

# FIRST CONFERENCE VIRTUAL EDITION OF WHERE DEFENDERS SHARE



## The Intelligent Process Lifecycle of Active Cyber Defenders

**Desiree Sacher-Boldewin and Eireann Leverett** 

## **About us**

#### **Desiree Sacher**



- Principal Security Architect of Operational IT
   @ Finanz Informatik
- 10 years finance industry experience as IT Security Engineer & Security Analyst

#### **Finanz Informatik**

- German IT service provider for the German Savings Banks Finance Group
- 32k servers / 324k devices, incl. ATMs

#### **Eireann Leverett**

- **AIRBUS**
- Senior Scientist in Cyber Innovation
- 3 Years in ICS Red Team/ 7 Years in Risk

#### **Airbus Operations Limited**

- 140 Nationalities and 4 generations
- 10 Types of aircraft
- 4 Externally Facing SOCs



#### Disclaimer

The opinions and views expressed here are our own and do not represent the opinions of our employers

Quick recap of FIRST 2019 presentation



 FIRST sponsored peer reviewed ACM DTRAP paper https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3370084

## **Categories Summary**







Categories	Solution Type	Alert Cause
a) Announced administrative/user action		*
o) Unnannounced administrative/user action		*
c) Log management rule configuration error		
d) Detection device/rule configuration error		<b>1</b>
e) Bad IOC/rule pattern value	wie	
) Test alert		<b>Q</b>
g) Confirmed Attack with IR actions	¥	
h) Confirmed Attack attempt without IR actions	¥	



#### **BENEFITS**



 Statistics for effectiveness of internal security measures & architecture → new KPI possibility

KPI	Explanation	Target Value
Number of Log Management Rule Configuration Error events per month	This value reflects the rules configured in the SIEM by the SOC Analysts. A high number suspects bad quality of rules, more training or experience needed.	< 10 %
Number of Announced Administrative/User Action events per month	This value reflects suppressions that should be improved.	< 10 %
Number of Bad IOC/rule pattern value events per month	If too many events were created by bad IOCs or rule pattern values, the source or the trust in it should be questioned.	< 5 %
Number of Confirmed Attack attempt without IR actions (best matched with Log Source Category)	Number of events detected but prevented by measures in place or where the alert isn't viewed as a high risk.	> 50 %
Number of Confirmed Attack attempt with IR actions (best matched with Log Source Category)	Very high numbers → Security Architecture should be updated Very low numbers → The rules aren't detecting or you are safe	$\odot$

Fingerpointing False Positives - Hack.lu Edition

19.10.2019

First

## Benefits - Reports



>2 Confirmed Attack with IR actions 1 Confirmed Attack with IR actions

No coverage

20+ Confirmed Attack attempt without IR actions 10-20 Confirmed Attack attempt without IR action 5-10 Confirmed Attack attempt without IR actions 1-5 Confirmed Attack attempt without IR actions 0 Confirmed Attack attempt without IR actions

	External Threat Heatmap														
	MITRE ATT&CK Tacticts	Target Enviroment	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec	Sample Use Cases:
		Client Systems													Exploit Public-Facing Application,
2	Initial Access	Company Infrastructure													Spearphishing Link,
2	Illitial Access	Customer Service Infrastructure													Spearphishing Attachment
		Development systems													Spearphisming Attachment
E	Persistance	Client Systems													Scheduled Task, New Service, File Deletion, Registry Run
ä	Defense Evasion	Company Infrastructure													Keys / Startup Folder, Remote Access Tools, Remote File
Med	Command and Control	Customer Service Infrastructure													
-	Command and Control	Development systems													Copy, Standard Application Layer Protocol
	Discovery	Client Systems													Network Service Scanning, Security Software Discovery,
High	Privilege Escalation	Company Infrastructure													Bypass User Account Control, Signed Binary Proxy Execution,
Ξ	Execution	Customer Service Infrastructure													Powershell, Scheduled Task, Brute Force, Credential
	Credential Access	Development systems													Dumping
	Lateral Movement	Client Systems													Windows Remote Management, Logon Scripts, Data from
Critical	Collection	Company Infrastructure													Local System, Exfiltration over C2 Channel, Data Encrypted,
Ę	Exfiltration	Customer Service Infrastructure													Remote File Copy, Remote Access Tools, Standard
	Impact	Development systems													Application Layer Protocol, Data Destruction, Defacement,

Sample External Threat Heatmap

## Benefits - Reports



		Internal Security Heatmap													
	MITRE ATT&CK Tacticts	Target Enviroment	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec	Sample Use Cases:
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Internal Events consists of:

Unannounced administrative/user action, Detection device/rule configuration error, Bad IOCs/rule pattern values

Sample Internal Security Heatmap

20+ Events
15-20 Events
10-15 Events
5-10 Events
1-5 Events
0 Events
No coverage




## **Motivation for Update**

- Cloud infrastructure more relies on secure configuration of systems
- Detection of configuration changes is of key importance
- SOC services quality reflect overall security quality state of infrastructure
- Number of vulnerabilities seem to be rising....

SOC becomes operational data verification and technical security quality assurance center with cyber incident investigation & analysis capabilities

### **Poster**


- Display of categorised «false positives» states, error types and problems
- Visibility of «continuous improvement» action to correct state of problem
- Based on «Intelligence-Driven Computer Network Defense Informed by Analysis of Adversary Campaigns and Intrusion Kill Chains" paper by Lockheed Martin



Reference: https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed-martin/rms/documents/cyber/LM-White-Paper-Intel-Driven-Defense.pdf



**Integrity/Technical Security Compliance Monitoring** 



#### **Follow Up Actions**

Adjust baseline configuration, document change

Security configuration/baseline needs engineer review

Tool provider should be verified

Should be excluded from reporting


Alerts should be forwarded to security management/policy responsible to confirm scope

Security incident should be opened, and alert followed up on

Adjust baseline configuration, Update information process to involve SOC

Save or keep old baseline, possibly add temporary suppression

**Vulnerability Management** 



#### **Follow Up Actions**

Verify your tool capabilities

Verify your security documention of specific context for threat protection measures

Vulnerability remediation delay reason

DELAY REASON?

Resource Problem

**Compatibility Problem** 

Bad SLA

**Support Problem** 

Security measure implementation failure reason

#### **Follow Up Actions**

Review and if reasonable report risk for staffing/budget priorities

Review and if reasonable report risk for your product dependencies

Review and if reasonable update SLA/SLA dependencies or report risk

Review and if reasonable verify partner dependencies

**Detection failure reason** 

THREATOEN



**Detection / Discover possible?** 



#### **Detective Action**

New Security Monitoring rule

New Integrity / Compliance Configuration Monitoring Verification

New Hunting action (Onetime or scheduled discovery)

increase visibility

**Detection of possible** exploitation created



#### **Detection failure reason**

Events can not be logged

**Detection pattern unclear** 

Log/event ratio unreasonable

**Resource Problem Detection** 

Logs can not be delivered

**Resource Problem Delivery** 

No tool for logging

No process/demand/ responsible for detection

Blind spot identified

#### **Follow Up Actions**

Report risk, find a close enough approximation

Report risk, schedule education for SOC engineers

Report risk, verify economic alternatives

Report risk, Verify priorities and staffing within SOC

Report risk, review architecture for possible log transmission

Report risk, Verify priorities and staffing with security engineers

Report risk, Security management/IT governance verification

Report risk, Security management/IT governance verification



## **Benefits: KPI Suggestions**

**Integrity/Technical Security Compliance Monitoring** 



Exogenous

KPI	Explanation	Target Value	Owner	Risk Type
Number of legitimate violations authorized by change	This value reflects events which usually are classic false positives, where all official change processes were correctly followed but the SOC was not included in the process and therefore could not prevent the false alarm	< 10 %	Compliance	्रि
Number of configuration errors in baseline (best matched with Log Source Categories	This value reflects what system configurations (or even configuration templates) needs improvement.	< 10 %	Compliance/ Operational	(مُلِّثُ
Number of Limitation in verification products found	If too many of these events were created by configurations, the causing tool should be questioned.	< 5 %	Compliance/ Operational	خآک
Number of activities with no change required	There seems to be a mismatch between the defined security scope and the verified security scope. Gaps should be verified	< 5 %	Policy	Î
Number of unauthorized changes without legitimate cause	Very high numbers → Security process and IT process integration needs rework  Very low numbers → The configurations aren't detecting or you are safe		Policy	فآث



## **Benefits: KPI Suggestions**

**Vulnerability Management** 

Endogenous



Exogenous

KPI	Explanation	Target Value	Owner	Risk Type
Number of delays due to unreasonable SLA	If this value is high very often, correlated to the applications you are running you might be able to impact either SLA or policy documents	0	Operational/ Contractual	£ F
Numbers of delays due to resource problems or Average # of days delays due to resource problems	If this happens to often it can illustrate how your staff management is impacting the quality of security services. If occuring too often a risk entry is important	0	Contractual	4 1°
Numbers of installed patch on time	This is the goal. If it can't be reached too often policies or failing reasons should be reviewed	>80%	Counter-Party/ Contractual	€ A
Number of blind spots identified	Any time a detection can not be created this should be tracked, possibly by creating risk entries.	< 5 %	Operational/ Contractual	(4°) (1°)
Number of context of exploitability not given	Very high numbers → You might not be getting honest responses or your threat identification process is faulty	$\odot$	Counter-Party/ Contractual	<b>€</b>



## **Threat/Risk Communication**

- Identify where time is actually being spent
- Create statistics for effectiveness of internal security measures
   & architecture for evidence based discussions
- Integrate possibility for directly initiating continuous improvement into the process

## Risk and incentive alignment

- Identify "Value at Risk" by combining numbers with specifc target environments that are problematic
- Create transparency in your risk treatments (proportinal to severity/proportional to frequency)
- Review VaR by checking contracts








Risk treatments aren't booleans!

## **Call to Action**

Add categories to your security ticketing tool



- Twitter : @d3sre & @blackswanburst
- More information on technical impementation can be found on https://github.com/d3sre/IntelligentProcessLifecycle