9000d9abe48 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000002 [ 37.965118][T15626] R10: 000000000000000a R11: f000000000000000 R12: ffff888013145680 [ 37.965836][T15626] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffffffffffffec R15: ffff8880432aba80 [ 37.966441][T15626] FS: 00007f2177907700(0000) GS:ffff88803ec00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 37.966979][T15626] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 37.967384][T15626] CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 000000004aaf1000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 37.967864][T15626] Call Trace: [ 37.968062][T15626] <TASK> [ 37.968240][T15626] rxrpc_preparse_s+0x59/0x90 [ 37.968541][T15626] key_create_or_update+0x174/0x510 [ 37.968863][T15626] __x64_sys_add_key+0x139/0x1d0 [ 37.969165][T15626] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 [ 37.969451][T15626] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 37.969824][T15626] RIP: 0033:0x43a1f9 Signed-off-by: Xiaolong Huang <butterflyhuangxx@gmail.com> Tested-by: Xiaolong Huang <butterflyhuangxx@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com> cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org Link: http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/linux-afs/2022-March/005069.html Fixes: 12da59f ("rxrpc: Hand server key parsing off to the security class") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/164865013439.2941502.8966285221215590921.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
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MM defined the rule [1] very clearly that once page was set with PG_private flag, we should increment the refcount in that page, also main flows like pageout(), migrate_page() will assume there is one additional page reference count if page_has_private() returns true. Otherwise, we may get a BUG in page migration: page:0000000080d05b9d refcount:-1 mapcount:0 mapping:000000005f4d82a8 index:0xe2 pfn:0x14c12 aops:ubifs_file_address_operations [ubifs] ino:8f1 dentry name:"f30e" flags: 0x1fffff80002405(locked|uptodate|owner_priv_1|private|node=0| zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(page_count(page) != 0) ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at include/linux/page_ref.h:184! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU: 3 PID: 38 Comm: kcompactd0 Not tainted 5.15.0-rc5 RIP: 0010:migrate_page_move_mapping+0xac3/0xe70 Call Trace: ubifs_migrate_page+0x22/0xc0 [ubifs] move_to_new_page+0xb4/0x600 migrate_pages+0x1523/0x1cc0 compact_zone+0x8c5/0x14b0 kcompactd+0x2bc/0x560 kthread+0x18c/0x1e0 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 Before the time, we should make clean a concept, what does refcount means in page gotten from grab_cache_page_write_begin(). There are 2 situations: Situation 1: refcount is 3, page is created by __page_cache_alloc. TYPE_A - the write process is using this page TYPE_B - page is assigned to one certain mapping by calling __add_to_page_cache_locked() TYPE_C - page is added into pagevec list corresponding current cpu by calling lru_cache_add() Situation 2: refcount is 2, page is gotten from the mapping's tree TYPE_B - page has been assigned to one certain mapping TYPE_A - the write process is using this page (by calling page_cache_get_speculative()) Filesystem releases one refcount by calling put_page() in xxx_write_end(), the released refcount corresponds to TYPE_A (write task is using it). If there are any processes using a page, page migration process will skip the page by judging whether expected_page_refs() equals to page refcount. The BUG is caused by following process: PA(cpu 0) kcompactd(cpu 1) compact_zone ubifs_write_begin page_a = grab_cache_page_write_begin add_to_page_cache_lru lru_cache_add pagevec_add // put page into cpu 0's pagevec (refcnf = 3, for page creation process) ubifs_write_end SetPagePrivate(page_a) // doesn't increase page count ! unlock_page(page_a) put_page(page_a) // refcnt = 2 [...] PB(cpu 0) filemap_read filemap_get_pages add_to_page_cache_lru lru_cache_add __pagevec_lru_add // traverse all pages in cpu 0's pagevec __pagevec_lru_add_fn SetPageLRU(page_a) isolate_migratepages isolate_migratepages_block get_page_unless_zero(page_a) // refcnt = 3 list_add(page_a, from_list) migrate_pages(from_list) __unmap_and_move move_to_new_page ubifs_migrate_page(page_a) migrate_page_move_mapping expected_page_refs get 3 (migration[1] + mapping[1] + private[1]) release_pages put_page_testzero(page_a) // refcnt = 3 page_ref_freeze // refcnt = 0 page_ref_dec_and_test(0 - 1 = -1) page_ref_unfreeze VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(-1 != 0, page) UBIFS doesn't increase the page refcount after setting private flag, which leads to page migration task believes the page is not used by any other processes, so the page is migrated. This causes concurrent accessing on page refcount between put_page() called by other process(eg. read process calls lru_cache_add) and page_ref_unfreeze() called by migration task. Actually zhangjun has tried to fix this problem [2] by recalculating page refcnt in ubifs_migrate_page(). It's better to follow MM rules [1], because just like Kirill suggested in [2], we need to check all users of page_has_private() helper. Like f2fs does in [3], fix it by adding/deleting refcount when setting/clearing private for a page. BTW, according to [4], we set 'page->private' as 1 because ubifs just simply SetPagePrivate(). And, [5] provided a common helper to set/clear page private, ubifs can use this helper following the example of iomap, afs, btrfs, etc. Jump [6] to find a reproducer. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/2b19b3c4-2bc4-15fa-15cc-27a13e5c7af1@aol.com [2] https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-mtd/msg04018.html [3] http://lkml.iu.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/1903.0/03313.html [4] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-f2fs-devel/20210422154705.GO3596236@casper.infradead.org [5] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20200517214718.468-1-guoqing.jiang@cloud.ionos.com [6] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=214961 Fixes: 1e51764 ("UBIFS: add new flash file system") Signed-off-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
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If there is already an entry present that is of order >= XA_CHUNK_SHIFT when we call xas_create_range(), xas_create_range() will misinterpret that entry as a node and dereference xa_node->parent, generally leading to a crash that looks something like this: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000001: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f] CPU: 0 PID: 32 Comm: khugepaged Not tainted 5.17.0-rc8-syzkaller-00003-g56e337f2cf13 #0 RIP: 0010:xa_parent_locked include/linux/xarray.h:1207 [inline] RIP: 0010:xas_create_range+0x2d9/0x6e0 lib/xarray.c:725 It's deterministically reproducable once you know what the problem is, but producing it in a live kernel requires khugepaged to hit a race. While the problem has been present since xas_create_range() was introduced, I'm not aware of a way to hit it before the page cache was converted to use multi-index entries. Fixes: 6b24ca4 ("mm: Use multi-index entries in the page cache") Reported-by: syzbot+0d2b0bf32ca5cfd09f2e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
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nvme_mpath_init_identify() invoked from nvme_init_identify() fetches a fresh ANA log from the ctrl. This is essential to have an up to date path states for both existing namespaces and for those scan_work may discover once the ctrl is up. This happens in the following cases: 1) A new ctrl is being connected. 2) An existing ctrl is successfully reconnected. 3) An existing ctrl is being reset. While in (1) ctrl->namespaces is empty, (2 & 3) may have namespaces, and nvme_read_ana_log() may call nvme_update_ns_ana_state(). This result in a hang when the ANA state of an existing namespace changes and makes the disk live: nvme_mpath_set_live() issues IO to the namespace through the ctrl, which does NOT have IO queues yet. See sample hang below. Solution: - nvme_update_ns_ana_state() to call set_live only if ctrl is live - nvme_read_ana_log() call from nvme_mpath_init_identify() therefore only fetches and parses the ANA log; any erros in this process will fail the ctrl setup as appropriate; - a separate function nvme_mpath_update() is called in nvme_start_ctrl(); this parses the ANA log without fetching it. At this point the ctrl is live, therefore, disks can be set live normally. Sample failure: nvme nvme0: starting error recovery nvme nvme0: Reconnecting in 10 seconds... block nvme0n6: no usable path - requeuing I/O INFO: task kworker/u8:3:312 blocked for more than 122 seconds. Tainted: G E 5.14.5-1.el7.elrepo.x86_64 #1 Workqueue: nvme-wq nvme_tcp_reconnect_ctrl_work [nvme_tcp] Call Trace: __schedule+0x2a2/0x7e0 schedule+0x4e/0xb0 io_schedule+0x16/0x40 wait_on_page_bit_common+0x15c/0x3e0 do_read_cache_page+0x1e0/0x410 read_cache_page+0x12/0x20 read_part_sector+0x46/0x100 read_lba+0x121/0x240 efi_partition+0x1d2/0x6a0 bdev_disk_changed.part.0+0x1df/0x430 bdev_disk_changed+0x18/0x20 blkdev_get_whole+0x77/0xe0 blkdev_get_by_dev+0xd2/0x3a0 __device_add_disk+0x1ed/0x310 device_add_disk+0x13/0x20 nvme_mpath_set_live+0x138/0x1b0 [nvme_core] nvme_update_ns_ana_state+0x2b/0x30 [nvme_core] nvme_update_ana_state+0xca/0xe0 [nvme_core] nvme_parse_ana_log+0xac/0x170 [nvme_core] nvme_read_ana_log+0x7d/0xe0 [nvme_core] nvme_mpath_init_identify+0x105/0x150 [nvme_core] nvme_init_identify+0x2df/0x4d0 [nvme_core] nvme_init_ctrl_finish+0x8d/0x3b0 [nvme_core] nvme_tcp_setup_ctrl+0x337/0x390 [nvme_tcp] nvme_tcp_reconnect_ctrl_work+0x24/0x40 [nvme_tcp] process_one_work+0x1bd/0x360 worker_thread+0x50/0x3d0 Signed-off-by: Anton Eidelman <anton@lightbitslabs.com> Reviewed-by: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
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The io-specific memcpy/memset functions use string mmio accesses to do their work. Under SEV, the hypervisor can't emulate these instructions because they read/write directly from/to encrypted memory. KVM will inject a page fault exception into the guest when it is asked to emulate string mmio instructions for an SEV guest: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc90000065068 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 8000100000067 P4D 8000100000067 PUD 80001000fb067 PMD 80001000fc067 PTE 80000000fed40173 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc7 #3 As string mmio for an SEV guest can not be supported by the hypervisor, unroll the instructions for CC_ATTR_GUEST_UNROLL_STRING_IO enabled kernels. This issue appears when kernels are launched in recent libvirt-managed SEV virtual machines, because virt-install started to add a tpm-crb device to the guest by default and proactively because, raisins: virt-manager/virt-manager@eb58c09 and as that commit says, the default adding of a TPM can be disabled with "virt-install ... --tpm none". The kernel driver for tpm-crb uses memcpy_to/from_io() functions to access MMIO memory, resulting in a page-fault injected by KVM and crashing the kernel at boot. [ bp: Massage and extend commit message. ] Fixes: d8aa7ee ('x86/mm: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support') Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220321093351.23976-1-joro@8bytes.org
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We've got a mess on our hands. 1. xfs_trans_commit() cannot cancel transactions because the mount is shut down - that causes dirty, aborted, unlogged log items to sit unpinned in memory and potentially get written to disk before the log is shut down. Hence xfs_trans_commit() can only abort transactions when xlog_is_shutdown() is true. 2. xfs_force_shutdown() is used in places to cause the current modification to be aborted via xfs_trans_commit() because it may be impractical or impossible to cancel the transaction directly, and hence xfs_trans_commit() must cancel transactions when xfs_is_shutdown() is true in this situation. But we can't do that because of #1. 3. Log IO errors cause log shutdowns by calling xfs_force_shutdown() to shut down the mount and then the log from log IO completion. 4. xfs_force_shutdown() can result in a log force being issued, which has to wait for log IO completion before it will mark the log as shut down. If #3 races with some other shutdown trigger that runs a log force, we rely on xfs_force_shutdown() silently ignoring #3 and avoiding shutting down the log until the failed log force completes. 5. To ensure #2 always works, we have to ensure that xfs_force_shutdown() does not return until the the log is shut down. But in the case of #4, this will result in a deadlock because the log Io completion will block waiting for a log force to complete which is blocked waiting for log IO to complete.... So the very first thing we have to do here to untangle this mess is dissociate log shutdown triggers from mount shutdowns. We already have xlog_forced_shutdown, which will atomically transistion to the log a shutdown state. Due to internal asserts it cannot be called multiple times, but was done simply because the only place that could call it was xfs_do_force_shutdown() (i.e. the mount shutdown!) and that could only call it once and once only. So the first thing we do is remove the asserts. We then convert all the internal log shutdown triggers to call xlog_force_shutdown() directly instead of xfs_force_shutdown(). This allows the log shutdown triggers to shut down the log without needing to care about mount based shutdown constraints. This means we shut down the log independently of the mount and the mount may not notice this until it's next attempt to read or modify metadata. At that point (e.g. xfs_trans_commit()) it will see that the log is shutdown, error out and shutdown the mount. To ensure that all the unmount behaviours and asserts track correctly as a result of a log shutdown, propagate the shutdown up to the mount if it is not already set. This keeps the mount and log state in sync, and saves a huge amount of hassle where code fails because of a log shutdown but only checks for mount shutdowns and hence ends up doing the wrong thing. Cleaning up that mess is an exercise for another day. This enables us to address the other problems noted above in followup patches. Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
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When calling smb2_ioctl_query_info() with smb_query_info::flags=PASSTHRU_FSCTL and smb_query_info::output_buffer_length=0, the following would return 0x10 buffer = memdup_user(arg + sizeof(struct smb_query_info), qi.output_buffer_length); if (IS_ERR(buffer)) { kfree(vars); return PTR_ERR(buffer); } rather than a valid pointer thus making IS_ERR() check fail. This would then cause a NULL ptr deference in @buffer when accessing it later in smb2_ioctl_query_ioctl(). While at it, prevent having a @buffer smaller than 8 bytes to correctly handle SMB2_SET_INFO FileEndOfFileInformation requests when smb_query_info::flags=PASSTHRU_SET_INFO. Here is a small C reproducer which triggers a NULL ptr in @buffer when passing an invalid smb_query_info::flags #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <stdint.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <sys/ioctl.h> #define die(s) perror(s), exit(1) #define QUERY_INFO 0xc018cf07 int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int fd; if (argc < 2) exit(1); fd = open(argv[1], O_RDONLY); if (fd == -1) die("open"); if (ioctl(fd, QUERY_INFO, (uint32_t[]) { 0, 0, 0, 4, 0, 0}) == -1) die("ioctl"); close(fd); return 0; } mount.cifs //srv/share /mnt -o ... gcc repro.c && ./a.out /mnt/f0 [ 114.138620] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI [ 114.139310] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] [ 114.139775] CPU: 2 PID: 995 Comm: a.out Not tainted 5.17.0-rc8 #1 [ 114.140148] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4b9b-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 [ 114.140818] RIP: 0010:smb2_ioctl_query_info+0x206/0x410 [cifs] [ 114.141221] Code: 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 c8 01 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 8b 7b 28 4c 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 9c 01 00 00 49 8b 3f e8 58 02 fb ff 48 8b 14 24 [ 114.142348] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000b47b00 EFLAGS: 00010256 [ 114.142692] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff888115503200 RCX: ffffffffa020580d [ 114.143119] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffffffa043a380 [ 114.143544] RBP: ffff888115503278 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000003 [ 114.143983] R10: fffffbfff4087470 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff888115503288 [ 114.144424] R13: 00000000ffffffea R14: ffff888115503228 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 114.144852] FS: 00007f7aeabdf740(0000) GS:ffff888151600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 114.145338] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 114.145692] CR2: 00007f7aeacfdf5e CR3: 000000012000e000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0 [ 114.146131] Call Trace: [ 114.146291] <TASK> [ 114.146432] ? smb2_query_reparse_tag+0x890/0x890 [cifs] [ 114.146800] ? cifs_mapchar+0x460/0x460 [cifs] [ 114.147121] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x70 [ 114.147412] ? cifs_strndup_to_utf16+0x15b/0x250 [cifs] [ 114.147775] ? dentry_path_raw+0xa6/0xf0 [ 114.148024] ? cifs_convert_path_to_utf16+0x198/0x220 [cifs] [ 114.148413] ? smb2_check_message+0x1080/0x1080 [cifs] [ 114.148766] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x70 [ 114.149065] cifs_ioctl+0x1577/0x3320 [cifs] [ 114.149371] ? lock_downgrade+0x6f0/0x6f0 [ 114.149631] ? cifs_readdir+0x2e60/0x2e60 [cifs] [ 114.149956] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x70 [ 114.150250] ? __rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x80b/0xbe0 [ 114.150562] ? __up_read+0x192/0x710 [ 114.150791] ? __ia32_sys_rseq+0xf0/0xf0 [ 114.151025] ? __x64_sys_openat+0x11f/0x1d0 [ 114.151296] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x127/0x190 [ 114.151549] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [ 114.151768] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 114.152079] RIP: 0033:0x7f7aead043df [ 114.152306] Code: 00 48 89 44 24 18 31 c0 48 8d 44 24 60 c7 04 24 10 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8d 44 24 20 48 89 44 24 10 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <41> 89 c0 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 1f 48 8b 44 24 18 64 48 2b 04 25 28 00 [ 114.153431] RSP: 002b:00007ffc2e0c1f80 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 [ 114.153890] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f7aead043df [ 114.154315] RDX: 00007ffc2e0c1ff0 RSI: 00000000c018cf07 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 114.154747] RBP: 00007ffc2e0c2010 R08: 00007f7aeae03db0 R09: 00007f7aeae24c4e [ 114.155192] R10: 00007f7aeabf7d40 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffc2e0c2128 [ 114.155642] R13: 0000000000401176 R14: 0000000000403df8 R15: 00007f7aeae57000 [ 114.156071] </TASK> [ 114.156218] Modules linked in: cifs cifs_arc4 cifs_md4 bpf_preload [ 114.156608] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 114.156898] RIP: 0010:smb2_ioctl_query_info+0x206/0x410 [cifs] [ 114.157792] Code: 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 c8 01 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 8b 7b 28 4c 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 9c 01 00 00 49 8b 3f e8 58 02 fb ff 48 8b 14 24 [ 114.159293] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000b47b00 EFLAGS: 00010256 [ 114.159641] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff888115503200 RCX: ffffffffa020580d [ 114.160093] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffffffa043a380 [ 114.160699] RBP: ffff888115503278 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000003 [ 114.161196] R10: fffffbfff4087470 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff888115503288 [ 114.155642] R13: 0000000000401176 R14: 0000000000403df8 R15: 00007f7aeae57000 [ 114.156071] </TASK> [ 114.156218] Modules linked in: cifs cifs_arc4 cifs_md4 bpf_preload [ 114.156608] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 114.156898] RIP: 0010:smb2_ioctl_query_info+0x206/0x410 [cifs] [ 114.157792] Code: 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 c8 01 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 8b 7b 28 4c 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 9c 01 00 00 49 8b 3f e8 58 02 fb ff 48 8b 14 24 [ 114.159293] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000b47b00 EFLAGS: 00010256 [ 114.159641] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff888115503200 RCX: ffffffffa020580d [ 114.160093] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffffffa043a380 [ 114.160699] RBP: ffff888115503278 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000003 [ 114.161196] R10: fffffbfff4087470 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff888115503288 [ 114.161823] R13: 00000000ffffffea R14: ffff888115503228 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 114.162274] FS: 00007f7aeabdf740(0000) GS:ffff888151600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 114.162853] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 114.163218] CR2: 00007f7aeacfdf5e CR3: 000000012000e000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0 [ 114.163691] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception [ 114.164087] Kernel Offset: disabled [ 114.164316] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception ]--- Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc@cjr.nz> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
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When calling smb2_ioctl_query_info() with invalid smb_query_info::flags, a NULL ptr dereference is triggered when trying to kfree() uninitialised rqst[n].rq_iov array. This also fixes leaked paths that are created in SMB2_open_init() which required SMB2_open_free() to properly free them. Here is a small C reproducer that triggers it #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <stdint.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <sys/ioctl.h> #define die(s) perror(s), exit(1) #define QUERY_INFO 0xc018cf07 int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int fd; if (argc < 2) exit(1); fd = open(argv[1], O_RDONLY); if (fd == -1) die("open"); if (ioctl(fd, QUERY_INFO, (uint32_t[]) { 0, 0, 0, 4, 0, 0}) == -1) die("ioctl"); close(fd); return 0; } mount.cifs //srv/share /mnt -o ... gcc repro.c && ./a.out /mnt/f0 [ 1832.124468] CIFS: VFS: \\w22-dc.zelda.test\test Invalid passthru query flags: 0x4 [ 1832.125043] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI [ 1832.125764] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] [ 1832.126241] CPU: 3 PID: 1133 Comm: a.out Not tainted 5.17.0-rc8 #2 [ 1832.126630] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4b9b-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 [ 1832.127322] RIP: 0010:smb2_ioctl_query_info+0x7a3/0xe30 [cifs] [ 1832.127749] Code: 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 6c 05 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4d 8b 74 24 28 4c 89 f2 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 cb 04 00 00 49 8b 3e e8 bb fc fa ff 48 89 da 48 [ 1832.128911] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000957b08 EFLAGS: 00010256 [ 1832.129243] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff888117e9b850 RCX: ffffffffa020580d [ 1832.129691] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffffffa043a2c0 [ 1832.130137] RBP: ffff888117e9b878 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000003 [ 1832.130585] R10: fffffbfff4087458 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff888117e9b800 [ 1832.131037] R13: 00000000ffffffea R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff888117e9b8a8 [ 1832.131485] FS: 00007fcee9900740(0000) GS:ffff888151a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 1832.131993] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 1832.132354] CR2: 00007fcee9a1ef5e CR3: 0000000114cd2000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0 [ 1832.132801] Call Trace: [ 1832.132962] <TASK> [ 1832.133104] ? smb2_query_reparse_tag+0x890/0x890 [cifs] [ 1832.133489] ? cifs_mapchar+0x460/0x460 [cifs] [ 1832.133822] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x70 [ 1832.134125] ? cifs_strndup_to_utf16+0x15b/0x250 [cifs] [ 1832.134502] ? lock_downgrade+0x6f0/0x6f0 [ 1832.134760] ? cifs_convert_path_to_utf16+0x198/0x220 [cifs] [ 1832.135170] ? smb2_check_message+0x1080/0x1080 [cifs] [ 1832.135545] cifs_ioctl+0x1577/0x3320 [cifs] [ 1832.135864] ? lock_downgrade+0x6f0/0x6f0 [ 1832.136125] ? cifs_readdir+0x2e60/0x2e60 [cifs] [ 1832.136468] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x70 [ 1832.136769] ? __rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x80b/0xbe0 [ 1832.137096] ? __up_read+0x192/0x710 [ 1832.137327] ? __ia32_sys_rseq+0xf0/0xf0 [ 1832.137578] ? __x64_sys_openat+0x11f/0x1d0 [ 1832.137850] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x127/0x190 [ 1832.138103] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [ 1832.138378] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 1832.138702] RIP: 0033:0x7fcee9a253df [ 1832.138937] Code: 00 48 89 44 24 18 31 c0 48 8d 44 24 60 c7 04 24 10 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8d 44 24 20 48 89 44 24 10 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <41> 89 c0 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 1f 48 8b 44 24 18 64 48 2b 04 25 28 00 [ 1832.140107] RSP: 002b:00007ffeba94a8a0 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 [ 1832.140606] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fcee9a253df [ 1832.141058] RDX: 00007ffeba94a910 RSI: 00000000c018cf07 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 1832.141503] RBP: 00007ffeba94a930 R08: 00007fcee9b24db0 R09: 00007fcee9b45c4e [ 1832.141948] R10: 00007fcee9918d40 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffeba94aa48 [ 1832.142396] R13: 0000000000401176 R14: 0000000000403df8 R15: 00007fcee9b78000 [ 1832.142851] </TASK> [ 1832.142994] Modules linked in: cifs cifs_arc4 cifs_md4 bpf_preload [last unloaded: cifs] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc@cjr.nz> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
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Petr Machata says: ==================== Allow configuration of multipath hash seed Let me just quote the commit message of patch #2 here to inform the motivation and some of the implementation: When calculating hashes for the purpose of multipath forwarding, both IPv4 and IPv6 code currently fall back on flow_hash_from_keys(). That uses a randomly-generated seed. That's a fine choice by default, but unfortunately some deployments may need a tighter control over the seed used. In this patchset, make the seed configurable by adding a new sysctl key, net.ipv4.fib_multipath_hash_seed to control the seed. This seed is used specifically for multipath forwarding and not for the other concerns that flow_hash_from_keys() is used for, such as queue selection. Expose the knob as sysctl because other such settings, such as headers to hash, are also handled that way. Despite being placed in the net.ipv4 namespace, the multipath seed sysctl is used for both IPv4 and IPv6, similarly to e.g. a number of TCP variables. Like those, the multipath hash seed is a per-netns variable. The seed used by flow_hash_from_keys() is a 128-bit quantity. However it seems that usually the seed is a much more modest value. 32 bits seem typical (Cisco, Cumulus), some systems go even lower. For that reason, and to decouple the user interface from implementation details, go with a 32-bit quantity, which is then quadruplicated to form the siphash key. One example of use of this interface is avoiding hash polarization, where two ECMP routers, one behind the other, happen to make consistent hashing decisions, and as a result, part of the ECMP space of the latter router is never used. Another is a load balancer where several machines forward traffic to one of a number of leaves, and the forwarding decisions need to be made consistently. (This is a case of a desired hash polarization, mentioned e.g. in chapter 6.3 of [0].) There has already been a proposal to include a hash seed control interface in the past[1]. - Patches #1-#2 contain the substance of the work - Patch #3 is an mlxsw offload - Patches #4 and #5 are a selftest [0] https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/nsdi18/nsdi18-araujo.pdf [1] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/YIlVpYMCn%2F8WfE1P@rnd/ ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240607151357.421181-1-petrm@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Nikolay Aleksandrov says: ==================== net: bridge: mst: fix suspicious rcu usage warning This set fixes a suspicious RCU usage warning triggered by syzbot[1] in the bridge's MST code. After I converted br_mst_set_state to RCU, I forgot to update the vlan group dereference helper. Fix it by using the proper helper, in order to do that we need to pass the vlan group which is already obtained correctly by the callers for their respective context. Patch 01 is a requirement for the fix in patch 02. Note I did consider rcu_dereference_rtnl() but the churn is much bigger and in every part of the bridge. We can do that as a cleanup in net-next. [1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=9bbe2de1bc9d470eb5fe ============================= WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 6.10.0-rc2-syzkaller-00235-g8a92980606e3 #0 Not tainted ----------------------------- net/bridge/br_private.h:1599 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 4 locks held by syz-executor.1/5374: #0: ffff888022d50b18 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: mmap_read_lock include/linux/mmap_lock.h:144 [inline] #0: ffff888022d50b18 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: __mm_populate+0x1b0/0x460 mm/gup.c:2111 #1: ffffc90000a18c00 ((&p->forward_delay_timer)){+.-.}-{0:0}, at: call_timer_fn+0xc0/0x650 kernel/time/timer.c:1789 #2: ffff88805fb2ccb8 (&br->lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] #2: ffff88805fb2ccb8 (&br->lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: br_forward_delay_timer_expired+0x50/0x440 net/bridge/br_stp_timer.c:86 #3: ffffffff8e333fa0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:329 [inline] #3: ffffffff8e333fa0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:781 [inline] #3: ffffffff8e333fa0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: br_mst_set_state+0x171/0x7a0 net/bridge/br_mst.c:105 stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 5374 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc2-syzkaller-00235-g8a92980606e3 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024 Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x221/0x340 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:6712 nbp_vlan_group net/bridge/br_private.h:1599 [inline] br_mst_set_state+0x29e/0x7a0 net/bridge/br_mst.c:106 br_set_state+0x28a/0x7b0 net/bridge/br_stp.c:47 br_forward_delay_timer_expired+0x176/0x440 net/bridge/br_stp_timer.c:88 call_timer_fn+0x18e/0x650 kernel/time/timer.c:1792 expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1843 [inline] __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:2417 [inline] __run_timer_base+0x66a/0x8e0 kernel/time/timer.c:2428 run_timer_base kernel/time/timer.c:2437 [inline] run_timer_softirq+0xb7/0x170 kernel/time/timer.c:2447 handle_softirqs+0x2c4/0x970 kernel/softirq.c:554 __do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:588 [inline] invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:428 [inline] __irq_exit_rcu+0xf4/0x1c0 kernel/softirq.c:637 irq_exit_rcu+0x9/0x30 kernel/softirq.c:649 instr_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1043 [inline] sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xa6/0xc0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1043 </IRQ> <TASK> ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240609103654.914987-1-razor@blackwall.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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When queues are started, netif_napi_add() and napi_enable() are called. If there are 4 queues and only 3 queues are used for the current configuration, only 3 queues' napi should be registered and enabled. The ionic_qcq_enable() checks whether the .poll pointer is not NULL for enabling only the using queue' napi. Unused queues' napi will not be registered by netif_napi_add(), so the .poll pointer indicates NULL. But it couldn't distinguish whether the napi was unregistered or not because netif_napi_del() doesn't reset the .poll pointer to NULL. So, ionic_qcq_enable() calls napi_enable() for the queue, which was unregistered by netif_napi_del(). Reproducer: ethtool -L <interface name> rx 1 tx 1 combined 0 ethtool -L <interface name> rx 0 tx 0 combined 1 ethtool -L <interface name> rx 0 tx 0 combined 4 Splat looks like: kernel BUG at net/core/dev.c:6666! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 3 PID: 1057 Comm: kworker/3:3 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc2+ #16 Workqueue: events ionic_lif_deferred_work [ionic] RIP: 0010:napi_enable+0x3b/0x40 Code: 48 89 c2 48 83 e2 f6 80 b9 61 09 00 00 00 74 0d 48 83 bf 60 01 00 00 00 74 03 80 ce 01 f0 4f RSP: 0018:ffffb6ed83227d48 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff97560cda0828 RCX: 0000000000000029 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff97560cda0a28 RBP: ffffb6ed83227d50 R08: 0000000000000400 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff97560ce3c1a0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff975613ba0a20 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff975d5f780000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f8f734ee200 CR3: 0000000103e50000 CR4: 00000000007506f0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? die+0x33/0x90 ? do_trap+0xd9/0x100 ? napi_enable+0x3b/0x40 ? do_error_trap+0x83/0xb0 ? napi_enable+0x3b/0x40 ? napi_enable+0x3b/0x40 ? exc_invalid_op+0x4e/0x70 ? napi_enable+0x3b/0x40 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20 ? napi_enable+0x3b/0x40 ionic_qcq_enable+0xb7/0x180 [ionic 59bdfc8a035436e1c4224ff7d10789e3f14643f8] ionic_start_queues+0xc4/0x290 [ionic 59bdfc8a035436e1c4224ff7d10789e3f14643f8] ionic_link_status_check+0x11c/0x170 [ionic 59bdfc8a035436e1c4224ff7d10789e3f14643f8] ionic_lif_deferred_work+0x129/0x280 [ionic 59bdfc8a035436e1c4224ff7d10789e3f14643f8] process_one_work+0x145/0x360 worker_thread+0x2bb/0x3d0 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0xcc/0x100 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 Fixes: 0f3154e ("ionic: Add Tx and Rx handling") Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Brett Creeley <brett.creeley@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Shannon Nelson <shannon.nelson@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240612060446.1754392-1-ap420073@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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A panic happens in ima_match_policy: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010 PGD 42f873067 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 5 PID: 1286325 Comm: kubeletmonit.sh Kdump: loaded Tainted: P Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:ima_match_policy+0x84/0x450 Code: 49 89 fc 41 89 cf 31 ed 89 44 24 14 eb 1c 44 39 7b 18 74 26 41 83 ff 05 74 20 48 8b 1b 48 3b 1d f2 b9 f4 00 0f 84 9c 01 00 00 <44> 85 73 10 74 ea 44 8b 6b 14 41 f6 c5 01 75 d4 41 f6 c5 02 74 0f RSP: 0018:ff71570009e07a80 EFLAGS: 00010207 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000200 RDX: ffffffffad8dc7c0 RSI: 0000000024924925 RDI: ff3e27850dea2000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffffabfce739 R10: ff3e27810cc42400 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ff3e2781825ef970 R13: 00000000ff3e2785 R14: 000000000000000c R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 00007f5195b51740(0000) GS:ff3e278b12d40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000626d24002 CR4: 0000000000361ee0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: ima_get_action+0x22/0x30 process_measurement+0xb0/0x830 ? page_add_file_rmap+0x15/0x170 ? alloc_set_pte+0x269/0x4c0 ? prep_new_page+0x81/0x140 ? simple_xattr_get+0x75/0xa0 ? selinux_file_open+0x9d/0xf0 ima_file_check+0x64/0x90 path_openat+0x571/0x1720 do_filp_open+0x9b/0x110 ? page_counter_try_charge+0x57/0xc0 ? files_cgroup_alloc_fd+0x38/0x60 ? __alloc_fd+0xd4/0x250 ? do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250 do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250 do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca Commit c7423db ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()") introduced call to ima_lsm_copy_rule within a RCU read-side critical section which contains kmalloc with GFP_KERNEL. This implies a possible sleep and violates limitations of RCU read-side critical sections on non-PREEMPT systems. Sleeping within RCU read-side critical section might cause synchronize_rcu() returning early and break RCU protection, allowing a UAF to happen. The root cause of this issue could be described as follows: | Thread A | Thread B | | |ima_match_policy | | | rcu_read_lock | |ima_lsm_update_rule | | | synchronize_rcu | | | | kmalloc(GFP_KERNEL)| | | sleep | ==> synchronize_rcu returns early | kfree(entry) | | | | entry = entry->next| ==> UAF happens and entry now becomes NULL (or could be anything). | | entry->action | ==> Accessing entry might cause panic. To fix this issue, we are converting all kmalloc that is called within RCU read-side critical section to use GFP_ATOMIC. Fixes: c7423db ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: GUO Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: fixed missing comment, long lines, !CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES case] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Shin'ichiro reported that when he's running fstests' test-case btrfs/167 on emulated zoned devices, he's seeing the following NULL pointer dereference in 'btrfs_zone_finish_endio()': Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000011: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000088-0x000000000000008f] CPU: 4 PID: 2332440 Comm: kworker/u80:15 Tainted: G W 6.10.0-rc2-kts+ #4 Hardware name: Supermicro Super Server/X11SPi-TF, BIOS 3.3 02/21/2020 Workqueue: btrfs-endio-write btrfs_work_helper [btrfs] RIP: 0010:btrfs_zone_finish_endio.part.0+0x34/0x160 [btrfs] RSP: 0018:ffff88867f107a90 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff893e5534 RDX: 0000000000000011 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000000088 RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed1081696028 R10: ffff88840b4b0143 R11: ffff88834dfff600 R12: ffff88840b4b0000 R13: 0000000000020000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff888530ad5210 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888e3f800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f87223fff38 CR3: 00000007a7c6a002 CR4: 00000000007706f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die_body.cold+0x19/0x27 ? die_addr+0x46/0x70 ? exc_general_protection+0x14f/0x250 ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30 ? do_raw_read_unlock+0x44/0x70 ? btrfs_zone_finish_endio.part.0+0x34/0x160 [btrfs] btrfs_finish_one_ordered+0x5d9/0x19a0 [btrfs] ? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10 ? do_raw_write_lock+0x90/0x260 ? __pfx_do_raw_write_lock+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_btrfs_finish_one_ordered+0x10/0x10 [btrfs] ? _raw_write_unlock+0x23/0x40 ? btrfs_finish_ordered_zoned+0x5a9/0x850 [btrfs] ? lock_acquire+0x435/0x500 btrfs_work_helper+0x1b1/0xa70 [btrfs] ? __schedule+0x10a8/0x60b0 ? __pfx___might_resched+0x10/0x10 process_one_work+0x862/0x1410 ? __pfx_lock_acquire+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10 ? assign_work+0x16c/0x240 worker_thread+0x5e6/0x1010 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x2c3/0x3a0 ? trace_irq_enable.constprop.0+0xce/0x110 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x70 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Enabling CONFIG_BTRFS_ASSERT revealed the following assertion to trigger: assertion failed: !list_empty(&ordered->list), in fs/btrfs/zoned.c:1815 This indicates, that we're missing the checksums list on the ordered_extent. As btrfs/167 is doing a NOCOW write this is to be expected. Further analysis with drgn confirmed the assumption: >>> inode = prog.crashed_thread().stack_trace()[11]['ordered'].inode >>> btrfs_inode = drgn.container_of(inode, "struct btrfs_inode", \ "vfs_inode") >>> print(btrfs_inode.flags) (u32)1 As zoned emulation mode simulates conventional zones on regular devices, we cannot use zone-append for writing. But we're only attaching dummy checksums if we're doing a zone-append write. So for NOCOW zoned data writes on conventional zones, also attach a dummy checksum. Reported-by: Shinichiro Kawasaki <shinichiro.kawasaki@wdc.com> Fixes: cbfce4c ("btrfs: optimize the logical to physical mapping for zoned writes") CC: Naohiro Aota <Naohiro.Aota@wdc.com> # 6.6+ Tested-by: Shin'ichiro Kawasaki <shinichiro.kawasaki@wdc.com> Reviewed-by: Naohiro Aota <naohiro.aota@wdc.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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The syzbot fuzzer found that the interrupt-URB completion callback in the cdc-wdm driver was taking too long, and the driver's immediate resubmission of interrupt URBs with -EPROTO status combined with the dummy-hcd emulation to cause a CPU lockup: cdc_wdm 1-1:1.0: nonzero urb status received: -71 cdc_wdm 1-1:1.0: wdm_int_callback - 0 bytes watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 26s! [syz-executor782:6625] CPU#0 Utilization every 4s during lockup: #1: 98% system, 0% softirq, 3% hardirq, 0% idle #2: 98% system, 0% softirq, 3% hardirq, 0% idle #3: 98% system, 0% softirq, 3% hardirq, 0% idle #4: 98% system, 0% softirq, 3% hardirq, 0% idle #5: 98% system, 1% softirq, 3% hardirq, 0% idle Modules linked in: irq event stamp: 73096 hardirqs last enabled at (73095): [<ffff80008037bc00>] console_emit_next_record kernel/printk/printk.c:2935 [inline] hardirqs last enabled at (73095): [<ffff80008037bc00>] console_flush_all+0x650/0xb74 kernel/printk/printk.c:2994 hardirqs last disabled at (73096): [<ffff80008af10b00>] __el1_irq arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:533 [inline] hardirqs last disabled at (73096): [<ffff80008af10b00>] el1_interrupt+0x24/0x68 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:551 softirqs last enabled at (73048): [<ffff8000801ea530>] softirq_handle_end kernel/softirq.c:400 [inline] softirqs last enabled at (73048): [<ffff8000801ea530>] handle_softirqs+0xa60/0xc34 kernel/softirq.c:582 softirqs last disabled at (73043): [<ffff800080020de8>] __do_softirq+0x14/0x20 kernel/softirq.c:588 CPU: 0 PID: 6625 Comm: syz-executor782 Tainted: G W 6.10.0-rc2-syzkaller-g8867bbd4a056 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024 Testing showed that the problem did not occur if the two error messages -- the first two lines above -- were removed; apparently adding material to the kernel log takes a surprisingly large amount of time. In any case, the best approach for preventing these lockups and to avoid spamming the log with thousands of error messages per second is to ratelimit the two dev_err() calls. Therefore we replace them with dev_err_ratelimited(). Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Suggested-by: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+5f996b83575ef4058638@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-usb/00000000000073d54b061a6a1c65@google.com/ Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+1b2abad17596ad03dcff@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-usb/000000000000f45085061aa9b37e@google.com/ Fixes: 9908a32 ("USB: remove err() macro from usb class drivers") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-usb/40dfa45b-5f21-4eef-a8c1-51a2f320e267@rowland.harvard.edu/ Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/29855215-52f5-4385-b058-91f42c2bee18@rowland.harvard.edu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Petr Machata says: ==================== mlxsw: Handle MTU values Amit Cohen writes: The driver uses two values for maximum MTU, but neither is accurate. In addition, the value which is configured to hardware is not calculated correctly. Handle these issues and expose accurate values for minimum and maximum MTU per netdevice. Add test cases to check that the exposed values are really supported. Patch set overview: Patches #1-#3 set the driver to use accurate values for MTU Patch #4 aligns the driver to always use the same value for maximum MTU Patch #5 adds a test ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/cover.1718275854.git.petrm@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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The large folio is mapped with folio size(not greater PMD_SIZE) aligned virtual address during the pagefault, ie, 'addr = ALIGN_DOWN(vmf->address, nr_pages * PAGE_SIZE)' in do_anonymous_page(). But after the mremap(), the virtual address only requires PAGE_SIZE alignment. Also pte is moved to new in move_page_tables(), then traversal of the new pte in the numa_rebuild_large_mapping() could hit the following issue, Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 00000a80c021a788 Mem abort info: ESR = 0x0000000096000004 EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000 CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00002040341a6000 [00000a80c021a788] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000 Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] SMP ... CPU: 76 PID: 15187 Comm: git Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W 6.10.0-rc2+ #209 Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 V2/BC82AMDD, BIOS 1.79 08/21/2021 pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : numa_rebuild_large_mapping+0x338/0x638 lr : numa_rebuild_large_mapping+0x320/0x638 sp : ffff8000b41c3b00 x29: ffff8000b41c3b30 x28: ffff8000812a0000 x27: 00000000000a8000 x26: 00000000000000a8 x25: 0010000000000001 x24: ffff20401c7170f0 x23: 0000ffff33a1e000 x22: 0000ffff33a76000 x21: ffff20400869eca0 x20: 0000ffff33976000 x19: 00000000000000a8 x18: ffffffffffffffff x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000020 x15: ffff8000b41c36a8 x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 205d373831353154 x12: 5b5d333331363732 x11: 000000000011ff78 x10: 000000000011ff10 x9 : ffff800080273f30 x8 : 000000320400869e x7 : c0000000ffffd87f x6 : 00000000001e6ba8 x5 : ffff206f3fb5af88 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : fffffdffc0000000 x0 : 00000a80c021a780 Call trace: numa_rebuild_large_mapping+0x338/0x638 do_numa_page+0x3e4/0x4e0 handle_pte_fault+0x1bc/0x238 __handle_mm_fault+0x20c/0x400 handle_mm_fault+0xa8/0x288 do_page_fault+0x124/0x498 do_translation_fault+0x54/0x80 do_mem_abort+0x4c/0xa8 el0_da+0x40/0x110 el0t_64_sync_handler+0xe4/0x158 el0t_64_sync+0x188/0x190 Fix it by making the start and end not only within the vma range, but also within the page table range. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240612122822.4033433-1-wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com Fixes: d2136d7 ("mm: support multi-size THP numa balancing") Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: "Huang, Ying" <ying.huang@intel.com> Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com> Cc: Liu Shixin <liushixin2@huawei.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Cc: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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Al reported a possible use-after-free (UAF) in kvm_spapr_tce_attach_iommu_group(). It looks up `stt` from tablefd, but then continues to use it after doing fdput() on the returned fd. After the fdput() the tablefd is free to be closed by another thread. The close calls kvm_spapr_tce_release() and then release_spapr_tce_table() (via call_rcu()) which frees `stt`. Although there are calls to rcu_read_lock() in kvm_spapr_tce_attach_iommu_group() they are not sufficient to prevent the UAF, because `stt` is used outside the locked regions. With an artifcial delay after the fdput() and a userspace program which triggers the race, KASAN detects the UAF: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in kvm_spapr_tce_attach_iommu_group+0x298/0x720 [kvm] Read of size 4 at addr c000200027552c30 by task kvm-vfio/2505 CPU: 54 PID: 2505 Comm: kvm-vfio Not tainted 6.10.0-rc3-next-20240612-dirty #1 Hardware name: 8335-GTH POWER9 0x4e1202 opal:skiboot-v6.5.3-35-g1851b2a06 PowerNV Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0xb4/0x108 (unreliable) print_report+0x2b4/0x6ec kasan_report+0x118/0x2b0 __asan_load4+0xb8/0xd0 kvm_spapr_tce_attach_iommu_group+0x298/0x720 [kvm] kvm_vfio_set_attr+0x524/0xac0 [kvm] kvm_device_ioctl+0x144/0x240 [kvm] sys_ioctl+0x62c/0x1810 system_call_exception+0x190/0x440 system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec ... Freed by task 0: ... kfree+0xec/0x3e0 release_spapr_tce_table+0xd4/0x11c [kvm] rcu_core+0x568/0x16a0 handle_softirqs+0x23c/0x920 do_softirq_own_stack+0x6c/0x90 do_softirq_own_stack+0x58/0x90 __irq_exit_rcu+0x218/0x2d0 irq_exit+0x30/0x80 arch_local_irq_restore+0x128/0x230 arch_local_irq_enable+0x1c/0x30 cpuidle_enter_state+0x134/0x5cc cpuidle_enter+0x6c/0xb0 call_cpuidle+0x7c/0x100 do_idle+0x394/0x410 cpu_startup_entry+0x60/0x70 start_secondary+0x3fc/0x410 start_secondary_prolog+0x10/0x14 Fix it by delaying the fdput() until `stt` is no longer in use, which is effectively the entire function. To keep the patch minimal add a call to fdput() at each of the existing return paths. Future work can convert the function to goto or __cleanup style cleanup. With the fix in place the test case no longer triggers the UAF. Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240610024437.GA1464458@ZenIV/ Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://msgid.link/20240614122910.3499489-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au
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Luis has been reporting an assert failure when freeing an inode cluster during inode inactivation for a while. The assert looks like: XFS: Assertion failed: bp->b_flags & XBF_DONE, file: fs/xfs/xfs_trans_buf.c, line: 241 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/xfs/xfs_message.c:102! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 4 PID: 73 Comm: kworker/4:1 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc1 #4 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 Workqueue: xfs-inodegc/loop5 xfs_inodegc_worker [xfs] RIP: 0010:assfail (fs/xfs/xfs_message.c:102) xfs RSP: 0018:ffff88810188f7f0 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88816e748250 RCX: 1ffffffff844b0e7 RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: ffff88810188f558 RDI: ffffffffc2431fa0 RBP: 1ffff11020311f01 R08: 0000000042431f9f R09: ffffed1020311e9b R10: ffff88810188f4df R11: ffffffffac725d70 R12: ffff88817a3f4000 R13: ffff88812182f000 R14: ffff88810188f998 R15: ffffffffc2423f80 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8881c8400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000055fe9d0f109c CR3: 000000014426c002 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> xfs_trans_read_buf_map (fs/xfs/xfs_trans_buf.c:241 (discriminator 1)) xfs xfs_imap_to_bp (fs/xfs/xfs_trans.h:210 fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_inode_buf.c:138) xfs xfs_inode_item_precommit (fs/xfs/xfs_inode_item.c:145) xfs xfs_trans_run_precommits (fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c:931) xfs __xfs_trans_commit (fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c:966) xfs xfs_inactive_ifree (fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c:1811) xfs xfs_inactive (fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c:2013) xfs xfs_inodegc_worker (fs/xfs/xfs_icache.c:1841 fs/xfs/xfs_icache.c:1886) xfs process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3231) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3306 (discriminator 2) kernel/workqueue.c:3393 (discriminator 2)) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:389) ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:257) </TASK> And occurs when the the inode precommit handlers is attempt to look up the inode cluster buffer to attach the inode for writeback. The trail of logic that I can reconstruct is as follows. 1. the inode is clean when inodegc runs, so it is not attached to a cluster buffer when precommit runs. 2. #1 implies the inode cluster buffer may be clean and not pinned by dirty inodes when inodegc runs. 3. #2 implies that the inode cluster buffer can be reclaimed by memory pressure at any time. 4. The assert failure implies that the cluster buffer was attached to the transaction, but not marked done. It had been accessed earlier in the transaction, but not marked done. 5. #4 implies the cluster buffer has been invalidated (i.e. marked stale). 6. #5 implies that the inode cluster buffer was instantiated uninitialised in the transaction in xfs_ifree_cluster(), which only instantiates the buffers to invalidate them and never marks them as done. Given factors 1-3, this issue is highly dependent on timing and environmental factors. Hence the issue can be very difficult to reproduce in some situations, but highly reliable in others. Luis has an environment where it can be reproduced easily by g/531 but, OTOH, I've reproduced it only once in ~2000 cycles of g/531. I think the fix is to have xfs_ifree_cluster() set the XBF_DONE flag on the cluster buffers, even though they may not be initialised. The reasons why I think this is safe are: 1. A buffer cache lookup hit on a XBF_STALE buffer will clear the XBF_DONE flag. Hence all future users of the buffer know they have to re-initialise the contents before use and mark it done themselves. 2. xfs_trans_binval() sets the XFS_BLI_STALE flag, which means the buffer remains locked until the journal commit completes and the buffer is unpinned. Hence once marked XBF_STALE/XFS_BLI_STALE by xfs_ifree_cluster(), the only context that can access the freed buffer is the currently running transaction. 3. #2 implies that future buffer lookups in the currently running transaction will hit the transaction match code and not the buffer cache. Hence XBF_STALE and XFS_BLI_STALE will not be cleared unless the transaction initialises and logs the buffer with valid contents again. At which point, the buffer will be marked marked XBF_DONE again, so having XBF_DONE already set on the stale buffer is a moot point. 4. #2 also implies that any concurrent access to that cluster buffer will block waiting on the buffer lock until the inode cluster has been fully freed and is no longer an active inode cluster buffer. 5. #4 + #1 means that any future user of the disk range of that buffer will always see the range of disk blocks covered by the cluster buffer as not done, and hence must initialise the contents themselves. 6. Setting XBF_DONE in xfs_ifree_cluster() then means the unlinked inode precommit code will see a XBF_DONE buffer from the transaction match as it expects. It can then attach the stale but newly dirtied inode to the stale but newly dirtied cluster buffer without unexpected failures. The stale buffer will then sail through the journal and do the right thing with the attached stale inode during unpin. Hence the fix is just one line of extra code. The explanation of why we have to set XBF_DONE in xfs_ifree_cluster, OTOH, is long and complex.... Fixes: 82842fe ("xfs: fix AGF vs inode cluster buffer deadlock") Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Tested-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanbabu@kernel.org>
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syzbot reminds us that in6_dev_get() can return NULL. fib6_nh_init() ip6_validate_gw( &idev ) ip6_route_check_nh( idev ) *idev = in6_dev_get(dev); // can be NULL Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc00000000bc: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000005e0-0x00000000000005e7] CPU: 0 PID: 11237 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc2-syzkaller-00249-gbe27b8965297 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 06/07/2024 RIP: 0010:fib6_nh_init+0x640/0x2160 net/ipv6/route.c:3606 Code: 00 00 fc ff df 4c 8b 64 24 58 48 8b 44 24 28 4c 8b 74 24 30 48 89 c1 48 89 44 24 28 48 8d 98 e0 05 00 00 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 0f b6 04 38 84 c0 0f 85 b3 17 00 00 8b 1b 31 ff 89 de e8 b8 8b RSP: 0018:ffffc900032775a0 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 00000000000000bc RBX: 00000000000005e0 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: ffffc90003277a54 RDI: ffff88802b3a08d8 RBP: ffffc900032778b0 R08: 00000000000002fc R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00000000000002fc R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88802b3a08b8 R13: 1ffff9200064eec8 R14: ffffc90003277a00 R15: dffffc0000000000 FS: 00007f940feb06c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b9400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000000245e8000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> ip6_route_info_create+0x99e/0x12b0 net/ipv6/route.c:3809 ip6_route_add+0x28/0x160 net/ipv6/route.c:3853 ipv6_route_ioctl+0x588/0x870 net/ipv6/route.c:4483 inet6_ioctl+0x21a/0x280 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:579 sock_do_ioctl+0x158/0x460 net/socket.c:1222 sock_ioctl+0x629/0x8e0 net/socket.c:1341 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:893 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f940f07cea9 Fixes: 428604f ("ipv6: do not set routes if disable_ipv6 has been enabled") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Lorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240614082002.26407-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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syzbot caught a NULL dereference in rt6_probe() [1] Bail out if __in6_dev_get() returns NULL. [1] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc00000000cb: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000658-0x000000000000065f] CPU: 1 PID: 22444 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc2-syzkaller-00383-gb8481381d4e2 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024 RIP: 0010:rt6_probe net/ipv6/route.c:656 [inline] RIP: 0010:find_match+0x8c4/0xf50 net/ipv6/route.c:758 Code: 14 fd f7 48 8b 85 38 ff ff ff 48 c7 45 b0 00 00 00 00 48 8d b8 5c 06 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 14 02 48 89 f8 83 e0 07 83 c0 03 38 d0 7c 08 84 d2 0f 85 19 RSP: 0018:ffffc900034af070 EFLAGS: 00010203 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffc90004521000 RDX: 00000000000000cb RSI: ffffffff8990d0cd RDI: 000000000000065c RBP: ffffc900034af150 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 000000000000000a R13: 1ffff92000695e18 R14: ffff8880244a1d20 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f4844a5a6c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b9300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000001b31b27000 CR3: 000000002d42c000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> rt6_nh_find_match+0xfa/0x1a0 net/ipv6/route.c:784 nexthop_for_each_fib6_nh+0x26d/0x4a0 net/ipv4/nexthop.c:1496 __find_rr_leaf+0x6e7/0xe00 net/ipv6/route.c:825 find_rr_leaf net/ipv6/route.c:853 [inline] rt6_select net/ipv6/route.c:897 [inline] fib6_table_lookup+0x57e/0xa30 net/ipv6/route.c:2195 ip6_pol_route+0x1cd/0x1150 net/ipv6/route.c:2231 pol_lookup_func include/net/ip6_fib.h:616 [inline] fib6_rule_lookup+0x386/0x720 net/ipv6/fib6_rules.c:121 ip6_route_output_flags_noref net/ipv6/route.c:2639 [inline] ip6_route_output_flags+0x1d0/0x640 net/ipv6/route.c:2651 ip6_dst_lookup_tail.constprop.0+0x961/0x1760 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1147 ip6_dst_lookup_flow+0x99/0x1d0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1250 rawv6_sendmsg+0xdab/0x4340 net/ipv6/raw.c:898 inet_sendmsg+0x119/0x140 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:853 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline] sock_write_iter+0x4b8/0x5c0 net/socket.c:1160 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:497 [inline] vfs_write+0x6b6/0x1140 fs/read_write.c:590 ksys_write+0x1f8/0x260 fs/read_write.c:643 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Fixes: 52e1635 ("[IPV6]: ROUTE: Add router_probe_interval sysctl.") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jason Xing <kerneljasonxing@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240615151454.166404-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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ip6_dst_idev() can return NULL, xfrm6_get_saddr() must act accordingly. syzbot reported: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] CPU: 1 PID: 12 Comm: kworker/u8:1 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc2-syzkaller-00383-gb8481381d4e2 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024 Workqueue: wg-kex-wg1 wg_packet_handshake_send_worker RIP: 0010:xfrm6_get_saddr+0x93/0x130 net/ipv6/xfrm6_policy.c:64 Code: df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 97 00 00 00 4c 8b ab d8 00 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 89 ea 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 86 00 00 00 4d 8b 6d 00 e8 ca 13 47 01 48 b8 00 RSP: 0018:ffffc90000117378 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88807b079dc0 RCX: ffffffff89a0d6d7 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff89a0d6e9 RDI: ffff88807b079e98 RBP: ffff88807ad73248 R08: 0000000000000007 R09: fffffffffffff000 R10: ffff88807b079dc0 R11: 0000000000000007 R12: ffffc90000117480 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f4586d00440 CR3: 0000000079042000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> xfrm_get_saddr net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:2452 [inline] xfrm_tmpl_resolve_one net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:2481 [inline] xfrm_tmpl_resolve+0xa26/0xf10 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:2541 xfrm_resolve_and_create_bundle+0x140/0x2570 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:2835 xfrm_bundle_lookup net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3070 [inline] xfrm_lookup_with_ifid+0x4d1/0x1e60 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3201 xfrm_lookup net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3298 [inline] xfrm_lookup_route+0x3b/0x200 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3309 ip6_dst_lookup_flow+0x15c/0x1d0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1256 send6+0x611/0xd20 drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c:139 wg_socket_send_skb_to_peer+0xf9/0x220 drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c:178 wg_socket_send_buffer_to_peer+0x12b/0x190 drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c:200 wg_packet_send_handshake_initiation+0x227/0x360 drivers/net/wireguard/send.c:40 wg_packet_handshake_send_worker+0x1c/0x30 drivers/net/wireguard/send.c:51 process_one_work+0x9fb/0x1b60 kernel/workqueue.c:3231 process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3312 [inline] worker_thread+0x6c8/0xf70 kernel/workqueue.c:3393 kthread+0x2c1/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 Fixes: 1da177e ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240615154231.234442-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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…is found Bail from outer address space loop, not just the inner memslot loop, when a "null" handler is encountered by __kvm_handle_hva_range(), which is the intended behavior. On x86, which has multiple address spaces thanks to SMM emulation, breaking from just the memslot loop results in undefined behavior due to assigning the non-existent return value from kvm_null_fn() to a bool. In practice, the bug is benign as kvm_mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_end() is the only caller that passes handler=kvm_null_fn, and it doesn't set flush_on_ret, i.e. assigning garbage to r.ret is ultimately ignored. And for most configuration the compiler elides the entire sequence, i.e. there is no undefined behavior at runtime. ------------[ cut here ]------------ UBSAN: invalid-load in arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:655:10 load of value 160 is not a valid value for type '_Bool' CPU: 370 PID: 8246 Comm: CPU 0/KVM Not tainted 6.8.2-amdsos-build58-ubuntu-22.04+ #1 Hardware name: AMD Corporation Sh54p/Sh54p, BIOS WPC4429N 04/25/2024 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x48/0x60 ubsan_epilogue+0x5/0x30 __ubsan_handle_load_invalid_value+0x79/0x80 kvm_mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_end.cold+0x18/0x4f [kvm] __mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_end+0x63/0xe0 __split_huge_pmd+0x367/0xfc0 do_huge_pmd_wp_page+0x1cc/0x380 __handle_mm_fault+0x8ee/0xe50 handle_mm_fault+0xe4/0x4a0 __get_user_pages+0x190/0x840 get_user_pages_unlocked+0xe0/0x590 hva_to_pfn+0x114/0x550 [kvm] kvm_faultin_pfn+0xed/0x5b0 [kvm] kvm_tdp_page_fault+0x123/0x170 [kvm] kvm_mmu_page_fault+0x244/0xaa0 [kvm] vcpu_enter_guest+0x592/0x1070 [kvm] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x145/0x8a0 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x288/0x6d0 [kvm] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8f/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x77/0x120 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 </TASK> ---[ end trace ]--- Fixes: 071064f ("KVM: Don't take mmu_lock for range invalidation unless necessary") Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b8723d39903b64c241c50f5513f804390c7b5eec.1718203311.git.babu.moger@amd.com [sean: massage changelog] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
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….DX6 behaviors input_action_end_dx4() and input_action_end_dx6() are called NF_HOOK() for PREROUTING hook, in PREROUTING hook, we should passing a valid indev, and a NULL outdev to NF_HOOK(), otherwise may trigger a NULL pointer dereference, as below: [74830.647293] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000090 [74830.655633] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [74830.657888] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [74830.659500] PGD 0 P4D 0 [74830.660450] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI ... [74830.664953] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011 [74830.666569] RIP: 0010:rpfilter_mt+0x44/0x15e [ipt_rpfilter] ... [74830.689725] Call Trace: [74830.690402] <IRQ> [74830.690953] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df [74830.692020] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df [74830.693095] ? ipt_do_table+0x286/0x710 [ip_tables] [74830.694275] ? __die_body.cold+0x8/0xd [74830.695205] ? page_fault_oops+0xac/0x140 [74830.696244] ? exc_page_fault+0x62/0x150 [74830.697225] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 [74830.698344] ? rpfilter_mt+0x44/0x15e [ipt_rpfilter] [74830.699540] ipt_do_table+0x286/0x710 [ip_tables] [74830.700758] ? ip6_route_input+0x19d/0x240 [74830.701752] nf_hook_slow+0x3f/0xb0 [74830.702678] input_action_end_dx4+0x19b/0x1e0 [74830.703735] ? input_action_end_t+0xe0/0xe0 [74830.704734] seg6_local_input_core+0x2d/0x60 [74830.705782] lwtunnel_input+0x5b/0xb0 [74830.706690] __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x63/0xa0 [74830.707825] process_backlog+0x99/0x140 [74830.709538] __napi_poll+0x2c/0x160 [74830.710673] net_rx_action+0x296/0x350 [74830.711860] __do_softirq+0xcb/0x2ac [74830.713049] do_softirq+0x63/0x90 input_action_end_dx4() passing a NULL indev to NF_HOOK(), and finally trigger a NULL dereference in rpfilter_mt()->rpfilter_is_loopback(): static bool rpfilter_is_loopback(const struct sk_buff *skb, const struct net_device *in) { // in is NULL return skb->pkt_type == PACKET_LOOPBACK || in->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK; } Fixes: 7a3f5b0 ("netfilter: add netfilter hooks to SRv6 data plane") Signed-off-by: Jianguo Wu <wujianguo@chinatelecom.cn> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
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Petr Machata says: ==================== mlxsw: Use page pool for Rx buffers allocation Amit Cohen writes: After using NAPI to process events from hardware, the next step is to use page pool for Rx buffers allocation, which is also enhances performance. To simplify this change, first use page pool to allocate one continuous buffer for each packet, later memory consumption can be improved by using fragmented buffers. This set significantly enhances mlxsw driver performance, CPU can handle about 370% of the packets per second it previously handled. The next planned improvement is using XDP to optimize telemetry. Patch set overview: Patches #1-#2 are small preparations for page pool usage Patch #3 initializes page pool, but do not use it Patch #4 converts the driver to use page pool for buffers allocations Patch #5 is an optimization for buffer access Patch #6 cleans up an unused structure Patch #7 uses napi_consume_skb() as part of Tx completion ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/cover.1718709196.git.petrm@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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…git/netfilter/nf Pablo Neira Ayuso says: ==================== Netfilter fixes for net The following patchset contains Netfilter fixes for net: Patch #1 fixes the suspicious RCU usage warning that resulted from the recent fix for the race between namespace cleanup and gc in ipset left out checking the pernet exit phase when calling rcu_dereference_protected(), from Jozsef Kadlecsik. Patch #2 fixes incorrect input and output netdevice in SRv6 prerouting hooks, from Jianguo Wu. Patch #3 moves nf_hooks_lwtunnel sysctl toggle to the netfilter core. The connection tracking system is loaded on-demand, this ensures availability of this knob regardless. Patch #4-#5 adds selftests for SRv6 netfilter hooks also from Jianguo Wu. netfilter pull request 24-06-19 * tag 'nf-24-06-19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf: selftests: add selftest for the SRv6 End.DX6 behavior with netfilter selftests: add selftest for the SRv6 End.DX4 behavior with netfilter netfilter: move the sysctl nf_hooks_lwtunnel into the netfilter core seg6: fix parameter passing when calling NF_HOOK() in End.DX4 and End.DX6 behaviors netfilter: ipset: Fix suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240619170537.2846-1-pablo@netfilter.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
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Jun 28, 2024
Currently, the ionic_run_xdp() doesn't handle multi-buffer packets properly for XDP_TX and XDP_REDIRECT. When a jumbo frame is received, the ionic_run_xdp() first makes xdp frame with all necessary pages in the rx descriptor. And if the action is either XDP_TX or XDP_REDIRECT, it should unmap dma-mapping and reset page pointer to NULL for all pages, not only the first page. But it doesn't for SG pages. So, SG pages unexpectedly will be reused. It eventually causes kernel panic. Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x504f4e4dbebc64ff: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc3+ #25 RIP: 0010:xdp_return_frame+0x42/0x90 Code: 01 75 12 5b 4c 89 e6 5d 31 c9 41 5c 31 d2 41 5d e9 73 fd ff ff 44 8b 6b 20 0f b7 43 0a 49 81 ed 68 01 00 00 49 29 c5 49 01 fd <41> 80 7d0 RSP: 0018:ffff99d00122ce08 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000005453 RBX: ffff8d325f904000 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: 00000000670e1000 RSI: 000000011f90d000 RDI: 504f4e4d4c4b4a49 RBP: ffff99d003907740 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 000000011f90d000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8d325f904010 R13: 504f4e4dbebc64fd R14: ffff8d3242b070c8 R15: ffff99d0039077c0 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8d399f780000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f41f6c85e38 CR3: 000000037ac30000 CR4: 00000000007506f0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <IRQ> ? die_addr+0x33/0x90 ? exc_general_protection+0x251/0x2f0 ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x22/0x30 ? xdp_return_frame+0x42/0x90 ionic_tx_clean+0x211/0x280 [ionic 15881354510e6a9c655c59c54812b319ed2cd015] ionic_tx_cq_service+0xd3/0x210 [ionic 15881354510e6a9c655c59c54812b319ed2cd015] ionic_txrx_napi+0x41/0x1b0 [ionic 15881354510e6a9c655c59c54812b319ed2cd015] __napi_poll.constprop.0+0x29/0x1b0 net_rx_action+0x2c4/0x350 handle_softirqs+0xf4/0x320 irq_exit_rcu+0x78/0xa0 common_interrupt+0x77/0x90 Fixes: 5377805 ("ionic: implement xdp frags support") Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Shannon Nelson <shannon.nelson@amd.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Jun 28, 2024
syzbot reported a lockdep violation involving bridge driver [1] Make sure netdev_rename_lock is softirq safe to fix this issue. [1] WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected 6.10.0-rc2-syzkaller-00249-gbe27b8965297 #0 Not tainted ----------------------------------------------------- syz-executor.2/9449 [HC0[0]:SC0[2]:HE0:SE0] is trying to acquire: ffffffff8f5de668 (netdev_rename_lock.seqcount){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: rtnl_fill_ifinfo+0x38e/0x2270 net/core/rtnetlink.c:1839 and this task is already holding: ffff888060c64cb8 (&br->lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline] ffff888060c64cb8 (&br->lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: br_port_slave_changelink+0x3d/0x150 net/bridge/br_netlink.c:1212 which would create a new lock dependency: (&br->lock){+.-.}-{2:2} -> (netdev_rename_lock.seqcount){+.+.}-{0:0} but this new dependency connects a SOFTIRQ-irq-safe lock: (&br->lock){+.-.}-{2:2} ... which became SOFTIRQ-irq-safe at: lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] br_forward_delay_timer_expired+0x50/0x440 net/bridge/br_stp_timer.c:86 call_timer_fn+0x18e/0x650 kernel/time/timer.c:1792 expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1843 [inline] __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:2417 [inline] __run_timer_base+0x66a/0x8e0 kernel/time/timer.c:2428 run_timer_base kernel/time/timer.c:2437 [inline] run_timer_softirq+0xb7/0x170 kernel/time/timer.c:2447 handle_softirqs+0x2c4/0x970 kernel/softirq.c:554 __do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:588 [inline] invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:428 [inline] __irq_exit_rcu+0xf4/0x1c0 kernel/softirq.c:637 irq_exit_rcu+0x9/0x30 kernel/softirq.c:649 instr_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1043 [inline] sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xa6/0xc0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1043 asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:702 lock_acquire+0x264/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5758 fs_reclaim_acquire+0xaf/0x140 mm/page_alloc.c:3800 might_alloc include/linux/sched/mm.h:334 [inline] slab_pre_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3890 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3980 [inline] kmalloc_trace_noprof+0x3d/0x2c0 mm/slub.c:4147 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:660 [inline] kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:778 [inline] class_dir_create_and_add drivers/base/core.c:3255 [inline] get_device_parent+0x2a7/0x410 drivers/base/core.c:3315 device_add+0x325/0xbf0 drivers/base/core.c:3645 netdev_register_kobject+0x17e/0x320 net/core/net-sysfs.c:2136 register_netdevice+0x11d5/0x19e0 net/core/dev.c:10375 nsim_init_netdevsim drivers/net/netdevsim/netdev.c:690 [inline] nsim_create+0x647/0x890 drivers/net/netdevsim/netdev.c:750 __nsim_dev_port_add+0x6c0/0xae0 drivers/net/netdevsim/dev.c:1390 nsim_dev_port_add_all drivers/net/netdevsim/dev.c:1446 [inline] nsim_dev_reload_create drivers/net/netdevsim/dev.c:1498 [inline] nsim_dev_reload_up+0x69b/0x8e0 drivers/net/netdevsim/dev.c:985 devlink_reload+0x478/0x870 net/devlink/dev.c:474 devlink_nl_reload_doit+0xbd6/0xe50 net/devlink/dev.c:586 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit net/netlink/genetlink.c:1115 [inline] genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:1195 [inline] genl_rcv_msg+0xb14/0xec0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1210 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1e3/0x430 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2564 genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1219 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1335 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x7ea/0x980 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1361 netlink_sendmsg+0x8db/0xcb0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1905 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x221/0x270 net/socket.c:745 ____sys_sendmsg+0x525/0x7d0 net/socket.c:2585 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2639 [inline] __sys_sendmsg+0x2b0/0x3a0 net/socket.c:2668 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f to a SOFTIRQ-irq-unsafe lock: (netdev_rename_lock.seqcount){+.+.}-{0:0} ... which became SOFTIRQ-irq-unsafe at: ... lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 do_write_seqcount_begin_nested include/linux/seqlock.h:469 [inline] do_write_seqcount_begin include/linux/seqlock.h:495 [inline] write_seqlock include/linux/seqlock.h:823 [inline] dev_change_name+0x184/0x920 net/core/dev.c:1229 do_setlink+0xa4b/0x41f0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:2880 __rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3696 [inline] rtnl_newlink+0x180b/0x20a0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3743 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x89b/0x1180 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6635 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1e3/0x430 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2564 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1335 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x7ea/0x980 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1361 netlink_sendmsg+0x8db/0xcb0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1905 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x221/0x270 net/socket.c:745 __sys_sendto+0x3a4/0x4f0 net/socket.c:2192 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2204 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2200 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0xde/0x100 net/socket.c:2200 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f other info that might help us debug this: Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(netdev_rename_lock.seqcount); local_irq_disable(); lock(&br->lock); lock(netdev_rename_lock.seqcount); <Interrupt> lock(&br->lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by syz-executor.2/9449: #0: ffffffff8f5e7448 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: rtnl_lock net/core/rtnetlink.c:79 [inline] #0: ffffffff8f5e7448 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x842/0x1180 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6632 #1: ffff888060c64cb8 (&br->lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline] #1: ffff888060c64cb8 (&br->lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: br_port_slave_changelink+0x3d/0x150 net/bridge/br_netlink.c:1212 #2: ffffffff8e333fa0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:329 [inline] #2: ffffffff8e333fa0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:781 [inline] #2: ffffffff8e333fa0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: team_change_rx_flags+0x29/0x330 drivers/net/team/team_core.c:1767 the dependencies between SOFTIRQ-irq-safe lock and the holding lock: -> (&br->lock){+.-.}-{2:2} { HARDIRQ-ON-W at: lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 __raw_spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:126 [inline] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x35/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:178 spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline] br_add_if+0xb34/0xef0 net/bridge/br_if.c:682 do_set_master net/core/rtnetlink.c:2701 [inline] do_setlink+0xe70/0x41f0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:2907 __rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3696 [inline] rtnl_newlink+0x180b/0x20a0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3743 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x89b/0x1180 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6635 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1e3/0x430 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2564 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1335 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x7ea/0x980 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1361 netlink_sendmsg+0x8db/0xcb0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1905 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x221/0x270 net/socket.c:745 __sys_sendto+0x3a4/0x4f0 net/socket.c:2192 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2204 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2200 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0xde/0x100 net/socket.c:2200 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f IN-SOFTIRQ-W at: lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] br_forward_delay_timer_expired+0x50/0x440 net/bridge/br_stp_timer.c:86 call_timer_fn+0x18e/0x650 kernel/time/timer.c:1792 expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1843 [inline] __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:2417 [inline] __run_timer_base+0x66a/0x8e0 kernel/time/timer.c:2428 run_timer_base kernel/time/timer.c:2437 [inline] run_timer_softirq+0xb7/0x170 kernel/time/timer.c:2447 handle_softirqs+0x2c4/0x970 kernel/softirq.c:554 __do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:588 [inline] invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:428 [inline] __irq_exit_rcu+0xf4/0x1c0 kernel/softirq.c:637 irq_exit_rcu+0x9/0x30 kernel/softirq.c:649 instr_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1043 [inline] sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xa6/0xc0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1043 asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:702 lock_acquire+0x264/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5758 fs_reclaim_acquire+0xaf/0x140 mm/page_alloc.c:3800 might_alloc include/linux/sched/mm.h:334 [inline] slab_pre_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3890 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3980 [inline] kmalloc_trace_noprof+0x3d/0x2c0 mm/slub.c:4147 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:660 [inline] kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:778 [inline] class_dir_create_and_add drivers/base/core.c:3255 [inline] get_device_parent+0x2a7/0x410 drivers/base/core.c:3315 device_add+0x325/0xbf0 drivers/base/core.c:3645 netdev_register_kobject+0x17e/0x320 net/core/net-sysfs.c:2136 register_netdevice+0x11d5/0x19e0 net/core/dev.c:10375 nsim_init_netdevsim drivers/net/netdevsim/netdev.c:690 [inline] nsim_create+0x647/0x890 drivers/net/netdevsim/netdev.c:750 __nsim_dev_port_add+0x6c0/0xae0 drivers/net/netdevsim/dev.c:1390 nsim_dev_port_add_all drivers/net/netdevsim/dev.c:1446 [inline] nsim_dev_reload_create drivers/net/netdevsim/dev.c:1498 [inline] nsim_dev_reload_up+0x69b/0x8e0 drivers/net/netdevsim/dev.c:985 devlink_reload+0x478/0x870 net/devlink/dev.c:474 devlink_nl_reload_doit+0xbd6/0xe50 net/devlink/dev.c:586 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit net/netlink/genetlink.c:1115 [inline] genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:1195 [inline] genl_rcv_msg+0xb14/0xec0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1210 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1e3/0x430 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2564 genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1219 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1335 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x7ea/0x980 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1361 netlink_sendmsg+0x8db/0xcb0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1905 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x221/0x270 net/socket.c:745 ____sys_sendmsg+0x525/0x7d0 net/socket.c:2585 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2639 [inline] __sys_sendmsg+0x2b0/0x3a0 net/socket.c:2668 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f INITIAL USE at: lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 __raw_spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:126 [inline] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x35/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:178 spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:356 [inline] br_add_if+0xb34/0xef0 net/bridge/br_if.c:682 do_set_master net/core/rtnetlink.c:2701 [inline] do_setlink+0xe70/0x41f0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:2907 __rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3696 [inline] rtnl_newlink+0x180b/0x20a0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3743 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x89b/0x1180 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6635 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1e3/0x430 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2564 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1335 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x7ea/0x980 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1361 netlink_sendmsg+0x8db/0xcb0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1905 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x221/0x270 net/socket.c:745 __sys_sendto+0x3a4/0x4f0 net/socket.c:2192 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2204 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2200 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0xde/0x100 net/socket.c:2200 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f } ... key at: [<ffffffff94b9a1a0>] br_dev_setup.__key+0x0/0x20 the dependencies between the lock to be acquired and SOFTIRQ-irq-unsafe lock: -> (netdev_rename_lock.seqcount){+.+.}-{0:0} { HARDIRQ-ON-W at: lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 do_write_seqcount_begin_nested include/linux/seqlock.h:469 [inline] do_write_seqcount_begin include/linux/seqlock.h:495 [inline] write_seqlock include/linux/seqlock.h:823 [inline] dev_change_name+0x184/0x920 net/core/dev.c:1229 do_setlink+0xa4b/0x41f0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:2880 __rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3696 [inline] rtnl_newlink+0x180b/0x20a0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3743 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x89b/0x1180 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6635 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1e3/0x430 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2564 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1335 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x7ea/0x980 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1361 netlink_sendmsg+0x8db/0xcb0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1905 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x221/0x270 net/socket.c:745 __sys_sendto+0x3a4/0x4f0 net/socket.c:2192 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2204 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2200 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0xde/0x100 net/socket.c:2200 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f SOFTIRQ-ON-W at: lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 do_write_seqcount_begin_nested include/linux/seqlock.h:469 [inline] do_write_seqcount_begin include/linux/seqlock.h:495 [inline] write_seqlock include/linux/seqlock.h:823 [inline] dev_change_name+0x184/0x920 net/core/dev.c:1229 do_setlink+0xa4b/0x41f0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:2880 __rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3696 [inline] rtnl_newlink+0x180b/0x20a0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3743 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x89b/0x1180 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6635 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1e3/0x430 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2564 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1335 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x7ea/0x980 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1361 netlink_sendmsg+0x8db/0xcb0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1905 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x221/0x270 net/socket.c:745 __sys_sendto+0x3a4/0x4f0 net/socket.c:2192 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2204 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2200 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0xde/0x100 net/socket.c:2200 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f INITIAL USE at: lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 do_write_seqcount_begin_nested include/linux/seqlock.h:469 [inline] do_write_seqcount_begin include/linux/seqlock.h:495 [inline] write_seqlock include/linux/seqlock.h:823 [inline] dev_change_name+0x184/0x920 net/core/dev.c:1229 do_setlink+0xa4b/0x41f0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:2880 __rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3696 [inline] rtnl_newlink+0x180b/0x20a0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3743 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x89b/0x1180 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6635 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1e3/0x430 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2564 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1335 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x7ea/0x980 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1361 netlink_sendmsg+0x8db/0xcb0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1905 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x221/0x270 net/socket.c:745 __sys_sendto+0x3a4/0x4f0 net/socket.c:2192 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2204 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2200 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0xde/0x100 net/socket.c:2200 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f INITIAL READ USE at: lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 seqcount_lockdep_reader_access include/linux/seqlock.h:72 [inline] read_seqbegin include/linux/seqlock.h:772 [inline] netdev_copy_name+0x168/0x2c0 net/core/dev.c:949 rtnl_fill_ifinfo+0x38e/0x2270 net/core/rtnetlink.c:1839 rtmsg_ifinfo_build_skb+0x18a/0x260 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4073 rtmsg_ifinfo_event net/core/rtnetlink.c:4107 [inline] rtmsg_ifinfo+0x91/0x1b0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4116 register_netdevice+0x1665/0x19e0 net/core/dev.c:10422 register_netdev+0x3b/0x50 net/core/dev.c:10512 loopback_net_init+0x73/0x150 drivers/net/loopback.c:217 ops_init+0x359/0x610 net/core/net_namespace.c:139 __register_pernet_operations net/core/net_namespace.c:1247 [inline] register_pernet_operations+0x2cb/0x660 net/core/net_namespace.c:1320 register_pernet_device+0x33/0x80 net/core/net_namespace.c:1407 net_dev_init+0xfcd/0x10d0 net/core/dev.c:11956 do_one_initcall+0x248/0x880 init/main.c:1267 do_initcall_level+0x157/0x210 init/main.c:1329 do_initcalls+0x3f/0x80 init/main.c:1345 kernel_init_freeable+0x435/0x5d0 init/main.c:1578 kernel_init+0x1d/0x2b0 init/main.c:1467 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 } ... key at: [<ffffffff8f5de668>] netdev_rename_lock+0x8/0xa0 ... acquired at: lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 seqcount_lockdep_reader_access include/linux/seqlock.h:72 [inline] read_seqbegin include/linux/seqlock.h:772 [inline] netdev_copy_name+0x168/0x2c0 net/core/dev.c:949 rtnl_fill_ifinfo+0x38e/0x2270 net/core/rtnetlink.c:1839 rtmsg_ifinfo_build_skb+0x18a/0x260 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4073 rtmsg_ifinfo_event net/core/rtnetlink.c:4107 [inline] rtmsg_ifinfo+0x91/0x1b0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4116 __dev_notify_flags+0xf7/0x400 net/core/dev.c:8816 __dev_set_promiscuity+0x152/0x5a0 net/core/dev.c:8588 dev_set_promiscuity+0x51/0xe0 net/core/dev.c:8608 team_change_rx_flags+0x203/0x330 drivers/net/team/team_core.c:1771 dev_change_rx_flags net/core/dev.c:8541 [inline] __dev_set_promiscuity+0x406/0x5a0 net/core/dev.c:8585 dev_set_promiscuity+0x51/0xe0 net/core/dev.c:8608 br_port_clear_promisc net/bridge/br_if.c:135 [inline] br_manage_promisc+0x505/0x590 net/bridge/br_if.c:172 nbp_update_port_count net/bridge/br_if.c:242 [inline] br_port_flags_change+0x161/0x1f0 net/bridge/br_if.c:761 br_setport+0xcb5/0x16d0 net/bridge/br_netlink.c:1000 br_port_slave_changelink+0x135/0x150 net/bridge/br_netlink.c:1213 __rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3689 [inline] rtnl_newlink+0x169f/0x20a0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3743 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x89b/0x1180 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6635 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1e3/0x430 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2564 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1335 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x7ea/0x980 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1361 netlink_sendmsg+0x8db/0xcb0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1905 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x221/0x270 net/socket.c:745 ____sys_sendmsg+0x525/0x7d0 net/socket.c:2585 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2639 [inline] __sys_sendmsg+0x2b0/0x3a0 net/socket.c:2668 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 9449 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc2-syzkaller-00249-gbe27b8965297 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 06/07/2024 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114 print_bad_irq_dependency kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2626 [inline] check_irq_usage kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2865 [inline] check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3138 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline] validate_chain+0x4de0/0x5900 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869 __lock_acquire+0x1346/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 seqcount_lockdep_reader_access include/linux/seqlock.h:72 [inline] read_seqbegin include/linux/seqlock.h:772 [inline] netdev_copy_name+0x168/0x2c0 net/core/dev.c:949 rtnl_fill_ifinfo+0x38e/0x2270 net/core/rtnetlink.c:1839 rtmsg_ifinfo_build_skb+0x18a/0x260 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4073 rtmsg_ifinfo_event net/core/rtnetlink.c:4107 [inline] rtmsg_ifinfo+0x91/0x1b0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4116 __dev_notify_flags+0xf7/0x400 net/core/dev.c:8816 __dev_set_promiscuity+0x152/0x5a0 net/core/dev.c:8588 dev_set_promiscuity+0x51/0xe0 net/core/dev.c:8608 team_change_rx_flags+0x203/0x330 drivers/net/team/team_core.c:1771 dev_change_rx_flags net/core/dev.c:8541 [inline] __dev_set_promiscuity+0x406/0x5a0 net/core/dev.c:8585 dev_set_promiscuity+0x51/0xe0 net/core/dev.c:8608 br_port_clear_promisc net/bridge/br_if.c:135 [inline] br_manage_promisc+0x505/0x590 net/bridge/br_if.c:172 nbp_update_port_count net/bridge/br_if.c:242 [inline] br_port_flags_change+0x161/0x1f0 net/bridge/br_if.c:761 br_setport+0xcb5/0x16d0 net/bridge/br_netlink.c:1000 br_port_slave_changelink+0x135/0x150 net/bridge/br_netlink.c:1213 __rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3689 [inline] rtnl_newlink+0x169f/0x20a0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3743 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x89b/0x1180 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6635 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1e3/0x430 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2564 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1335 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x7ea/0x980 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1361 netlink_sendmsg+0x8db/0xcb0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1905 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x221/0x270 net/socket.c:745 ____sys_sendmsg+0x525/0x7d0 net/socket.c:2585 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2639 [inline] __sys_sendmsg+0x2b0/0x3a0 net/socket.c:2668 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f3b3047cf29 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 e1 20 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f3b311740c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f3b305b4050 RCX: 00007f3b3047cf29 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000000 RDI: 0000000000000008 RBP: 00007f3b304ec074 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000000000000006e R14: 00007f3b305b4050 R15: 00007ffca2f3dc68 </TASK> Fixes: 0840556 ("net: Protect dev->name by seqlock.") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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If a BUG_ON() can be hit in the wild, it shouldn't be a BUG_ON() For reference, this has popped up once in the CI, and we'll need more info to debug it: 03240 ------------[ cut here ]------------ 03240 kernel BUG at lib/closure.c:21! 03240 kernel BUG at lib/closure.c:21! 03240 Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] SMP 03240 Modules linked in: 03240 CPU: 15 PID: 40534 Comm: kworker/u80:1 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc4-ktest-ga56da69799bd #25570 03240 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) 03240 Workqueue: btree_update btree_interior_update_work 03240 pstate: 00001005 (nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT +SSBS BTYPE=--) 03240 pc : closure_put+0x224/0x2a0 03240 lr : closure_put+0x24/0x2a0 03240 sp : ffff0000d12071c0 03240 x29: ffff0000d12071c0 x28: dfff800000000000 x27: ffff0000d1207360 03240 x26: 0000000000000040 x25: 0000000000000040 x24: 0000000000000040 03240 x23: ffff0000c1f20180 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffff0000c1f20168 03240 x20: 0000000040000000 x19: ffff0000c1f20140 x18: 0000000000000001 03240 x17: 0000000000003aa0 x16: 0000000000003ad0 x15: 1fffe0001c326974 03240 x14: 0000000000000a1e x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 1fffe000183e402d 03240 x11: ffff6000183e402d x10: dfff800000000000 x9 : ffff6000183e402e 03240 x8 : 0000000000000001 x7 : 00009fffe7c1bfd3 x6 : ffff0000c1f2016b 03240 x5 : ffff0000c1f20168 x4 : ffff6000183e402e x3 : ffff800081391954 03240 x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 00000000a8000000 03240 Call trace: 03240 closure_put+0x224/0x2a0 03240 bch2_check_for_deadlock+0x910/0x1028 03240 bch2_six_check_for_deadlock+0x1c/0x30 03240 six_lock_slowpath.isra.0+0x29c/0xed0 03240 six_lock_ip_waiter+0xa8/0xf8 03240 __bch2_btree_node_lock_write+0x14c/0x298 03240 bch2_trans_lock_write+0x6d4/0xb10 03240 __bch2_trans_commit+0x135c/0x5520 03240 btree_interior_update_work+0x1248/0x1c10 03240 process_scheduled_works+0x53c/0xd90 03240 worker_thread+0x370/0x8c8 03240 kthread+0x258/0x2e8 03240 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 03240 Code: aa1303e0 d63f0020 a94363f7 17ffff8c (d4210000) 03240 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- 03240 Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception 03240 SMP: stopping secondary CPUs 03241 SMP: failed to stop secondary CPUs 13,15 03241 Kernel Offset: disabled 03241 CPU features: 0x00,00000003,80000008,4240500b 03241 Memory Limit: none 03241 ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception ]--- 03246 ========= FAILED TIMEOUT copygc_torture_no_checksum in 7200s Signed-off-by: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev>
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The code in ocfs2_dio_end_io_write() estimates number of necessary transaction credits using ocfs2_calc_extend_credits(). This however does not take into account that the IO could be arbitrarily large and can contain arbitrary number of extents. Extent tree manipulations do often extend the current transaction but not in all of the cases. For example if we have only single block extents in the tree, ocfs2_mark_extent_written() will end up calling ocfs2_replace_extent_rec() all the time and we will never extend the current transaction and eventually exhaust all the transaction credits if the IO contains many single block extents. Once that happens a WARN_ON(jbd2_handle_buffer_credits(handle) <= 0) is triggered in jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata() and subsequently OCFS2 aborts in response to this error. This was actually triggered by one of our customers on a heavily fragmented OCFS2 filesystem. To fix the issue make sure the transaction always has enough credits for one extent insert before each call of ocfs2_mark_extent_written(). Heming Zhao said: ------ PANIC: "Kernel panic - not syncing: OCFS2: (device dm-1): panic forced after error" PID: xxx TASK: xxxx CPU: 5 COMMAND: "SubmitThread-CA" #0 machine_kexec at ffffffff8c069932 #1 __crash_kexec at ffffffff8c1338fa #2 panic at ffffffff8c1d69b9 #3 ocfs2_handle_error at ffffffffc0c86c0c [ocfs2] #4 __ocfs2_abort at ffffffffc0c88387 [ocfs2] #5 ocfs2_journal_dirty at ffffffffc0c51e98 [ocfs2] #6 ocfs2_split_extent at ffffffffc0c27ea3 [ocfs2] #7 ocfs2_change_extent_flag at ffffffffc0c28053 [ocfs2] #8 ocfs2_mark_extent_written at ffffffffc0c28347 [ocfs2] #9 ocfs2_dio_end_io_write at ffffffffc0c2bef9 [ocfs2] #10 ocfs2_dio_end_io at ffffffffc0c2c0f5 [ocfs2] #11 dio_complete at ffffffff8c2b9fa7 #12 do_blockdev_direct_IO at ffffffff8c2bc09f #13 ocfs2_direct_IO at ffffffffc0c2b653 [ocfs2] #14 generic_file_direct_write at ffffffff8c1dcf14 #15 __generic_file_write_iter at ffffffff8c1dd07b #16 ocfs2_file_write_iter at ffffffffc0c49f1f [ocfs2] #17 aio_write at ffffffff8c2cc72e #18 kmem_cache_alloc at ffffffff8c248dde #19 do_io_submit at ffffffff8c2ccada #20 do_syscall_64 at ffffffff8c004984 #21 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffff8c8000ba Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240617095543.6971-1-jack@suse.cz Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240614145243.8837-1-jack@suse.cz Fixes: c15471f ("ocfs2: fix sparse file & data ordering issue in direct io") Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> Reviewed-by: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn> Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com> Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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…session In MLD connection, link_data/link_conf are dynamically allocated. They don't point to vif->bss_conf. So, there will be no chanreq assigned to vif->bss_conf and then the chan will be NULL. Tweak the code to check ht_supported/vht_supported/has_he/has_eht on sta deflink. Crash log (with rtw89 version under MLO development): [ 9890.526087] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [ 9890.526102] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 9890.526105] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 9890.526109] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 9890.526114] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI [ 9890.526119] CPU: 2 PID: 6367 Comm: kworker/u16:2 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE 6.9.0 #1 [ 9890.526123] Hardware name: LENOVO 2356AD1/2356AD1, BIOS G7ETB3WW (2.73 ) 11/28/2018 [ 9890.526126] Workqueue: phy2 rtw89_core_ba_work [rtw89_core] [ 9890.526203] RIP: 0010:ieee80211_start_tx_ba_session (net/mac80211/agg-tx.c:618 (discriminator 1)) mac80211 [ 9890.526279] Code: f7 e8 d5 93 3e ea 48 83 c4 28 89 d8 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 cc cc cc cc 49 8b 84 24 e0 f1 ff ff 48 8b 80 90 1b 00 00 <83> 38 03 0f 84 37 fe ff ff bb ea ff ff ff eb cc 49 8b 84 24 10 f3 All code ======== 0: f7 e8 imul %eax 2: d5 (bad) 3: 93 xchg %eax,%ebx 4: 3e ea ds (bad) 6: 48 83 c4 28 add $0x28,%rsp a: 89 d8 mov %ebx,%eax c: 5b pop %rbx d: 41 5c pop %r12 f: 41 5d pop %r13 11: 41 5e pop %r14 13: 41 5f pop %r15 15: 5d pop %rbp 16: c3 retq 17: cc int3 18: cc int3 19: cc int3 1a: cc int3 1b: 49 8b 84 24 e0 f1 ff mov -0xe20(%r12),%rax 22: ff 23: 48 8b 80 90 1b 00 00 mov 0x1b90(%rax),%rax 2a:* 83 38 03 cmpl $0x3,(%rax) <-- trapping instruction 2d: 0f 84 37 fe ff ff je 0xfffffffffffffe6a 33: bb ea ff ff ff mov $0xffffffea,%ebx 38: eb cc jmp 0x6 3a: 49 rex.WB 3b: 8b .byte 0x8b 3c: 84 24 10 test %ah,(%rax,%rdx,1) 3f: f3 repz Code starting with the faulting instruction =========================================== 0: 83 38 03 cmpl $0x3,(%rax) 3: 0f 84 37 fe ff ff je 0xfffffffffffffe40 9: bb ea ff ff ff mov $0xffffffea,%ebx e: eb cc jmp 0xffffffffffffffdc 10: 49 rex.WB 11: 8b .byte 0x8b 12: 84 24 10 test %ah,(%rax,%rdx,1) 15: f3 repz [ 9890.526285] RSP: 0018:ffffb8db09013d68 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 9890.526291] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff9308e0d656c8 [ 9890.526295] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffab99460b RDI: ffffffffab9a7685 [ 9890.526300] RBP: ffffb8db09013db8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000873 [ 9890.526304] R10: ffff9308e0d64800 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: ffff9308e5ff6e70 [ 9890.526308] R13: ffff930952500e20 R14: ffff9309192a8c00 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 9890.526313] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff930b4e700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 9890.526316] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 9890.526318] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000391c58005 CR4: 00000000001706f0 [ 9890.526321] Call Trace: [ 9890.526324] <TASK> [ 9890.526327] ? show_regs (arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:479) [ 9890.526335] ? __die (arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:421 arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:434) [ 9890.526340] ? page_fault_oops (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:713) [ 9890.526347] ? search_module_extables (kernel/module/main.c:3256 (discriminator 3)) [ 9890.526353] ? ieee80211_start_tx_ba_session (net/mac80211/agg-tx.c:618 (discriminator 1)) mac80211 Signed-off-by: Zong-Zhe Yang <kevin_yang@realtek.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240617115217.22344-1-kevin_yang@realtek.com Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
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Petr Machata says: ==================== mlxsw: Reduce memory footprint of mlxsw driver Amit Cohen writes: A previous patch-set used page pool to allocate buffers, to simplify the change, we first used one continuous buffer, which was allocated with order > 0. This set improves page pool usage to allocate the exact number of pages which are required for packet. This change requires using fragmented SKB, till now all the buffer was in the linear part. Note that 'skb->truesize' is decreased for small packets. This set significantly reduces memory consumption of mlxsw driver. The footprint is reduced by 26%. Patch set overview: Patch #1 calculates number of scatter/gather entries and stores the value Patch #2 converts the driver to use fragmented buffers ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/cover.1719321422.git.petrm@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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In the TRACE_EVENT(qdisc_reset) NULL dereference occurred from qdisc->dev_queue->dev <NULL> ->name This situation simulated from bunch of veths and Bluetooth disconnection and reconnection. During qdisc initialization, qdisc was being set to noop_queue. In veth_init_queue, the initial tx_num was reduced back to one, causing the qdisc reset to be called with noop, which led to the kernel panic. I've attached the GitHub gist link that C converted syz-execprogram source code and 3 log of reproduced vmcore-dmesg. https://gist.github.com/yskelg/cc64562873ce249cdd0d5a358b77d740 Yeoreum and I use two fuzzing tool simultaneously. One process with syz-executor : https://github.com/google/syzkaller $ ./syz-execprog -executor=./syz-executor -repeat=1 -sandbox=setuid \ -enable=none -collide=false log1 The other process with perf fuzzer: https://github.com/deater/perf_event_tests/tree/master/fuzzer $ perf_event_tests/fuzzer/perf_fuzzer I think this will happen on the kernel version. Linux kernel version +v6.7.10, +v6.8, +v6.9 and it could happen in v6.10. This occurred from 51270d5. I think this patch is absolutely necessary. Previously, It was showing not intended string value of name. I've reproduced 3 time from my fedora 40 Debug Kernel with any other module or patched. version: 6.10.0-0.rc2.20240608gitdc772f8237f9.29.fc41.aarch64+debug [ 5287.164555] veth0_vlan: left promiscuous mode [ 5287.164929] veth1_macvtap: left promiscuous mode [ 5287.164950] veth0_macvtap: left promiscuous mode [ 5287.164983] veth1_vlan: left promiscuous mode [ 5287.165008] veth0_vlan: left promiscuous mode [ 5287.165450] veth1_macvtap: left promiscuous mode [ 5287.165472] veth0_macvtap: left promiscuous mode [ 5287.165502] veth1_vlan: left promiscuous mode … [ 5297.598240] bridge0: port 2(bridge_slave_1) entered blocking state [ 5297.598262] bridge0: port 2(bridge_slave_1) entered forwarding state [ 5297.598296] bridge0: port 1(bridge_slave_0) entered blocking state [ 5297.598313] bridge0: port 1(bridge_slave_0) entered forwarding state [ 5297.616090] 8021q: adding VLAN 0 to HW filter on device bond0 [ 5297.620405] bridge0: port 1(bridge_slave_0) entered disabled state [ 5297.620730] bridge0: port 2(bridge_slave_1) entered disabled state [ 5297.627247] 8021q: adding VLAN 0 to HW filter on device team0 [ 5297.629636] bridge0: port 1(bridge_slave_0) entered blocking state … [ 5298.002798] bridge_slave_0: left promiscuous mode [ 5298.002869] bridge0: port 1(bridge_slave_0) entered disabled state [ 5298.309444] bond0 (unregistering): (slave bond_slave_0): Releasing backup interface [ 5298.315206] bond0 (unregistering): (slave bond_slave_1): Releasing backup interface [ 5298.320207] bond0 (unregistering): Released all slaves [ 5298.354296] hsr_slave_0: left promiscuous mode [ 5298.360750] hsr_slave_1: left promiscuous mode [ 5298.374889] veth1_macvtap: left promiscuous mode [ 5298.374931] veth0_macvtap: left promiscuous mode [ 5298.374988] veth1_vlan: left promiscuous mode [ 5298.375024] veth0_vlan: left promiscuous mode [ 5299.109741] team0 (unregistering): Port device team_slave_1 removed [ 5299.185870] team0 (unregistering): Port device team_slave_0 removed … [ 5300.155443] Bluetooth: hci3: unexpected cc 0x0c03 length: 249 > 1 [ 5300.155724] Bluetooth: hci3: unexpected cc 0x1003 length: 249 > 9 [ 5300.155988] Bluetooth: hci3: unexpected cc 0x1001 length: 249 > 9 …. [ 5301.075531] team0: Port device team_slave_1 added [ 5301.085515] bridge0: port 1(bridge_slave_0) entered blocking state [ 5301.085531] bridge0: port 1(bridge_slave_0) entered disabled state [ 5301.085588] bridge_slave_0: entered allmulticast mode [ 5301.085800] bridge_slave_0: entered promiscuous mode [ 5301.095617] bridge0: port 1(bridge_slave_0) entered blocking state [ 5301.095633] bridge0: port 1(bridge_slave_0) entered disabled state … [ 5301.149734] bond0: (slave bond_slave_0): Enslaving as an active interface with an up link [ 5301.173234] bond0: (slave bond_slave_0): Enslaving as an active interface with an up link [ 5301.180517] bond0: (slave bond_slave_1): Enslaving as an active interface with an up link [ 5301.193481] hsr_slave_0: entered promiscuous mode [ 5301.204425] hsr_slave_1: entered promiscuous mode [ 5301.210172] debugfs: Directory 'hsr0' with parent 'hsr' already present! [ 5301.210185] Cannot create hsr debugfs directory [ 5301.224061] bond0: (slave bond_slave_1): Enslaving as an active interface with an up link [ 5301.246901] bond0: (slave bond_slave_0): Enslaving as an active interface with an up link [ 5301.255934] team0: Port device team_slave_0 added [ 5301.256480] team0: Port device team_slave_1 added [ 5301.256948] team0: Port device team_slave_0 added … [ 5301.435928] hsr_slave_0: entered promiscuous mode [ 5301.446029] hsr_slave_1: entered promiscuous mode [ 5301.455872] debugfs: Directory 'hsr0' with parent 'hsr' already present! [ 5301.455884] Cannot create hsr debugfs directory [ 5301.502664] hsr_slave_0: entered promiscuous mode [ 5301.513675] hsr_slave_1: entered promiscuous mode [ 5301.526155] debugfs: Directory 'hsr0' with parent 'hsr' already present! [ 5301.526164] Cannot create hsr debugfs directory [ 5301.563662] hsr_slave_0: entered promiscuous mode [ 5301.576129] hsr_slave_1: entered promiscuous mode [ 5301.580259] debugfs: Directory 'hsr0' with parent 'hsr' already present! [ 5301.580270] Cannot create hsr debugfs directory [ 5301.590269] 8021q: adding VLAN 0 to HW filter on device bond0 [ 5301.595872] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000130-0x0000000000000137] [ 5301.595877] Mem abort info: [ 5301.595881] ESR = 0x0000000096000006 [ 5301.595885] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 5301.595889] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 5301.595893] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 5301.595896] FSC = 0x06: level 2 translation fault [ 5301.595900] Data abort info: [ 5301.595903] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000006, ISS2 = 0x00000000 [ 5301.595907] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 [ 5301.595911] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 [ 5301.595915] [dfff800000000026] address between user and kernel address ranges [ 5301.595971] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000006 [#1] SMP … [ 5301.596076] CPU: 2 PID: 102769 Comm: syz-executor.3 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W ------- --- 6.10.0-0.rc2.20240608gitdc772f8237f9.29.fc41.aarch64+debug #1 [ 5301.596080] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware20,1/VBSA, BIOS VMW201.00V.21805430.BA64.2305221830 05/22/2023 [ 5301.596082] pstate: 01400005 (nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 5301.596085] pc : strnlen+0x40/0x88 [ 5301.596114] lr : trace_event_get_offsets_qdisc_reset+0x6c/0x2b0 [ 5301.596124] sp : ffff8000beef6b40 [ 5301.596126] x29: ffff8000beef6b40 x28: dfff800000000000 x27: 0000000000000001 [ 5301.596131] x26: 6de1800082c62bd0 x25: 1ffff000110aa9e0 x24: ffff800088554f00 [ 5301.596136] x23: ffff800088554ec0 x22: 0000000000000130 x21: 0000000000000140 [ 5301.596140] x20: dfff800000000000 x19: ffff8000beef6c60 x18: ffff7000115106d8 [ 5301.596143] x17: ffff800121bad000 x16: ffff800080020000 x15: 0000000000000006 [ 5301.596147] x14: 0000000000000002 x13: ffff0001f3ed8d14 x12: ffff700017ddeda5 [ 5301.596151] x11: 1ffff00017ddeda4 x10: ffff700017ddeda4 x9 : ffff800082cc5eec [ 5301.596155] x8 : 0000000000000004 x7 : 00000000f1f1f1f1 x6 : 00000000f2f2f200 [ 5301.596158] x5 : 00000000f3f3f3f3 x4 : ffff700017dded80 x3 : 00000000f204f1f1 [ 5301.596162] x2 : 0000000000000026 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000130 [ 5301.596166] Call trace: [ 5301.596175] strnlen+0x40/0x88 [ 5301.596179] trace_event_get_offsets_qdisc_reset+0x6c/0x2b0 [ 5301.596182] perf_trace_qdisc_reset+0xb0/0x538 [ 5301.596184] __traceiter_qdisc_reset+0x68/0xc0 [ 5301.596188] qdisc_reset+0x43c/0x5e8 [ 5301.596190] netif_set_real_num_tx_queues+0x288/0x770 [ 5301.596194] veth_init_queues+0xfc/0x130 [veth] [ 5301.596198] veth_newlink+0x45c/0x850 [veth] [ 5301.596202] rtnl_newlink_create+0x2c8/0x798 [ 5301.596205] __rtnl_newlink+0x92c/0xb60 [ 5301.596208] rtnl_newlink+0xd8/0x130 [ 5301.596211] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x2e0/0x890 [ 5301.596214] netlink_rcv_skb+0x1c4/0x380 [ 5301.596225] rtnetlink_rcv+0x20/0x38 [ 5301.596227] netlink_unicast+0x3c8/0x640 [ 5301.596231] netlink_sendmsg+0x658/0xa60 [ 5301.596234] __sock_sendmsg+0xd0/0x180 [ 5301.596243] __sys_sendto+0x1c0/0x280 [ 5301.596246] __arm64_sys_sendto+0xc8/0x150 [ 5301.596249] invoke_syscall+0xdc/0x268 [ 5301.596256] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x16c/0x240 [ 5301.596259] do_el0_svc+0x48/0x68 [ 5301.596261] el0_svc+0x50/0x188 [ 5301.596265] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x130 [ 5301.596268] el0t_64_sync+0x194/0x198 [ 5301.596272] Code: eb15001f 54000120 d343fc02 12000801 (38f46842) [ 5301.596285] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs [ 5301.597053] Starting crashdump kernel... [ 5301.597057] Bye! After applying our patch, I didn't find any kernel panic errors. We've found a simple reproducer # echo 1 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/qdisc/qdisc_reset/enable # ip link add veth0 type veth peer name veth1 Error: Unknown device type. However, without our patch applied, I tested upstream 6.10.0-rc3 kernel using the qdisc_reset event and the ip command on my qemu virtual machine. This 2 commands makes always kernel panic. Linux version: 6.10.0-rc3 [ 0.000000] Linux version 6.10.0-rc3-00164-g44ef20baed8e-dirty (paran@fedora) (gcc (GCC) 14.1.1 20240522 (Red Hat 14.1.1-4), GNU ld version 2.41-34.fc40) #20 SMP PREEMPT Sat Jun 15 16:51:25 KST 2024 Kernel panic message: [ 615.236484] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000005 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 615.237250] Dumping ftrace buffer: [ 615.237679] (ftrace buffer empty) [ 615.238097] Modules linked in: veth crct10dif_ce virtio_gpu virtio_dma_buf drm_shmem_helper drm_kms_helper zynqmp_fpga xilinx_can xilinx_spi xilinx_selectmap xilinx_core xilinx_pr_decoupler versal_fpga uvcvideo uvc videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops videobuf2_v4l2 videodev videobuf2_common mc usbnet deflate zstd ubifs ubi rcar_canfd rcar_can omap_mailbox ntb_msi_test ntb_hw_epf lattice_sysconfig_spi lattice_sysconfig ice40_spi gpio_xilinx dwmac_altr_socfpga mdio_regmap stmmac_platform stmmac pcs_xpcs dfl_fme_region dfl_fme_mgr dfl_fme_br dfl_afu dfl fpga_region fpga_bridge can can_dev br_netfilter bridge stp llc atl1c ath11k_pci mhi ath11k_ahb ath11k qmi_helpers ath10k_sdio ath10k_pci ath10k_core ath mac80211 libarc4 cfg80211 drm fuse backlight ipv6 Jun 22 02:36:5[3 6k152.62-4sm98k4-0k]v kCePUr:n e1l :P IUDn:a b4le6 8t oC ohmma: nidpl eN oketr nteali nptaedg i6n.g1 0re.0q-urecs3t- 0at0 1v6i4r-tgu4a4le fa2d0dbraeeds0se-dir tyd f#f2f08 615.252376] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) [ 615.253220] pstate: 80400005 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 615.254433] pc : strnlen+0x6c/0xe0 [ 615.255096] lr : trace_event_get_offsets_qdisc_reset+0x94/0x3d0 [ 615.256088] sp : ffff800080b269a0 [ 615.256615] x29: ffff800080b269a0 x28: ffffc070f3f98500 x27: 0000000000000001 [ 615.257831] x26: 0000000000000010 x25: ffffc070f3f98540 x24: ffffc070f619cf60 [ 615.259020] x23: 0000000000000128 x22: 0000000000000138 x21: dfff800000000000 [ 615.260241] x20: ffffc070f631ad00 x19: 0000000000000128 x18: ffffc070f448b800 [ 615.261454] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000001 x15: ffffc070f4ba2a90 [ 615.262635] x14: ffff700010164d73 x13: 1ffff80e1e8d5eb3 x12: 1ffff00010164d72 [ 615.263877] x11: ffff700010164d72 x10: dfff800000000000 x9 : ffffc070e85d6184 [ 615.265047] x8 : ffffc070e4402070 x7 : 000000000000f1f1 x6 : 000000001504a6d3 [ 615.266336] x5 : ffff28ca21122140 x4 : ffffc070f5043ea8 x3 : 0000000000000000 [ 615.267528] x2 : 0000000000000025 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000 [ 615.268747] Call trace: [ 615.269180] strnlen+0x6c/0xe0 [ 615.269767] trace_event_get_offsets_qdisc_reset+0x94/0x3d0 [ 615.270716] trace_event_raw_event_qdisc_reset+0xe8/0x4e8 [ 615.271667] __traceiter_qdisc_reset+0xa0/0x140 [ 615.272499] qdisc_reset+0x554/0x848 [ 615.273134] netif_set_real_num_tx_queues+0x360/0x9a8 [ 615.274050] veth_init_queues+0x110/0x220 [veth] [ 615.275110] veth_newlink+0x538/0xa50 [veth] [ 615.276172] __rtnl_newlink+0x11e4/0x1bc8 [ 615.276944] rtnl_newlink+0xac/0x120 [ 615.277657] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x4e4/0x1370 [ 615.278409] netlink_rcv_skb+0x25c/0x4f0 [ 615.279122] rtnetlink_rcv+0x48/0x70 [ 615.279769] netlink_unicast+0x5a8/0x7b8 [ 615.280462] netlink_sendmsg+0xa70/0x1190 Yeoreum and I don't know if the patch we wrote will fix the underlying cause, but we think that priority is to prevent kernel panic happening. So, we're sending this patch. Fixes: 51270d5 ("tracing/net_sched: Fix tracepoints that save qdisc_dev() as a string") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240229143432.273b4871@gandalf.local.home/t/ Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Tested-by: Yunseong Kim <yskelg@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Yunseong Kim <yskelg@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Yeoreum Yun <yeoreum.yun@arm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240624173320.24945-4-yskelg@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
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…git/netfilter/nf Pablo Neira Ayuso says: ==================== Netfilter fixes for net The following patchset contains two Netfilter fixes for net: Patch #1 fixes CONFIG_SYSCTL=n for a patch coming in the previous PR to move the sysctl toggle to enable SRv6 netfilter hooks from nf_conntrack to the core, from Jianguo Wu. Patch #2 fixes a possible pointer leak to userspace due to insufficient validation of NFT_DATA_VALUE. Linus found this pointer leak to userspace via zdi-disclosures@ and forwarded the notice to Netfilter maintainers, he appears as reporter because whoever found this issue never approached Netfilter maintainers neither via security@ nor in private. netfilter pull request 24-06-27 * tag 'nf-24-06-27' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf: netfilter: nf_tables: fully validate NFT_DATA_VALUE on store to data registers netfilter: fix undefined reference to 'netfilter_lwtunnel_*' when CONFIG_SYSCTL=n ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240626233845.151197-1-pablo@netfilter.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
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Danielle Ratson says: ==================== Add ability to flash modules' firmware CMIS compliant modules such as QSFP-DD might be running a firmware that can be updated in a vendor-neutral way by exchanging messages between the host and the module as described in section 7.2.2 of revision 4.0 of the CMIS standard. According to the CMIS standard, the firmware update process is done using a CDB commands sequence. CDB (Command Data Block Message Communication) reads and writes are performed on memory map pages 9Fh-AFh according to the CMIS standard, section 8.12 of revision 4.0. Add a pair of new ethtool messages that allow: * User space to trigger firmware update of transceiver modules * The kernel to notify user space about the progress of the process The user interface is designed to be asynchronous in order to avoid RTNL being held for too long and to allow several modules to be updated simultaneously. The interface is designed with CMIS compliant modules in mind, but kept generic enough to accommodate future use cases, if these arise. The kernel interface that will implement the firmware update using CDB command will include 2 layers that will be added under ethtool: * The upper layer that will be triggered from the module layer, is cmis_ fw_update. * The lower one is cmis_cdb. In the future there might be more operations to implement using CDB commands. Therefore, the idea is to keep the cmis_cdb interface clean and the cmis_fw_update specific to the cdb commands handling it. The communication between the kernel and the driver will be done using two ethtool operations that enable reading and writing the transceiver module EEPROM. The operation ethtool_ops::get_module_eeprom_by_page, that is already implemented, will be used for reading from the EEPROM the CDB reply, e.g. reading module setting, state, etc. The operation ethtool_ops::set_module_eeprom_by_page, that is added in the current patchset, will be used for writing to the EEPROM the CDB command such as start firmware image, run firmware image, etc. Therefore in order for a driver to implement module flashing, that driver needs to implement the two functions mentioned above. Patchset overview: Patch #1-#2: Implement the EEPROM writing in mlxsw. Patch #3: Define the interface between the kernel and user space. Patch #4: Add ability to notify the flashing firmware progress. Patch #5: Veto operations during flashing. Patch #6: Add extended compliance codes. Patch #7: Add the cdb layer. Patch #8: Add the fw_update layer. Patch #9: Add ability to flash transceiver modules' firmware. v8: Patch #7: * In the ethtool_cmis_wait_for_cond() evaluate the condition once more to decide if the error code should be -ETIMEDOUT or something else. * s/netdev_err/netdev_err_once. v7: Patch #4: * Return -ENOMEM instead of PTR_ERR(attr) on ethnl_module_fw_flash_ntf_put_err(). Patch #9: * Fix Warning for not unlocking the spin_lock in the error flow on module_flash_fw_work_list_add(). * Avoid the fall-through on ethnl_sock_priv_destroy(). v6: * Squash some of the last patch to patch #5 and patch #9. Patch #3: * Add paragraph in .rst file. Patch #4: * Reserve '1' more place on SKB for NUL terminator in the error message string. * Add more prints on error flow, re-write the printing function and add ethnl_module_fw_flash_ntf_put_err(). * Change the communication method so notification will be sent in unicast instead of multicast. * Add new 'struct ethnl_module_fw_flash_ntf_params' that holds the relevant info for unicast communication and use it to send notification to the specific socket. * s/nla_put_u64_64bit/nla_put_uint/ Patch #7: * In ethtool_cmis_cdb_init(), Use 'const' for the 'params' parameter. Patch #8: * Add a list field to struct ethtool_module_fw_flash for module_fw_flash_work_list that will be presented in the next patch. * Move ethtool_cmis_fw_update() cleaning to a new function that will be represented in the next patch. * Move some of the fields in struct ethtool_module_fw_flash to a separate struct, so ethtool_cmis_fw_update() will get only the relevant parameters for it. * Edit the relevant functions to get the relevant params for them. * s/CMIS_MODULE_READY_MAX_DURATION_USEC/CMIS_MODULE_READY_MAX_DURATION_MSEC Patch #9: * Add a paragraph in the commit message. * Rename labels in module_flash_fw_schedule(). * Add info to genl_sk_priv_*() and implement the relevant callbacks, in order to handle properly a scenario of closing the socket from user space before the work item was ended. * Add a list the holds all the ethtool_module_fw_flash struct that corresponds to the in progress work items. * Add a new enum for the socket types. * Use both above to identify a flashing socket, add it to the list and when closing socket affect only the flashing type. * Create a new function that will get the work item instead of ethtool_cmis_fw_update(). * Edit the relevant functions to get the relevant params for them. * The new function will call the old ethtool_cmis_fw_update(), and do the cleaning, so the existence of the list should be completely isolated in module.c. =================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Petr Machata says: ==================== selftest: Clean-up and stabilize mirroring tests The mirroring selftests work by sending ICMP traffic between two hosts. Along the way, this traffic is mirrored to a gretap netdevice, and counter taps are then installed strategically along the path of the mirrored traffic to verify the mirroring took place. The problem with this is that besides mirroring the primary traffic, any other service traffic is mirrored as well. At the same time, because the tests need to work in HW-offloaded scenarios, the ability of the device to do arbitrary packet inspection should not be taken for granted. Most tests therefore simply use matchall, one uses flower to match on IP address. As a result, the selftests are noisy. mirror_test() accommodated this noisiness by giving the counters an allowance of several packets. But that only works up to a point, and on busy systems won't be always enough. In this patch set, clean up and stabilize the mirroring selftests. The original intention was to port the tests over to UDP, but the logic of ICMP ends up being so entangled in the mirroring selftests that the changes feel overly invasive. Instead, ICMP is kept, but where possible, we match on ICMP message type, thus filtering out hits by other ICMP messages. Where this is not practical (where the counter tap is put on a device that carries encapsulated packets), switch the counter condition to _at least_ X observed packets. This is less robust, but barely so -- probably the only scenario that this would not catch is something like erroneous packet duplication, which would hopefully get caught by the numerous other tests in this extensive suite. - Patches #1 to #3 clean up parameters at various helpers. - Patches #4 to #6 stabilize the mirroring selftests as described above. - Mirroring tests currently allow testing SW datapath even on HW netdevices by trapping traffic to the SW datapath. This complicates the tests a bit without a good reason: to test SW datapath, just run the selftests on the veth topology. Thus in patch #7, drop support for this dual SW/HW testing. - At this point, some cleanups were either made possible by the previous patches, or were always possible. In patches #8 to #11, realize these cleanups. - In patch #12, fix mlxsw mirror_gre selftest to respect setting TESTS. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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This adds a check before freeing the rx->skb in flush and close functions to handle the kernel crash seen while removing driver after FW download fails or before FW download completes. dmesg log: [ 54.634586] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000080 [ 54.643398] Mem abort info: [ 54.646204] ESR = 0x0000000096000004 [ 54.649964] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 54.655286] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 54.658348] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 54.661498] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault [ 54.666391] Data abort info: [ 54.669273] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000 [ 54.674768] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 [ 54.674771] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 [ 54.674775] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000048860000 [ 54.674780] [0000000000000080] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000 [ 54.703880] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 54.710152] Modules linked in: btnxpuart(-) overlay fsl_jr_uio caam_jr caamkeyblob_desc caamhash_desc caamalg_desc crypto_engine authenc libdes crct10dif_ce polyval_ce polyval_generic snd_soc_imx_spdif snd_soc_imx_card snd_soc_ak5558 snd_soc_ak4458 caam secvio error snd_soc_fsl_micfil snd_soc_fsl_spdif snd_soc_fsl_sai snd_soc_fsl_utils imx_pcm_dma gpio_ir_recv rc_core sch_fq_codel fuse [ 54.744357] CPU: 3 PID: 72 Comm: kworker/u9:0 Not tainted 6.6.3-otbr-g128004619037 #2 [ 54.744364] Hardware name: FSL i.MX8MM EVK board (DT) [ 54.744368] Workqueue: hci0 hci_power_on [ 54.757244] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 54.757249] pc : kfree_skb_reason+0x18/0xb0 [ 54.772299] lr : btnxpuart_flush+0x40/0x58 [btnxpuart] [ 54.782921] sp : ffff8000805ebca0 [ 54.782923] x29: ffff8000805ebca0 x28: ffffa5c6cf1869c0 x27: ffffa5c6cf186000 [ 54.782931] x26: ffff377b84852400 x25: ffff377b848523c0 x24: ffff377b845e7230 [ 54.782938] x23: ffffa5c6ce8dbe08 x22: ffffa5c6ceb65410 x21: 00000000ffffff92 [ 54.782945] x20: ffffa5c6ce8dbe98 x19: ffffffffffffffac x18: ffffffffffffffff [ 54.807651] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffa5c6ce2824ec x15: ffff8001005eb857 [ 54.821917] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: ffffa5c6cf1a02e0 x12: 0000000000000642 [ 54.821924] x11: 0000000000000040 x10: ffffa5c6cf19d690 x9 : ffffa5c6cf19d688 [ 54.821931] x8 : ffff377b86000028 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000 [ 54.821938] x5 : ffff377b86000000 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000 [ 54.843331] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000002 x0 : ffffffffffffffac [ 54.857599] Call trace: [ 54.857601] kfree_skb_reason+0x18/0xb0 [ 54.863878] btnxpuart_flush+0x40/0x58 [btnxpuart] [ 54.863888] hci_dev_open_sync+0x3a8/0xa04 [ 54.872773] hci_power_on+0x54/0x2e4 [ 54.881832] process_one_work+0x138/0x260 [ 54.881842] worker_thread+0x32c/0x438 [ 54.881847] kthread+0x118/0x11c [ 54.881853] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 54.896406] Code: a9be7bfd 910003fd f9000bf3 aa0003f3 (b940d400) [ 54.896410] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Signed-off-by: Neeraj Sanjay Kale <neeraj.sanjaykale@nxp.com> Tested-by: Guillaume Legoupil <guillaume.legoupil@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
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Jun 28, 2024
… unloading When unload the btnxpuart driver, its associated timer will be deleted. If the timer happens to be modified at this moment, it leads to the kernel call this timer even after the driver unloaded, resulting in kernel panic. Use timer_shutdown_sync() instead of del_timer_sync() to prevent rearming. panic log: Internal error: Oops: 0000000086000007 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: algif_hash algif_skcipher af_alg moal(O) mlan(O) crct10dif_ce polyval_ce polyval_generic snd_soc_imx_card snd_soc_fsl_asoc_card snd_soc_imx_audmux mxc_jpeg_encdec v4l2_jpeg snd_soc_wm8962 snd_soc_fsl_micfil snd_soc_fsl_sai flexcan snd_soc_fsl_utils ap130x rpmsg_ctrl imx_pcm_dma can_dev rpmsg_char pwm_fan fuse [last unloaded: btnxpuart] CPU: 5 PID: 723 Comm: memtester Tainted: G O 6.6.23-lts-next-06207-g4aef2658ac28 #1 Hardware name: NXP i.MX95 19X19 board (DT) pstate: 20400009 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : 0xffff80007a2cf464 lr : call_timer_fn.isra.0+0x24/0x80 ... Call trace: 0xffff80007a2cf464 __run_timers+0x234/0x280 run_timer_softirq+0x20/0x40 __do_softirq+0x100/0x26c ____do_softirq+0x10/0x1c call_on_irq_stack+0x24/0x4c do_softirq_own_stack+0x1c/0x2c irq_exit_rcu+0xc0/0xdc el0_interrupt+0x54/0xd8 __el0_irq_handler_common+0x18/0x24 el0t_64_irq_handler+0x10/0x1c el0t_64_irq+0x190/0x194 Code: ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? (????????) ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception in interrupt SMP: stopping secondary CPUs Kernel Offset: disabled CPU features: 0x0,c0000000,40028143,1000721b Memory Limit: none ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception in interrupt ]--- Signed-off-by: Luke Wang <ziniu.wang_1@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
BluezTestBot
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Jun 28, 2024
This fixes the following deadlock introduced by 39a92a5 ("bluetooth/l2cap: sync sock recv cb and release") ============================================ WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 6.10.0-rc3-g4029dba6b6f1 #6823 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- kworker/u5:0/35 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888002ec2510 (&chan->lock#2/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: l2cap_sock_recv_cb+0x44/0x1e0 but task is already holding lock: ffff888002ec2510 (&chan->lock#2/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: l2cap_get_chan_by_scid+0xaf/0xd0 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&chan->lock#2/1); lock(&chan->lock#2/1); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 3 locks held by kworker/u5:0/35: #0: ffff888002b8a940 ((wq_completion)hci0#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x750/0x930 #1: ffff888002c67dd0 ((work_completion)(&hdev->rx_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x44e/0x930 #2: ffff888002ec2510 (&chan->lock#2/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: l2cap_get_chan_by_scid+0xaf/0xd0 To fix the original problem this introduces l2cap_chan_lock at l2cap_conless_channel to ensure that l2cap_sock_recv_cb is called with chan->lock held. Fixes: 39a92a5 ("bluetooth/l2cap: sync sock recv cb and release") Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
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syzbot has found a reproducer for the following issue on:
HEAD commit: e49d033 Linux 5.12-rc6
git tree: upstream
console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=12579f11d00000
kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=b8dbd3c72fdc7777
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=80f5bab4eb14d14e7386
syz repro: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=143b1696d00000
C reproducer: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=14c5a30ed00000
IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit:
Reported-by: syzbot+80f5bab4eb14d14e7386@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
BUG: memory leak
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