




# La sécurité dès le début de la conception d'un projet



David Aparicio

Meetup Café DevOps  
Jeudi 12 Décembre 2024, 18h30

  
@dadideo

# David Aparicio

15/ DD INSA de Lyon / UNICAMP (Brésil)

Facebook Open Academy / MIT AppInventor

17/ Dev(Sec)Ops @ AMADEUS (Nice, 2 ans)

19/ Data(Sec)Ops @ OVHcloud (Lyon, 5 ans)

24/ Senior Dev(Sec)Ops @ Sopht (Lyon, 1 mois)





# Une solution pensée pour un pilotage centralisé de votre écosystème IT

## Collecte automatisée

Sur toute la chaîne de valeur d'un écosystème IT

## Observabilité à 360°


sur les scopes 1, 2 et 3 avec des données granulaires et dynamiques

## Actionnabilité guidée

Au moyen de simulations et recommandations contextualisées

## Suivi d'impact

Avec l'incidence de vos actions sur votre trajectoire en surveillant l'impact CO2/€



# Observabilité

- Mesure complète de l'écosystème IT
- Couverture des scopes 1, 2 et 3
- Facteurs d'émission multicritères
- Exploration dynamique des données
- Projection et prévision d'impact
- Filtrage des données par entité



## Nos principales références

BNP PARIBAS  
La banque d'un monde qui change

SUEZ



AIRBUS



VEOLIA



SEQENS





CED



soitec

MARIE BRIZARD  
WINE & SPIRITS

## Nos partenaires



## Intégrations aux plateformes ESG





“

Évaluer et comprendre nos principaux facteurs d'émission est évidemment un enjeu en soi, mais les piloter de manière dynamique avec des plans d'actions concrets, c'est ce que nous permet la plateforme Sopht.



**Marie Ait-Daoud**  
Green IT manager  
Vinci Groupe



# Agenda

Introduction

Outils

Conseils

Demo

Conclusion




# Introduction





# Pourquoi ce talk ?



[Thread @zigazou](#)



# Agir.. Avant la PROD!

## Y a-t-il un pilote à jour dans l'avion ?

En 2015, les autorités états-uniennes de l'aviation alertaient les compagnies aériennes: le Boeing 787 Dreamliner devait être redémarré tous les 248 jours pour contourner un bogue pouvant entraîner une coupure de courant généralisée dont on peut imaginer les conséquences en vol. Cette fois, elles ont

annoncé qu'il faut éteindre et rallumer ces mêmes avions tous les 51 jours pour éviter des problèmes informatiques catastrophiques en raison d'une mémoire saturée de données sinon. Mesdames et Messieurs, veuillez regagner vos places et attacher vos ceintures de sécurité, nous allons bientôt rebouter!



Octobre 2020,  
Le Virus Informatique  
n°44 (papier/en ligne)

# Pourquoi ?

2013	2017 (new, * from the community)	2021 (new, * from the survey)
A1 - Injection	A1 - <b>Injection</b>	A1 - Broken Access Control
A2 - Broken Authentication & Session Management	A2 - <b>Broken Authentication</b>	A2 - Cryptographic Failures
A3 - Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)	A3 - <b>Sensitive Data Exposure</b>	A3 - <b>Injection</b>
<b>A4 - Insecure Direct Object References</b>	A4 - XML External Entities (XXE)	<b>A4 - Insecure Design</b>
A5 - Security Misconfiguration	A5 - <b>Broken Access Control [MERGED A4+A7]</b>	A5 - <b>Security Misconfiguration</b>
A6 - Sensitive Data Exposure	A6 - <b>Security Misconfiguration</b>	A6 - Vulnerable and Outdated Components
<b>A7 - Missing Function Level Access Control</b>	A7 - Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)	A7 - Identification and Authentication Failures
A8 - Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)	<b>A8 - Insecure Deserialization *</b>	<b>A8 - Software and Data Integrity Failures</b>
A9 - Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities	A9 - <b>Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities</b>	A9 - Security Logging and Monitoring Failures *
A10 - Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards	<b>A10 - Insufficient Logging &amp; Monitoring *</b>	<b>A10 - Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) *</b>

**OWASP TOP 10**





Bonjour ChatGPT! Peux-tu me donner des actions concrètes pour sécuriser mon code ?



Bonjour! Voici quelques actions concrètes pour sécuriser votre code :

1. Effectuer des tests d'intrusion réguliers pour détecter les vulnérabilités dans votre code.
2. Utiliser des mots de passe forts et un stockage sécurisé des mots de passe.
3. Valider toutes les entrées utilisateur pour éviter les attaques par injection SQL ou d'autres types d'injection.
4. Utiliser des autorisations d'accès appropriées pour limiter l'accès aux fonctionnalités sensibles de votre application.
5. Utiliser des bibliothèques et des frameworks de sécurité réputés pour ajouter des couches supplémentaires de sécurité à votre code.
6. Assurez-vous que vos dépendances et bibliothèques utilisées sont à jour et sécurisées.
7. Utilisez des outils pour détecter les vulnérabilités de sécurité automatiquement.
8. Utilisez des mécanismes de chiffrement pour protéger les données sensibles.
9. Utilisez des certificats SSL pour sécuriser les communications réseau.
10. Utilisez une stratégie de gestion des vulnérabilités pour gérer efficacement les vulnérabilités de sécurité détectées.

---

# Sécurité dès la conception

Du domaine du **Génie Logiciel**

Souvent associé à **Privacy By Design**

Considérer la sécurité comme une **partie intégrante**

Conception d'architecture **robuste**

Résistant aux attaques **bien connues**

Utilisant des techniques **réutilisables**

Minimiser l'impact **en prévision** des vulnérabilités

Exigences dans de **multiples domaines** (auth., intégrité, confidentialité, etc..,)

Même lorsque le système est attaqué

**Préserver** l'architecture pendant l'**évolution du logiciel**

Mise en oeuvre durant tout le **cycle de vie**, jusqu'à la fin du support, et donc une date de **décommissionnement**






Voici quelques actions concrètes pour sécuriser votre chaîne d'intégration et de déploiement (CI/CD) :

1. Utiliser des outils de gestion de code source pour gérer les autorisations d'accès aux dépôts de code.
2. Automatiser les tests de sécurité dans le pipeline de CI/CD pour détecter les vulnérabilités dans le code avant le déploiement.
3. Utiliser des outils de chiffrement pour protéger les données sensibles stockées dans les conteneurs ou les images de conteneur.
4. Utiliser des outils de gestion de configuration pour s'assurer que les paramètres de sécurité sont correctement configurés dans les environnements de déploiement.
5. Utiliser des outils de surveillance pour surveiller les activités de la chaîne d'intégration et de déploiement pour détecter les anomalies et les comportements suspects.
6. Utiliser des outils de gestion des accès pour contrôler qui peut déployer des applications et dans quels environnements.
7. Utiliser des outils de gestion des vulnérabilités pour suivre les vulnérabilités de sécurité dans les dépendances et les bibliothèques utilisées dans le pipeline CI/CD.
8. Automatiser les mises à jour de sécurité pour les dépendances et les bibliothèques utilisées dans le pipeline CI/CD.
9. Utiliser des outils pour automatiser les audits de sécurité pour les environnements de production.
10. Utiliser des outils pour automatiser le déploiement d'applications dans des environnements sécurisés.



# Shift-left Security



[dodcio.defense.gov](http://dodcio.defense.gov)






# Outils





# Shift-left Security



[dodcio.defense.gov](http://dodcio.defense.gov)





# DevOps





# CI/CD

Pipeline Jobs 5



[Philippe Charrière \(Twitter\)](#)



# Plan: Threat Model





# Bonnes pratiques ANSSI

Se documenter, se former

Lire les guides de l'ANSSI

Comparer les technologies, les langages de programmation

Effectuer l'analyse des risques

Identifier le modèle de l'attaquant pour ce produit en particulier

Préparer des spécifications / des ateliers

Participer à des conférences Sécurité

Choix du système hôte ([OS hardening](#))

Veille technologique ([Feedly/RSS](#))



ANSSI

Agence nationale de la sécurité des  
systèmes d'information



RECOMMANDATIONS RELATIVES À L'INTERCONNEXION D'UN SYSTÈME D'INFORMATION  
Réseaux

19/06/2020

architecture interconnexion Internet messagerie passerelle



RÈGLES DE PROGRAMMATION POUR LE DÉVELOPPEMENT D'APPLICATIONS SÉCURISÉES  
09/06/2020

application sécurisée bonne pratique développement sécurisé langage de  
règle



RECOMMANDATIONS DE SÉCURITÉ RELATIVES À TLS  
Cryptographie Réseaux

26/03/2020

chiffrement HTTPS TLS



RECOMMANDATIONS SUR LA SÉCURISATION DES SYSTÈMES DE CONTRÔLE D'ACCÈS PHYSIQUE ET  
VIDÉOPROTECTION



[Bonnes pratiques de sécurité numérique \(ANSSI\)](#)



# Dev: Secure Coding/SaC



# Linters

## Go

Un linter est un outil d'analyse statique de code source. Il sert à détecter : des erreurs (très utile sur des langages interprétés comme JavaScript qui n'ont pas de phase de compilation) ; des problèmes de syntaxe et de non-respect de style (tabulation vs espaces, indentation, etc.)

```
linters:  
  disable-all: true  
  enable:  
    - bodyclose  
    - deadcode  
    - depguard  
    - dogsled  
    - dupl  
    - errcheck  
    - funlen  
    - goconst  
    - gocritic  
    - gocyclo  
    - gofmt  
    - goimports  
    - golint  
    - gomnd  
    - goprintffuncname  
    - gosec  
    - gosimple  
    - govet  
    - ineffassign  
    - interfacer  
    - misspell  
    - nakedret  
    - rowerrcheck  
    - scopelint  
    - staticcheck  
# - ...
```

## STATIC LINTS WITH GOLANG-CI



Customize: linters list, values...

In few situations you can bypass the linters with `nolint` directive.

`//nolint`



["Common mistakes" en Go, Aurélie Vache \(Async 2021\)](#)



# Linters

## Shell

Il permet d'avoir un code avec moins d'effets de bord  
Disponible dans (quasiment) tous les langages

```
$ shellcheckmyscript

Line 4:
if ! grep -q backup=true.* "~/.myconfig"
    ^-- SC2062: Quote the grep pattern so the
                  ^-- SC2088: Tilde does not

Line 6:
echo 'Backup not enabled in $HOME/.myconfig, exiting'
    ^-- SC2016: Expressions don't expand in single

Line 10:
if [[ $1 =~ "-v(erbose)??" ]]
    ^-- SC2076: Don't quote right-hand side of

Line 12:
verbose='printf "Copying %f\n"'
    ^-- SC2089: Quotes/backslashes will be treated

Line 16:
-iname *.tar.gz \
    ^-- SC2061: Quote the parameter to -iname so
                  ^-- SC2035: Use ./glob* or -- *glob* so name
```



[ShellCheck, finds bugs in your shell scripts](#)



# Docker CLI




Guillaume 🐾  
@glours



Replying to @glours @silvin\_docker and 2 others

With a better Gif and a link to the documentation  
[docs.docker.com/engine/scan/](https://docs.docker.com/engine/scan/)



```
~/docker/scan (zsh) 11 ..an-cli-plugin (zsh) 12
0 100% docker scan hello-world

Testing hello-world...

Organization: docker-desktop-test
Package manager: linux
Project name: docker-image|hello-world
Docker image: hello-world
Licenses: enabled

/ Tested hello-world for known issues, no vulnerable paths found.

Note that we do not currently have vulnerability data for your image.

GIF
```

12:11 PM · Sep 2, 2020 · TweetDeck



Vulnerability scanning - Docker Documentation



# 19/10/20



## Quatre packages npm trouvés en train d'ouvrir des shells sur des systèmes Linux et Windows.

Tout ordinateur avec l'un de ces packages installés « doit être considéré comme totalement compromis »

Le 19 octobre 2020 à 12:27, par Stan Adkens

6 commentaires



364 PARTAGES



L'équipe de sécurité de npm a supprimé la semaine dernière quatre packages hébergés sur son dépôt, découverts en train d'ouvrir des shells afin d'établir une connexion à des serveurs distants pour exfiltrer les données des utilisateurs à partir des systèmes Linux et Windows infectés. Selon l'équipe de sécurité, chaque bibliothèque a été téléchargée des centaines de fois depuis son chargement sur le portail npm.

Les noms des quatre packages npm sont : plutov-slack-client, nodetest199, nodetest1010 et npmpubman. Les packages ont été mis en ligne sur le portail npm en mai 2018 (en ce qui concerne le premier) et en septembre de la même année (pour le reste). Jeudi dernier, le personnel du npm a retiré les quatre paquets JavaScript du portail npm parce qu'ils contenaient du code malveillant.



npm est le plus grand dépôt de packages pour tous les langages de programmation. L'équipe de sécurité de npm scanne régulièrement sa collection de bibliothèques JavaScript, considérée comme le plus important dépôt. Bien que les paquets malveillants soient régulièrement supprimés, la suppression de la semaine dernière est la troisième grande mesure de répression de ces trois derniers mois.

Selon les avis publiés par l'équipe de sécurité de npm, les quatre bibliothèques JavaScript ont ouvert des shells sur les ordinateurs des développeurs qui ont importé ces packages dans leurs projets. Les shells permettaient aux acteurs de la



### 4 packages npm ouvrent des shells [Linux/Windows]



# npm-audit

## Javascript

Auditer les vulnérabilités connues des librairies et des dépendances associées

High	Arbitrary File Overwrite
Package	tar
Patched in	>=4.4.2
Dependency of	libnpm
Path	libnpm > npm-lifecycle > node-gyp > tar
More info	<a href="https://npmjs.com/advisories/803">https://npmjs.com/advisories/803</a>
High	Arbitrary File Overwrite
Package	tar
Patched in	>=4.4.2
Dependency of	npm-lifecycle
Path	npm-lifecycle > node-gyp > tar
More info	<a href="https://npmjs.com/advisories/803">https://npmjs.com/advisories/803</a>

```
Found 19 vulnerabilities (8 moderate, 11 high) in 11360 scanned packages
run `npm audit fix` to fix 4 of them.
12 vulnerabilities require semver-major dependency updates.
3 vulnerabilities require manual review. See the full report for details.
```





# Github Code Scanning

Il permet d'avoir un retour rapide  
directement dans son code  
(sur les failles)



The screenshot shows a GitHub code scanning result for the `CatalogService.java` file. The code snippet is as follows:

```
public Map<String, Object> getConfig(String id) {  
    Map<String, Object> conf = jdbcTemplate.queryForMap("SELECT * FROM configuration WHERE id = '" + id + "'");  
}
```

Participants: `@github-code-scanning`

github-code-scanning 1 week ago

**Query built from user-controlled sources**

Query might include code from this user input.

Show more details

Reply...



[Github Code Scanning / Démo TelecomValley](#)

Pas copier-coller depuis StackOverFlow

# 98% snippets sécu/crypto sont insecures



Fisher et al., 2017; Nadi et al., 2016; Das et al., 2014, Prevent cryptographic pitfalls by design

# PS: Copilot aussi

## GitHub Copilot Security Study: 'Developers Should Remain Awake' in View of 40% Bad Code Rate

By David Ramel 08/26/2021

Researchers published a scholarly paper looking into security implications of GitHub Copilot, an advanced AI system now being used for code completion in Visual Studio Code and possibly headed for Visual Studio after its current preview period ends.

In multiple scenario testing, some 40 percent of tested projects were found to include security vulnerabilities.

**GitHub Copilot** is described as an "[AI pair programmer](#)" whose advanced AI




[40% of Code Produced by GitHub Copilot Vulnerable to Threats](#)



# Build: SAST / DAST / IAST

# SAST DAST IAST App Security Test





# AWS git-secrets / GitGuardian



**1 policy break detected!**

[ca-certificates.crt](#) – FILE EXTENSIONS

2022-10-11 10:35:19 pm (UTC)

 [davidaparicio/namecheck](#)

[See on GitGuardian](#)

[SEE ON GITHUB](#)


[GitGuardian](#) is an automated secrets detection service.

We help developers and security teams secure the modern software development process.




# Sonar

```
246     if (Provider.class == roleTypeClass) {  
247         Type providedType = ReflectionUtils.getLastTypeGenericArgument(dependen-  
248             2 Class providedClass = 1 ReflectionUtils.getTypeClass(providedType);  
249  
250         if (this.componentManager.hasComponent(providedType, dependencyDescriptor  
251             || 3 providedClass.isAssignableFrom(List.class) || providedClass.  
  
A "NullPointerException" could be thrown; "providedClass" is nullable here.  
Bug Major cert, cwe  
252             continue;  
253         }  
    }
```





# Snyk



The image shows a weekly report from Snyk for user davidaparicio. The dashboard features a dark blue header with a stylized dog logo. Below the header, the title "davidaparicio's weekly report" is displayed, along with the date range "2nd of September – 9th of September 2020". A section titled "Status of all 4 active projects" provides key metrics: 1 known vulnerability (1 H, 0 M, 0 L) and 49 total dependencies. A call-to-action button "View on Snyk" is present. The bottom of the dashboard includes a message encouraging users to review their project status and a note from the Snyk team about staying secure.

davidaparicio's weekly report  
2nd of September – 9th of September 2020

Status of all 4 active projects

1 known vulnerability 1 H   0 M   0 L	49 total dependencies
---	--------------------------

Review the status of your projects on your dashboard. [View on Snyk](#)

If you have any questions, [we're happy to help](#).

Stay secure!  
*The Snyk team*

 Email report

# DAST (Gitlab)

Language (package managers) / framework	Scan tool
.NET Core	<a href="#">Security Code Scan ↗</a>
C/C++	<a href="#">Flawfinder ↗</a>
Go	<a href="#">Gosec ↗</a>
Helm Charts	<a href="#">Kubesec ↗</a>
Java ( <a href="#">Ant ↗</a> , <a href="#">Gradle ↗</a> , <a href="#">Maven ↗</a> , <a href="#">SBT ↗</a> )	<a href="#">SpotBugs ↗ with find-sec-bugs ↗</a>
Java / Kotlin (Android)	<a href="#">MobSF (beta) ↗</a>
JavaScript	<a href="#">ESLint security plugin ↗</a>
Kubernetes manifests	<a href="#">Kubesec ↗</a>
Node.js	<a href="#">NodeJsScan ↗</a>
PHP	<a href="#">phpcs-security-audit ↗</a>
Python ( <a href="#">pip ↗</a> )	<a href="#">bandit ↗</a>

## Available rules

- G101: Look for hard coded credentials
- G102: Bind to all interfaces
- G103: Audit the use of unsafe block
- G104: Audit errors not checked
- G106: Audit the use of ssh.InsecureIgnoreHostKey
- G107: Url provided to HTTP request as taint input
- G108: Profiling endpoint automatically exposed on /debug/pprof
- G109: Potential Integer overflow made by strconv.Atoi result conversion to int16/32
- G110: Potential DoS vulnerability via decompression bomb
- G201: SQL query construction using format string
- G202: SQL query construction using string concatenation
- G203: Use of unescaped data in HTML templates
- G204: Audit use of command execution
- G301: Poor file permissions used when creating a directory
- G302: Poor file permissions used with chmod
- G303: Creating tempfile using a predictable path
- G304: File path provided as taint input
- G305: File traversal when extracting zip/tar archive
- G306: Poor file permissions used when writing to a new file
- G307: Deferring a method which returns an error
- G401: Detect the usage of DES, RC4, MD5 or SHA1
- G402: Look for bad TLS connection settings
- G403: Ensure minimum RSA key length of 2048 bits
- G404: Insecure random number source (rand)
- G501: Import blocklist: crypto/md5
- G502: Import blocklist: crypto/des
- G503: Import blocklist: crypto/rc4
- G504: Import blocklist: net/http/cgi
- G505: Import blocklist: crypto/sha1
- G601: Implicit memory aliasing of items from a range statement

## Retired rules

- G105: Audit the use of math/big.Int.Exp - CVE is fixed


# 42Crunch

## Scanner d'API

Utilise la spécification OpenAPI / Swagger pour identifier les faiblesses de votre API



Protection contre le Top 10 de la sécurité de l'API de l'OWASP



The security audit score: 43

**Security (18/30)**

**Data validation (25/70)**

Please submit your feedback for the security audit [here](#)

**The security section of the operation 'post' contains an empty array**

Line 97. Severity: High. Score impact 4

**Description**

The `security` field of the operation does not list any security schemes to be applied. Instead, it just contains an empty array.

The top-level `security` field of the OpenAPI contract contains an array of the security schemes applied to the whole API. The list of values describes alternative security schemes that can be used. There is a logical OR between the security requirements. Individual

```
pixiBasic-v1.0.json
c:\Projects>pixi-demo>OpenAPI> pixiBasic-v1.0.json > ...
33     ],
34     "summary": "login successfully and receive",
35     "parameters": [
36         {
37             "in": "formData",
38             "name": "user",
39             "type": "string",
40             "format": "password",
41             "required": true
42         },
43         {
44             "in": "formData",
45             "name": "pass",
46             "type": "string",
47             "format": "password",
48             "required": true
49         }
50     ],
51     "operationId": "authenticate",
52     "description": "user supplies user name an",
53     "produces": [
54         "application/json"
55     ],
56     "responses": {
57         "200": {
58             "description": "",
59             "schema": {
60                 "type": "object",
61                 "properties": {
62                     "message": {
63                         "type": "string"
64                     }
65                 }
66             }
67         }
68     }
69 }
```




# Test: PenTest





# Proxy



The screenshot shows the Hetty proxy logs interface. At the top, there's a search bar labeled "Search proxy logs...". Below it, a table lists proxy logs with columns for Method, Origin, Path, and Status. The logs show several GET requests from `https://juice-shop.herokuapp.com` to various endpoints like `/rest/products/search?q=`, `/rest/admin/application-configuration`, and `/assets/i18n/en.json`. All requests result in 200 OK status codes.

Below the log table, there's a detailed view for a specific request to `/rest/admin/application-configuration`. It shows the REQUEST section with Query Params, Headers (12), and Body. The Headers tab is selected, showing the following:

Key	Value
User-Agent	Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/98.0.4758.109 Safari/537.36
Referer	<a href="https://juice-shop.herokuapp.com/">https://juice-shop.herokuapp.com/</a>
Sec-Fetch-Dest	empty
Accept-Language	en-US, en;q=0.9
Accept-Encoding	gzip, deflate, br
Accept	application/json, text/plain, */*

The RESPONSE section shows the HTTP response details: Body (18690 bytes), Headers (11), and a green circle indicating HTTP/1.1 200 OK.


```

1 [{"config": {"server": {"port": 3000, "basePath": ""}}, "application": {"domain": "juice-sh.ap", "name": "OWASP Juice Shop", "logo": "JuiceShop_Logo.png", "favicon": "favicon.js.ico", "theme": "bluegrey-lightgreen", "showVersionNumber": true, "showGitHubLinks": true, "localBackupEnabled": true, "numberOfRandomFakeUsers": 0, "altcoinName": "Juicycoin", "privacyContactEmail": "donotreply@owasp-juice.shop", "customMetricsPrefix": "juiceshop", "chatBot": {"name": "Juicy", "greeting": "Nice to meet you <customer-name>, I'm <bot-name>", "trainingData": "botDefaultTrainingData.json", "defaultResponse": "Sorry I couldn't understand what you were trying to say!", "avatar": "JuicyChatBot.png"}, "social": {"twitterUrl": "https://twitter.com/owasp_juiceshop", "facebookUrl": "https://www.facebook.com/owasp.juiceshop", "slackUrl": "https://owasp.org/slack/invite", "redditUrl": "https://www.reddit.com/r/owasp_juiceshop", "presskitUrl": "https://github.com/OWASP/owasp-swag/tree/master/projects/juice-shop", "questionnaireUrl": null}, "recyclePage": {"topProductImage": "fruit_press.jpg"}}]

```

## Security Bug Hunting with Proxies (Black Box)

Hetty, Burp Suite, OWASP ZAP, mitmproxy, charles






# Kali Linux / Parrot OS

## Boîte à outils

Les tests d'intrusion sont un moyen de trouver et de colmater des brèches. Objectif: Simuler des attaques pour tester la robustesse de la plate-forme

- Nmap
- Metasploit
- Wireshark
- John The Ripper
- Hashcat
- Hydra
- Burp Suite
- Zed Attack Proxy (ZAP)
- sqlmap
- aircrack-ng



11 outils pour s'initier au pentest



# Hackers as a Service





# Release: Digital Signature






# Docker Notary

## Ready for PROD

Signer pour certifier et être avoir la garantie sur la provenance (non-altération)






# Deliver: Secure Transfer





# JFrog Artifactory Repository

Signer pour certifier, être avoir la garantie sur la provenance (non-altération), archiver et faciliter les rollbacks



The screenshot shows the JFrog Artifactory interface. On the left, the 'Artifact Repository Browser' sidebar lists repositories: 'docker', 'docker-local' (selected), 'hello-world' (under docker-local), 'bintray-docker-remote-cache', and 'docker-remote-cache'. The 'hello-world' node has 'uploads' and 'v1.0' subfolders. On the right, the main panel displays the 'docker' repository details under the 'General' tab. The 'Info' section includes:

Name:	docker
Package Type:	Docker
Repository Path:	docker/
Repository Layout:	simple-default

The 'Included Repositories' section lists 'docker-local', 'bintray-docker-r...', and 'docker-remote'.



# Deploy: Security Conf/Scan



# Argo CI + Vault


## Keep immutable

Les définitions, configurations et environnements des applications doivent être déclaratifs et contrôlés par version. Le déploiement et la gestion du cycle de vie des applications doivent être automatisés, contrôlables et faciles à comprendre

-> Maintenir un système iso aux specs



[Why Argo CD? \[EN\]](#)





# Operate: Secu. Patch/Audit



# Ansible / Chef / Puppet

## Patch & Reboot

Maintenir un système à jour en installant les patchs de sécurité

- Linux
- Windows
- Mac OS
- iOS
- Android
- /e/
- etc...



Playbook: apply patches & perform a reboot if required

```
---
```

```
- name: Patch and reboot servers
hosts: all
vars:
  yum_name: "*"
  yum_state: latest
  yum_securityrepo: yes
  yum_enablerepo: "rhel-?-server-rpms,rhel-?-server-satellite-tools-6.?-rpms"
  yum_disablerepo: "*"
  yum_exclude: ""
tasks:
  - name: upgrade packages via yum
    yum:
      name:{{ yum_name }}
      state:{{ yum_state }}
      security:{{ yum_securityrepo }}
    become: "yes"
    register: yumcommandout
    when:
      - (ansible_facts['distribution_major_version'] == '6') or
        (ansible_facts['distribution_major_version'] == '7')

  - name: display security packages
    debug:
      msg: "security patches for: {{ yumcommandout.changes.updated }}"
    when: yumcommandout.changes is defined

  - name: check to see if we need a reboot
    command: needs-restarting -r
    register: result
    ignore_errors: yes
    changed_when: false #avoid changed

  - name: Reboot Server if Necessary
    command: shutdown -r now "Ansible Updates Triggered"
    become: true
    async: 30
    poll: 0
    when: result.rc is defined and result.rc == 1
```




# Monitor: Security Monitoring





# Elastic Security



SIEM at the speed of Elasticsearch

# Falco

- Runtime detection
- Alerts



## Build

- Image Scanning
- Configuration Validation

## Run

- Runtime prevention
- Automated policy creation using ML
- Policy editor and rules library
- Automatic remediation
- Falco Tuning

## Respond

- Incident Response
- Forensics
- Audit



← Continuous Compliance (PCI, NIST, CIS, etc.) →





Kris Nova, Fixing the Kubernetes clusterfuck @FOSDEM



# OVH Bastion (SSH proxy)

The  
 OVHcloud  
Bastion

Part #1



```
slesimpl@the-bastion-2.99.99-rc9.2-ovh1:~$ zdevbst --osh help
*-----*
| THIS IS A PRIVATE COMPUTER SYSTEM, UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED.
| ALL CONNECTIONS ARE LOGGED. IF YOU ARE NOT AUTHORIZED, DISCONNECT NOW.
*-----*
Enter PIN for 'PIV Card Holder pin (PIV_II)':
-----the-bastion-2.99.99-rc9.2-ovh1-----
=> OSH help

> MANAGE YOUR ACCOUNT
- manage your ingress credentials (you->bastion):
  selfListIngressKeys selfAddIngressKey selfDelIngressKey
  selfGenerateIngressKey
  selfUpdateIngressKey
  selfGetIngressKey

- manage your egress credentials (bastion->server):
  selfListEgressKeys selfGenerateEgressKey
  selfAddEgressKey selfDelEgressKey
  selfDeleteEgressKey
  selfGetEgressKey

- manage your accesses to servers:
  selfListAccesses selfAddPersonalAccess selfDelPersonalAccess
  selfDeletePersonalAccess
  selfGetPersonalAccess
```



[Blog article](#) / [Documentation](#) / [Source Code](#)




# Feedback: Secu. Analysis





# AlienVault OTX



Hi David,

A user you are subscribed to (AlienVault) has posted a new pulse:

**Introducing The Jupyter Infostealer/Backdoor**

 [VIEW PULSE](#) [SUGGEST EDIT](#) [SCAN ENDPOINTS](#)

To view the pulse, please visit <https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/5faf00679c90b876019cc653/>

Click "Embed" on the pulse to insert this pulse in your blog.

You can also [tweet](#) it out to your followers.

Get this updated threat intelligence automatically in your infrastructure using [the OTX API](#)



[OTX: Open Threat Exchange \[EN\]](#)



# AlienVault OTX


[Browse](#)
[Scan Endpoints](#)
[Create Pulse](#)
[Submit Sample](#)
[API Integration](#)

All ▾ Search OTX



## Introducing The Jupyter Infostealer/Backdoor



CREATED 2 DAYS AGO by AlienVault | Public | TLP: White

During what began as a routine incident response process, Morphisec has identified (and prevented) a new .NET infostealer variant called Jupyter. Morphisec discovered this variant as part of assisting a higher education customer in the U.S. with their incident response. Jupyter is an infostealer that primarily targets Chromium, Firefox, and Chrome browser data. However, its attack chain, delivery, and loader demonstrate additional capabilities for full backdoor functionality.

REFERENCE: [https://www.morphisec.com/hubfs/eBooks\\_and\\_Whitepapers/Jupyter%20Infostealer%20WEB.pdf](https://www.morphisec.com/hubfs/eBooks_and_Whitepapers/Jupyter%20Infostealer%20WEB.pdf)

TAGS: Jupyter Loader, Infostealer, Backdoor, Academia, Russian Actors, Docx2Rtf, Magix Photo Manager, Jupyter Client, PoshC2


INDUSTRY: Education

MALWARE FAMILIES: PoshC2 - S0378, Jupyter Loader, Jupyter Client

ATT&amp;CK IDS:

T1564 - Hide Artifacts, T1033 - System Owner/User Discovery, T1082 - System Information Discovery, T1140 - Deobfuscate/Decode, T127 - Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution, T1059.001 - PowerShell, T1055.012 - Process Hollowing, T1036 - Masquerading, T1217 - Browser Bookmark Discovery, T1050.001 - Archive via Utility, T1059.003 - Windows Command Shell, T1547.001 - Registry Run, T1049 - System Network Connections Discovery, T1016 - System Network Configuration Discovery

! ENDPOINT SECURITY Scan your endpoints for IOCs from this Pulse!

[Indicators of Compromise \(39\)](#)
[Related Pulses \(8\)](#)
[Comments \(0\)](#)
[History \(0\)](#)

**TYPES OF INDICATORS**

Show 10 entries


**THREAT INFRASTRUCTURE**

Show 10 entries

**TYPE**
**INDICATOR**
**ROLE**
**TITLE**

IPv4 91.241.19.21

© COPYRIGHT 2020 ALIENVAULT, INC. | [LEGAL](#) | [STATUS](#) |

TYPE	INDICATOR	ROLE	TITLE
IPv4	91.241.19.21		
IPv4	45.146.165.219		
IPv4	45.146.165.222		
IPv4	45.135.232.131		
FileHash-SHA1	6ad28e1810eb1be26e835e5224e78e13576887b9		


[Introducing The Jupyter Infostealer/Backdoor](#)

# OpenCVE

 SAUCS

Have an account ?

-  Vulnerabilities (CVE)
-  Vendors (CPE)
-  Categories (CWE)

FILTER

Search... 

ALL LOW MEDIUM HIGH

 130145 total CVE

CVE	Vendors	Products	Updated	CVSS
CVE-2019-2215	 Google	 Android	2019-10-16	<span style="background-color: orange; color: white; padding: 2px 5px;">4.6</span>
CVE-2019-2183	 Google	 Android	2019-10-16	<span style="background-color: blue; color: white; padding: 2px 5px;">2.1</span>
CVE-2019-9533	 Cobham	 Explorer 710 Firmware	2019-10-16	<span style="background-color: red; color: white; padding: 2px 5px;">10.0</span>
CVE-2019-2187	 Google	 Android	2019-10-16	<span style="background-color: blue; color: white; padding: 2px 5px;">2.1</span>
CVE-2019-17420	 Oisf, Suricata-ids	 Libhttp, Suricata	2019-10-16	<span style="background-color: orange; color: white; padding: 2px 5px;">5.0</span>
CVE-2019-2184	 Google	 Android	2019-10-16	<span style="background-color: red; color: white; padding: 2px 5px;">9.3</span>

 Site Web OpenCVE



# OpenCVE / Vue d'une CVE

[CVE-2019-2215](#)

CVE-2019-2215

A use-after-free in binder.c allows an elevation of privilege from an application to the Linux Kernel. No user interaction is required to exploit this vulnerability, however exploitation does require either the installation of a malicious local application or a separate vulnerability in a network facing application. Product: AndroidAndroid ID: A-141720095

CVSS v3.0

7.8 HIGH

CVSS v2.0

4.6 MEDIUM

**7.8 /10**

CVSS v3.0 : HIGH

V3 Legend 

Vector :

Exploitability : 1.8 / Impact : 5.9

Attack Vector	LOCAL	Confidentiality Impact	HIGH
Attack Complexity	LOW	Integrity Impact	HIGH
Privileges Required	LOW	Availability Impact	HIGH
User Interaction	NONE	Scope	UNCHANGED

## References

Link	Resource
<a href="http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/154911/Android-Binder-Use-After-Free.html">http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/154911/Android-Binder-Use-After-Free.html</a>	
<a href="http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/155212/Slackware-Security-Advisory-Slackware-14.2-kernel-Updates.html">http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/155212/Slackware-Security-Advisory-Slackware-14.2-kernel-Updates.html</a>	
<a href="http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/156495/Android-Binder-Use-After-Free.html">http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/156495/Android-Binder-Use-After-Free.html</a>	
<a href="http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2019/Oct/38">http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2019/Oct/38</a>	



# CERT-FR (Flux RSS)

[Menaces et incidents](#)

CERT-FR

PUBLICATIONS ▾ SCANS ARCHIVES ▾

RÉSEAU DES CSIRT ▾ RECRUTEMENT CONTACT À PROPOS



## MENACES ET INCIDENTS

### LE MALWARE-AS-A-SERVICE EMOTET

CERTFR-2020-CTI-010 • Publié le 2 novembre 2020

Observé pour la première fois en 2014 en tant que cheval de Troie bancaire, Emotet a évolué vers une structure modulaire à partir de 2015. Depuis 2017, Emotet ...

### 🇬🇧 DEVELOPMENT OF THE ACTIVITY OF THE TA505 CYBERCRIMINAL GROUP

CERTFR-2020-CTI-009 • Publié le 27 août 2020

The intrusion set TA505 has been active since at least 2014 when it initially stole financial information through the use of Dridex and mass distributed ransomwares. It evolved and ...

### 🇬🇧 THE MALWARE DRIDEX: ORIGINS AND USES

CERTFR-2020-CTI-008 • Publié le 17 juillet 2020

Surfacing in June 2014 as a variant of the banking trojan Bugat, Dridex is a malware which has evolved a lot since then in terms of functionalities and uses. This report provides ...



# Lifecycle: Decommission





# Planification (LTS/Migration/EoL)

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US Edition


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Web hosting

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Resources

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[HOME](#)  [DAILY NEWS](#)  [ATM MIGRATION TO WINDOWS 10 – THE TIME IS NEAR!](#)
[Home](#) > [News](#) > [Computing](#)

## ATM security still running Windows XP

By Anthony Spadafora November 15, 2018

New study reveals ATM security is mostly for show

New research from Positive Technologies has revealed that ATM machines are vulnerable to a number of basic attack techniques that could allow hackers to steal thousands in cash.

The company's researchers studied over two dozen different models of ATMs and discovered that almost all of them are vulnerable to network or local access attacks that would allow hackers to obtain money from them illegally.

Positive Technologies' study had its researchers try to penetrate 26 machines from various manufacturers and service providers.

The researchers found that 15 of the ATMs were running Windows XP, 22 were vulnerable to a "network spoofing" attack, 18 were vulnerable to 'black box' attacks, 20 could be forced to exit kiosk mode via USB or PS/2 and 24 had no data encryption in place on their hard drives.

## ATM migration to Windows 10 – the time is near!

BY ALEX ROLFE DECEMBER 11, 2019 DAILY NEWS

SHARE: [f](#) [t](#) [in](#)  2,903 VIEWS

The banking sector will face a big ATM migration challenge in 2020. Microsoft made the official announcement: Windows 7 (operating system for many ATMs) extended support will end on January 14, 2020. Consequently, all banks have to update their entire ATM network by installing a new operating system caring about data security.

There are about 3.2 million ATMs in the world. They are used daily by billions of people, but only a few know that most ATMs work on the Windows operating system.

A lot of ATMs around the globe are still running Windows XP embedded, long after Microsoft ceased support with security and stability patches. Support for Windows XP was discontinued in 2014, which means that since then the Microsoft Company has not rolled out any security updates for this Windows version.


*ATM migration to Windows 10 – the time is near!*

In June 2018, The Central Bank of India issued a statement saying that all ATMs in the country should be updated from Windows XP to the newer platform by December 2019. It is estimated that about 50% of ATMs use Windows XP operating system.



# Synthèse





# DevSecOps Toolbox

- Secure Coding
  - [Linters](#), [gosec](#), [npm-audit](#), [git-secrets/GitGuardian](#), [42Crunch](#)
- Security as Code
  - [Cilium](#) (Network), [gVisor/Kata](#) (Sandbox), [Istio/maesh](#) (SSL)
- SAST / DAST / IAST
  - [SonarQube](#), [Gitlab SAST/GitHub](#), [Clair/Anchore/Dagda](#) (CVE)
- Pentest
  - [Parrot/Kali OS](#), [YesWeHack/Yogosha](#), [Hetty/Burp Suite/SuperTruder/ffuf](#), [OWASP ZAP](#)
- Digital signature / Secure Transfer
  - [Notary](#), [JFrog Artifactory](#)
- Security Configuration, Security Scan
  - [Argo+Vault](#), [OpenSCAP](#)
- Security Patching, Security Audit
  - [Puppet](#), [Chef](#), [Ansible Playbook/AWX](#) ou [RedHat Tower](#)
- Security Monitoring
  - [Elastic Security](#), [Falco](#), [OVH Bastion](#)
- Security Analysis
  - [OpenCVE](#), [AlienVault OTX](#)

And more... (not exhaustive) 😊

# Open Source Security Scanning -- focus on cloud native

## Vulnerability Scans

Trivy

Clair

Syft

## IaC Misconfiguration Scans

Trivy

tfsec

terrascan

KICS

checkov

## Secret Scanning

tfsec (terraform)

Trivy (K8s)

squealer

gitleaks

gitLeaks

git-all-secrets

many-more non cloud native

## Compliance Scans

kube-bench CIS

kube-beacon CIS

Starboard NSA

Kubescape NSA

## SBOM

Trivy

Syft

## In-Cluster Scans

Trivy

Kubescape

kube-hunter

chain-bench




# Demo





# DDoS



Liran Tal on X: "⚠️ Beware of DoS attacks in Node.js! Learn how to protect your applications with rate limiting, timeouts, and asynchronous operations

#nodejs #security #webdev

4:07 PM · Dec 2, 2024 · 1 View

Post your reply

Discover more

Sourced from across X

Relevant people

Liran Tal @liran\_tal Following

Node.js Secure Coding: nodejs-security.com ⚡ Awarded @GitHub Star 🏆 Awarded @OpenJS Pathfinder award for Security 🌱 DevRel @snyksec


What's happening

News · Trending ALERTE INFO 6,661 posts

 Twitter @Liran Tal

[View reviewed changes](#)

# DDoS



github-advanced-security (bot) found potential problems on Oct 23, 2022

cmd/server/main.go

```
61      -      }
62      -      }
63      -      if err := srv.ListenAndServe(); err != nil {
52 +      if err := http.ListenAndServe(":8080", nil); err != nil {
```

✗ Check failure

Code scanning / gosec

Use of net/http serve function that has no support for setting timeouts

Use of net/http serve function that has no support for setting timeouts

Show more details

Reply...

sonarcloud (bot) commented on Dec 31, 2022

Kudos, SonarCloud Quality Gate passed! Passed

- 0 Bugs
- 0 Vulnerabilities
- 0 Security Hotspots
- 0 Code Smells

- No Coverage information
- 0.0% Duplication

[GitHub Namecheck](#)



David Aparicio &gt; gokvs &gt; Pull Requests &gt; 🔍 81 – 🔥 rem: Go Meetup 3 December 2024 (Batch, Lyon) 🎉 ✅

[Summary](#)   [Issues](#)   [Security Hotspots](#)   [Measures](#)   [Code](#)

## PR Summary

4 New Lines • 🔍 meetup\_3Dec24 → ⚙ main

 Quality Gate ?**Passed**

Last analysis 44 minutes ago • 🏷 dc7b9770

**New Issues****0**

No conditions set

**Accepted Issues****0**

Valid issues that were not fixed

**Coverage**

There is not enough lines to compute coverage

**Duplications****0.0%**Required ≤ 3.0%  
on 4 New Lines

0.0% Estimated after merge

**Security Hotspots****0**

No conditions set



```
[main.go:12] - G304: Potential file inclusion via variable  
(Confidence: HIGH, Severity: MEDIUM)
```

```
11: func readFile(filename string) {  
> 12:     data, err := ioutil.ReadFile(filename)  
13:     if err != nil {
```

```
package main

import (
    "fmt"
    "io/ioutil"
)

func main() {
    userInput := "/etc/passwd" // Entrée contrôlée par l'attaquant
    content, err := ioutil.ReadFile(userInput)
    if err != nil {
        panic(err)
    }
    fmt.Println(string(content))
}
```



```
package main

import (
    "fmt"
    "io/ioutil"
    "path/filepath"
    "strings"
)

func main() {
    userInput := "/etc/passwd" // Entrée contrôlée par l'attaquant
    safebasePath := "/safe/path"

    cleanPath := filepath.Clean(userInput)
    if !strings.HasPrefix(cleanPath, safebasePath) {
        panic("Chemin non autorisé")
    }

    content, err := ioutil.ReadFile(cleanPath)
    if err != nil {
        panic(err)
    }
    fmt.Println(string(content))
}
```



# AI-inside

## Auto fixing vulnerabilities

gosec can suggest fixes based on AI recommendation. It will call an AI API to receive a suggestion for a security finding.

You can enable this feature by providing the following command line arguments:

- `ai-api-provider` : the name of the AI API provider, currently only `gemini` is supported.
- `ai-api-key` or set the environment variable `GOSEC_AI_API_KEY` : the key to access the AI API, For gemini, you can create an API key following [these instructions](#).
- `ai-endpoint` : the endpoint of the AI provider, this is optional argument.

```
gosec -ai-api-provider="gemini" -ai-api-key="your_key" ./...
```





# Autre outil

## Govulncheck v1.0.0 is released!

*Julie Qiu, for the Go security team*

13 July 2023

We are excited to announce that govulncheck v1.0.0 has been released, along with v1.0.0 of the API for integrating scanning into other tools!

Go's support for vulnerability management was [first announced](#) last September. We have made several changes since then, culminating in today's release.

This post describes Go's updated vulnerability tooling, and how to get started using it. We also recently published a [security best practices guide](#) to help you prioritize security in your Go projects.

### Govulncheck

[Govulncheck](#) is a command-line tool that helps Go users find known vulnerabilities in their project dependencies. The tool can analyze both codebases and binaries, and it reduces noise by prioritizing vulnerabilities in functions that your code is actually calling.

You can install the latest version of govulncheck using [go install](#):

```
go install golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/govulncheck@latest
```

Then, run govulncheck inside your module:

```
govulncheck ./...
```

See the [govulncheck tutorial](#) for additional information on how to get started with using the tool.


As of this release, there is now a stable API available, which is described at [golang.org/x/vuln/scan](#). This API provides the same functionality as the govulncheck command, enabling developers to integrate security scanners and other tools with govulncheck. As an example, see the [osv-scanner integration with govulncheck](#).

### Database

Govulncheck is powered by the Go vulnerability database, <https://vuln.go.dev>, which provides a comprehensive source of information about known vulnerabilities in public Go modules. You can browse the entries in the database at [pkgo.dev/vuln](http://pkgo.dev/vuln).



# Scan Every- where



 Twitter  
[@RhysSullivan](https://twitter.com/@RhysSullivan)




# Conseils



# Attention avec Docker

Number of OS vulnerabilities by docker image



[The state of open source security – 2019](#)

# Attention avec vos dépendances

## Open Source Security report

- 78% of vulnerabilities are found in indirect dependencies




c



The state of open source security – 2019



# Attention avec vos dépendances



The image shows the header of the PCWorld website. The header is red with the "PCWorld" logo and "FROM IDG" text. It features social media icons for Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, and a search bar with the placeholder "Start Searching". Below the header is a navigation bar with categories: NEWS, REVIEWS, HOW-TO, VIDEO, DEALS (with a dropdown arrow), BUSINESS, LAPTOPS, SMARTPHONES, HARDWARE, SECURITY, SOFTWARE, and GADG. A secondary navigation bar below includes links for Privacy, Encryption, and Antivirus.

Home / Internet

NEWS

## Failure to patch known ImageMagick flaw for months costs Facebook \$40k

A researcher found that Facebook was still vulnerable to the ImageTragick exploit months after it was disclosed



By [Lucian Constantin](#)


CSO Senior Writer, IDG News Service | JAN 18, 2017 12:06 PM PST



[PCWorld - Remote Code Execution Exploit \(Write-up\)](#)



# Ne pas afficher des données personnelles (PII)



The screenshot shows the Ameli.fr user interface. At the top, there's a navigation bar with links for Accueil, Mes paiements, Mes démarches, Mon espace prévention, and Mes informations. Below this is a main content area divided into several sections:

- MES DERNIERS PAIEMENTS**: Shows two recent payments: "Paiement à un tiers" on 1 OCT. for 3,09€ and another on 2 OCT. for 7,41€.
- MES DÉMARCHES EN 2 CLICS**: A list of quick actions:
  - Attestation de droits
  - Attestation de paiement d'indemnités journalières
  - Carte européenne d'assurance maladie (CEAM)
  - Voir toutes les démarches
  - Consulter les délais de traitement de ma CPAM
- MON AGENDA**: Options for viewing or scheduling appointments.
- MON ESPACE PRÉVENTION**: Options for prevention measures.

In the "MES DÉMARCHES EN 2 CLICS" section, the phone number 2 69 05 49 588 157 80 is circled in red. The entire screenshot is framed by a thick red border.


Site d'Ameli.fr  
(numéro modifié pour illustrer)



CNIL - Donnée personnelle, Personally identifiable information (PII)



# Ne pas utiliser les configurations par défaut



The screenshot shows a news article from Website Planet. The title is "Report: Hotel Reservation Platform Leaves Millions of People Exposed in Massive Data Breach". The author is Mark Holden, and the date is November 06, 2020. The article details a data breach by Prestige Software, which sells a channel management platform called Cloud Hospitality. The company is based in Madrid and Barcelona and sells to hotels like Expedia and Booking.com. The breach exposed highly sensitive data from millions of hotel guests worldwide, including credit card details for 100,000s of people. The company was storing years of credit card data without any protection in place, putting millions of people at risk of fraud and online attacks.

## Customer Data Exposed

- PII data: Full names, email addresses, national ID numbers, and phone numbers of hotel guests

Prestige Software doesn't list that appeared to originate from including, but not limited to:

- Agoda
- Amadeus
- Booking.com
- Expedia
- Hotels.com
- Hotelbeds
- Omnibees
- Sabre
- and many others



[Hotel Reservation Platform Leaves Millions of People Exposed in Massive Data Breach](#)



# Ne pas utiliser les configurations par défaut



The screenshot shows a news article from the 'mackeeper' blog. The title is 'BREAKING: Massive Breach of Mexican Voter Data'. Below the title, there is a snippet of text: 'See the interview with Chris Vickery commenting on this breach.' The text of the article discusses a publicly accessible database containing voter records from Mexico, which was discovered on an Amazon cloud server. The author states they did not transmit the data out of Mexico and that no password or authentication was required for public access.

See the [interview with Chris Vickery](#) commenting on this breach.

Before going any further, let's make one thing very clear. I'm not the one who transmitted the data out of Mexico. Someone else will have to answer for that. However, eight days ago (April 14th), I did discover a publicly accessible database, hosted on an Amazon cloud server, containing these records. There was no password or authentication of any sort required. It was configured purely for public access. Why? I have no clue.

After reporting the situation to the US State Department, DHS, the Mexican Embassy in Washington, the Mexican Instituto Nacional Electoral (INE), and Amazon, the database was finally taken offline April 22nd, 2016.

Under Mexican law, these files are “strictly confidential” carrying a penalty of up to 12 years in prison for anyone extracting this data from the government for personal gain. We’re talking about names, home addresses, birthdates, a couple of national identification numbers, and a few other bits of info.



[Massive Breach of Mexican Voter Data](#)



# Ne pas utiliser les permissions par défaut



Mathis Hammel  
@MathisHammel

Mais le souci justement, c'est que les permissions étaient mal configurées. Tout ce qui touchait aux candidats était autorisé en lecture et en écriture, notamment la fonction permettant d'ajouter ou de modifier une proposition...

Translate Tweet

```
éprop { createPropositions(input: {id:"555", titleContent:"", source:""}) {id} }  
createPropositions(input: {id:"555", title:"Y'a un souci", source:""}) {id} }  
:  
:  
ip { deletePropositions(input:{id:"555"})(title)  
positions(input:{id:"555"})(title)  
:  
:  
i souci l\u00e0 non ?"
```

Bannir les pesticides, instaurer des zones-tampons, lutter contre l'artificialisation des sols  
Par Jean-Luc Mélenchon

Créer un haut-commissariat à l'eau  
Par Jean-Luc Mélenchon

Planifier le 100% d'énergies renouvelables avec un double axe sobriété/efficacité énergétique pour 2050  
Par Jean-Luc Mélenchon

Sortir du nucléaire : abandonner les projets d'EPR et d'enfouissement des déchets nucléaires, planifier le démantèlement de la..  
Par Jean-Luc Mélenchon

Y'a un souci là non ?  
Par Jean-Luc Mélenchon

5:46 PM · Jan 15, 2022 · Twitter Web App



[Thread @MathisHammel](#)



# Attention au risque humain

**ars TECHNICA**

**ELON SPEAKS —**

## Russian tourist offered employee \$1 million to cripple Tesla with malware

“This was a serious attack,” Elon Musk says.

DAN GOODIN - 8/28/2020, 4:12 AM










Tesla

[Enlarge](#)





# Attention au traffic sortant aussi !


[Introduction à DNSSEC](#)

[Exfiltration DNS @Rob Sobers](#)

# Quelques bonnes pratiques

- Diminuer surface d'attaque (scratch, distroless, ubi-minimal)
- Principe de moindre privilège (!root, 1 user = 1 appli)
- Défense en profondeur (bastion, traceability, siem)
- Détection de connexion, proposer/activer MFA
- Pas de configuration/permissions par défaut (K8s, [MongoDB](#))
- Pas de secrets dans les Docker images ou les repositories Git (Vault, .gitignore)
- Pas de données sensibles dans les GUI (cf slide suivante)
- Ne pas afficher de stacktrace (pas debug | Fail securely)
- Ni de version/nom de framework
- Vérifier les entrées/sorties des clients/noeuds (injection/XSS, protocoles)
- Faire des backups régulièrement et déconnectées du réseau
- Mettre à jour infra/docker images (CI/CD|[GitOps](#))
- PaaS (BUILD/RUN)  OVHcloud/CleverCloud

# Pourquoi ?

2013	2017 (new, * from the community)	2021 (new, * from the survey)
A1 - Injection	A1 - <b>Injection</b>	A1 - Broken Access Control
A2 - Broken Authentication & Session Management	A2 - <b>Broken Authentication</b>	A2 - Cryptographic Failures
A3 - Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)	A3 - <b>Sensitive Data Exposure</b>	A3 - <b>Injection</b>
<b>A4 - Insecure Direct Object References</b>	A4 - XML External Entities (XXE)	<b>A4 - Insecure Design</b>
A5 - Security Misconfiguration	A5 - <b>Broken Access Control [MERGED A4+A7]</b>	A5 - <b>Security Misconfiguration</b>
A6 - Sensitive Data Exposure	A6 - <b>Security Misconfiguration</b>	A6 - Vulnerable and Outdated Components
<b>A7 - Missing Function Level Access Control</b>	A7 - Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)	A7 - Identification and Authentication Failures
A8 - Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)	<b>A8 - Insecure Deserialization *</b>	<b>A8 - Software and Data Integrity Failures</b>
A9 - Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities	A9 - <b>Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities</b>	A9 - Security Logging and Monitoring Failures *
A10 - Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards	<b>A10 - Insufficient Logging &amp; Monitoring *</b>	<b>A10 - Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) *</b>

**OWASP TOP 10**



# Conclusion



# TL;DR - The state of open source security 2019 report, at a glance



## Open source adoption

- ▷ Growth in indexed packages, 2017 to 2018
  - ❖ Maven Central - 102%
  - ❖ PyPI - 40%
  - ❖ npm - 37%
  - ❖ NuGet - 26%
  - ❖ RubyGems - 5.6%
- ▷ npm reported 304 billion downloads for 2018
- ▷ 78% of vulnerabilities are found in indirect dependencies



## Known vulnerabilities

- ▷ 88% growth in application vulnerabilities over two years
- ▷ In 2018, vulnerabilities for npm grew by 47%. Maven Central and PHP Packagist disclosures grew by 27% and 56% respectively
- ▷ In 2018, we tracked over 4 times more vulnerabilities found in RHEL, Debian and Ubuntu as compared to 2017



## Vulnerability identification

- ▷ 37% of open source developers don't implement any sort of security testing during CI and 54% of developers don't do any docker image security testings
- ▷ The median time from when a vulnerability was added to an open source package until it was fixed was over 2 years



## Who's responsible for open source security?

- ▷ 81% of users feel developers are responsible for open source security
- ▷ 68% of users feel that developers should own the security responsibility of their docker container images
- ▷ Only three in ten open source maintainers consider themselves to have high security knowledge



## Known vulnerabilities in docker images

- ▷ Each of the top ten most popular default docker images contains at least 30 vulnerable system libraries
- ▷ 44% of scanned docker images can fix known vulnerabilities by updating their base image tag



## Snyk stats

- ▷ In the second half of 2018 alone, Snyk opened more than 70,000 Pull Requests for its users to remediate vulnerabilities in their projects
- ▷ CVE/NVD and public vulnerability databases miss many vulnerabilities, only accounting for 60% of the vulnerabilities Snyk tracks
- ▷ In 2018 alone, 500 vulnerabilities were disclosed by Snyk's proprietary dedicated research team



The state of open  
source security - 2019



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# Analogie

« Nul n'est censé ignorer la loi »





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# Ma devise

« Nul développeur n'est censé ignorer la sécurité »





## Pour aller plus loin

- [ANSSI \(Sécurité Agile, Applications sécurisés en Rust, Déploiement de conteneurs Docker\)](#)
- [10 leçons sur les 10 plus grosses fuites de données](#), de Adrien Pessu (JSC 2020)
- [La Cryptographie en 55' chrono](#) de m4dz (SnowCamp2020)
- [Sécurité du Cloud](#), de Eric Briand (RemoteClazz 2020)
- [La nuit tous les hackers sont gris](#) (Fiction écrite par Vincent Hazard, 2019)

TV5 Monde Analyse d'Incident / Incident Analysis

35

## Traumatisme

- Ce genre d'incident de sécurité a plusieurs conséquences
  - Conditions de travail très dures : horaires importants, vacances annulées, pression croissante...
  - Traumatisme lié à l'attaque qui perdure et qui est difficile à percevoir lorsque l'ANSSI intervient
  - La crainte que l'attaquant revienne est permanente

Retour technique de l'incident de TV5Monde

ANSSI

SSTIC 2017 7 au 9 juin 2017 <https://www.sstic.org>

38:39 / 1:16:25





[La Sécurité dès la conception \(Secure by design\)](#), Programmez! (Hors-série 8 Septembre/Octobre 2022)

# Rappelez-vous: Les hackers n'en ont rien à "faire"

- À propos du scope de votre projet
- Il est géré par une tierce partie / sous-traitant
- C'est un système ancien (Legacy)
- TPCM / " Touche pas ! C'est magique "
- C'est "trop critique pour être réparé"
- A propos de vos périodes de maintenance
- A propos de votre budget
- Vous l'avez toujours fait de cette façon
- À propos de votre date de mise en service
- Il s'agit seulement d'un pilote/PoC
- À propos des accords de non-divulgation
- Ce n'était pas une exigence dans le contrat
- C'est un système interne
- Il est vraiment difficile de modifier / changer
- Vous n'êtes pas sûr de savoir comment y remédier
- Il doit être remplacé
- C'est géré dans le Cloud
- À propos de votre inscription au registre des risques
- L'éditeur ne prend pas en charge cette configuration
- C'est une solution provisoire
- Il est conforme à [insérer la norme ici]
- Il est crypté sur disque
- Le rapport coût-bénéfice ne scale pas
- "Personne d'autre ne pouvait le comprendre"
- Vous ne pouvez pas expliquer le risque au "Business"
- Vous avez d'autres priorités
- Sur votre foi dans la compétence de vos utilisateurs internes
- Vous n'avez pas de justification commerciale
- Vous ne pouvez pas montrer le retour sur investissement
- Vous avez sous-traité ce risque
- C'était à la mode [insérer la technologie hype ici].
- De vos certifications





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Merci beaucoup aux  
organisateurs & à Zenika  
pour nous accueillir ce soir





# Merci pour votre attention !

 N'oubliez pas de me donner votre avis sur cette session: <https://tinyurl.com/meetgo24>

 Lien des slides dans les commentaires 



Faites-vous confiance aux QRCodes ?