Revert "ecdsa_impl: replace scalar if-checks with VERIFY_CHECKs in ec…

…dsa_sig_sign"

This reverts commit 25e3cfb. The reverted
commit was probably based on the assumption that this is about the touched
checks cover the secret nonce k instead of r, which is the x-coord of the public
nonce. A signature with a zero r is invalid by the spec, so we should return 0
to make the caller retry with a different nonce. Overflow is not an issue.

Fixes bitcoin#720.

src/ecdsa_impl.h

@@ -288,10 +288,14 @@ static int secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_sign(const secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *ctx, sec
     secp256k1_fe_normalize(&r.y);
     secp256k1_fe_get_b32(b, &r.x);
     secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(sigr, b, &overflow);
-    /* These two conditions should be checked before calling */
-    VERIFY_CHECK(!secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(sigr));
-    VERIFY_CHECK(overflow == 0);
-
+    if (secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(sigr)) {
+        /* P.x = order is on the curve, so technically sig->r could end up zero, which would be an invalid signature.
+         * This branch is cryptographically unreachable as hitting it requires finding the discrete log of P.x = N.
+         */
+        secp256k1_gej_clear(&rp);
+        secp256k1_ge_clear(&r);
+        return 0;
+    }
     if (recid) {
         /* The overflow condition is cryptographically unreachable as hitting it requires finding the discrete log
          * of some P where P.x >= order, and only 1 in about 2^127 points meet this criteria.