

# An incentive-compatible decentralized file storage

## Final Project in Decentralized Systems Engineering

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### Introduction

Our Peerster protocol allows us to exchange messages and files in a decentralized network. While we also have the functionality of a private message, the topic of *privacy* has not been a big concern in this implementation. With the presented final project, Peerster shall be extended to allow for the upload of private files with a high availability while preserving incentive compatibility for nodes in the network. Furthermore, the implementation of private messages shall be extended, so that it prevents other nodes from eavesdropping on the exchanged content.

### Related work

**Cryptography** Providing privacy for the contents of files and messages can be achieved utilizing cryptography. In asymmetric cryptography, peers generate a key-pair (pub, priv) of which only the public key is made available to other peers. Data that is addressed to a peer can then be encrypted using their public key. Once encrypted, the data can then only be decrypted by the peer possessing the corresponding private key. One asymmetric key encryption algorithm is Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA). On the other hand, in symmetric cryptography, a single key is used to en- and decrypt data. Data can thereby be shared among peers by distributing a key, e.g. utilizing asymmetric cryptography, or, in bilateral settings, using Diffie–Hellman key exchange to generate the key upfront. One method of symmetric cryptography are algorithms using block ciphers such as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) (Smart, 2002).

**Availability** Availability in p2p networks where nodes cannot be assumed to be reliable can be achieved by *replications* or *erasure coding* (Weatherspoon and Kubiatowicz, 2002). While the approach of replications distributed copies of files or chunks of files among nodes, whereas erasure coding introduces redundancy on the data level and breaks up the data into fragments that are stored across different nodes.

**Incentive compatibility in p2p cloud storage** When storing Public Files, other peers may have some inherent benefit from storing a file published by another peer, e.g. by having constant access to the data. However, when files are encrypted and made private, this incentive fades.

Feldman and Chuang (2005) examines different incentive mechanisms and finds *Inherent Generosity*, *Monetary Payment Systems* and *Reciprocity-Based Schemes* as main concepts.

A concept that relies on inherent generosity is the p2p cloud storage system Freenet (Clarke et al., 2001). However, this doesn't seem to provide sufficient incentive compatibility as the system suffers from lacking storage capacity (Kopp et al., 2017).

*Monetary incentives* are used in a multitude of different systems. Many of them issue tokens that can be traded on exchanges (e.g. Vorick and Champine (2014), Wilkinson et al. (2014) and Lambert et al. (2015)). Thereby, differences in supply and demand of storage may result in price changes of the coin and, in turn, change supply and demand to a new equilibrium.

Thirdly, in *Reciprocity-Based Schemes* transaction histories are incorporated into decision processes. Schemes like tit-for-that such as BitTorrent (c.f. Cohen (2003)) or classic reputation systems are attributed to this class of incentive mechanisms (Feldman and Chuang, 2005). One approach to act based upon transaction history is for example *stranger discrimination* which discriminates newly joined nodes to avoid Sybil attacks (Lai et al., 2003).

**Proving data possession** A basic way of ensuring replication is the so-called Proof-of-Retrievability (PoR). The core idea is to let peers compute values based on the data they are supposed to store. By using a hash instead of downloading the entire file, communication overhead is reduced. To further ensure that a peer does not precompute hashes, the peer may only know the precise task he has to solve at the time he is asked to provide the proof.

To make collusion among peers for the computation of PoRs infeasible, Protocol Labs (2017) propose to send out pseudo-random permutations of data, whereas Vorick and Champine (2014) sends out data with different encryption keys. Protocol Labs (2017) additionally introduces a Proof-of-Spacetime, which is an iterative PoR that takes the previous proof as input of subsequent proof and thereby aims at proving the continued storage of a file while reducing communication overhead.

Kopp et al. (2017) uses publicly verifiable PoR based on *Homomorphic Linear Authenticator*, as introduced by Ateniese et al. (2009). An alternative to this are *Zero Knowledge Proofs* (c.f. Lambert et al. (2015)).

Combining this with blockchain-based *Smart Contracts* allows to automate the monitoring and verification of PoRs (c.f. Vorick and Champine (2014)).

## System Goals & Functionalities & Architecture

**Goals** The goal of this final project implementation is to enable Private File storage through Peerster. As storing private files of others does not inherently benefit any node that cannot access its contents, other measures have to be taken to nevertheless ensure the distribution of the file across the network, and, thereby, availability of a file in case of temporary node failures. Furthermore, as payment systems additionally complicate the implementation and, if traded on exchanges, are usually subject to high volatility, the presented approach aims at providing incentive compatibility without introducing tokens or coins.

**Private file upload** To describe private files, we introduce a new struct `PrivateFile`. Private files are similar to the `Files` that we have previously used. However, the result of the file indexing process will not be published, i.e. not included in the blockchain and not returned as result of search requests. Besides the `File` struct that we used in previous homeworks, `Replica` are used to represent the storage of a file at another peer. Each replica instance represents an AES encrypted version of the original file. For each `Replica` another `EncryptionKey` is used, the reason for this will be explained later on in the paragraph targeting Proof of Retrievability. Right after the indexing of the file, the variables `NodeID` and `ExchangeMFH` are empty as the replications are only stored locally at this point.

**Distribute replications** To distribute the file among the network, a process resembling a three-way handshake, using `FileExchangeRequests` is performed for each replica:

1. The node broadcasts a `FileExchangeRequest` with the status `OFFER` to the network. Further variables contain information about the `MetaFileHash` of the `Replica` and the name of the node sending the request.

---

```

1  type PrivateFile struct {
2      File
3      Replications []Replica
4  }
5
6  type Replica struct {
7      NodeID      string // Name of the remote peer storing the file
8      EncryptionKey []byte // AES Encryption key
9      ExchangeMPH  string // Exchange Metafilehash
10     Metafilehash  string // Metafilehash of the encrypted file
11 }

```

---

Listing 1: Structs modelling private files and their replications

---

```

1  type FileExchangeRequest struct {
2      Origin      string
3      Destination string // Empty for OFFER, i.e. the initial broadcast
4      Status      string // OFFER, ACCEPT, FIX
5      HopLimit    uint32
6      MetaFileHash string // hex-representation of the Metafilehash of the Replica
7      ExchangeMetaFileHash string // Empty for OFFER, i.e. the initial broadcast
8  }

```

---

Listing 2: Struct used to initiate the exchange of file replicas

2. Interested peers respond to that message with another `FileExchangeMessage` including the metafilehash of the file they would be interested to send in exchange as variable `ExchangeMetaFileHash`. This message has a status of `ACCEPT`. The peer then starts a timeout counter to avoid waiting infinitely long for a response.
3. The initiating node checks on every incoming `FileExchangeRequest` whether the replica they want to distribute, as specified in `MetaFileHash` was already assigned to some other peer or whether the peer is already storing another `Replica` instance of the same `PrivateFile`. If this is not the case, it sends an acknowledgement `FileExchangeMessage` with status `FIX` and starts downloading the file specified by `ExchangeMetaFileHash` from the peer.
4. On reception of the `FileExchangeMessage` with status `FIX`, the peer, in turn, starts to download the file specified by `MetaFileHash`.

At this point, the file exchange has been established and the variables `NodeID` and `ExchangeMPH` of the exchanged `Replica` are assigned to the corresponding peer. Both nodes then periodically request a *Proof of Retrievability*.

**Proof of Retrievability** For the implemented PoR, a peer needs to compute a hash based on the data he has stored. To avoid precomputation, we use the `Challenge` struct that specifies the precise parameters that peer should use for the proof. The PoR the peer is supposed to solve is a SHA1 hash of chunk data (the specific chunk is defined by its metahash `ChunkHash`) and some appended data provided in `Postpend`. Both the specified chunk and the postpend data is selected (pseudo)-randomly

---

```

1  type Challenge struct {
2      Origin      string
3      Destination string
4      MetaFileHash string
5      ChunkHash   string
6      Postpend    []byte
7      Solution    []byte // Empty for request
8      HopLimit    uint32
9  }

```

---

Listing 3: Struct used for Proofs of Retrievability

by the requesting node. The value that the peer computes will then be stored in `Solution` and returned to the requesting node.

The PoR request, i.e. the challenge is sent out periodically. If a peer fails to provide a correct PoR for a defined number of times, the node terminates the FileExchange and thus, drops the file that it downloaded in exchange to free up the occupied storage space. To decrease communication overhead, the intervals in which the PoR are performed in increasing by a (pseudo-)randomized factor after every successful PoR, and reset to the initial value if the PoR is wrong or left unanswered.

To ensure that peers cannot collude to solve the challenges, each `Replica` is encrypted using a different key.

**Retrieving a file and state management** The private files stored by a node can be exported by the client and uploaded to any other node. This state contains all the required data to fetch one of the replications and therefore allows clients to retrieve the file through other nodes in case the initial uploading node is temporarily unavailable. A node can download the remote file by sending a standardized `DataRequest`, followed by an `AESDecryption` with the `EncryptionKey` corresponding to the replica.

**Private Encrypted Messaging** In addition to private, replicated files, the final project introduces asymmetric encryption to encrypt the content of private messages. For this, the `nodeID` that was previously used is replaced by a public key that is generated during the bootstrapping process of a node. To allow for a public key as `nodeID`. The key is generated on the start of a gossip node. Private messages can then be encrypted using this public key.

Sharing of a file can be done by sending the Private File state to another client using encrypted private Messages, however this is a manual process and not specifically supported by the infrastructure.

## References

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