re:Invent

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Beyond five 9s: Lessons from our highest available data planes

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What is a data plane?





The Amazon Builders' Library

- First-hand articles from engineers who built AWS services:
 - Caching
 - Retries
 - Fairness
 - Safety
 - More ...





https://aws.amazon.com/builders-library/



Rethinking the nines model

Simplicity and survival of the fittest

Testing as time travel

Building technical fearlessness





Compartmentalization and blast radius

Constant-work and minimizing change

Operational safety



60

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Rethinking the nines model



• 99% available

= 3.65 days per year of impact

• 99.9% available

= 8.77 hours per year of impact

• 99.99% available

= 52.6 minutes per year of impact

• 99.999% available

= 5.26 minutes per year of impact

Great for measuring overall business impact and value

Low-fidelity measurement

Not so great for systems design



Some problems with the nines model

What about partitioned and cellular systems?


How do you pick a good time duration? Modern services can go years without an issue

"Never trust summary statistics alone; always visualize your data"

- Alberto Cairo

The Datasaurus Dozen

 Justin Matejka, George Fitzmaurice






How long could an interruption last?

Recovery Time Objective (RTO)


How often could it happen?

What is the Rate and Expected Duration? (RED)
















Rate and expected duration

Simpler to talk about and to reason about

Uncovers the "lumpiness"

Focuses on what kind of resilience plans are needed

Highlights where operational processes matter



Rate and expected duration

Cloud services

On-premises databases

On-premises appliances

Low-level physical infrastructure



Rate and expected duration

Measuring historical data is the gold standard

But even guesses are useful

Just asking the question can be clarifying

Feynman's Appendix F



What else is wrong with nines?



What else is wrong with nines?


The nines model comes from mechanical and civil engineering

Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA)


 Physical components have different failure characteristics, and usually no recovery

















$$1 - ((1 - 0.99) \times (1 - 0.99) \times (1 - 0.99))$$








Case study: Using multiple DNS providers



Other DNS provider

Chains, braids, and cantilevers





Takeaways so far

Focus on the rate and estimated duration of issues

Whole system "end-to-end" testing is critical

Whole lifecycle "birth-to-rebirth" testing is critical



Compartmentalization and blast radius



Regional isolation





Regional isolation





Zonal isolation





Cellular isolation

Cell 1 Cell 2 Cell 3 Cell 4




Cellular Isolation





Shuffle sharding






Simplicity and survival of the fittest



Which is simple?







Which is simple?

It's not the "fewest moving parts," it's more like "fewest needed parts"

Simplicity takes into account all of the trade-offs a design must make

Most important factor is usability





Survival of the fittest

Over time, systems evolve more than they are designed

More faults are eliminated over time

The best and most well-worn patterns are reused over and over






Survival of the fittest





Even the first original AWS services still contain original code from the launch versions





"Respect what came before" vs. NIH






Our Corrections of Error (COE) process feeds back into design iterations













Constant work and minimizing change




Risk is proportionate to rates of change in systems

Example: a spike in load can slow down a system, which can cause knock-on and cascading effects


Reducing dynamism in systems is a great way to make them simpler

A counter-intuitive solution is to run the system at "maximum" load all the time, every time























"There is no compression algorithm for experience,,

Andy Jassy




1000s of unit tests

100s of integration tests


Pre-prod environments

Roll forward and rollback testing




Running s2n_hash_test.c	PAS	SED 161	tests
Running s2n_rc4_test.c	PAS	SED 28742	tests
Running s2n_map_test.c	PAS	SED 57418	tests
Running s2n_override_openssl_random_test.c	PAS	SED 13	tests
Running s2n_handshake_test.c	PAS	SED 232	tests
Running s2n_ecc_test.c	PAS	SED 30	tests
Running s2n_stuffer_test.c	PAS	SED 701	tests
Running s2n_3des_test.c	PAS	SED 27248	tests
Running s2n_stuffer_hex_test.c	PAS	SED 319	tests
Running s2n_pem_rsa_dhe_test.c	PAS	SED 50	tests
Running s2n_aes_test.c	PAS	SED 54189	tests
Running s2n_fragmentation_coalescing_test.c	PAS	SED 64	tests
Running s2n_aes_sha_composite_test.c	PAS	SED 196450	tests
Running s2n_malformed_handshake_test.c	PAS	SED 82	tests
Running s2n_hmac_test.c	PAS	SED 392	tests
Running s2n_record_test.c	PAS	SED 179817	tests
Running s2n_client_extensions_test.c	PAS	SED 225	tests
Running s2n_self_talk_test.c	PAS	SED 43000462	tests
Running s2n_self_talk_alpn_test.c	PAS	SED 64500710	tests
Running s2n_drbg_test.c	PAS	SED 1000155	tests
Running s2n_random_test.c	PAS	SED 204480831	tests
Running s2n_cbc_verify_test.c	PAS	SED 8641805	tests
Running s2n_aead_aes_test.c	PAS	SED 29115201	tests












With chaos engineering, Region-scale simulation, automated reasoning, and formal verification, we're going much further

We can prove that code is correct for any possible set of inputs

Getting easier and easier



Use instrumentation and observability for full life-cycle testing

Every sensor you add can provide a lifetime of value

More data as the service grows





Operational safety



Operational safety

Web services are ... services


Live, running, operational concerns

Most issues are triggered by people making changes





Deployment safety



Deployment safety

New code means risk, so we are incredibly paranoid about deploying it

CI/CD staged deployment process


Promotion testing and monitoring at every stage, with automated rollback

Fast and reliable rollback



Deployment safety

- 1. Code-review
- 2. Check-in
- 3. Pre-Production
- 4. One Box
- 5. One Availability Zone
- 6. One Region
- 7. Onward ...





Cattle vs. pets

Most systems at AWS are beyond a scale that can be managed by hand

We use Auto Scaling groups, VPCs, subnets, security groups, and more as units of abstraction

Our deployment systems clone infrastructure between Regions



Cattle vs. pets

AWS operators don't have access to all AWS Regions

Services such as AWS Snowball and AWS Snowmobile are designed to be disconnected for periods of time

Bastioned systems: limited access for recovery via "bastions," with record and notification processes

Hermetic systems: systems with no general purpose, interactive, or administrative access




Automation first

"Automation first" is the only scalable answer

"Automation first" is also the safer option

Every lesson learned can be stored as code, not just good intentions







"Culture eats strategy for breakfast,,

Peter Drucker



High standards demand elite teams, and elite teams insist on high standards

Quality isn't something that is budgeted explicitly

Quality is embedded in the very approach



No "dumb questions"

Any person can be elite with the right support

Critiques and criticism broadly welcomed



















Takeaways

















Thank you!

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