AnalyzingMARCH

November 25, 2021

1 MARCH Tests

1.1 March C-nv-SRAM

In this example, we are investigating a 128kx8 SRAM that was exposed to radiation in March C & D tests. Hence, the content inside the memory was continuously written and red. At any rate, from the point of view of statistical analysisis, this test is equivalent to a pseudostatic one, with two different patterns and with addresses in switching order.

1.2 Loading packages

The very first thing we must do is to load the packages required to load files (*DelimitedFiles*) as well as the LELAPE module. I suppose you have installed both. Load is done with:

```
[4]: push!(LOAD_PATH,"/home/francisco/Escritorio/LELAPE-main/LELAPE/src") using DelimitedFiles, LELAPE
```

1.3 Defining variables

Previous paragraph allows us to define several variables for checking the tests:

- Word width: 8 bits
- Memory size in words: 2M is just 2^21.
- In SRAMs, it seems more likely to succeed the XOR operation.
- Tests were pseudostatic. Therefore, it is intelligent to keep information about the different cycles.

Ok, let us use this information to set these variables:

```
[5]: LA = 2^17 # Memory size in words

WordWidth = 8 # Selfexplaining.

Operation = "XOR" # Only "XOR" or "POS" are allowed.

KeepCycles = true # This is a Bool variable and only true false are accepted.
```

[5]: true

1.4 Loading data

Results are stored in three different files following the required format: * CSV files * Every row is formed as WORD ADDRESS, READ VALUE, PATTERN, CYCLE. Besides, the first row contains

column heading (must be skipped), separators are commas and EOL character is the standard.

We will use the *readdlm* function provided by the *DelimitedFiles* package to load the first CSV file and to store everything in the new variable, DATA. Finally, it is important to indicate that DATA must be an array of UInt32 numbers.

```
[7]: DATA1 = readdlm("March C-nv-SRAM.csv", ',', UInt32, '\n', skipstart=1)
```

```
[7]: 429×4 Matrix{UInt32}:
      0x00000536
                  0x00000004
                                          0x0000001
                              0x0000000
      0x00000e66
                  0x00000040
                              0x0000000
                                          0x0000001
      0x00003588
                  08000000x0
                              0x0000000
                                          0x0000001
      0x0000362d
                  0x0000010
                              0x0000000
                                          0x0000001
      0x00005611
                  08000000x0
                              0x0000000
                                          0x0000001
      0x000063bc
                  0x0000002
                              0x0000000
                                          0x0000001
      0x000065d6
                  0x00000002
                              0x0000000
                                          0x0000001
      0x000095e9
                  0x0000010
                              0x0000000
                                          0x0000001
      0x0000c6ca
                  0x0000010
                              0x0000000
                                          0x0000001
      0x0000d161
                  0x00000002
                              0x0000000
                                          0x0000001
      0x0000d629
                  0x0000001
                              0x0000000
                                          0x0000001
      0x0000d9f7
                  08000000x0
                              0x0000000
                                          0x0000001
      0x0000ec57
                  0x0000001
                              0x0000000
                                          0x0000001
      0x0001a815
                  0x00000020
                              0x0000000
                                          0x0000000a
                  0x0000010
      0x0001a8dc
                              0x0000000
                                          0x0000000a
      0x0001ad05
                  0x00000040
                              0x0000000
                                          0x0000000a
      0x0001afb1
                  0x00000004
                              0x0000000
                                          0x0000000a
      0x0001bcc4
                  0x00000004
                              0x0000000
                                          0x0000000a
      0x0001cca5
                  0x00000020
                              0x0000000
                                          0x0000000a
      0x0001d95b
                  0x0000001
                              0x0000000
                                          0x0000000a
      0x0001e15e
                  8000000x0
                              0x0000000
                                          0x0000000a
      0x0001e467
                  08000000x0
                              0x0000000
                                          0x0000000a
      0x0001e8c3
                  0x0000010
                              0x0000000
                                          0x0000000a
      0x0001fbbc
                  0x00000002
                              0x00000000
                                          0x0000000a
      0x0001fcdc
                  0x0000010
                              0x0000000
                                          0x0000000a
```

1.5 Looking for MBUs

This analysis is quite simple. We will call the *CheckMBUs* function that returns the MBUs present in DATA. Input arguments are the second and third columns, and the wordwidth.

This function returns two vectors. The first one indicates in position k the number of bitflips observed in the kth word. The second one is a vector of vectors and contains more detailed information: not only the number of bitflips per word but the position of the flipped bit (0 = LSB, WordWidth-1 = MSB).

```
[8]: MBUSize, MBU_bit_pos = CheckMBUs(DATA1[:,2], DATA1[:,3], WordWidth)
```

```
[8]: ([1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1 ... 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1], Any[[2], [6], [7], [4], [7], [1], [4], [4], [1] ... [6], [2], [2], [5], [0], [3], [7], [4], [1], [4]])
```

The following loop will show how many MBUs per number of flipped bits were observed:

6-bit MBUs: 0 7-bit MBUs: 0

5-bit MBUs: 0

8-bit MBUs: 0

1.6 Looking for MCUs

As modern memories are interleaved, it is not worth investigating MBUs but MCUs. Now, the system will combine addresses in all the possible pairs and operate them to create a DV set. If there were no MCUs, their characteristics are known.

In particular, we can state that if the expected number of elements repeated k times in this set is lower than a very low positive number, it is impossible to observe this number of repetitions unless the Only SBU assumption fails. We will define this threshold as 0.001 (default, 0.05).

Although without a solid theoretical background, it seems that using pseudoaddress instead of word address provides better results.

Some experiments seem to show that if an element with very few number of 1s in binary format is too often repeated, it is indicative of the presence of MCUs. This is the Trace Rule and, in our analysis, we want to keep all those too often repeated elements such that contain 2 ones or less in binary format.

Finally, perhaps we know that MCUs will not very large. For example, we may guess that MCUs with more than 20 bitflips are totally rejected. Therefore, to help the software and to avoid running out of memory, we will say the program "Don't be silly and do not expect events larger than 20!!" If somehow this idea was wrong, we can change this value again and repeat the calculations.

```
[10]: = 0.001 # If the expected number of elements repeated k times is lower than

→ ,

# we can afirm that this is virtually impossible.

UsePseudoAddress = true

TraceRuleLength = 2

LargestMCUSize = 20
```

[10]: 20

Time to test!!! We will call the function. Deppending on the set size or even if this is your first test, it will take you more or less time (Don't get up from your chair, though!!!!)

The following instruction will look for: 1. Values that pass the self-consistency test (C1_SCY) 2. Values found after inspecting MCUs derived from self-consistency-test (C1_MCU). 3. Values with less than or equal to *TraceRuleLength* 1s in binary format that appear too often in the DV set (C1_TRC). 4. Values that, after combining in pairs the union of all the previous three sets and applying the operation and that appear too many times within the DV set (C1_SHF).

The first column of each matrix are the possible values and the second one the times it appeared.

```
[11]: C1_SCY, C1_MCU, C1_TRC, C1_SHF = DetectAnomalies_FullCheck(DATA1, WordWidth, UseA, Operation, TraceRuleLength, UsePseudoAddress, KeepCycles, JargestMCUSize)
```

[11]: (Matrix{UInt32}(undef, 0, 2), Matrix{UInt32}(undef, 0, 2), Matrix{UInt32}(undef, 0, 2), Matrix{UInt32}(undef, 0, 2))

Perhaps these matrices are hard to read since, for efficiency, they were returned in UInt32 format, even the number of occurrences!!! Execute the following instrucction for a better comprehension.

```
println("Elements appearing more than expected and passing the Self-Consistency
→test:\n")
for index in 1:length(C1_SCY[:, 1])
    println("Value: 0x", string(C1_SCY[index, 1], base=16, pad = 6), " --> ",
    →Int(C1_SCY[index, 2]),".")
end

UsePseudoAddress ? L = LA*WordWidth : L = LA

print("\nOnly up to ", MaxExpectedRepetitions(NPairs(DATA1, UsePseudoAddress,
→WordWidth, KeepCycles), L, Operation, )-1, " repetitions are explained by
→randomness.")
```

Elements appearing more than expected and passing the Self-Consistency test:

Only up to 4 repetitions are explained by randomness.

In this example, it is not worth to check the other sets since they did not yield any positive result. If you had had success, you would only have to do the following:

```
[13]: C1_All = [C1_SCY; C1_MCU; C1_TRC; C1_SHF]
```

[13]: 0×2 Matrix{UInt32}

1.7 Grouping bitflips

Now, we have discovered those values relating pairs of pseudoaddresses. Now, let us go to group events in DATA.

The first step consists in labeling all the pseudoaddresses and grouping their assigned indexes to a matrix containing information for the possible MCUs. It is an intermediate step and is done with the instruction MCU Indexes with the required and already defined parameters.

```
[14]: Labeled_addresses = MCU_Indexes(DATA1, Operation, C1_All[:, 1], UsePseudoAddress, WordWidth)
```

```
[14]: 0×2 Matrix{Int64}
```

Using this information, we can group the addresses.

Difficult to read, isn't it? The following instruction makes the content more readable:

Pseudoaddresses involved in 2-bit MCUs (0 events):

```
Pseudoaddresses involved in 1-bit MCUs (429 events): 0x0029b2 0x007336 0x01ac47 0x01b16c 0x02b08f 0x031de1
```

0x032eb1

0x04af4c

0x063654

0x068b09

0x06b148

0x06cfbf

0x0762b8

01010200

0x078795

0x07ceec

0x082482

0x0829af

0x08d10e

0x0945be

0x096016

0x09789d

0x09bd00

0x0b13e6

0x0b197d

0x0b550b

0x0b703b

0x0b7e2b

0x0b918a

0x0be79b

0x0cdd6c

0x0d71e7

0x0da1f5

0x0e44d0

0x0ed88a

0x0f357c

0x0f3afc

0x0f424b

0x0fe99e

0x0ff398

0x0036c3

0x003a44

0x0144be

0x015819

0x016120

0x01ce04

0x01fcc6

0x026c15

0x02926b

0x02a099

0x035549 0x038e12

0 001401

0x03b13d

0x04b8d1 0x04c359 0x058ae5

0x05adfd

0x05bac4

0x063803

0x063e34

0x0652a3

0x067bb9

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

0x06b13d

0x06cd51

0 x 0 6 f d 7 d

0x076cda

0x07c0cf

0x07c28a

0x07e9c0

0x09120b

0x0abbfd

0x0ad4f5

0x0add44

0x0c1530

0x0c3dbd

0x0c7f97

0x0cbff7

0x0cc5d0

0x0cdce1

0x0cf786

0x0d1288

0x0db2e9

0x0dbb73

ONOGDDIO

0x0dfe84

0x0e18c1

0x0e80ef

0x0e8797

0x0ead21

0x0facc6

0x0fad2b

0x0fe13a

0x0deb01

0x0d620a

0x0cb1eb

0x0bba52 0x0b77f6

0x0a372a

0x08c5c5

0x0859f7

0x082b89

0 00444

0x08111e

0x07da1f 0x0759a2 0x06730c

0x0585ec

0x050377

0x04fceb

0x04d85f

0x04986f

0x04836a

0x046cf8

0x044719

0x042d44

0x041e5f

0x041b0f

0x03c83f

0x02fc77

0x02e560

0x02b9f3

0x02b9e3

0x02838b

0x027ad1

0x0265ef

0x02644f

0x022318

0x01dbb3

0x01dac9

0x01c69a

0x01b7fe

0x017fb3

0x017a11

0x01658e

0x01654c

0x01539f

0x013a61

0x012407

0x01075e

0x00ceb0

0x00cac1

0x008654

0x0036ec

0x0fa545

0x0fa218

0x0f9884

0x0f8fee

0x0f5ad5

0x0efe5d

0x0eb4c2

0x0e8572

- - ---

0x0e7501 0x0dd41f

0x0d7edd

0x0d1e78

0x0c851e

0x0c2b89

0x0bb343

0x0b1d3b

0x09d989

0x09ce1f

- - - - - -

0x096c26

0x0874b4

0x084ff9

 $0 \\ x \\ 0 \\ 8 \\ 1 \\ 3 \\ d \\ 3$

0x07eb1e

0x07a141

0x067771

0x05f3c2

0x05db07

0x059a3b

0x057a53

0x0547f8

0x05425f

0x04597b

0x033166

0x02f99d

0x02f156

0x0213bb

0x01fa22

0x01cd4c

0x015054

0x00bdd4

0x00bbc6

0x001ad9

0x02eb3c

0x02f7db

0x030b62

0x03b51b

0x059800

0x0665e5

0x077dfd

0x077eb0

0x0821f2

0x086aa9

0x09088f

0x097d78

0x0a8b9f

0x0b2e70

0x0c5589

0x0cae20

0x0caf0e

0x0cb070

0x0cbf93

0x0cc6a1

0x0d1f2c

0x0d2804

0x0d8c5e

0 0 1 6 0 0

0x0df60e

0x0e1f3b

0x0e5899

0x0e5fa1

0x0e9899

0x0effed

0x0f0df3

0x0f7a45

0x0f9e91

0x0322fb

0x032a89

0x03eab0

0x05424a

0x05c370

0x062437

0x06b42f

0 x 0 6 f 3 a b

0x0711f6

0x0748af

0x0876c2

 $0 \\ x \\ 0 \\ 9 \\ 2 \\ 3 \\ df$

0x09264d

0x09c074

0x0a71f9

0x0a8063

0x0ad92d

0x0b4797

0x0b8797

0x0cafdb

0x0d9a3a

0x0dadc5

0x0db73e

0x0dd779

0x0de48a

0x0e2d1e 0x0ea420

0x0f024a

0x0f424a

0 001000

0x0fd808

0x0fead7 0x003194 0x005bc8

0x007005

0x0146ba

0x018c38

0x018e0a

OYOTOGO

0x019fcf

0x01a3f4

0x01c4b6

0x01d026

0x01e3f4

0.000450

0x022473

0x024548

0x02b47b

0x02fd17

0x0370e3

0x038845

0x03ad52

0x03b123

0x055e48

0x057397

0x05b2a8

0x063c4c

0x0659c0

0x06bf7f

0x06ef09

0x0764ee

0x0772e4

0x077358

0x07752a

0x07a4d7

0x07cf9f

0x081512

0x08341f

0x086cf2

0x08b4af

0x096e77

 $0 \times 09 = 572$

0x09d4a2

0x0a0809

0x0a2ca9

0x0a6e62

0x0ac59a 0x0accd8

0x0b1330

ONODIOOO

0x0b3985

0x0b3d88

0x0b6687 0x0cdaab 0x0cf7a3

0x0d394b

0x0dfef3

0x0e3f62

0x0e81cb

0x0e8adb

0x0f13b9

0x0f4d44

0x0f5563

0x0fa1d7

0x0fc7c0

0x0fccb7

0x0fd36a

0x0cdb9b

0x0c1c62

0x0af8c9

0x0acd97

0x0aac59

0x0a987f

0x0a4a1c

0x09ed2a

0x09dd4b

0x091621

0x08234e

0x07b1c8

0x076ca7

0x072de4

0x068c63

0x05eb85

0x05e8b0

0x056d02

0x052023

0x04bc76

0x04bc56

0x04bc46

0x040360

0x03bf3e

0x039dc3

0x039ceb 0x0382be

0x032c7d

0x0307af

0x02cea1 0x02be7b

0x025ede

0x02439c

0x023cd7

0x01d8d3

0x019463

0x013f0a

0x013b64

0x0114a5

0...0 _ _ _ _ _

0x010895

0x010225

0 x 00 d f 8 f

0x00abd0

0x009a15

0x00895b

0x001dd7

0x00102e

0x0fb286

0x0f931e

0x0f92f2

0x0f52f2

0x0f5241

0x0ebcf5

0x0e269f

0x0e2270

0x0db0ec

0x0da607

0x0c8882

0x0c593f

0x0ba6a3

 $0 \\ x \\ 0 \\ a \\ b \\ 4 \\ f \\ 4$

0x0a74ea

0x096ab3

0x07fea4

0x0751cd

0x0708fe

0x06abb8

0x068ea1

0x05b597

0x05a73c

0x052562

0x04cf4f

0x049cee

0x040e86

0x03d6ee

0x03352d

0x030950

0x02d05b

0x025708

0x023d32

0x0233f8

0x01d50f 0x01b7a8 0x00c735

0x0088c5

0x00877e

0x003e4c

0x0341fc

0x03f5ca

0x056502

0x05c30f

0x080e6f

.

0x08326e

0x083b1c

0x0889f2

0x089e6f

0x0a2f49

0x0a85a5

0x0accab

0x0af307

 $0 \\ \text{x} \\ 0 \\ \text{b} \\ 774 \\ \text{f}$

0x0ba2cb

0x0ba571

0x0bc2ad

0x0be76f

0x0bf8ae

0x0c6a8b

0x0c8289

0x0ca6a1

0x0cbd6a

0x0d40ad

0x0d46e4

0x0d682e

0x0d7d8a

0x0de622

0x0e652d

0x0ecad8

0x0f0af3

0x0f233f

0x0f461c

0x0fdde1

0x0fe6e4

1.8 Analysis completed!