Appendix

Productivity and the firm

- The higher the productivity of a firm, the lower its costs
- Prices levied by firms consist of costs plus a markup
- A firm with higher productivity
 - lower production costs and prices
 - · higher demand for their output
 - higher optimal size and profits
- We model productivities as Pareto distributed
 - ullet in the Intermediate sector $i \sim G_i(\cdot, \underline{i}, i_{shape})$
 - ullet in the Final sector $f \sim \mathcal{G}_f(\cdot, \underline{f}, f_{shape})$

From One Sector to the Economy


Intermediate sector

- Consists of (a continuum) of firms selling to a continuum of Final firms (B2B)
- Buys inputs (labor and capital) from the Competitive sector
- Produces a differentiated good used as an input in the Final sector


Final sector

- Combines inputs from all Intermediate firms ('preference' for input variety)
- Produces a differentiated good sold to a representative consumer (B2C), who
 has preferences for variety (Dixit-Stiglitz)

Intermediate and Final goods sectors



Distortions - Intermediate Registered



R: No input distortion

Output distortion: VAT in price affects Final firms (Reg. status) and consumers

NR:

Input distortion:

Cascading + VAT not credited

Output distortion:

Indirect VAT effect (goods are complements)

В

Input distortion:

Cascading + VAT not credited

Output distortion:


Bunching + Indirect VAT effect (goods are complements)

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Input distortion: Cascading

Output distortion: Direct effect of VAT on price

Distortions - Intermediate Non-Registered



NR:

Input distortion: VAT not credited

Output distortion:

Indirect VAT effect (goods are complements)

NR:

Input distortion: Cascading

Output distortion:

Indirect VAT effect (goods are complements)

B

Input distortion: Cascading

Output distortion:

Bunching + Indirect VAT effect (goods are complements)

l:

Input distortion: Cascading

Output distortion: Direct effect of VAT on price

Optimal Thresholds - Net Revenues Maximization

	Corner	Keen and Mintz Ext.	$s_I = s_F$	$s_I \neq s_F$
Intermed. Sect threshold turnover	32070	176308	92331	86918
Final Sect threshold turnover	42973	176308	92331	118634
Intermed. Sect % Nonreg.	0.000	80.316	30.195	0.002
Intermed. Sect % Bunch.	0.000	15.511	54.509	79.903
Intermed. Sect % Reg.	100.000	4.173	15.296	20.095
Final Sect % Nonreg.	0.000	81.389	50.011	69.023
Final Sect % Bunch.	0.000	16.459	42.704	25.844
Final Sect % Reg.	100.000	2.152	7.285	5.133
Total Gross Revenues	3.26×10^{10}	4.05×10^{10}	4.11×10^{10}	4.15×10^{10}
Total Admin. Costs	3.80×10^{9}	1.20×10^{8}	4.29×10^{8}	4.79×10^{8}
Total Net Revenues	2.88×10^{10}	4.04×10^{10}	4.06×10^{10}	4.10×10^{10}