# Quarkslab

#### MIFARE Classic: exposing the static encrypted nonce variant

Y'en a un peu plus, j'vous l'mets quand même?

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21-11-2024

What to expect?

**Breaking MIFARE Classic in 2024 ??** 

#### FM11RF08S 芯片 EEPROM 存储器的出厂配置数据如下: Sector Block 13 | 14 | UID Chip Info FF FF FF Sector Block 14 | 15 FF FF FF Sector Block 13 | 14 | 15 FF FF FF

# Reader

# Tag

$$\begin{array}{c} \stackrel{\text{UID}}{\longleftarrow} \\ \stackrel{\text{AuthA/B for block X}}{\longrightarrow} \\ a_R := f(n_T) \\ \text{Generate } n_R \\ \\ \stackrel{\{n_R \mid a_R\}}{\longrightarrow} \\ \\ a_T \stackrel{?}{=} f'(n_T) \\ a_T := f'(n_T) \\ \end{array}$$

### Reader

# Tag

{AuthA/B for block Y}

$$\longrightarrow$$

$$\stackrel{\{n_T\}}{\longleftarrow}$$

Generate  $n_T$ 

$$a_R \coloneqq f(n_T)$$
  
Generate  $n_R$ 

$$\xrightarrow{\{n_R|a_R\}}$$

$$\overset{\{a_T\}}{\longleftarrow}$$

$$\begin{array}{l} a_R \stackrel{?}{=} f(n_T) \\ a_T \coloneqq f'(n_T) \end{array}$$

 $a_T \stackrel{?}{=} f'(n_T)$ 



1994 first Philips MIFARE Classic

1997 Infineon SLE44R35

2004 Fudan FM11RF08

2007-2009 the end

• 24C3 Mifare (Little Security Despite Obscurity)



1994 first Philips MIFARE Classic


1997 Infineon SLE44R35

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
2007-2009 the end

- 24C3 Mifare (Little Security Despite Obscurity)
- Dismantling MIFARE Classic

Reader+Tag



Reader-only





1994 first Philips MIFARE Classic


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- 24C3 Mifare (Little Security Despite Obscurity)
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- Dark Side Of Security by Obscurity and Cloning MiFare Classic Rail and Building Passes Anywhere

Card-only: Darkside attack





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- 24C3 Mifare (Little Security Despite Obscurity)
- Dismantling MIFARE Classic
- Dark Side Of Security by Obscurity and Cloning MiFare Classic Rail and Building Passes Anywhere
- Wirelessly Pickpocketing a Mifare Classic Card

Card-only: Nested attack

Reader Tag {AuthA/B for block Y} predictable, "16-bit"  $n_T$  $\{n_T\}$ (1-2 more times) key found!



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1997 Infineon SLE44R35

2004 Fudan FM11RF08

2007-2009 the end? not really...

2010 MIFARE Plus (with Classic compatible SL1)

2014 MIFARE Classic EV1

Hardened cards

Reader Tag UID AuthA/B for block X truly random  $n_T$  $n_T$ random no more NACK



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
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2010 MIFARE Plus (with Classic compatible SL1)

2014 MIFARE Classic EV1

2015 Ciphertext-only Cryptanalysis on Hardened Mifare Classic Cards

Hardnested attack



# Static Encrypted Nonce cards

Resist all known card-only attacks



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
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2020 Fudan FM11RF08S

FM11RF08S aka Static Encrypted Nonce cards





# Static Encrypted Nonce depends on

- the card
- the sector
- the key itself




#### Static Encrypted Nonce depends on

- the card
- the sector
- the key itself

Assume a key is repeated across some sectors / cards

# Reused Keys Nested Attack

#### Reused Keys Nested Attack



Lightweight fuzzing



# Nested AuthA/B for block $X \longrightarrow X$

$$60xx = keyA$$

$$61xx = keyB$$

6000, 6200, 6800, 6a00  $\rightarrow$   $\{n_T\}$  = 4e506c9c, auth successful with keyA


6100, 6300, 6900, 6b00  $\rightarrow \{n_T\}$  = 7bfc7a5b, auth successful with keyB

6400, 6600, 6c00, 6e00  $\rightarrow \{n_T\}$  = 65aaa443, auth failed

6500, 6700, 6d00, 6f00  $\rightarrow$   $\{n_T\}$  = 55062952, auth failed

# Reused Keys Nested Attack

#### Reused Keys Nested Attack



# **A396EFA4E24F**


all sectors

all FM11RF08S tags

**DEMO: Data Read** 



Data-first + Reader-only




**DEMO:** Data-first + Reader-only

**Backdoored nested attack** 



6000, 6200, 6800, 6a00  $\rightarrow n_T$  = 75bfa373, auth successful with keyA 6100, 6300, 6900, 6b00  $\rightarrow n_T$  = 999c7562, auth successful with keyB 6400, 6600, 6c00, 6e00  $\rightarrow n_T$  = 75bfa373, auth successful with **A396EFA4E24F** 6500, 6700, 6d00, 6f00  $\rightarrow n_T$  = 999c7562, auth successful with **A396EFA4E24F** 

## Backdoored nested attack



Data-first attacks, supporting nested

Data-first + Reader-only, with nested auth support

Reader		Tag
	$\begin{array}{c} \operatorname{AuthA/B} \text{ for block X} \\ \longleftrightarrow \end{array}$	
	$\{n_T\}$ $\{n_B a_B\}$	
	$\xrightarrow{\langle n_R   a_R \rangle}$	key found!
	$   \begin{array}{c}                                     $	
	$\{ Read block X \}$	
		Sure!
	$ \begin{array}{c} \longleftrightarrow\\ \{\text{Read block X}\}\\ \longrightarrow \end{array} $	Sure!

## **Reversing Nested Nonce Generation**

$$n_{T_0}, K_0, K_1 \rightarrow n_{T_1}$$

## **Faster Backdoored Nested Attack**

**DEMO: Full Card Recovery** 

**Light-Fast Supply Chain Attack** 

**DEMO: Light-Fast Supply Chain Attack** 

## **More Backdoors**

 $FM11RF08 \Rightarrow A31667A8CEC1$ 

 $FM11RF32N \Rightarrow 518B3354E760$ 

With help of community:

 $FM11RF08S-7B \Rightarrow A396EFA4E24F$ 

 $FM1208-10 \Rightarrow A31667A8CEC1$ 

 $FM1216-137 \Rightarrow A31667A8CEC1$ 

one FM11RF08S  $\Rightarrow$  A31667A8CEC1

Official manufacturers...

 $MF1ICS5003 \Rightarrow A31667A8CEC1$ 

 $MF1ICS5004 \Rightarrow A31667A8CEC1$ 


 $SLE66R35 \Rightarrow A31667A8CEC1$ 







- 47-page https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1275 (v1.2 2024-11-08)
- Proxmark3 Iceman fork 🤎
- 7 new commands/tools/scripts
- 4 updated commands with backdoor support

Contributions per week to master, line counts have been omitted because commit count exceeds 10,000.









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- RFID Hacking by Iceman Discord
  - ► Great community **(\*)**

