分析某加固的Anti-Frida保护

分析样本: 某邦加固企业版

首先得感谢龙哥在分析过程中提出了大量非常专业的指导与建议, bug属于我, 荣耀属于白龙Lilac!

分析过程

找到检测所在的so

我们可以通过 frida-trace 快速进行系统函数的 hook ,首先我们需要知道load so的函数一般为dlopen 和 android_dlopen_ext ,所以先执行

frida-trace -U -f com.wujie.chengxin -i dlopen

可以观察到以下输出:

可以看到这里只显示了调用dlopen,但是参数没有输出,dlopen的第一个参数即为所需load的so的名字(args[0].readCString())我们可以去提示的路径下修改dlopen.js脚本

修改前:

修改后:

```
us chengxin.js
                Js dlopen.js 3 X
chenxin > _handlers_ > libdl.so > _s dlopen.js
           * @this {object} - Object allowing you to store state for use in onLeave.
           * <code>@param {function} log</code> - Call this function with a string to be presented to the user.
          * <code>@param {array} args</code> - Function arguments represented as an array of NativePointer objects
 14
          * @param {object} state - Object allowing you to keep state across function calls.
 20
         onEnter(log, args, state) {
          log('dlopen(): '+args[0].readCString());
          * @this {object} - Object allowing you to access state stored in onEnter.
          * <code>@param {function} log</code> - Call this function with a string to be presented to the user.
           * @param {NativePointer} retval - Return value represented as a NativePointer object.
           * <code>@param {object} state - Object allowing you to keep state across function calls.</code>
         onLeave(log, retval, state) {
```

再次输出一下:

```
PS E:\样本\antiantifrida\chenxin>
Frida-trace -U -f com.wujie.chengxin -i dlopen
Instrumenting...
dlopen: Loaded handler at "E:\\样本\\antiantifrida\\chenxin\\_handlers_\\libdl.so\\dlopen.js"
Started tracing 1 function. Press Ctrl+C to stop.

/* TID 0x3e92 */
241 ms dlopen(): libc.so
242 ms dlopen(): libc.so
247 ms dlopen(): libdatajar.so

Process terminated
PS E:\样本\antiantifrida\chenxin>_
```

现在dlopen的参数就显示出来了,但是这里load的三个so显然是系统的so而非app的so,所以我们再hook android_dlopen_ext看看:

可以看到当load到libDexHelper.so的时候,frida被杀掉了,所以我们初步可以判定做检测的位置在libDexHelper.so中

检测点一

首先我们可以通过hook字符串比较函数(比如strstr和strcmp等函数)来观察是否传入了frida相关的字符串进行比较

```
E:\样本\antiantifrida\chenxin> frida-trace
strstr: Loaded handler at "E:\\样本\\antiantifrida\\chenxin\\ handlers \\libc.so\\strstr.js"
started tracing 1 function. Press Ctrl+C to stop
           /* TID 0x4dcd */
  246 ms
trstr(s1="/data/local/tmp/re.frida.server/linjector-62", s2="com.wujie.chengxin")
  258 ms
strstr(s1="d0e51000-d1c72000 r-xp 00000000 103:06 4063246", s2="lib/libart.so")
                                                                                            /data/local/tmp/re.frida.server/frida-agent-32.se
  258 ms
strstr(s1="d1c72000-d1cca000 r--p 00e20000 103:06 4063246", s2="lib/libart.so")
                                                                                            /data/local/tmp/re.frida.server/frida-agent-32.se
  258 ms
strstr(s1="d1cca000-d1cd8000 rw-p 00e78000 103:06 4063246", s2="lib/libart.so")
                                                                                            /data/local/tmp/re.frida.server/frida-agent-32.se
310 ms
strstr(s1="d0e51000-d1c72000 r-xp 00000000 103:06 4063246
", s2="/lib/libdexfile.so")
                                                                                            /data/local/tmp/re.frida.server/frida-agent-32.se
/data/local/tmp/re.frida.server/frida-agent-32.se
, s2="/lib/libdexfile.so")

310 ms
strstr(s1="dlcca000-dlcd8000 rw-p 00e78000 103:06 4063246", s2="/lib/libdexfile.so")
                                                                                            /data/local/tmp/re.frida.server/frida-agent-32.se
, s2= /ilb/liboekile.so /
397 ms
strstr(s1="d0e51000-d1c72000 r-xp 00000000 103:06 4063246
', s2="/lib/libart.so")
                                                                                            /data/local/tmp/re.frida.server/frida-agent-32.se
  397 ms
., s2="/lib/libart.so")
                                                                                            /data/local/tmp/re.frida.server/frida-agent-32.se
  398 ms
", s2="/lib/libart.so")
                                                                                            /data/local/tmp/re.frida.server/frida-agent-32.sc
  441 ms
T-T III3
Strstr(51="d0e51000-d1c72000 r-xp 00000000 103:06 4063246", s2="/lib/libart.so")
                                                                                            /data/local/tmp/re.frida.server/frida-agent-32.sc
  441 ms
T-1 m3
trstr(51="d1c72000-d1cca000 r--p 00e20000 103:06 4063246", s2="/lib/libart.so")
                                                                                            /data/local/tmp/re.frida.server/frida-agent-32.se
  441 ms
trstr(s1="d1cca000-d1cd8000 rw-p 00e78000 103:06 4063246
                                                                                            /data/local/tmp/re.frida.server/frida-agent-32.s
```

通过这些字符串的特征,可以知道它们来自maps,而Frida的一大特征就是在注入到app中后,app的maps中会有frida-agent.so的内存分布。所以这里我们可以通过伪造maps来绕过这里的检测(在/data/data/pkgname/路径下创建一个新的maps,并读取按行读取原始的maps,如果某一行中存在tmp字符串时,就跳过这一行,否则写入新的maps)在脚本里加入以下代码:

```
const openPtr = Module.getExportByName('libc.so', 'open');
const open = new NativeFunction(openPtr, 'int', ['pointer', 'int']);
var readPtr = Module.findExportByName("libc.so", "read");
var read = new NativeFunction(readPtr, 'int', ['int', 'pointer', "int"]);

var fakePath = "/data/data/com.pkgname/maps";
var file = new File(fakePath, "w");
var buffer = Memory.alloc(512);

Interceptor.replace(openPtr, new NativeCallback(function (pathnameptr, flag) {
```

```
var pathname = Memory.readUtf8String(pathnameptr);
    var realFd = open(pathnameptr, flag);
    console.log("open:", pathname)
    if (pathname.indexOf("maps") >= 0) {
        // console.log("open maps:", pathname);
        while(parseInt(read(realFd, buffer, 512)) !== 0){
            var oneLine = Memory.readCString(buffer);
            if(oneLine.indexOf("tmp")===-1){
                file.write(oneLine);
            }else {
                console.log(oneLine);
            }
        }
        var filename = Memory.allocUtf8String(fakePath);
        return open(filename, flag);
   }
   var fd = open(pathnameptr, flag);
    // Thread.sleep(1)
    return fd;
}, 'int', ['pointer', 'int']));
```

执行后的输出如下:

```
/data/local/tmp/re.frida.server/frida-agent-32.se
d1ff7000-d203b000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
open: /data/app/com.wujie.chengxin-WZCaCd7ATEUlEIc9Fl7Xdg==/base.apk
open: /proc/self/maps
-d1170000 r-xs 02000000 00:05 66941807
                                                                     /memfd:/jit-cache (deleted)
d1170000-d1f91000 r-xp 00000000 103:06 4063243
                                                                              /data/local/tmp/re.frida.server/frida-agent-32.so
d1f91000-d1fe9000 r--p 00e20000 103:06 4063243
                                                                              /data/local/tmp/re.frida.server/frida-agent-32.so
d1fe9000-d1ff7000 rw-p 00e78000 103:06 4063243
                                                                              /data/local/tmp/re.frida.server/frida-agent-32.so
d1ff7000-d203b000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
open: /data/app/com.wujie.chengxin-WZCaCd7ATEUlEIc9Fl7Xdg==/base.apk
open: /data/app/com.wujie.chengxin-WZCaCd7ATEUlEIc9Fl7Xdg==/base.apk
open: /apex/com.android.runtime/lib/bionic/libc.so
 ppen: /proc/26096/maps
 -d1170000 r-xs 02000000 00:05 66941807
                                                                     /memfd:/jit-cache (deleted)
d1170000-d1f91000 r-xp 00000000 103:06 4063243
                                                                              /data/local/tmp/re.frida.server/frida-agent-32.so
d1f91000-d1fe9000 r--p 00e20000 103:06 4063243
d1fe9000-d1ff70<mark>0</mark>0 rw-p 00e78000 103:06 4063243
d1ff7000-d203b000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
                                                                              /data/local/tmp/re.frida.server/frida-agent-32.so
                                                                              /data/local/tmp/re.frida.server/frida-agent-32.so
open: /proc/self/task/26096/status
open: /proc/self/task/26101/status
open: /proc/self/task/26102/status
open: /proc/self/task/26103/status
open: /proc/self/task/26104/status
open: /proc/self/task/26105/status
open: /proc/self/task/26107/status
open: /proc/self/task/26112/status
open: /proc/self/task/26113/status
open: /proc/self/task/26115/status
open: /proc/self/task/26116/status
open: /proc/self/task/26117/status
open: /proc/self/task/26118/status
open: /proc/self/task/26119/status
open: /proc/self/task/26120/status
open: /proc/self/task/26121/status
open: /proc/self/task/26122/status
open: /proc/self/task/26123/status
open: /proc/self/task/26124/status
open: /proc/self/task/26125/status
[MIX 3::com.wujie.chengxin]->
Thank you for using Frida!
PS E:\样本\antiantifrida\che
```

通过观察log可以发现,之前maps中frida相关的字符串没有出现在strstr的参数中,说明我们已经过掉了这个检测点,但是frida仍然被杀掉了,并且被杀掉之前app打开了/proc/self/task/pid/status文件,所以我们需要再去观察一下这些status文件。

检测点二

通过观察发现,当app中注入了frida,那么frida的特征会在status文件中的Name字段有所体现,这里我们可以通过其它没有检测frida的app做一个验证,如下图所示:

```
perseus:/proc/27152/task # cat ./27177/status
Name: gdbus
Umask: 0077
State: S (sleeping)
<sup>></sup>Tgid: 27152
<sup>></sup>Ngid:
        0
Pid:
       27177
<sup>O</sup>PPid:
        6142
TracerPid:
                0
Uid:
        10323 10323 10323 10323
       10323 10323 10323 10323
<sup>S</sup>Gid:
<sup>S</sup>FDSize: 128
<sup>1</sup>Groups: 9997 20323 50323
VmPeak: 5916520 kB
VmSize: 5406868 kB
VmLck:
                0 kB
VmPin:
               0 kB
VmHWM:
         118596 kB
VmRSS: 115800 kB
RssAnon:
                    29496 kB
RssFile:
                    86012 kB
RssShmem:
                      292 kB
VmData: 1216788 kB
VmStk:
             8192 kB
VmExe:
               28 kB
VmLib:
         186144 kB
perseus:/proc/27152/task # cat ./27176/status
Name: gmain
Umask: 0077
State: S (sleeping)
<sup>O</sup>Tgid: 27152
Ngid:
       27176
Pid:
<sup>S</sup>PPid:
        6142
               0
TracerPid:
<sup>i</sup>Uid:
       10323 10323 10323 10323
Gid:
       10323 10323 10323 10323
FDSize: 128
Groups: 9997 20323 50323
VmPeak: 5916520 kB
VmSize: 5406868 kB
VmLck:
               0 kB
VmPin:
               0 kB
VmHWM: 118596 kB
VmRSS: 115800 kB
RssAnon:
                    29496 kB
RssFile:
                   86012 kB
RssShmem:
                      292 kB
VmData: 1216788 kB
VmStk:
            8192 kB
VmExe:
               28 kB
VmLib: 186144 kB
```

```
perseus:/proc/27152/task # cat ./27178/status
Name: gum-js-loop
Umask: 0077
State: S (sleeping)
Tgid:
       27152
Ngid:
        0
Pid:
        27178
PPid:
        6142
TracerPid:
                 0
Uid:
                10323
        10323
                         10323
                                 10323
<sup>O</sup>Gid:
        10323
                10323
                         10323
                                 10323
FDSize: 128
Groups: 9997 20323 50323
<sup>5</sup>VmPeak: 5916520 kB
VmSize: 5406868 kB
UmLck:
               0 kB
VmPin:
               0 kB
VmHWM:
          118596 kB
VmRSS:
          115800 kB
RssAnon:
                    29496 kB
RssFile:
                    86012 kB
RssShmem:
                      292 kB
VmData: 1216788 kB
```

所以我们可以通过上面伪造maps的方法去伪造task,修改脚本如下:

```
const openPtr = Module.getExportByName('libc.so', 'open');
const open = new NativeFunction(openPtr, 'int', ['pointer', 'int']);
var readPtr = Module.findExportByName("libc.so", "read");
var read = new NativeFunction(readPtr, 'int', ['int', 'pointer', "int"]);
var fakePath = "/data/data/com.pkgname/maps";
var file = new File(fakePath, "w");
var buffer = Memory.alloc(512);
var fakePath2 = "/data/data/com.pkgname/task";
var file2 = new File(fakePath2, "w");
var buffer2 = Memory.alloc(512);
Interceptor.replace(openPtr, new NativeCallback(function (pathnameptr, flag) {
    var pathname = Memory.readUtf8String(pathnameptr);
    var realFd = open(pathnameptr, flag);
    console.log("open:", pathname)
    if (pathname.indexOf("maps") >= 0 || pathname.indexOf("task") >= 0) {
        var temp = pathname.indexOf("maps") >= 0 ? 1:2;
        switch(temp){
            case 1:
                // console.log("open maps:", pathname);
                while(parseInt(read(realFd, buffer, 512)) !== 0){
                    var oneLine = Memory.readCString(buffer);
                    if(oneLine.indexOf("tmp")===-1){
                        file.write(oneLine);
                    }else {
                        // console.log(oneLine);
                    }
```

```
var filename = Memory.allocUtf8String(fakePath);
                return open(filename, flag);
                break:
            case 2:
                // console.log("open task:", pathname);
                while(parseInt(read(realFd, buffer2, 512)) !== 0){
                    var oneLine = Memory.readCString(buffer2);
                    var replaceStr = "123"
                    if(oneLine.indexOf("gum-js-loop")!=-1){
                        oneLine = oneLine.replace("gum-js-loop", replaceStr)
                    if(oneLine.indexOf("qmain")!=-1){
                        oneLine = oneLine.replace("gmain", replaceStr)
                    file2.write(oneLine);
                    // console.log(oneLine)
                }
                var filename = Memory.allocUtf8String(fakePath2);
                return open(filename, flag);
                break;
        }
   }
   var fd = open(pathnameptr, flag);
   // Thread.sleep(1)
   return fd;
}, 'int', ['pointer', 'int']));
```

上面的脚本执行完成后,其实frida还是会被断下来,但是查看输出的log我们可以看到替换是成功的:

```
Mems allowed:
              1
Mems_allowed_list:
voluntary ctxt switches:
                             53
nonvoluntary_ctxt_switches:
                             3
PTE:
            988 kB
VmPMD:
            16 kB
VmSwap: 19556 k
Name: 123
Umask: 0077
State: S (sleeping)
Tgid:
      22820
Ngid:
       0
Pid:
      22849
PPid:
       6143
TracerPid:
Uid:
      10341
              10341 10341
                             10341
Gid:
       10341
              10341
                     10341
                             10341
FDSize: 128
Groups: 3003 9997 20341 50341
VmPeak: 2010596 kB
VmSize: 2010228 kB
VmLck:
             0 kB
VmPin:
             0 kB
VmHWM:
        148848 kB
VmRSS:
       148848 kB
```

但细心一点我们会发现,还有一个frida相关的字符串出现在了log里(pool-frida)所以我们需要修改一下脚本:

```
case 2:
    // console.log("open task:", pathname);
    while(parseInt(read(realFd, buffer2, 512)) !== 0){
        var oneLine = Memory.readCString(buffer2);
        var replaceStr = "123"
        if(oneLine.indexOf("pool-frida")!=-1){
                  oneLine = oneLine.replace("pool-frida", replaceStr)
        }
        if(oneLine.indexOf("gum-js-loop")!=-1){
                  oneLine = oneLine.replace("gum-js-loop", replaceStr)
        }
        if(oneLine.indexOf("gmain")!=-1){
                  oneLine = oneLine.replace("gmain", replaceStr)
        }
        file2.write(oneLine);
        // console.log(oneLine)
    }
    var filename = Memory.allocUtf8String(fakePath2);
        return open(filename, flag);
        break;
```

然后,执行! 然后frida又双叒叕被终止了, 所以还是继续看输出。

检测点三


通过输出可以看到上面还有个关于strstr函数且参数为frida相关字符串的调用:

```
open: /data/app/com.wujie.chengxin-WZCaCd7ATEUlEIc9Fl7Xdg==/oat/arm/base.vdex
open: /data/app/com.wujie.chengxin-WZCaCd7ATEUlEIc9Fl7Xdg==/base.apk
open: /system/framework/arm/boot.art
open: /data/app/com.wujie.chengxin-WZCaCd7ATEUlEIc9Fl7Xdg==/oat/arm/base.art
open: /data/app/com.wujie.chengxin-WZCaCd7ATEUlEIc9Fl7Xdg==/lib/arm/libDexHelper.so
open: /proc/8423/cmdline
strstr(s1="/data/local/tmp/re.frida.server/linjector-99", s2="com.wujie.chengxin")
open: /system/lib/libc.so
open: /proc/self/maps
open: /data/app/com.wujie.chengxin-WZCaCd7ATEUlEIc9Fl7Xdg==/oat/arm/base.odex
open: /data/user/0/com.wujie.chengxin/.cache/classes.dve
open: /system/lib/libc.so
open: /proc/self/maps
open: /proc/self/maps
open: /proc/self/maps
open: /proc/self/maps
open: /proc/self/maps
open: /data/app/com.wujie.chengxin-WZCaCd7ATEUlEIc9Fl7Xdg==/base.apk
open: /proc/self/maps
open: /data/app/com.wujie.chengxin-WZCaCd7ATEUlEIc9Fl7Xdg==/base.apk
open: /data/app/com.wujie.chengxin-WZCaCd7ATEUlEIc9Fl7Xdg==/base.apk
open: /apex/com.android.runtime/lib/bionic/libc.so
open: /proc/8423/maps
open: /proc/self/task/8423/status
open: /proc/self/task/8427/status
open: /proc/self/task/8429/status
open: /proc/self/task/8430/status
open: /proc/self/task/8431/status
open: /proc/self/task/8432/status
open: /proc/self/task/8434/status
open: /proc/self/task/8439/status
open: /proc/self/task/8440/status
open: /proc/self/task/8441/status
open: /proc/self/task/8442/status
open: /proc/self/task/8443/status
open: /proc/self/task/8444/status
open: /proc/self/task/8445/status
open: /proc/self/task/8446/status
open: /proc/self/task/8447/status
open: /proc/self/task/8448/status
open: /proc/self/task/8449/status
open: /proc/self/task/8450/status
open: /proc/self/task/8451/status
open: /proc/self/task/8452/status
open: /proc/self/task/8453/status
open: /proc/self/task/8454/status
open: /proc/self/task/8455/status
[MIX 3::com.wujie.chengxin]->
```

我们打印一下这个strstr的调用栈看看

```
PS E:\样本\antiantifrida\chenxin> <mark>frida</mark>
                                                com.wujie.chengxin
                                                                       .\chengxin.js
             Frida 15.0.18 - A world-class dynamic instrumentation toolkit
   | (_|
             Commands:
                            -> Displays the help system
                 help
                 object? -> Display information about 'object'
                 exit/quit -> Exit
             More info at https://frida.re/docs/home/
Spawned `com.wujie.chengxin`. Resuming main thread!
[MIX 3::com.wujie.chengxin]->
strstr(s1="/data/local/tmp/re.frida.server/linjector-102", s2="com.wujie.chengxin")
0xca12891d libDexHelper.so!JNI_OnLo<mark>a</mark>d+0x14a8
0xf6c55100
```

所以我们再去看看图中这个JNI_OnLoad+0x14a8位置的代码逻辑(此处省略从内存中dump xxx.so以及修复so过程)



通过在ida里搜索可以看到INI_OnLoad函数被抹掉了,所以我们得去打印libDexHelper.so的基址,然后计算偏移来获取strstr的调用点,修改hook strstr部分的脚本为:

执行:

```
PS E:\样本\antiantifrida\chenxin> <mark>frida</mark> -U -f com.wujie.chengxin -l .\chengxin.js --no-paus
             Frida 15.0.18 - A world-class dynamic instrumentation toolkit
             Commands:
                            -> Displays the help system
                 help
                 object?
                            -> Display information about 'object'
                 exit/quit -> Exit
             More info at https://frida.re/docs/home/
 Spawned `com.wujie.chengxin`. Resuming main thread!
[MIX 3::com.wujie.chengxin]->
libDexHelper.so base address: 0xc2e8a000
strstr(s1="/data/local/tmp<mark>/</mark>re.frida.server/linjector-99", s2="com.wujie.chengxin")
0xc2eae91d libDexHelper.so!JNI_OnLoad+0x14a8
0xefc13180
[MIX 3::com.wujie.chengxin]->
Thank you for using Frida!
PS E:\样本\antiantifrida\chenxin>
```

所以偏移为: 0xc2eae91d-0xc2e8a000,在ida里跳转后,往上找一找能发现一个strstr函数调用(其实计算出来的偏移在ida中跳转后并不是strstr的调用点,但肯定是在这个函数里的,所以需要上下找一找):

```
📳 Pseudocode-A 🔀
                                          📳 Pseudocode-B 🔃 🔘 Hex View-1 🔣
🔳 IDA View-A 🔣
                                                                                       A Structures
  539
       v94 = 3;
  540
      LABEL 45:
  541
        while (2)
  542
  543
          switch ( v94 )
  544
  545
            case 0:
            case 9:
  546
  547
              goto LABEL_398;
  548
            case 1:
             sub_11644((int)v334, 8, 169);
  549
  550
              goto LABEL_398;
  551
             case 2:
  552
              v89 = readdir64(v87);
              if ( v89 )
  553
                v94 = 8;
  554
  555
              else
                v94 = 7;
  557
              continue;
  558
            case 3:
  559
              closedir_0(v87);
  560
              goto LABEL_9;
  561
            case 4:
              if ( !*((_BYTE *)&stru_18C.st_name + **(_DWORD **)(v92 + 0xFFFFFC50))
  562
  563
                 || (v94 = sub_113B8((int)&v518, v334, a3)) != 0 )
              {
  565
  566
              }
  567
              continue;
  569
              v93 = atoi_0((const char *)(v89 + 19));
              sub_87488((int)v91, (int)v270, v90, v93);
*(&v518 + readlink_0((int)v91, (int)&v518, 1023)) = 0;
  570
  571
              if ( strstr_0(&v518, v291) && sub_113B8((int)&v518, v332, a3) )
  572
  573
                v94 = 4;
              else
  574
  575 LABEL_398:
  576
                v94 = 2;
  577
              continue;
  578
            case 6:
  579
              closedir_0(v87);
      0002443E sub_24410:572 (2443E)
```

这里strstr函数上面就是一个readlink函数,并且参数v518也和readlink似乎有点关联,所以我们去hook 这个readlink看看,在我们的脚本里补充:

```
var iii,jjj;
Interceptor.attach(Module.findExportByName(null, "readlink"),{
    onEnter: function(args){
        console.log("call readlink")
        iii = args[0]
        jjj = args[1]
        // console.log(Thread.backtrace(this.context,

Backtracer.ACCURATE).map(DebugSymbol.fromAddress).join('\n') + '\n');

    },
    onLeave: function(retval){
        console.log("leave readlink: "+iii.readCString()+" "+jjj.readCString())
    }
});
```

果然,我们可以看到frida出现了:

```
leave readlink: /proc/4085/fd/44 anon_inode:[eventfd]
leave readlink: /proc/4085/fd/45 socket:[68595041]fd]
leave readlink: /proc/4085/fd/46 anon_inode:[eventfd]
leave readlink: /proc/4085/fd/47 anon_inode:[eventfd]
leave readlink: /proc/4085/fd/48 socket:[68621502]fd]
leave readlink: /proc/4085/fd/49 socket:[68620885]
leave readlink: /proc/4085/fd/50 socket:[68620894]
leave readlink: /proc/4085/fd/51 /dev/proc_kperfevents.apk
leave readlink: /proc/4085/fd/52 anon inode:[eventfd]s
leave readlink: /proc/4085/fd/53 /data/local/tmp/re.frida.server/linjector-105-ext-res.apk
libDexHelper.so base address: 0xc2e80000
strstr(s1="/data/local/tmp/re.frida.server/linjector-105", s2="com.wujie.chengxin")
0xc2ea491d libDexHelper.so!JNI_OnLoad+0x14a8
0xefc13180
leave readlink: /proc/4085/fd/54 /data/data/com.wujie.chengxin/mapsnjector-105
leave readlink: /proc/4085/fd/55 socket:[68620928]jie.chengxin/maps
leave readlink: /proc/4085/fd/56 /data/data/com.wujie.chengxin/task
leave readlink: /proc/4085/fd/57 anon_inode:[eventfd].chengxin/task
leave readlink: /proc/4085/fd/58 anon_inode:[eventpoll]hengxin/task
leave readlink: /proc/4085/fd/59 /proc/4123/timerslack_nsngxin/task
leave readlink: /proc/4085/fd/60 /proc/4124/timerslack_ns
leave readlink: /proc/4085/fd/61 /proc/4125/timerslack_ns
leave readlink: /proc/4085/fd/62 /proc/4085/task/4085/delayxin/task
leave readlink: /proc/4085/fd/63 /data/system/theme/iconsay
leave readlink: /proc/4085/fd/64 /data/system/theme/icons
leave readlink: /proc/4085/fd/65 /data/system/theme/framework-miui-resctor-105
leave readlink: /proc/4085/fd/66 /data/system/theme/framework-miui-res
leave readlink: /proc/4085/fd/67 /proc/4085/cmdline/framework-miui-res
leave readlink: /proc/4085/fd/68 /system/framework/oat/arm/org.apache.http.legacy.vdex.apk
```

readlink函数的定义如下:

linux下readlink函数详解

相关函数: stat, lstat, symlink 表头文件: #include <unistd.h>

定义函数: int readlink(const char *path, char *buf, size_t bufsiz);

函数说明: readlink()会将参数path的符号连接内容到参数buf所指的内存空间,返回的内容不是以NULL作字符串结尾,但会将字符串的字符数返回。若参数bufsiz小于符号连接的内容长度,过长的内容会被

截断

返回值 : 执行成功则传符号连接所指的文件路径字符串,失败返回-1, 错误代码存于errno

错误代码:

EACCESS 取文件时被拒绝,权限不够

EINVAL 参数bufsiz为负数

EIO O存取错误

ENAMETOOLONG 参数path的路径名称太长 ENOENT 参数path所指定的文件不存在

ENOMEM 核心内存不足

ENOTDIR 参数path路径中的目录存在但却非真正的目录

所以,我们需要在readlink函数返回的时候替换掉buf中关于frida的内容,这样就能绕过这个检测了,脚本如下:

```
var aaa,bbb,ccc;
var ss = false
Interceptor.attach(Module.findExportByName(null, "readlink"),{
```

```
onEnter: function(args){
        aaa = args[0];
        bbb = args[1];
        ccc = args[2];
    onLeave: function(retval){
      if(bbb.readCString().indexOf("frida")!==-1
         bbb.readCString().indexOf("gum-js-loop")!==-1||
         bbb.readCString().indexOf("gmain")!==-1
         bbb.readCString().indexOf("linjector")!==-1){
          console.log('\nreadlink(' +
                's1="' + aaa.readCString() + '"' +
                ', s2="' + bbb.readCString() + '"' +
                ', s3="' + ccc + '"' +
              ')');
          bbb.writeUtf8String("/system/framework/boot.art")
          console.log("replce with: "+bbb.readCString())
          retval.replace(0x1A)
          console.log("retval: "+retval)
      }
});
```

再次执行:

```
S E:\样本\antiantifrida\chenxin> <mark>frida</mark> -U -f
                                              com.wujie.chengxin -1 .\chengxin.js
             Frida 15.0.18 - A world-class dynamic instrumentation toolkit
             Commands:
                           -> Displays the help system
                object? -> Display information about 'object'
                exit/quit -> Exit
            More info at https://frida.re/docs/home/
Spawned `com.wujie.chengxin`. Resuming main thread!
[MIX 3::com.wujie.chengxin]->
readlink(s1="/proc/4843/fd/53", s2="/data/local/tmp/re.frida.server/linjector-109-ext-res.apk", s3="0x3ff'
replce with: /system/framework/boot.art
retval: 0x1a
readlink(s1="/proc/4843/fd/53", s2="/data/local/tmp/re.frida.server/linjector-109-ext-res.apk", s3="0x3ff'
replce with: /system/framework/boot.art
retval: 0x1a
readlink(s1="/proc/self/fd/53", s2="/data/local/tmp/re.frida.server/linjector-109", s3="0x100")
replce with: /system/framework/boot.art
retval: 0x1a
[MIX 3::com.wujie.chengxin]->
[MIX 3::com.wujie.chengxin]->
[MIX 3::com.wujie.chengxin]->
[MIX 3::com.wujie.chengxin]-> Process.id
4843
[MIX 3::com.wujie.chengxin]-> _
```

成功! (ps: 将上面的脚本拼接起来就可以复现)

常见Frida检测点总结

通过maps检测

扫描/proc/self/maps文件中的内存分布,寻找是否存在打开了/data/local/tmp路径下的so (Frida在运行时会先确定/data/local/tmp路径下是否有re.frida.server文件夹,若没有则创建该文件夹并存放fridaagent.so等文件)

```
perseus:/data/local/tmp/re.frida.server # ls -11
.total 37848
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 15226516 2021-09-26 16:21:26.412616821 +0800 frida-agent-32.so
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 20847304 2021-09-26 16:21:26.512616821 +0800 frida-agent-64.so
-rwx----- 1 root root 2665124 2021-09-26 16:21:26.522616821 +0800 frida-helper-32
prw-rw-rw- 1 root root 0 2021-09-26 16:21:26.662616821 +0800 linjector-1
prw-rw-rw- 1 root root 0 2021-09-26 16:21:27.952616820 +0800 linjector-2
prw-rw-rw- 1 root root 0 2021-09-26 16:21:55.252616810 +0800 linjector-3
prw-rw-rw- 1 root root 0 2021-09-26 16:21:52.762616811 +0800 linjector-7
perseus:/data/local/tmp/re.frida.server #
```

在maps里表现为:

```
seus:/proc/10884 # cat maps grep frida
cae51000-cce51000 r--s 02000000 00:05 66344170
                                                                                 /memfd:/jit-cache (deleted)
cce51000-cee51000 rw-s 00000000 00:05 66344170
                                                                                 /memfd:/jit-cache (deleted)
cee51000-d0e51000 r-xs 02000000 00:05 66344170
                                                                                 /memfd:/jit-cache (deleted)
                                                                                 /data/local/tmp/re.frida.server/frida-agent-32.so
/data/local/tmp/re.frida.server/frida-agent-32.so
d0e51000-d1c72000 r-xp 00000000 103:06 4063246
d1c72000-d1cca000 r--p 00e20000 103:06 4063246
d1cca000-d1cd8000 rw-p 00e78000 103:06 4063246
                                                                                 /data/local/tmp/re.frida.server/frida-agent-32.so
d1cd8000-d1d1c000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
                                                                                 [anon:.bss]
d1d1e000-d1d34000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
                                                                                 [anon:dalvik-large object space allocation]
d1d39000-d1d3e000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
perseus:/proc/10884 #
                                                                                 [anon:dalvik-large object space allocation]
```

通过task检测

扫描task目录下所有/task/pid/status中的Name字段寻找是否存在frida注入的特征,具体线程名为gmain 、gdbus 和 gum-js- loop ,一般情况下这三个线程在第11--13的位置,此外在frida运行脚本过程中,还会存在一个Name字段为 pool-frida 的线程。

```
perseus:/proc/10884 # cd task/
perseus:/proc/10884/task # ls -ll
total 0
dr-xr-xr-x 7 u0_a341 u0_a341 0 2021-09-26 16:21:52.752616811 +0800 10884
dr-xr-xr-x 7 u0 a341 u0 a341 0 2021-09-26 16:21:53.842616810 +0800 10888
dr-xr-xr-x 7 u0_a341 u0_a341 0 2021-09-26 16:21:53.842616810 +0800 10901
dr-xr-xr-x 7 u0_a341 u0_a341 0 2021-09-26 16:21:53.842616810 +0800 10903
dr-xr-xr-x 7 u0_a341 u0_a341 0 2021-09-26 16:21:53.842616810 +0800 10904
dr-xr-xr-x 7 u0_a341 u0_a341 0 2021-09-26 16:21:53.842616810 +0800 10905
dr-xr-xr-x 7 u0_a341 u0_a341 0 2021-09-26 16:21:53.842616810 +0800 10906
dr-xr-xr-x 7 u0_a341 u0_a341 0 2021-09-26 16:21:53.842616810 +0800 10913
dr-xr-xr-x 7 u0_a341 u0_a341 0 2021-09-26 16:21:53.842616810 +0800 10914
dr-xr-xr-x 7 u0_a341 u0_a341 0 2021-09-26 16:21:53.842616810 +0800 10915
dr-xr-xr-x 7 u0 a341 u0 a341 0 2021-09-26 16:21:53.842616810 +0800 10916
dr-xr-xr-x 7 u0_a341 u0_a341 0 2021-09-26 16:21:53.842616810 +0800 10918
dr-xr-xr-x 7 u0_a341 u0_a341 0 2021-09-26 16:21:53.842616810 +0800 10919
dr-xr-xr-x 7 u0_a341 u0_a341 0 2021-09-26 16:21:53.842616810 +0800 10921
dr-xr-xr-x 7 u0_a341 u0_a341 0 2021-09-26 16:21:53.842616810 +0800 10925
dr-xr-xr-x 7 u0 a341 u0 a341 0 2021-09-26 16:21:53.842616810 +0800 10926
dr-xr-xr-x 7 u0_a341 u0_a341 0 2021-09-26 16:21:53.842616810 +0800 10927
dr-xr-xr-x 7 u0_a341 u0_a341 0 2021-09-26 16:21:54.082616810 +0800 10928
dr-xr-xr-x 7 u0_a341 u0_a341 0 2021-09-26 16:21:54.142616810 +0800 10931
dr-xr-xr-x 7 u0 a341 u0 a341 0 2021-09-26 16:21:54.142616810 +0800 10933
dr-xr-xr-x 7 u0_a341 u0_a341 0 2021-09-26 16:21:54.742616810 +0800 10935
dr-xr-xr-x 7 u0_a341 u0_a341 0 2021-09-26 16:21:54.742616810 +0800 10940
```

```
perseus:/proc/10884/task # cat ./10916/status | grep Name
Name: gmain
perseus:/proc/10884/task #
perseus:/proc/10884/task # cat ./10918/status | grep Name
Name: gdbus
perseus:/proc/10884/task # cat ./10919/status | grep Name
Name: gum-js-loop
```

通过fd检测

通过readlink查看 /proc/self/fd 和 /proc/self/task/pid/fd 下所有打开的文件,检测是否有frida相关文件。

```
perseus:/proc/10884 # ls -l fd |grep frida --context=3
lr-x----- 1 u0_a341 u0_a341 64 2021-09-26 16:39 447 -> /data/data/com.wujie.chengxin/files/split/1.0.4/libs/armell-wx----- 1 u0_a341 u0_a341 64 2021-09-26 16:39 448 -> /proc/11092/timerslack_ns
lr-x----- 1 u0_a341 u0_a341 64 2021-09-26 16:39 449 -> /proc/10884/status
l-wx----- 1 u0_a341 u0_a341 64 2021-09-26 16:37 45 -> /data/local/tmp/re.frida.server/linjector-7
lr-x----- 1 u0_a341 u0_a341 64 2021-09-26 16:39 450 -> /sys/devices/virtual/thermal/thermal_zone1/temp
l-wx----- 1 u0_a341 u0_a341 64 2021-09-26 16:39 451 -> /data/data/com.wujie.chengxin/shared_prefs/com.didichuxinhengxin.xml.bak (deleted)
lr-x----- 1 u0_a341 u0_a341 64 2021-09-26 16:39 452 -> /sys/devices/platform/soc/18800000.qcom,icnss/net/wlan0/aperseus:/proc/10884 #
perseus:/proc/10884 #
```

通过D-BUS检测

Frida是通过D-Bus协议进行通信的,所以可以遍历/proc/net/tcp文件,向每个开放的端口发送 D-Bus 的 认证消息 AUTH ,如果端口回复了 REJECT ,那么这个端口就是frida-server(具体案例后边补上)