

Choice, Welfare, and Market Design: An Empirical Investigation of Feeding America's Choice System

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Motivation

- Many organisations must allocate heterogeneous objects that arrive stochastically
 - Council houses to tenants
 - Donor kidneys to transplant patients
 - Contracts to contractors
- A central question is how much **Choice** should agents have?

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 - Estimating the degree of heterogeneity is key to welfare analysis

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- A central question is how much **Choice** should agents have?
- The benefits of choice depend on heterogeneity in preferences and objects
 - Estimating the degree of heterogeneity is key to welfare analysis
- **This paper** studies the allocation of food to food banks:
 - Food rescue organisations receive truckloads of various types of food and must decide which food bank to send it to
 - Numerous organisations face this problem e.g. FareShare, FEBA, Feeding America

Feeding America

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 - 1 in 7 Americans make *regular* use of a Feeding America affiliated food bank
- Before 2005 food banks were offered food at random
 - **Different** food banks want **different** types of food from Feeding America
 - and what a food bank wants is liable to change over time.

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 - 1 in 7 Americans make *regular* use of a Feeding America affiliated food bank
- After 2005 Feeding America introduced an Auction System
 - Food banks place bids on food using fake money
 - Food banks in areas with more poverty get more fake money

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 - Food banks place bids on food using fake money
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- **Research Question:** How does welfare compare under the two systems?
 - What factors are driving this difference?
 - Could other food bank networks benefit from adopting a similar system?

Feeding America




Feeding America



Feeding America

- Feeding America work with 200 food banks across the country
- They provide food to feed 130,000 people each day
- Distributing 100,000 tons of food to food banks each year



Feeding America



Research Strategy:

- **Empirical strategy:**
 - Estimate food banks' demand functions, and how these vary over time
 - Counterfactuals: Compare allocations under the current and previous regimes

- **Empirical strategy:**
 - Estimate food banks' demand functions, and how these vary over time
 - Counterfactuals: Compare allocations under the current and previous regimes
- **Challenges:**
 - ① Evidence of inter-temporal substitution: food banks treat lots as durable goods
 - ② Strategic bidding: I only observe food banks' bids, not their underlying values
 - ③ Unobserved state: I do not observe stocks, a key determinant of demand
- **Solution:** Estimate a dynamic multi-object auction model with unobserved states
 - This presents its own challenges for identification and estimation

Contribution and Related Literature

This paper makes two main contributions to the literature:

① Heterogeneity and the value of choice in dynamic allocation problems

- Feeding America: Prendergast (2017), Prendergast (2022)
- Public Housing: Waldinger (2022), Thakral (2016)
- Kidney Allocation: Agarwal et al (2020), Agarwal et al (2021)
- Hunting Permits: Reeling & Verdier (2022)

→ This paper: Uses a structural model to quantify and explain the welfare benefits of choice

② Estimation of dynamic games with time-varying unobserved heterogeneity

- Dynamic Auctions: Altmann (2022), Jofre-Bonet & Pesendorfer (2003), Backus & Lewis (forthcoming), Bodoh-Creed et al (2021)
- Discrete Choice: Arcidiacono & Miller (2011), Hotz & Miller (1993), Rust (1987)
- Identification: Berry & Compiani (2022), Connault (2016), Ho & Shum (2012), Kasahara & Shimotsu (2009)

→ This paper: Novel estimation procedure / identification framework for unobserved states

Outline

- ① Institutions and Data
- ② Model and Estimation
- ③ Counterfactuals

The Auction System

The Auction System (2005 - present):

- Each load is put to auction, in a simultaneous FPSB format
- Food banks place bids on loads using a fake currency - 'shares'
 - Daily allocations of fake money are determined by local poverty
 - fake money can be saved, and interest free credit is available
 - Negative bids are allowed, down to $-2000 \rightarrow$ this helps shift undesirable loads
 - The (fake) money supply varies with the food supply to keep prices constant

Two sources of data are used:

① Bidding Data

- Information on every auction from 2014-2017
- The goods included in each lot
- The location of each lot
- Identities and bids of both winning and losing bidders

② Food bank data

- Locations for 85% of food banks, covering 98.5% of consumption
- Catchment areas, local population data and poverty rates

→ I do not have data on stocks, local donations, or food sent to food pantries

Outline

- ① Institutions and Data
- ② Model and Estimation
 - Overview
 - Identification
 - Estimation Procedure
 - Results
- ③ Counterfactuals

Stylised Facts

The model needs to incorporate 4 key observed facts:

① Heterogeneity

- Systematic differences in behaviour across food banks and over time
 - Evidence of persistent and time-varying **unobserved heterogeneity**

Graphs

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Graphs

② Inter-temporal substitution

- After winning a lot, the probability of bidding on a similar lot falls by 25%
- Anecdotal evidence that food banks are forward looking and patient
→ Evidence we need a **Dynamic auction framework**

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Graphs

③ Static substitution

- The probability of bidding on any given lot falls, the more lots are auctioned
- Multiple loads are substitutes
→ Evidence we need a **Multi-object auction framework**

Graphs

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③ Static substitution


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Graphs

④ Negative prices and infrequent bidding

- 21% of bids are negative, and the average bidder only bids on 2% of lots
→ Evidence of **storage costs**


The Model



- Food banks bid in repeated rounds of simultaneous first price auctions
 - Independent private values, endogenous entry into auctions, risk neutral bidders
 - Quasi-linear payoffs, but marginal value of wealth, λ_i can vary across food banks

Model details


The Model



- If a food bank ends the period with stocks \mathbf{s}_i , they receive pay-off $j_i(\mathbf{s}_i)$
 - This depends on stock by subcategory and by storage type
 - This captures the utility of holding food to give it out, and storage costs


Model details

The Model



- $V(s)$ gives the continuation value: expected future payoffs given ending in state s
- If they win lot l they also receive lot specific idiosyncratic pay-off $v_{itl} \sim F^v$
 - This captures transportation costs and unmodelled variation in lot attributes

The Model



- I don't observe stocks, but I do observe winnings ($= w_t$)
 - Each period their stocks increase by $\text{winnings}_{t-1} + x_{it}$
 - x_{it} = local donations minus food distributed to local pantries ($x_{it} \sim F^x$)

Identification

Are the model primitives $\{j_i(\mathbf{s}), F_i^x\}_i$ identified from our data?

- In short, identification is a major challenge, particularly due to...
 - Simultaneous auctions
 - Repeated auctions
 - Reservation Prices
 - Unobserved State
- However, the model remains identified...
 - ① Using observed variation in the size and composition of lots
 - This pins down $j(\mathbf{s})$
 - ② Using observed variation in winnings
 - This pins down F^x

Reduced Form

Reduced Form

- The standard approach to estimating a dynamic auction model:
 - ① Estimate the distribution of equilibrium bids
 - ② Write $V(s)$ as a function of this distribution
 - ③ Back out $j(s)$
- This is not possible in a Multi-object environment
 - We cannot write V as a function of the distribution of bids **only**

3 step estimation procedure

① Estimate equilibrium beliefs: $P(i \text{ wins } l | \mathbf{b})$

[Details](#)

② Estimate F_i^x , and $k_i(\mathbf{s}) = j_i(\mathbf{s}) + \beta V_i(\mathbf{s})$ using Gibbs Sampler

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Details

③ Disentangle j_i and V_i

Details

- Write $V(\mathbf{s})$ as a function of bids and $k_i(\mathbf{s})$, then back out $j = k - \beta V$

3 step estimation procedure

- ① Estimate equilibrium beliefs: $P(i \text{ wins } l | \mathbf{b})$

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Details

- k -step: Given draw of $\{\mathbf{s}_t\}_T$, sample k
 - Regress available lots and \mathbf{s} on bids
- s -step: Given draw of k , sample $\{\mathbf{s}_t\}_T$ and F^x
 - Observe how winnings effects bids
 - Infer changes in stocks from changes in bids
- repeat


- ③ Disentangle j_i and V_i

Details

- Write $V(\mathbf{s})$ as a function of bids and $k_i(\mathbf{s})$, then back out $j = k - \beta V$

Results: Second stage


Estimated mean net donations ($\hat{E}[x_{it}]$)



Note: Plot shows estimated mean net local donations by food bank \times food type, sorted across food banks by estimate for Dried food (red). Error bars give 95% credible intervals.

Results: Third stage

Estimated Marginal Flow Payoff



Note: Plot shows estimated marginal flow pay-off from receiving an average lot by food bank \times food type, evaluated when stocks are empty. Estimates are sorted across food banks by estimate for Dried food. 95% credible intervals are plotted.

Outline

① Institutions and Data

② Model and Estimation

③ Counterfactuals


Mechanisms

Welfare

I consider 3 mechanisms:

- ① The Auction System
- ② The Old System
 - Food banks queue, get offered a load, then go to the back of the queue
- ③ Random Allocation (benchmark)
 - For each mechanism I need to solve for the Markov Perfect Equilibrium
 - Find the fixed point between Accept/Reject decisions and beliefs
 - Consider Welfare in terms of Consumer Surplus, measured in virtual currency
 - The money supply varies with the food supply to ensure prices remain constant
 - Hence we can translate welfare into equivalent increase in the food supply

Welfare



Note: Plot shows the posterior distribution of welfare under each mechanism. Evaluated over 1000 draws from the posterior distribution of parameters. Welfare is measured relative to the mean of the Random allocation. On average, welfare increased by 57 tons of food per day, representing a gain of 19.8% relative to the Old System.


Where does this benefit come from?

- More food allocated Histogram
 - On average 7% more food is allocated under the Auction System
- Less distance travelled Histogram
 - On average lots are allocated 37% closer under the Auction System
- 91% of the welfare change comes from reduced storage costs
 - They seem to accept food that doesn't meet their most pressing needs...
 - ... then don't have room to accept food that does meet these needs later
 - They accept food that other food banks might value more
- Equity? Plot
 - On average 70% of food banks achieve higher welfare under the Auction System

- ① How should Feeding America allocate food among its food banks?
 - How important is it to give food banks Choice in what they are allocated?
 - Applicable for numerous other food bank networks around the world
- ② Developed a framework to estimate demand when stocks are unobserved
 - Found evidence of strong heterogeneity both across food banks and across time
- ③ Allowing Choice is extremely important
 - Allows food banks to sort on types of food they need *and* when they need them
 - The majority of food banks are better off with choice

Future directions:


- How do other mechanisms fair?
- Is there room for improvement?




Note: Map plots counties in the catchment areas of food banks who make regular use of the Choice System.

crackers & cookies

A word cloud centered around food and drink items, with the main words being "snacks", "juice", "water", "Kellogg", and "potato". The words are colored in various shades of yellow, orange, red, and blue. Smaller words surrounding the center include "candy", "bars", "towel", "pop", "crisps", "vegetables", "soup", "yoghurt", "onion", "breakfast", "coffee", "dairy", "lunch", "condiments", "beans", "oranges/lemons", "peanut butter", "detergent", "shake", "onion", "carrot", "cheese", "meal", "boxes", "baked goods", "cheerio", "sausage", "slim jims", "pie", "tomato", "cer", "cer", "desert", "bev", "pizza", "meat", "apple", "cabbage", "melon", "corn flakes", "food", "sauce", "pasta", "cookie", "bread", "fish", "vitamin", "juice", "water", "Kellogg", and "potato".




Storage type: • dried • fresh • nf • refrigerated • tinned




◀ return

Heterogeneity in food



- Strong evidence that some goods are preferred to others
- But lots of variation within categories



Note: Plot shows average winning bids across 164 subcategories of food. Controlling for size, location, and composition of the lot. Subcategories are divided within the 15 categories shown.

[◀ return](#)

Reduced Form exercise:

Consider a simple Tobit regression:

- Split food into 5 types, according to how the food is stored:
 - Dried, Tinned / Bottled, Refrigerated, Fresh, and Non-food
 - This helps me focus on storage costs, and how they vary with stocks, as a key margin
- Find each food bank's average bid for each type of food


$$b_{itl} = \alpha_{ig} + \varepsilon_{itl}$$
$$b_{itl}^* = \begin{cases} b_{itl} & \text{if } b_{itl} \geq R_l \\ R_l & \text{if } \text{Otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$\varepsilon_{itl} \sim N(0, \sigma_{il}) \quad (1)$$

- Where α_{ig} are food bank \times type specific means

◀ return

Heterogeneity Across Food Banks




Note: Plot shows average bids across food banks \times food types, controlling for available lots and endogenous entry. Estimates are sorted by average bid on dried food. 95% confidence intervals are shown.

Heterogeneity Over Time


Instead, estimate $\alpha_{igm} = \text{food bank} \times \text{type} \times \text{month specific means}$

[◀ return](#)

Food bank (A)



Food bank (B)



Note: Plots show average bids across food types \times months, controlling for available lots and endogenous entry. The two food banks shown are the two highest consumption food banks ($\approx 5\%$ of total food each). Fresh / Non-food are excluded for graph-ability. The shaded area gives the 95% confidence intervals.

A Running Theme

A central theme will be this idea of heterogeneity:

① Heterogeneity in food

Graphs

- Is Cereal qualitatively different from Frozen Dinners?
- If food is all the same they will not care what they consume

② Heterogeneity in needs across food banks

Graphs

- 5 food banks receive as much food as the 122 food banks that receive the least food
- But, these 122 food banks spend 4 times as many shares


③ Heterogeneity in needs over time

Graphs

- Bidding behaviour within a food bank varies significantly over time


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Static Substitution




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Dynamic Substitution




Controlling for foodbank \times storage method fixed effects, conditional on goods being available.
P(Bid) at day 0 is normalised to the long-run average probability of bidding, to demonstrate scale.

Static Complementarities




Probability of bidding on a given lot, as a function of total available lots of the same storage type.
The dotted line gives the unconditional probability of bidding on any given lot.
Controlling for foodbank x storage method fixed effects, day of week, and good subcategories




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◀ Stylised Facts

◀ Identification

The institutional setting is a challenge for **standard approaches**:

- ① *Demand System Estimation* to find Compensating Variation
 - Accounting Period - Aggregate demand by month, or week?
 - Price Variation - Lack of within good type price variation
 - High Dimensional - A problem for Discrete Demand Estimation
 - Bid versus Win - Losing bids are not irrelevant
- ② *Welfare Index Numbers* to find the Compensating Variation
 - Negative Prices/Satiation - Incompatible with most indices
 - Heterogeneity over time - Incompatible with most methods
- ③ *Sufficient Statistics* approach to estimating CV
 - Complexity - Only excessively simplistic models are tractable
 - Misses key variation - Difficult to introduce changes over time

Exogeneity of x

- Essentially, I assume stocks *just happen* - x_{it} are an exogenous process then food banks respond by trying to win food on the Choice System
- This assumption likely biases my results **against** the value of choice
 - If there is reverse causality, can use winning to influence future net donations
 - Hence, additional benefits of allowing choice - more influence over net donations!
 - However, the effects on equity are more ambiguous → could be interesting to explore
- To an extent should be able to test this assumption using estimated donations
 - Look for correlation in net donations over time
 - Testing whether winnings Granger causes future net donations.
- I am also investigating whether I can do this as a robustness exercise
 - allow for reverse causation, or autocorrelation in net donations
 - This is possible in practice, but it is unclear whether any such process is identified

[◀ return](#)

The Food Bank Model

- The set of food on offer
 - Pounds by storage method, \mathbf{z}_{lt}^g and by Subcategory, \mathbf{z}_{lt}^h
 - \mathbf{c}_{lt} - Other lot characteristics, e.g. location.
- States
 - Stock of each storage type \mathbf{s}_i^g
→ This helps me capture storage costs
 - Stock of each subcategory \mathbf{s}_i^h
→ But, assume $j(\mathbf{s}_i)$ is linear in \mathbf{s}_i^h , i.e. Constant Returns
→ Therefore the level of \mathbf{s}_i^h doesn't matter, so I focus on changes through \mathbf{z}_{lt}^h
 - Aggregate supply \mathbf{s}_0 : daily and previous 30 day supply, by storage type
→ This *might* impact $P(i \text{ wins } l | \mathbf{b})$
- Transition Function: $\mathbf{s}_{it}^g = \mathbf{s}_{it-1}^g + \mathbf{w}_{it-1}^T \mathbf{z}_{t-1}^g + \mathbf{x}_{it}$
 - This is **not** a random walk. It is closer to an error correction process
→ winnings $\mathbf{w}_{it-1}^T \mathbf{z}_{t-1}^g$ vary with \mathbf{s}_{it-1}^g to prevent stocks dropping too low
 - I assume the process is stationary
 - This is an assumption about the competitive equilibrium
 - If \mathbf{s}_{it}^g ends up as an AR(1) process, I can actually test stationarity

- **Setup**

- *Rules:* Player i wins lot l in period t if $b_{itl} \geq \max_{j \neq i} b_{jtl}$
- *Reservation Prices* R_{tl} on each lot
- *Entry* is costless - valuations are known before entering
- *Ties* occur with zero probability*

Example: Two lots $\{apples, carrots\}$

- **Setup**

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- **States:**

- Player i begins period t in state s_{it}
- Player i ends period t in state s_{it}^a
- superscript a refers to which combination of lots they ended up winning

Example:

- $s_{it} = (stock_{it}^{apples}, stock_{it}^{carrots})$
- $s_{it}^a = (stock_{it}^{apples} + winnings_{it}^{apples}, stock_{it}^{carrots} + winnings_{it}^{carrots})$

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- **States:**

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- superscript a refers to which combination of lots they ended up winning

- **Lots**

- \mathbb{L}_t gives the set of lots players may bid on, with $\max|\mathbb{L}| = L$
- Lot l is described by a vector of characteristics \mathbf{c}_{tl} .

Example:

- $\mathbb{L}_t \in \{\{\emptyset\}, \{\text{apples}\}, \{\text{carrots}\}, \{\text{apples, carrots}\}\}$
- $\mathbf{c}_{tl} \in \dots$ (type of apples, location of apples, ...)

[◀ return](#)

- **Setup**

- *Rules:* Player i wins lot l in period t if $b_{itl} \geq \max_{j \neq i} b_{jtl}$
- *Reservation Prices* R_{tl} on each lot
- *Entry* is costless - valuations are known before entering
- *Ties* occur with zero probability*

- **States:**

- Player i begins period t in state s_{it}
- Player i ends period t in state s_{it}^a
- superscript a refers to which combination of lots they ended up winning

- **Lots**

- \mathbb{L}_t gives the set of lots players may bid on, with $\max|\mathbb{L}| = L$
- Lot l is described by a vector of characteristics \mathbf{c}_{tl} .

- Denote the *Overall* state $\mathbf{s}_t = (\{s_{it}\}_{i \in \mathbb{N}}, \mathbb{L}_t, \mathbf{C}_t)$

- **Valuations:**

- *Lot specific:* $\mathbf{v}_{it} \sim F(\cdot | \mathbf{s}_t)$, an L dimensional vector
- *Combination Value:* $J_i(\mathbf{s}_{it})$, a 2^L dimensional vector
Element a corresponds to ending period t in state \mathbf{s}_{it}^a : $j_i(\mathbf{s}_{it}^a)$

Example:

- $\mathbf{v}_{it} = \begin{pmatrix} v_{it} \text{ apples} \\ v_{it} \text{ carrots} \end{pmatrix}$
- Or, if carrots are not available at t : $\mathbf{v}_{it} = \begin{pmatrix} v_{it} \text{ apples} \\ . \end{pmatrix}$
- $J_i = \begin{pmatrix} J_{\text{win nothing}} \\ J_{\text{win apples}} \\ J_{\text{win carrots}} \\ J_{\text{win apples \& carrots}} \end{pmatrix}$

Where $J_{\text{win apples \& carrots}} \neq J_{\text{win apples}} + J_{\text{win carrots}}$

- **Valuations:**

- *Lot specific:* $v_{it} \sim F(\cdot | s_t)$, an L dimensional vector
- *Combination Value:* $J_i(s_{it})$, a 2^L dimensional vector
Element a corresponds to ending period t in state s_{it}^a : $j_i(s_{it}^a)$

- **Actions:**

- Player i chooses a subset of auctions to enter; \mathbf{d}_{it}
- They then choose their bids conditional on entry; \mathbf{b}_{it}
- *Strategies* conditional on primitives are given by σ_i

Example:

- If they only bid on apples: $\mathbf{d}_{it} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}$
- If they only bid on apples: $\mathbf{b}_{it} = \begin{pmatrix} b_{it \text{ apples}} \\ \vdots \end{pmatrix}$

[◀ return](#)

- **Valuations:**

- Lot specific: $v_{it} \sim F(\cdot | s_t)$, an L dimensional vector
- Combination Value: $J_i(s_{it})$, a 2^L dimensional vector
Element a corresponds to ending period t in state s_{it}^a : $j_i(s_{it}^a)$

- **Actions:**

- Player i chooses a subset of auctions to enter; d_{it}
- They then choose their bids conditional on entry; b_{it}
- Strategies conditional on primitives are given by σ_i

- **Equilibrium Win Probabilities:**

- Player i wins lot l with probability $\Gamma_{il}(b_{itl}, d_{itl}; \sigma_{-i})$
- $P_{ia}(b_{it}, d_{it}; \sigma_{-i})$ gives the probability of combination outcome a

Example:

$$P(b_{it}, d_{it}) = \begin{pmatrix} P(\text{win nothing} | b_{it}, d_{it}) \\ P(\text{win apples only} | b_{it}, d_{it}) \\ P(\text{win carrots only} | b_{it}, d_{it}) \\ P(\text{win both} | b_{it}, d_{it}) \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} [1 - \Gamma_{apples}(b_a)][1 - \Gamma_{carrots}(b_c)] \\ \Gamma_{apples}(b_a)[1 - \Gamma_{carrots}(b_c)] \\ [1 - \Gamma_{apples}(b_a)]\Gamma_{carrots}(b_c) \\ \Gamma_{apples}(b_{apples})\Gamma_{carrots}(b_{carrots}) \end{pmatrix}$$

- **Valuations:**

- *Lot specific:* $\mathbf{v}_{it} \sim F(\cdot | \mathbf{s}_t)$, an L dimensional vector
- *Combination Value:* $J_i(\mathbf{s}_{it})$, a 2^L dimensional vector
Element a corresponds to ending period t in state \mathbf{s}_{it}^a : $j_i(\mathbf{s}_{it}^a)$

- **Actions:**

- Player i chooses a subset of auctions to enter; \mathbf{d}_{it}
- They then choose their bids conditional on entry; \mathbf{b}_{it}
- *Strategies* conditional on primitives are given by σ_i

- **Expected Payoffs:**

$$EU(\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{d} | \mathbf{v}_i, \mathbf{s}; \sigma_{-i}) =$$

$$\Gamma_i(\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{d}; \sigma_{-i})^T \mathbf{v}_i + P_i(\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{d}; \sigma_{-i})^T [J_i(\mathbf{s}) + \beta V_i(\mathbf{s}; \sigma_{-i})]$$

Example: $EU(\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{d} | \mathbf{v}_i, \mathbf{s}; \sigma_{-i}) =$

$$\begin{pmatrix} \Gamma_a(b_a) \\ \Gamma_c(b_c) \end{pmatrix}^T \begin{pmatrix} v_{it} \text{ apples} - b_a \\ v_{it} \text{ carrots} - b_c \end{pmatrix} + \begin{pmatrix} P(\text{nothing} | \mathbf{b}_{it}, \mathbf{d}_{it}) \\ P(\text{apples} | \mathbf{b}_{it}, \mathbf{d}_{it}) \\ P(\text{carrots} | \mathbf{b}_{it}, \mathbf{d}_{it}) \\ P(\text{both} | \mathbf{b}_{it}, \mathbf{d}_{it}) \end{pmatrix}^T \begin{pmatrix} J_{\text{win nothing}} + \beta V_{\text{win nothing}} \\ J_{\text{win apples}} + \beta V_{\text{win apples}} \\ J_{\text{win carrots}} + \beta V_{\text{win carrots}} \\ J_{\text{win both}} + \beta V_{\text{win both}} \end{pmatrix}$$

[◀ return](#)

- **Valuations:**

- *Lot specific:* $\mathbf{v}_{it} \sim F(\cdot | \mathbf{s}_t)$, an L dimensional vector
- *Combination Value:* $J_i(\mathbf{s}_{it})$, a 2^L dimensional vector
Element a corresponds to ending period t in state \mathbf{s}_{it}^a : $j_i(\mathbf{s}_{it}^a)$

- **Actions:**

- Player i chooses a subset of auctions to enter; \mathbf{d}_{it}
- They then choose their bids conditional on entry; \mathbf{b}_{it}
- *Strategies* conditional on primitives are given by σ_i

- **Expected Payoffs:** $EU(\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{d} | \mathbf{v}_i, \mathbf{s}; \sigma_{-i}) =$

$$\Gamma_i(\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{d}; \sigma_{-i})^T \mathbf{v}_i + P_i(\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{d}; \sigma_{-i})^T [J_i(\mathbf{s}) + \beta V_i(\mathbf{s}; \sigma_{-i})]$$

- **Intertemporal Budget Constraint:** If A_t gives their savings at t

$$A_{it+1} - [A_{it} + y_{it} - \sum_{l \in \mathbb{L}_t} b_{ilt}] = 0$$

The Dynamic Programme

- **Bellman equation**

$$W(v, s, A; \sigma_{-i}) = \max_{\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{d}} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \sum_{I \in \mathbb{L}(s)} \Gamma_I(\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{d}|s) v_I + \sum_{w^a \in \mathbb{W}(s)} P_a(\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{d}|s) j(s^a) \\ + \beta \sum_{w^a} P_a(\mathbf{b}, \mathbf{d}|s) \int_{\tilde{s}, y} \int_{\tilde{v}} W(\tilde{v}, \tilde{s}, A - \sum_{I \in \mathbb{L}} \mathbb{I}[w_I^a = i] b_I + y; \sigma_{-i}) dF(\tilde{v}|\tilde{s}) dT(\tilde{s}, y|s^a) \end{array} \right\} \quad (2)$$

- **Continuation Value**

$$V_{ia}(s_t, A_t; \sigma_{-i}) = \int_{s_{t+1}, y} V_i^E(s, A + y; \sigma_{-i}) dT(s, y|s_t^a) \quad (3)$$

Write $k_i(s, A; \sigma_{-i}) = j_i(s) + \beta V_{ia}(s, A; \sigma_{-i})$

◀ return

- Focus on *Markov Perfect Equilibria* in Symmetric Markovian Strategies
 - σ_i depends only on s_t , not on t itself
- *Equilibrium Existence*
 - Conditional on the existence of a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in the Stage Game, taking entry as given, a Markov Perfect Equilibrium exists.
 - (For the quasi-linear utility case)
 - For the proof, see my first chapter
 - However, equilibrium in the Stage Game has yet to be proven
 - Except for specific cases of preferences
 - But this is not a practical problem
 - In practice, I assume food banks have beliefs consistent with observed behaviour
 - This is consistent with a number of non-standard equilibrium models
 - e.g. (?)

◀ return

This estimation procedure is unusual, but used for tractability

- In the Auction literature: Assume a bid distribution then back out j & V
 - This is not possible on account of the unobserved state / Multi-object environment
 - We cannot write V as a distribution of bids **only**
- In the Dynamic Discrete Choice literature: Given functional form for j , solve for V
 - Assume a form for J , solve for V in each likelihood evaluation
 - Solving for V given j requires numerically finding optimal \mathbf{b}^* , which is slow
- CCP methods: Given observed actions (bids, entry) solve for V
 - We cannot write V as a distribution of bids **only**
 - But in a discrete choice context, fitting a parametric functional form to CCPs is numerically equivalent to this 3 step method.

Estimation Step 1

Estimate $P(i \text{ wins } l | \mathbf{b}) = \Gamma_l(b_{il})$:

- For lot l with characteristics \mathbf{c}_{lt}

$$\Gamma_{il}(x | \mathbf{c}_{lt}, \mathbf{s}_t) = GEV(x; \xi_c, \zeta_c, \nu_h + \vartheta_g \mathbf{s}_0) \quad (4)$$

- Shape and Scale parameters ξ_c and ζ_c , category specific
- Subcategory specific mean parameter ν_{ch}
- Storage type specific linear 'demand' parameters ν_g
- The distribution is 'censored' at the reservation price

GEV assumption is motivated by extreme value theory

- $P(i \text{ wins} | b_i)$ is equivalent to b_i is the highest bid
 - i.e. The extreme value

Estimation Step 2 (a)

- Assume parametric form $k_i(\mathbf{s}_i) = \Phi \mathbf{s}_i^h + \mathbf{s}_i^{gT} \Psi_i \mathbf{s}_i^g$
 - Φ are assumed common across i - food banks have the same 'utility'
 - Ψ_i vary across i and negative definite, similar to quadratic storage costs.
 - More like 'opportunity cost' in this dynamic context
 - Different food banks likely have different storage costs, but very different opportunity costs
- I make the following distributional assumptions:
 - $v_{ilt} \sim N(\alpha_i \text{distance}_{ilt}, \sigma_c^2)$
 - $\mathbf{x}_{it} \sim N(\boldsymbol{\mu}_i, \Sigma_i)$
- The bidder's maximisation problem yields the optimality condition:

$$\lambda_i(b_{ilt} + \frac{\Gamma_I(b_{ilt})}{\nabla \Gamma_I(b_{ilt})}) \geq v_{ilt} + \Phi \mathbf{z}_{lt}^h + \mathbf{z}_{lt}^{gT} \Psi_i (\mathbf{z}_{lt}^g + 2\mathbf{s}_{it}^g + 2 \sum_{m \neq i} \Gamma_m(b_{imt}) \mathbf{z}_{mt}^g) \quad (5)$$

Which holds with equality when $b_{ilt} > R_I$

→ If I observed \mathbf{s}_{it}^g this would just be a censored regression equation!

Estimation Step 2 (b)

I have a three equation (censored) Linear Gaussian State Space model:

$$\mathbf{s}_{it}^g = \mathbf{s}_{it-1}^g + \mathbf{w}_{it-1}^T \mathbf{z}_{t-1}^g + \mathbf{x}_{it} \quad \rightarrow \text{Transition Eq.}$$

$$\lambda_i y_{ilt} = v_{ilt} + \Phi \mathbf{z}_{lt}^h + \mathbf{z}_{lt}^{gT} \Psi_i (\mathbf{z}_{lt}^g + 2\mathbf{s}_{it}^g + 2 \sum_{m \neq l} \Gamma_m(b_{imt}) \mathbf{z}_{mt}^g) \quad \rightarrow \text{Observation Eq.}$$

$$y_{ilt} = \begin{cases} b_{ilt} + \frac{\Gamma_l(b_{ilt})}{\nabla \Gamma_l(b_{ilt})} & \text{if } b_{ilt} > R_l \\ R_l & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad \rightarrow \text{Censoring Eq. (6)}$$

Estimation is done using a Gibbs Sampler:

- We want to draw samples of (θ_1, θ_2) from its posterior; $f(\theta_1, \theta_2 | data)$
→ but sampling from this distribution is hard.
- Instead, we can iteratively draw samples from $f(\theta_1 | \theta_2, data)$ and $f(\theta_2 | \theta_1, data)$
→ these conditional samples approximate the posterior distribution

Estimation Step 2 (b)

I have a three equation (censored) Linear Gaussian State Space model:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{s}_{it}^g &= \mathbf{s}_{it-1}^g + \mathbf{w}_{it-1}^T \mathbf{z}_{t-1}^g + \mathbf{x}_{it} && \rightarrow \text{Transition Eq.} \\ \lambda_i y_{ilt} &= v_{ilt} + \Phi \mathbf{z}_{lt}^h + \mathbf{z}_{lt}^{gT} \Psi_i (\mathbf{z}_{lt}^g + 2\mathbf{s}_{it}^g + 2 \sum_{m \neq l} \Gamma_m(b_{imt}) \mathbf{z}_{mt}^g) && \rightarrow \text{Observation Eq.} \\ y_{ilt} &= \begin{cases} b_{ilt} + \frac{\Gamma_l(b_{ilt})}{\nabla \Gamma_l(b_{ilt})} & \text{if } b_{ilt} > R_l \\ R_l & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} && \rightarrow \text{Censoring Eq. (6)} \end{aligned}$$

Estimation is done using a Gibbs Sampler:

- ① Given beliefs Γ , parameters of the pseudo-static model $\{k_i, F_i^v, F_i^x\}$, and states $\{\mathbf{s}_{it}^g\}$:
→ draw censored values of $\{y_{ilt}\}$ using the Censoring Equation
- ② Given Beliefs Γ , $\{k_i, F_i^v, F_i^x\}$, and censored observations $\{y_{ilt}\}$:
→ draw $\{\mathbf{s}_{it}^g\}$ using the Transition / Observation equations (Carter-Kohn)
- ③ Given beliefs Γ , censored observations $\{y_{ilt}\}$, and states $\{\mathbf{s}_{it}^g\}$:
→ draw $\{k_i, F_i^v, F_i^x\}$ from their posterior using the Observation Equation.
- ④ Repeat

Estimation Step 3

Write the continuation value $V(\mathbf{s})$ as a function of Γ , F^v , F^x and k :

Proposition

The ex-ante Value Function can be expressed as:

$$E[W(v, \mathbf{s}_i^g) | \mathbf{s}_i^g] = \frac{E[q_t(\mathbf{s}_i^g) \pi(\mathbf{b}_{it} | \mathbf{s}_i^g)]}{E[q_t(\mathbf{s}_i^g)]}$$


Where $q_t(\mathbf{s}_i^g)$ gives the posterior probability that $\mathbf{s}_{it}^g = \mathbf{s}_i^g$ and

$$\pi(\mathbf{b} | \mathbf{s}_i^g) = \sum_l \lambda_l \frac{\Gamma_l(b_{il})^2}{\nabla_b \Gamma_l(b_{il})} - \sum_{m \neq l} \Gamma_l(b_{il}) \mathbf{z}_l^{gT} \boldsymbol{\Psi}_i \mathbf{z}_m^g \Gamma_m(b_{im}) + \mathbf{s}_i^{gT} \boldsymbol{\Psi}_i \mathbf{s}_i^g$$


→ This is essentially just an extension of Arcidiacono & Miller (2011)

- The continuation value is given by $V(\mathbf{s}_i^g) = \int E[W(v, \mathbf{s}_i^g + \mathbf{x}) | \mathbf{s}_i^g + \mathbf{x}] dF^x(\mathbf{x})$ and, finally, $j(\mathbf{s}_i^g) = k(\mathbf{s}_i^g) - \beta V(\mathbf{s}_i^g)$
- Evaluate these expressions for a sample of parameters, drawn from their posterior


First Stage Demand results




◀ return




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
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


Note: Figure shows the distribution of the quantity of food allocated, weighted by estimated preference weights, measured in equivalent increase in the food supply. Using 1000 draws from the posterior distribution of parameters. On average, the increase allocated food is worth around 38 additional tons of food each day.




Note: Figure shows the distribution of transportation costs under each of the mechanisms, measured in equivalent increase in the food supply. Using 1000 draws from the posterior distribution of parameters. On average, the reduction in transportation costs is worth around 43 additional tons of food each day.

Welfare by food bank


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Note: Plot shows estimated welfare by food bank, ordered by posterior mean. 95% credible intervals are plotted.

Gains from Choice vs Marginal Value of Wealth $\hat{\lambda}_i$ 

Note: Plot shows relative welfare against opportunity cost of spending a share. y-axis gives welfare under the Auction System divided by welfare under the Old System. x-axis gives estimated opportunity cost. Colour indicates local poverty rate, with darker oval = more poverty. Size of oval indicates 95% credible intervals.

Additional Mechanisms



◀ return

References