

Children's Online Processing of Ad-Hoc Implicatures

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Abstract

Language comprehenders routinely make pragmatic inferences that go beyond the literal meanings of utterances. If A said "I ate some of the cookies," B should infer that A ate some *but not all* of the cookies. Children perform poorly on experimental tests of scalar implicatures like this, despite their early-emerging sensitivity to pragmatic cues. Our current work explores potential factors responsible for children's successes and failures in computing pragmatic inferences. In two experiments, we used an eye-tracking paradigm to test children's ability to compute implicatures when they have access to contextual alternatives to the target word (Experiment 1), and when they hear prosodic cues that emphasize the contrast between the target and alternative (Experiment 2). We found that by the time children are four years old, they quickly and successfully identify the inferential target referent in this paradigm; with supportive prosodic cues, we saw evidence of success in three-year-olds as well. With sufficient contextual support, young children are capable of making quick pragmatic inferences.

Keywords: Pragmatic cues; implicatures; cognitive development

Introduction

Language comprehension involves not only interpreting the literal meanings of words in utterances, but also understanding the communicative intentions behind what is said. Listeners make *pragmatic implicatures*, inferences about speakers' intended meanings that goes beyond the literal semantics of their utterances (Grice, 1975). One common type of implicatures, called *scalar implicatures*, involves scales built based on the knowledge of *lexical* alternatives (?, ?). For example, if A says to B, "Some of the students failed the test," B may infer that A intended to say "Some, *but not all*, of the students failed the test." That is, A's use of the term "some" *implicates* that the stronger scalar alternative "all" is negated.

Many studies have looked at the development of implicature understanding by testing adults' and children's ability to compute scalar implicatures (SI's from here on). Whereas adults readily compute SI's, children tend to perform poorly on SI tasks (e.g., Noveck, 2001; Papafragou & Musolino, 2003; Huang & Snedeker, 2009; Barner, Chow, & Yang, 2009; Teresa Guasti et al., 2005). For example, given a context in which three out of three horses jumped over a fence, if a puppet remarks that "some of the horses jumped over the fence," adults reject the statement as infelicitous, whereas children typically judge it to be acceptable (Papafragou & Musolino, 2003).

Children's failures on SI computation are surprising, given their early-emerging sensitivity to the informativeness of utterances. For example, by around the same age (approximately five years old), children are able to

adjust informativeness of their own expressions depending on the listeners' knowledge (Matthews, Lieven, Theakston, & Tomasello, 2006); reward speakers based on their informativeness (Katsos & Bishop, 2011); and provide more information when disambiguation between potential referents is difficult (Matthews, Butcher, Lieven, & Tomasello, 2012). And well before that, when they are still too young to produce many utterances, children are able to assess informativeness of their own gestures (O'Neill & Topolovec, 2001). In general, children excel at assessing the informativeness of both their own and other people's utterances and communicative gestures. Given this body of research, it seems unlikely that children's lack of pragmatic ability per se causes their failures on SI tasks. What factors are then responsible for their failures on SI computation? The current experiment investigates two potential factors: availability of alternatives to the current term, and cues that highlight the contrast between current term and its alternatives.

Implicature computation involves generating and negating alternatives to a given term. For example, upon hearing "some," the listener needs to generate a stronger alternative ("all") based on the lexical knowledge, and negate that alternative to compute the implicature. One potential cause of children's difficulty with previous SI tasks is their lack of access to lexical alternatives to the term offered (Barner, Brooks, & Bale, 2011). When adults hear "some," they generate the relevant scales and negate the stronger scalar alternative "all" to the term "some." But for children, even if they know that there are alternatives to be negated, they may not be able to generate the relevant scalar alternative to negate. If this hypothesis is true, children might succeed on implicature computation if given access to alternatives in the context.

Indeed, there is evidence that children can compute *ad-hoc* implicatures, which depend on contextually-derived scales rather than lexically-derived ones (Stiller, Goodman, & Frank, 2014).¹ Children saw three faces, one with glasses only, one with glasses and a top-hat, and one with none of the items. When children heard a puppet say: "My friend has glasses," 3.5-year-old children and older chose the face with glasses only as the referent above chance. Thus, children were able to compute the implicature "My friend has glasses, *but not a top-hat*" given the contextual access to the stronger alternative (face with glasses and top-hat) to be negated. In our current work we adopt the ad-hoc implicature paradigm

¹These inferences are sometimes known in the pragmatics literature as "particularized implicatures," in contrast to "generalized" implicatures; here we use the term ad-hoc to remain agnostic with respect to this distinction.

in this previous experiment for eye-tracking, using this more sensitive measure to ask both about factors underlying the previously-observed developmental trajectory and about the decision-making processes underlying children's implicature computation.

Eye-tracking offers several advantages over purely behavioral measures for examining pragmatic inference. First, it is possible to track participants' gaze as an utterance is being produced, providing moment-by-moment data about responses to spoken language. Second, eye gaze reflects a more implicit measure of comprehension and hence allows for more direct developmental comparisons compared with behavioral choices (which may reflect conscious deliberation in adults). Thus, in addition to replicating previous research on ad-hoc implicatures in the online processing context, we are able to pursue two goals: first, we can measure the time-course of decision-making in ad-hoc pragmatic inferences; second, we identify potential factors that contribute to the developmental differences in implicature computation performance. In Experiment 1, we measure implicature performance across a wide developmental range; in Experiment 2, we examine the contribution of contrastive intonation on performance for a subset of age groups. Our findings suggest ... FIXME

Experiment 1

Method

Participants Parents and their 2- to 5-year-old children visiting Children's Discovery Museum in San Jose, CA, were invited to participate in a short video study. The current sample comprised of children who were exposed to English at least 50% of the time as indicated by their parents. In addition, individual trials with more than 50% missing gaze data were excluded from analysis, and only participants who completed at least 8 of 16 trials according to this criterion were included in the analysis. These exclusion criteria led to a final sample of 108 (out of 113 participants): 24 2-year-olds ($M = 2;6$, range 2;1–2;11, 10 female), 28 3-year-olds ($M = 3;5$, range 3;1–3;11, 19 female), 24 4-year-olds ($M = 4;6$, range 4;1–4;11, 13 female), 32 5-year-olds ($M = 5;4$, range 5;1–5;9, 9 female). Children were given a sticker for participating in the study. We also tested fourteen adult participants, undergraduate students recruited through Stanford Psychology credit pool.

Stimuli and Design On each trial, participants saw two images: a target and distractor, which could either be an item with a single feature (e.g., a plate with only a carrot or only a banana), or an item with double features (e.g., a plate with a carrot and a banana). Each trial contained three phases: in the initial phase (8.5 seconds), two images were presented in silence for two seconds, then a pre-recorded voice said a sentence (e.g., "Look at these plates. Elmo's plate has a carrot."). Then, in the anticipatory phase (1.5 seconds), a chime sound played to induce participants' anticipatory gaze. In the following feedback phase (1.5 seconds), a character appeared

next to the target with an amusing sound effect. This outcome served to keep the task engaging for participants.

There were three types of test trials (pictured in Figure 1, bottom). In *inference* trials, the target item had a single feature (e.g., a carrot), and the distractor item had two features, one that was common with the target (e.g., a carrot) and the other feature that was unique (e.g., a banana). The test sentence named the feature that was common to the target and distractor. Thus, if participants understood that "Elmo's plate has a carrot" implicates "Elmo's plate has a carrot *but not a banana*," given the context, they should look more toward the target than the distractor; otherwise, they should equally to both.

There were two additional trial types, with semantically unambiguous targets: *Control-double* trials looked identical to inference trials, but the target and distractor were switched, such that the double-feature item was the target and the single-feature item was the distractor, and the test sentence named the unique feature on the target. *Control-single* trials presented two items that each had a unique single feature, and either could be the target. Children saw 4 inference, 4 control-double, and 4 control-single trials; adults saw 6 inference, 6 control-double, and 12 control-single trials.

There were six sets of item and feature types, and the features were named with nouns found on the MacArthur-Bates Communicative Development Inventory word list (?, ?). Two orders of the test trials were created, such that trial types and item types were counterbalanced and trial order was pseudo-randomized across the two orders.

Procedure Participants sat in a booster seat, approximately 60 cm away from the monitor of an SMI RED 120 Hz binocular remote eye-tracker. Participants were introduced to the task as watching a short video. The video began with a short Elmo video clip that lasted for 1-2 minutes, during which any necessary adjustments to the eye-tracker and participants' chair positions were made. The eye-tracker was then calibrated for each participant, using a 2-point calibration and validation of the calibration points. After calibration, participants were introduced to Sesame Street characters and were told "Today, [they] will show us lots of fun things. Are you ready? Let's go!"

Following the introduction, participants saw two gaze-contingent practice trials, with unambiguous targets that differed from the test items. Then children watched 16 test trials and adults watched 24 test trials, as well as 4 filler photos of children playing and 2 Elmo video clips, presented at a pseudo-random points between test trials. The video lasted approximately 8 minutes.

Results and Discussion

Participants of all age groups looked toward the targets in both control-double and control-single trials reliably above chance (50%; see Figure 1). Nevertheless, there were age differences in the speed of looking at the target and the proportion of correct looking across both control trial types, congru-




Figure 1: Proportion of 2- to 5-year-old children and adults looking to the target image as the utterance unfolds. Time 0 represents the target word onset. Proportion correct looking is defined by looks to the target divided by the total looks to both the target and the distractor. Bottom panels show example stimuli from each condition; the named character emerged at the end of the trial to mark the correct target.

ent with the findings of Fernald, Pinto, Swingley, Weinberg, and McRoberts (1998), who found that children’s efficiency of familiar word recognition over the second year; the current data show this developmental pattern continuing throughout childhood.

For inference trials, we observed similar age differences in accuracy. Children older than 4 showed robust looking to inferential targets (for 4-year-olds: $t(23) = 2.74, p = .01$). For example, upon hearing “Bert’s plate has a carrot,” older children were able to identify the plate with only a carrot as the referent rather than the plate with a carrot and a banana, replicating Stiller et al. (2014)’s findings of ad-hoc implicature (though that study found successes in 3.5–4-year-old children as well). Though previous datasets are not directly comparable due to low-level differences in the task and materials, this finding is nevertheless consistent with the hypothesis that children’s inferential ability might have been obscured in previous SI tasks due to the unavailability of lexical alternatives (e.g. “all” when “some” is mentioned; ?, ?).

One additional finding emerged from our analysis: two-year-olds’ looking at the target was below chance, rather than at chance, indicating that they looked significantly more at distractors than targets. FIXME. Hence, two-year-olds did not even seem to consider inferential targets and distractors as equally likely referents based on the literal meaning of the utterance. Rather, they did not disengage from distractors at all relative to their baseline bias prior to hearing the target word. We return to this pattern in the General Discussion

when we speculate about the sources for the developmental changes we observed.

We fit a linear mixed-effects model to measure the effects of trial type and age (as a continuous variable) on the proportion of children looking to the target between 1 and 4s after noun onset (Table 1). We selected this time window because participants would have to wait until the end of target noun (0.8 seconds on average) to know they should switch to the inferential target, given the absence of a disambiguating continuation (e.g., “Elmo’s plate has a carrot *and banana*.”). Results of the mixed-effects model indicate a significant interaction between trial type and age, such that older children looked more toward the inferential target compared with younger children. FIXME

We next analyzed participants’ reaction times (?, ?): We

Table 1: Coefficient estimates from mixed-effects models predicting proportion of looks to target in Experiment 1.

Predictor	Value (SE)	<i>t</i> -value
Intercept	.70 (.05)	15.06
Age	.02 (.01)	2.05
Control-single	-.10 (.06)	-1.57
Inference	-.34 (.07)	-4.91
Age × Control-single	.02 (.02)	.98
Age × Inference	.03 (.02)	1.71




Figure 2: Average reaction times for first switches to target in trials in which participants were looking at the distractor (and not the target) at the target word onset.

isolated trials on which participants were looking at the distractor at the point of disambiguation, and measured the average length of time prior to a shift to the target. Looks to the target were slower and overall lower in proportion in inference trials compared to both control trial types across all age groups (Figure 2). This finding further suggests that implicatures are generally slower and harder to process compared to the unambiguous semantic meanings, regardless of the participants' age. STATS! FIXME!

Experiment 2

In Experiment 1, we found that children of 4 years and older were able to compute implicatures and identify the pragmatically correct referent. Children younger than 4 still struggled with implicature computation, however. In Experiment 2, we explored another factor that could potentially help improve children's performance: prosody. Contrastive stress—a change in pitch, characterized by an initial drop followed by a rise—in assisting inference processing for both adults (Ito & Speer, 2008) and preschool children (Kurumada, 2014). For example, when children saw a picture of a zebra and a picture of an okapi that resembles a zebra, and heard “It LOOKS like a zebra” with a stress on the word “look,” children (HOW OLD, FIXME) chose the picture of okapi if the context provided support. In the current experiment, we investigate whether a contrastive stress added to the final noun (e.g., “Elmo’s plate has a CARROT”) in the inference trials would assist children in identifying the pragmatically-correct referent.

Method

Participants Participants were recruited as in Experiment 1. For Experiment 2, we focused on recruiting 3- and 4-year-olds. Out of 57 initial participants, the final sample was chosen based on the same criteria as Experiment 1, and consisted of 17 3-year olds (X female), and 31 4-year olds (x female).




Figure 4: Looking to the target as a proportion of looking to the target and distractor in inference trials, averaged during the time window of 2.5 - 4 s.

Stimuli, Design, and Procedure The stimuli, design and procedure were identical to Experiment 1, except for one change: Target nouns in each inference trial were produced with contrastive stress (low-high-low pitch accent and longer duration, 1.2 seconds on average). Based on previous findings that children identify contrastive prosody based on the norms set within an experiment, we decided to include prosodic cues only in inference trials (Kurumada, 2014).

Results and Discussion

To determine the effect of prosodic cues on children's inferential processing, we compared looking at targets across both Experiment 1 and 2 and across all three trial types (Figure ??). Children's looking toward unambiguous targets in both control trials remained similar to Experiment 1 in Experiment 2. In contrast, their looking toward inferential targets increased slightly Experiment 2, especially towards the end of trials. In a post-hoc analysis, we split trials into an early and late period; Figure 4 shows this analysis directly.

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A closer look at inferential trials in the two Experiments revealed that 3-year-old children identified inferential targets above chance when there were supportive prosodic cues, but not when the cues were absent. In Experiment 2, both 3- and 4-year-olds looked at the correct inferential target above chance (for 3-year-olds: $t(16) = 2.47$, $p < .03$; Figure 4). This was in contrast to Experiment 1, in which 3-year-olds looked at the inferential target at chance level ($t(27) = 1.49$, $p = .15$). Thus, for 3-year-old children, having access to contextual alternatives helps their implicature computation, but when there is another signal that directs their attention to the contrast between the term offered and its alternative in context. FIXME




Figure 3: Proportion of 3- and 4-year-old children looking to the target image as the utterance unfolds. Different colors represent Experiments 1 and 2. Time 0 represents the target noun onset. Proportion correct looking is defined by looks to the target divided by the total looks to both the target and the distractor.

General Discussion

RESTATE THE QUESTION The current work looked at children’s processing of ad-hoc implicatures with an eye-tracking paradigm, and found that adults and children older than 3 years show robust looking toward the inferential targets, although at slower and overall lower rate compared to semantically unambiguous targets, whereas younger children still struggled with implicature computation. In Experiment 2, we found that prosodic cues with supportive context can help children as young as 3 to compute implicatures and identify inferential targets.

Our findings are broadly convergent with previous findings (Stiller et al., 2014), suggesting that the ability to make ad-hoc implicatures is fragile but measurable in 3-year-olds (at least with contrastive prosody) and more robust with 4-year-olds. Nevertheless, accuracy in the two paradigms differed: The rate of looking to the inferential target was overall lower in the current study than the accuracy rates in Stiller et al. (2014), even though the current paradigm was simpler (with two referent choices instead of three). This difference might be due to divergences between the two paradigms, since accuracy in our paradigm reflected graded patterns of looking rather than a single multi-alternative forced choice.

One unpredicted and intriguing finding from our study was that two-year-olds not only failed to look at the correct inferential target, but looked more toward the distractor. One potential explanation comes from the inhibitory demands of our task. In inference trials in the current paradigm, the two

potential referents differed in their saliency: The distractor was always perceptually and conceptually more salient, because it contained an extra item (e.g., a carrot and a banana). Inhibitory control is difficult for children and continues to develop throughout the period we studied here (Davidson, Amso, Anderson, & Diamond, 2006; Gerardi-Caulton, 2000). Congruent with this hypothesis, several recent studies suggest that inhibitory control might potentially affect word recognition in a number of similar eye-tracking paradigms (Yurovsky & Frank, 2014; Nordmeyer & Frank, 2013). Future work should thus address this possibility by explicitly manipulating the salience of potential pragmatic targets.

In sum, in the current work we found that preschool children were able to compute ad-hoc implicatures in contexts where there was substantial contextual support, in particular when they had access to lexical alternatives in the context, and when there were signals that emphasize the contrast between the target and its alternative. **BRING BACK TO SCALAR IMPLICATURE LITERATURE HERE?**

Even young children are sensitive to the communicative intentions behind utterances they hear (?, ?, ?). Our work adds to the body of evidence suggesting that by preschool age they generate sophisticated pragmatic implicatures as well, even though these inferences are easily masked by other processing demands of specific contexts and situations. Overall, our current work takes one step further towards reconciling children’s early-emerging communicative abilities with the complex pattern of successes and failures that they show in

Gricean pragmatics.

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