unit1655: make it C90 compliant

Unclear why this was not detected in the CI. Follow-up to b766602
curl · Sep 16, 2019 · 3ad883a · 3ad883a
1 parent 6de1053
commit 3ad883a
Showing 1 changed file with 55 additions and 52 deletions.
diff --git a/tests/unit/unit1655.c b/tests/unit/unit1655.c
@@ -40,71 +40,74 @@ UNITTEST_START
  * so we can prove this test would detect it and that it is properly fixed
  */
 do {
-const char *bad = "this.is.a.hostname.where.each.individual.part.is.within."
-                  "the.sixtythree.character.limit.but.still.long.enough.to."
-                  "trigger.the.the.buffer.overflow......it.is.chosen.to.be."
-                  "of.a.length.such.that.it.causes.a.two.byte.buffer......."
-                  "overwrite.....making.it.longer.causes.doh.encode.to....."
-                  ".return.early.so.dont.change.its.length.xxxx.xxxxxxxxxxx"
-                  "..xxxxxx.....xx..........xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx"
-                  "xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx..x......xxxx"
-                  "xxxx..xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.x...xxxx.x.x.x...xxxxx";
+  const char *bad = "this.is.a.hostname.where.each.individual.part.is.within."
+    "the.sixtythree.character.limit.but.still.long.enough.to."
+    "trigger.the.the.buffer.overflow......it.is.chosen.to.be."
+    "of.a.length.such.that.it.causes.a.two.byte.buffer......."
+    "overwrite.....making.it.longer.causes.doh.encode.to....."
+    ".return.early.so.dont.change.its.length.xxxx.xxxxxxxxxxx"
+    "..xxxxxx.....xx..........xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx"
+    "xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx..x......xxxx"
+    "xxxx..xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.x...xxxx.x.x.x...xxxxx";
 
-/* plays the role of struct dnsprobe in urldata.h */
-struct demo {
+  /* plays the role of struct dnsprobe in urldata.h */
+  struct demo {
     unsigned char dohbuffer[512];
     unsigned char canary1;
     unsigned char canary2;
     unsigned char canary3;
-};
+  };
 
-size_t olen = 100000;
-struct demo victim;
-victim.canary1 = 87; /* magic numbers, arbritrarily picked */
-victim.canary2 = 35;
-victim.canary3 = 41;
-DOHcode d = doh_encode(bad, DNS_TYPE_A, victim.dohbuffer,
-                       sizeof(victim.dohbuffer), &olen);
-fail_unless(victim.canary1 == 87, "one byte buffer overwrite has happened");
-fail_unless(victim.canary2 == 35, "two byte buffer overwrite has happened");
-fail_unless(victim.canary3 == 41, "three byte buffer overwrite has happened");
-if(d == DOH_OK)
-{
-  fail_unless(olen <= sizeof(victim.dohbuffer), "wrote outside bounds");
-  fail_unless(olen > strlen(bad), "unrealistic low size");
-}
+  size_t olen = 100000;
+  struct demo victim;
+  DOHcode d;
+  victim.canary1 = 87; /* magic numbers, arbritrarily picked */
+  victim.canary2 = 35;
+  victim.canary3 = 41;
+  d = doh_encode(bad, DNS_TYPE_A, victim.dohbuffer,
+                 sizeof(victim.dohbuffer), &olen);
+  fail_unless(victim.canary1 == 87, "one byte buffer overwrite has happened");
+  fail_unless(victim.canary2 == 35, "two byte buffer overwrite has happened");
+  fail_unless(victim.canary3 == 41,
+              "three byte buffer overwrite has happened");
+  if(d == DOH_OK) {
+    fail_unless(olen <= sizeof(victim.dohbuffer), "wrote outside bounds");
+    fail_unless(olen > strlen(bad), "unrealistic low size");
+  }
 } while(0);
 
 /* run normal cases and try to trigger buffer length related errors */
 do {
-DNStype dnstype = DNS_TYPE_A;
-unsigned char buffer[128];
-const size_t buflen = sizeof(buffer);
-const size_t magic1 = 9765;
-size_t olen1 = magic1;
-const char *sunshine1 = "a.com";
-const char *sunshine2 = "aa.com";
+  DNStype dnstype = DNS_TYPE_A;
+  unsigned char buffer[128];
+  const size_t buflen = sizeof(buffer);
+  const size_t magic1 = 9765;
+  size_t olen1 = magic1;
+  const char *sunshine1 = "a.com";
+  const char *sunshine2 = "aa.com";
+  size_t olen2;
+  DOHcode ret2;
+  size_t olen;
 
-DOHcode ret = doh_encode(sunshine1, dnstype, buffer, buflen, &olen1);
-fail_unless(ret == DOH_OK, "sunshine case 1 should pass fine");
-fail_if(olen1 == magic1, "olen has not been assigned properly");
-fail_unless(olen1 > strlen(sunshine1), "bad out length");
+  DOHcode ret = doh_encode(sunshine1, dnstype, buffer, buflen, &olen1);
+  fail_unless(ret == DOH_OK, "sunshine case 1 should pass fine");
+  fail_if(olen1 == magic1, "olen has not been assigned properly");
+  fail_unless(olen1 > strlen(sunshine1), "bad out length");
 
-/* add one letter, the response should be one longer */
-size_t olen2 = magic1;
-DOHcode ret2 = doh_encode(sunshine2, dnstype, buffer, buflen, &olen2);
-fail_unless(ret2 == DOH_OK, "sunshine case 2 should pass fine");
-fail_if(olen2 == magic1, "olen has not been assigned properly");
-fail_unless(olen1 + 1 == olen2, "olen should grow with the hostname");
+  /* add one letter, the response should be one longer */
+  olen2 = magic1;
+  ret2 = doh_encode(sunshine2, dnstype, buffer, buflen, &olen2);
+  fail_unless(ret2 == DOH_OK, "sunshine case 2 should pass fine");
+  fail_if(olen2 == magic1, "olen has not been assigned properly");
+  fail_unless(olen1 + 1 == olen2, "olen should grow with the hostname");
 
-/* pass a short buffer, should fail */
-size_t olen;
-ret = doh_encode(sunshine1, dnstype, buffer, olen1 - 1, &olen);
-fail_if(ret == DOH_OK, "short buffer should have been noticed");
+  /* pass a short buffer, should fail */
+  ret = doh_encode(sunshine1, dnstype, buffer, olen1 - 1, &olen);
+  fail_if(ret == DOH_OK, "short buffer should have been noticed");
 
-/* pass a minimum buffer, should succeed */
-ret = doh_encode(sunshine1, dnstype, buffer, olen1, &olen);
-fail_unless(ret == DOH_OK, "minimal length buffer should be long enough");
-fail_unless(olen == olen1, "bad buffer length");
+  /* pass a minimum buffer, should succeed */
+  ret = doh_encode(sunshine1, dnstype, buffer, olen1, &olen);
+  fail_unless(ret == DOH_OK, "minimal length buffer should be long enough");
+  fail_unless(olen == olen1, "bad buffer length");
 } while(0);
 UNITTEST_STOP