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Update to 3.14-rc7 #1
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CC arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.o In file included from arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c:42:0: arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c: In function ‘mips_get_syscall_arg’: /home/ralf/src/linux/linux-mips/arch/mips/include/asm/syscall.h:60:1: error: control reaches end of non-void function [-Werror=return-type] cc1: all warnings being treated as errors make[2]: *** [arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.o] Error 1 make[1]: *** [arch/mips/kernel] Error 2 make: *** [arch/mips] Error 2 Fixed by marking the end of mips_get_syscall_arg() as unreachable. Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
enabled __must_check logic triggers a build error for mtx1 and gpr in the prom init code. Fix by checking the kstrtoul() return value. Signed-off-by: Manuel Lauss <manuel.lauss@gmail.com> Cc: Linux-MIPS <linux-mips@linux-mips.org> Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/6574/ Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Fixes the following build problen on allmodconfig: arch/mips/bcm47xx/board.c: In function 'bcm47xx_board_detect': arch/mips/bcm47xx/board.c:291:14: error: 'ENXIO' undeclared (first use in this function) Signed-off-by: Markos Chandras <markos.chandras@imgtec.com> Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/6571/ Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
There are 2 errors with the existing aprp_hook linking: - The prefix CONFIG_ is missing; - The hook should be linked exclusively in the cases of MT and CMP. Signed-off-by: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@imgtec.com> Reviewed-by: Steven J. Hill <Steven.Hill@imgtec.com> Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: john@phrozen.org Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/6588/ Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
If the aprp_hook is not assigned back to NULL, it will still be called after module exits. This is not wanted. Reviewed-by: Steven J. Hill <Steven.Hill@imgtec.com> Signed-off-by: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@imgtec.com> Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: john@phrozen.org Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/6590/ Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Now we have CONFIG_MIPS_VPE_LOADER and CONFIG_MIPS_VPE_LOADER_[CMP|MT]. The latter two are used by the 2 exclusive flavors. The vpe_run in malta-amon.c is for CMP APRP. Without the fix, this vpe_run will be used in MT APRP. Reviewed-by: Steven J. Hill <Steven.Hill@imgtec.com> Signed-off-by: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@imgtec.com> Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: john@phrozen.org Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/6589/ Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Quoting Alexander Aring: While fragmentation and unloading of 6lowpan module I got this kernel Oops after few seconds: BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at f88bbc30 [..] Modules linked in: ipv6 [last unloaded: 6lowpan] Call Trace: [<c012af4c>] ? call_timer_fn+0x54/0xb3 [<c012aef8>] ? process_timeout+0xa/0xa [<c012b66b>] run_timer_softirq+0x140/0x15f Problem is that incomplete frags are still around after unload; when their frag expire timer fires, we get crash. When a netns is removed (also done when unloading module), inet_frag calls the evictor with 'force' argument to purge remaining frags. The evictor loop terminates when accounted memory ('work') drops to 0 or the lru-list becomes empty. However, the mem accounting is done via percpu counters and may not be accurate, i.e. loop may terminate prematurely. Alter evictor to only stop once the lru list is empty when force is requested. Reported-by: Phoebe Buckheister <phoebe.buckheister@itwm.fraunhofer.de> Reported-by: Alexander Aring <alex.aring@gmail.com> Tested-by: Alexander Aring <alex.aring@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Since commit bd97268 "firewire: ohci: Fix 'failed to read phy reg' on FW643 rev8", there is a high chance that firewire-ohci fails to initialize LSI née Agere controllers. https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=65151 Peter Hurley points out the reason: IEEE 1394a:2000 clause 5A.1 (or IEEE 1394:2008 clause 17.2.1) say: "The PHY shall insure that no more than 10 ms elapse from the reassertion of LPS until the interface is reset. The link shall not assert LReq until the reset is complete." In other words, the link needs to give the PHY at least 10 ms to get the interface operational. With just the msleep(1) in bd97268, the first read_phy_reg() during ohci_enable() may happen before the phy-link interface reset was finished, and fail. Due to the high variability of msleep(n) with small n, this failure was not fully reproducible, and not apparent at all with low CONFIG_HZ setting. On the other hand, Peter can no longer reproduce the issue with FW643 rev8. The read phy reg failures that happened back then may have had an unrelated cause. So, just revert bd97268, except for the valid comment on TSB82AA2 cards. Reported-by: Mikhail Gavrilov Reported-by: Jay Fenlason <fenlason@redhat.com> Reported-by: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de> Reported-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.10+ Signed-off-by: Stefan Richter <stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de>
With -Werror=array-bounds, gcc v4.7.x warns that in phy_find_valid(), the settings[] "array subscript is above array bounds", I think because idx is a signed integer and if the caller supplied idx < 0, we pass the guard but still reference out of bounds. Fix this by making idx unsigned here and elsewhere. Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Acked-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The original documentation was very unclear. The code fix is presumably related to the formerly unclear documentation: SOCK_TIMESTAMPING_RX_SOFTWARE has no effect on __sock_recv_timestamp's behavior, so calling __sock_recv_ts_and_drops from sock_recv_ts_and_drops if only SOCK_TIMESTAMPING_RX_SOFTWARE is set is pointless. This should have no user-observable effect. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Acked-by: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The unix socket code is using the result of csum_partial to hash into a lookup table: unix_hash_fold(csum_partial(sunaddr, len, 0)); csum_partial is only guaranteed to produce something that can be folded into a checksum, as its prototype explains: * returns a 32-bit number suitable for feeding into itself * or csum_tcpudp_magic The 32bit value should not be used directly. Depending on the alignment, the ppc64 csum_partial will return different 32bit partial checksums that will fold into the same 16bit checksum. This difference causes the following testcase (courtesy of Gustavo) to sometimes fail: #include <sys/socket.h> #include <stdio.h> int main() { int fd = socket(PF_LOCAL, SOCK_STREAM|SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0); int i = 1; setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &i, 4); struct sockaddr addr; addr.sa_family = AF_LOCAL; bind(fd, &addr, 2); listen(fd, 128); struct sockaddr_storage ss; socklen_t sslen = (socklen_t)sizeof(ss); getsockname(fd, (struct sockaddr*)&ss, &sslen); fd = socket(PF_LOCAL, SOCK_STREAM|SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0); if (connect(fd, (struct sockaddr*)&ss, sslen) == -1){ perror(NULL); return 1; } printf("OK\n"); return 0; } As suggested by davem, fix this by using csum_fold to fold the partial 32bit checksum into a 16bit checksum before using it. Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The code to load a MAC address into a u64 for passing to the hypervisor via a register is broken on little endian. Create a helper function called ibmveth_encode_mac_addr which does the right thing in both big and little endian. We were storing the MAC address in a long in struct ibmveth_adapter. It's never used so remove it - we don't need another place in the driver where we create endian issues with MAC addresses. Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Without this fix, ipv6_exthdrs_offload_init doesn't register IPPROTO_DSTOPTS offload, but returns 0 (as the IPPROTO_ROUTING registration actually succeeds). This then causes the ipv6_gso_segment to drop IPv6 packets with IPPROTO_DSTOPTS header. The issue detected and the fix verified by running MS HCK Offload LSO test on top of QEMU Windows guests, as this test sends IPv6 packets with IPPROTO_DSTOPTS. Signed-off-by: Anton Nayshtut <anton@swortex.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Without this, a bo may get created in the cpu-inaccessible vram. Before the CP engines get setup, all copies are done via cpu memcpy. This means that the cpu tries to read from inaccessible memory, fails, and the radeon module proceeds to disable acceleration. Doing this has no downsides, as the real VRAM size gets set as soon as the CP engines get init. This is a candidate for 3.14 fixes. v2: Add comment on why the function is used Signed-off-by: Lauri Kasanen <cand@gmx.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Moving the pm resume up in the init order to fix dpm seems to have regressed somes cases with the old pm code. Move it back to late resume. Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Building radeon_ttm.o on 32 bit x86 triggers a warning: In file included from include/asm-generic/bug.h:13:0, from [...]/arch/x86/include/asm/bug.h:38, from include/linux/bug.h:4, from include/drm/drm_mm.h:39, from include/drm/drm_vma_manager.h:26, from include/drm/ttm/ttm_bo_api.h:35, from drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_ttm.c:32: drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_ttm.c: In function 'radeon_ttm_gtt_read': include/linux/kernel.h:712:17: warning: comparison of distinct pointer types lacks a cast [enabled by default] (void) (&_min1 == &_min2); \ ^ drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_ttm.c:938:22: note: in expansion of macro 'min' ssize_t cur_size = min(size, PAGE_SIZE - off); ^ Silence this warning by using min_t(). Since cur_size will never be negative and its upper bound is PAGE_SIZE, we can change its type to size_t and use min_t(size_t, [...]) here. Signed-off-by: Paul Bolle <pebolle@tiscali.nl> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Copy-paste typo. Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Should be at 0x8 rather than 0. fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=60523 Noticed by ArtForz on #radeon Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
We didn't correctly check cases where the value for lp_interval is not within the legal range due to a missing table terminator. This would let userspace trigger a kernel panic by specifying a value out of range: echo -1 > /sys/devices/virtual/net/bond0/bonding/lp_interval Introduced by commit 4325b37 ("bonding: convert lp_interval to use the new option API"). Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Fix a regression introduced by [1]. outbox was accessed instead of outbox->buf. Typo was copy-pasted to [2] and [3]. [1] - cc1ade9 mlx4_core: Disable memory windows for virtual functions [2] - 4de6580 mlx4_core: Add support for steerable IB UD QPs [3] - 7ffdf72 net/mlx4_core: Add basic support for TCP/IP offloads under tunneling Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Amir Vadai <amirv@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
… PF is ready Currently, the PF call to pci_enable_sriov from the PF probe function stalls for 10 seconds times the number of VFs probed on the host. This happens because the way for such VFs to determine of the PF initialization finished, is by attempting to issue reset on the comm-channel and get timeout (after 10s). The PF probe function is called from a kenernel workqueue, and therefore during that time, rcu lock is being held and kernel's workqueue is stalled. This blocks other processes that try to use the workqueue or rcu lock. For example, interface renaming which is calling rcu_synchronize is blocked, and timedout by systemd. Changed mlx4_init_slave() to allow VF probed on the host to immediatly detect that the PF is not ready, and return EPROBE_DEFER instantly. Only when the PF finishes the initialization, allow such VFs to access the comm channel. This issue and fix are relevant only for probed VFs on the hypervisor, there is no way to pass this information to a VM until comm channel is ready, so in a VM, if PF is not ready, the first command will be timedout after 10 seconds and return EPROBE_DEFER. Signed-off-by: Amir Vadai <amirv@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
DST_NOCOUNT should only be used if an authorized user adds routes locally. In case of routes which are added on behalf of router advertisments this flag must not get used as it allows an unlimited number of routes getting added remotely. Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
…linux into drm-fixes a few more radeon fixes. * 'drm-fixes-3.14' of git://people.freedesktop.org/~agd5f/linux: drm/radeon/dpm: fix typo in EVERGREEN_SMC_FIRMWARE_HEADER_softRegisters drm/radeon/cik: fix typo in documentation drm/radeon: silence GCC warning on 32 bit drm/radeon: resume old pm late drm/radeon: TTM must be init with cpu-visible VRAM, v2
…nux-cubox into drm-fixes fix for kfifo api change. * 'drm-armada-fixes' of git://ftp.arm.linux.org.uk/~rmk/linux-cubox: DRM: armada: fix use of kfifo_put()
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
Add a maintainers entry for the TDA998x driver. Rob Clark has handed this driver over to me to look after. Acked-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
We need to check for DVI vs. HDMI when setting up duallink since HDMI is single link only. Fixes 4k modes on newer asics. bug: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=75223 Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
…linux into drm-fixes one more radeon fix. * 'drm-fixes-3.14' of git://people.freedesktop.org/~agd5f/linux: drm/radeon/atom: select the proper number of lanes in transmitter setup
When we fork/clone we currently don't copy any of the TM state to the new thread. This results in a TM bad thing (program check) when the new process is switched in as the kernel does a tmrechkpt with TEXASR FS not set. Also, since R1 is from userspace, we trigger the bad kernel stack pointer detection. So we end up with something like this: Bad kernel stack pointer 0 at c0000000000404fc cpu 0x2: Vector: 700 (Program Check) at [c00000003ffefd40] pc: c0000000000404fc: restore_gprs+0xc0/0x148 lr: 0000000000000000 sp: 0 msr: 9000000100201030 current = 0xc000001dd1417c30 paca = 0xc00000000fe00800 softe: 0 irq_happened: 0x01 pid = 0, comm = swapper/2 WARNING: exception is not recoverable, can't continue The below fixes this by flushing the TM state before we copy the task_struct to the clone. To do this we go through the tmreclaim patch, which removes the checkpointed registers from the CPU and transitions the CPU out of TM suspend mode. Hence we need to call tmrechkpt after to restore the checkpointed state and the TM mode for the current task. To make this fail from userspace is simply: tbegin li r0, 2 sc <boom> Kudos to Adhemerval Zanella Neto for finding this. Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org> cc: Adhemerval Zanella Neto <azanella@br.ibm.com> cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
The 64bit relocation code places a few symbols in the text segment. These symbols are only 4 byte aligned where they need to be 8 byte aligned. Add an explicit alignment. Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Tested-by: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
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The following backtrace is seen when running aspeed G5 kernels. WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at drivers/gpu/drm/drm_fb_helper.c:2233 drm_fbdev_generic_setup+0x138/0x198 aspeed_gfx 1e6e6000.display: Device has not been registered. CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.8.0-rc3 #1 Hardware name: Generic DT based system Backtrace: [<8010d6d0>] (dump_backtrace) from [<8010d9b8>] (show_stack+0x20/0x24) r7:00000009 r6:60000153 r5:00000000 r4:8119fa94 [<8010d998>] (show_stack) from [<80b8cb98>] (dump_stack+0xcc/0xec) [<80b8cacc>] (dump_stack) from [<80123ef0>] (__warn+0xd8/0xfc) r7:00000009 r6:80e62ed0 r5:00000000 r4:974c3ccc [<80123e18>] (__warn) from [<80123f98>] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0x84/0xc4) r9:00000009 r8:806a0140 r7:000008b9 r6:80e62ed0 r5:80e631f8 r4:974c2000 [<80123f18>] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [<806a0140>] (drm_fbdev_generic_setup+0x138/0x198) r9:00000001 r8:9758fc10 r7:9758fc00 r6:00000000 r5:00000020 r4:9768a000 [<806a0008>] (drm_fbdev_generic_setup) from [<806d4558>] (aspeed_gfx_probe+0x204/0x32c) r7:9758fc00 r6:00000000 r5:00000000 r4:9768a000 [<806d4354>] (aspeed_gfx_probe) from [<806dfca0>] (platform_drv_probe+0x58/0xa8) Since commit 1aed950 ("drm/fb-helper: Remove return value from drm_fbdev_generic_setup()"), drm_fbdev_generic_setup() must be called after drm_dev_register() to avoid the warning. Do that. Fixes: 1aed950 ("drm/fb-helper: Remove return value from drm_fbdev_generic_setup()") Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Acked-by: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org> Acked-by: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au> Signed-off-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20200701001002.74997-1-linux@roeck-us.net
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In helper function is_flow_rule_duplicate_allowed() verify that rpviv pointer is not NULL before dereferencing it. This can happen when device is in NIC mode and leads to following crash: [90444.046419] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [90444.048149] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [90444.049781] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [90444.051386] PGD 80000003d35a4067 P4D 80000003d35a4067 PUD 3d35a3067 PMD 0 [90444.053051] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [90444.054683] CPU: 16 PID: 31736 Comm: tc Not tainted 5.8.0-rc1+ #1157 [90444.056340] Hardware name: Supermicro SYS-2028TP-DECR/X10DRT-P, BIOS 2.0b 03/30/2017 [90444.058079] RIP: 0010:mlx5e_configure_flower+0x3aa/0x9b0 [mlx5_core] [90444.059753] Code: 24 50 49 8b 95 08 02 00 00 48 b8 00 08 00 00 04 00 00 00 48 21 c2 48 39 c2 74 0a 41 f6 85 0d 02 00 00 20 74 16 48 8b 44 24 20 <48> 8b 00 66 83 78 20 ff 74 07 4d 89 aa e0 00 00 00 48 83 7d 28 00 [90444.063232] RSP: 0018:ffffabe9c61ff768 EFLAGS: 00010246 [90444.065014] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9b13c4c91e80 RCX: 00000000000093fa [90444.066784] RDX: 0000000400000800 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 000000000002d5e0 [90444.068533] RBP: ffff9b174d308468 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff9b17d63003f0 [90444.070285] R10: ffff9b17ea288600 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffabe9c61ff878 [90444.072032] R13: ffff9b174d300000 R14: ffffabe9c61ffbb8 R15: ffff9b174d300880 [90444.073760] FS: 00007f3c23775480(0000) GS:ffff9b13efc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [90444.075492] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [90444.077266] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000003e2a60002 CR4: 00000000001606e0 [90444.079024] Call Trace: [90444.080753] tc_setup_cb_add+0xca/0x1e0 [90444.082415] fl_hw_replace_filter+0x15f/0x1f0 [cls_flower] [90444.084119] fl_change+0xa59/0x13dc [cls_flower] [90444.085772] ? wait_for_completion+0xa8/0xf0 [90444.087364] tc_new_tfilter+0x3f5/0xa60 [90444.088960] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0xeb/0x360 [90444.090514] ? __d_lookup_done+0x76/0xe0 [90444.092034] ? proc_alloc_inode+0x16/0x70 [90444.093560] ? prep_new_page+0x8c/0xf0 [90444.095048] ? _cond_resched+0x15/0x30 [90444.096483] ? rtnl_calcit.isra.0+0x110/0x110 [90444.097907] netlink_rcv_skb+0x49/0x110 [90444.099289] netlink_unicast+0x191/0x230 [90444.100629] netlink_sendmsg+0x243/0x480 [90444.101984] sock_sendmsg+0x5e/0x60 [90444.103305] ____sys_sendmsg+0x1f3/0x260 [90444.104597] ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x5c/0x90 [90444.105916] ? __mod_lruvec_state+0x3c/0xe0 [90444.107210] ___sys_sendmsg+0x81/0xc0 [90444.108484] ? do_filp_open+0xa5/0x100 [90444.109732] ? handle_mm_fault+0x117b/0x1e00 [90444.110970] ? __check_object_size+0x46/0x147 [90444.112205] ? __check_object_size+0x136/0x147 [90444.113402] __sys_sendmsg+0x59/0xa0 [90444.114587] do_syscall_64+0x4d/0x90 [90444.115782] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [90444.116953] RIP: 0033:0x7f3c2393b7b8 [90444.118101] Code: Bad RIP value. [90444.119240] RSP: 002b:00007ffc6ad8e6c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e [90444.120408] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f3c2393b7b8 [90444.121583] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffc6ad8e740 RDI: 0000000000000003 [90444.122750] RBP: 000000005eea0c3a R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00007ffc6ad8e68c [90444.123928] R10: 0000000000404fa8 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001 [90444.125073] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffc6ad92a00 R15: 00000000004866a0 [90444.126221] Modules linked in: act_skbedit act_tunnel_key act_mirred bonding vxlan ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel nfnetlink act_gact cls_flower sch_ingress openvswitch nsh nf_conncount nfsv3 nfs_acl nfs lockd grace fscache tun bridge stp llc sunrpc rdma_ucm rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm mlx5_ib ib_uverbs ib_core mlx5_core intel_r apl_msr intel_rapl_common sb_edac x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp kvm_intel mlxfw kvm act_ct nf_flow_table nf_nat nf_conntrack irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul nf_defrag_ipv6 igb ipmi_ssif libcrc32c crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ipmi_si nf_defrag_ipv4 ptp ghash_clmulni_intel mei_me ses iTCO_wdt i2c_i801 pps_core ioatdma iTCO_vendor_support joydev mei enclosure intel_cstate i2c_smbus wmi dca ipmi_devintf intel_uncore lpc_ich ipmi_msghandler pcspkr acpi_pad acpi_power_meter ast i2c_algo_bit drm_vram_helper drm_kms_helper drm_ttm_helper ttm drm mpt3sas raid_class scsi_transport_sas [90444.136253] CR2: 0000000000000000 [90444.137621] ---[ end trace 924af62aa2b151bd ]--- Fixes: 553f932 ("net/mlx5e: Support tc block sharing for representors") Reported-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: Roi Dayan <roid@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com>
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After function reload, CPU mapping used by aRFS RX is broken, leading to a kernel panic. Fix by moving initialization of rx_cpu_rmap from netdev_init to netdev_attach. IRQ table is re-allocated on mlx5_load, but netdev is not re-initialize. Trace of the panic: [ 22.055672] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x785634120000ff1c: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [ 22.065010] CPU: 4 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/4 Not tainted 5.7.0-rc2-for-upstream-perf-2020-04-21_16-34-03-31 #1 [ 22.067967] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 22.071174] RIP: 0010:get_rps_cpu+0x267/0x300 [ 22.075692] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000244d60 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 22.076888] RAX: ffff888459b0e400 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX:0000000000000007 [ 22.078364] RDX: 0000000000008884 RSI: ffff888467cb5b00 RDI:0000000000000000 [ 22.079815] RBP: 00000000ff342b27 R08: 0000000000000007 R09:0000000000000003 [ 22.081289] R10: ffffffffffffffff R11: 00000000000070cc R12:ffff888454900000 [ 22.082767] R13: ffffc90000e5a950 R14: ffffc90000244dc0 R15:0000000000000007 [ 22.084190] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88846fc80000(0000)knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 22.086161] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 22.087427] CR2: ffffffffffffffff CR3: 0000000464426003 CR4:0000000000760ee0 [ 22.088888] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2:0000000000000000 [ 22.090336] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7:0000000000000400 [ 22.091764] PKRU: 55555554 [ 22.092618] Call Trace: [ 22.093442] <IRQ> [ 22.094211] ? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0xd/0x10 [ 22.095272] netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x258/0x2a0 [ 22.096460] gro_normal_list.part.137+0x19/0x40 [ 22.097547] napi_complete_done+0xc6/0x110 [ 22.098685] mlx5e_napi_poll+0x190/0x670 [mlx5_core] [ 22.099859] net_rx_action+0x2a0/0x400 [ 22.100848] __do_softirq+0xd8/0x2a8 [ 22.101829] irq_exit+0xa5/0xb0 [ 22.102750] do_IRQ+0x52/0xd0 [ 22.103654] common_interrupt+0xf/0xf [ 22.104641] </IRQ> Fixes: 4383cfc ("net/mlx5: Add devlink reload") Signed-off-by: Aya Levin <ayal@mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: Eran Ben Elisha <eranbe@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com>
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we need to set 'active_vfs' back to 0, if something goes wrong during the allocation of SR-IOV resources: otherwise, further VF configurations will wrongly assume that bp->pf.vf[x] are valid memory locations, and commands like the ones in the following sequence: # echo 2 >/sys/bus/pci/devices/${ADDR}/sriov_numvfs # ip link set dev ens1f0np0 up # ip link set dev ens1f0np0 vf 0 trust on will cause a kernel crash similar to this: bnxt_en 0000:3b:00.0: not enough MMIO resources for SR-IOV BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000014 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 43 PID: 2059 Comm: ip Tainted: G I 5.8.0-rc2.upstream+ #871 Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R740/08D89F, BIOS 2.2.11 06/13/2019 RIP: 0010:bnxt_set_vf_trust+0x5b/0x110 [bnxt_en] Code: 44 24 58 31 c0 e8 f5 fb ff ff 85 c0 0f 85 b6 00 00 00 48 8d 1c 5b 41 89 c6 b9 0b 00 00 00 48 c1 e3 04 49 03 9c 24 f0 0e 00 00 <8b> 43 14 89 c2 83 c8 10 83 e2 ef 45 84 ed 49 89 e5 0f 44 c2 4c 89 RSP: 0018:ffffac6246a1f570 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000000000000000b RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff98b28f538900 RBP: ffff98b28f538900 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000008 R10: ffffffffb9515be0 R11: ffffac6246a1f678 R12: ffff98b28f538000 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffffffc05451e0 FS: 00007fde0f688800(0000) GS:ffff98baffd40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000014 CR3: 000000104bb0a003 CR4: 00000000007606e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: do_setlink+0x994/0xfe0 __rtnl_newlink+0x544/0x8d0 rtnl_newlink+0x47/0x70 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x29f/0x350 netlink_rcv_skb+0x4a/0x110 netlink_unicast+0x21d/0x300 netlink_sendmsg+0x329/0x450 sock_sendmsg+0x5b/0x60 ____sys_sendmsg+0x204/0x280 ___sys_sendmsg+0x88/0xd0 __sys_sendmsg+0x5e/0xa0 do_syscall_64+0x47/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Fixes: c0c050c ("bnxt_en: New Broadcom ethernet driver.") Reported-by: Fei Liu <feliu@redhat.com> CC: Jonathan Toppins <jtoppins@redhat.com> CC: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com> Acked-by: Jonathan Toppins <jtoppins@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Ido Schimmel says: ==================== mlxsw: Various fixes Fix two issues found by syzkaller. Patch #1 removes inappropriate usage of WARN_ON() following memory allocation failure. Constantly triggered when syzkaller injects faults. Patch #2 fixes a use-after-free that can be triggered by 'devlink dev info' following a failed devlink reload. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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…evices Since commit a85a6c8 ("driver core: platform: Clarify that IRQ 0 is invalid"), the kernel is a bit touchy when it encounters interrupt 0. As a result, there are lots of warnings such as the following when booting systems such as 'kzm'. WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at drivers/base/platform.c:224 platform_get_irq_optional+0x118/0x128 0 is an invalid IRQ number Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.8.0-rc3 #1 Hardware name: Kyoto Microcomputer Co., Ltd. KZM-ARM11-01 [<c01127d4>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c010c620>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) [<c010c620>] (show_stack) from [<c06f5f54>] (dump_stack+0xe8/0x120) [<c06f5f54>] (dump_stack) from [<c0128878>] (__warn+0xe4/0x108) [<c0128878>] (__warn) from [<c0128910>] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0x74/0xbc) [<c0128910>] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [<c08b8e84>] (platform_get_irq_optional+0x118/0x128) [<c08b8e84>] (platform_get_irq_optional) from [<c08b8eb4>] (platform_irq_count+0x20/0x3c) [<c08b8eb4>] (platform_irq_count) from [<c0728660>] (mxc_gpio_probe+0x8c/0x494) [<c0728660>] (mxc_gpio_probe) from [<c08b93cc>] (platform_drv_probe+0x48/0x98) [<c08b93cc>] (platform_drv_probe) from [<c08b703c>] (really_probe+0x214/0x344) [<c08b703c>] (really_probe) from [<c08b7274>] (driver_probe_device+0x58/0xb4) [<c08b7274>] (driver_probe_device) from [<c08b7478>] (device_driver_attach+0x58/0x60) [<c08b7478>] (device_driver_attach) from [<c08b7504>] (__driver_attach+0x84/0xc0) [<c08b7504>] (__driver_attach) from [<c08b50f8>] (bus_for_each_dev+0x78/0xb8) [<c08b50f8>] (bus_for_each_dev) from [<c08b62cc>] (bus_add_driver+0x154/0x1e0) [<c08b62cc>] (bus_add_driver) from [<c08b82b8>] (driver_register+0x74/0x108) [<c08b82b8>] (driver_register) from [<c0102320>] (do_one_initcall+0x80/0x3b4) [<c0102320>] (do_one_initcall) from [<c1501008>] (kernel_init_freeable+0x170/0x208) [<c1501008>] (kernel_init_freeable) from [<c0e178d4>] (kernel_init+0x8/0x11c) [<c0e178d4>] (kernel_init) from [<c0100134>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x20) As it turns out, mxc_register_gpio() is a bit lax when setting the number of resources: it registers a resource with interrupt 0 when in reality there is no such interrupt. Fix the problem by not declaring the second interrupt resource if there is no second interrupt. Fixes: a85a6c8 ("driver core: platform: Clarify that IRQ 0 is invalid") Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <shawnguo@kernel.org>
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Early secure guest boot hits the below crash while booting with vcpus numbers aligned with page boundary for PAGE size of 64k and LPPACA size of 1k i.e 64, 128 etc. Partition configured for 64 cpus. CPU maps initialized for 1 thread per core ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at arch/powerpc/kernel/paca.c:89! Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1] LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries This is due to the BUG_ON() for shared_lppaca_total_size equal to shared_lppaca_size. Instead the code should only BUG_ON() if we have exceeded the total_size, which indicates we've overflowed the array. Fixes: bd104e6 ("powerpc/pseries/svm: Use shared memory for LPPACA structures") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.4+ Signed-off-by: Satheesh Rajendran <sathnaga@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com> [mpe: Reword change log to clarify we're fixing not removing the check] Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200619070113.16696-1-sathnaga@linux.vnet.ibm.com
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This reverts commit eb9aecd The above patch is supposed to fix a register index error on mt2701. It is not clear if the problem solved is a hang or just an invalid value returned, my guess is the second. The patch introduces, though, a new hang on MT8173 device making them unusable. So, seems reasonable, revert the patch because introduces a worst issue. The reason I send a revert instead of trying to fix the issue for MT8173 is because the information needed to fix the issue is in the datasheet and is not public. So I am not really able to fix it. Fixes the following bug when CONFIG_MTK_THERMAL is set on MT8173 devices. [ 2.222488] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff8000125f5001 [ 2.230421] Mem abort info: [ 2.233207] ESR = 0x96000021 [ 2.236261] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 2.241571] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 2.244623] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 2.247762] Data abort info: [ 2.250640] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000021 [ 2.254473] CM = 0, WnR = 0 [ 2.257544] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000041850000 [ 2.264251] [ffff8000125f5001] pgd=000000013ffff003, pud=000000013fffe003, pmd=000000013fff9003, pte=006800001100b707 [ 2.274867] Internal error: Oops: 96000021 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 2.280432] Modules linked in: [ 2.283483] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.7.0-rc6+ #162 [ 2.289914] Hardware name: Google Elm (DT) [ 2.294003] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO) [ 2.298792] pc : mtk_read_temp+0xb8/0x1c8 [ 2.302793] lr : mtk_read_temp+0x7c/0x1c8 [ 2.306794] sp : ffff80001003b930 [ 2.310100] x29: ffff80001003b930 x28: 0000000000000000 [ 2.315404] x27: 0000000000000002 x26: ffff0000f9550b10 [ 2.320709] x25: ffff0000f9550a80 x24: 0000000000000090 [ 2.326014] x23: ffff80001003ba24 x22: 00000000610344c0 [ 2.331318] x21: 0000000000002710 x20: 00000000000001f4 [ 2.336622] x19: 0000000000030d40 x18: ffff800011742ec0 [ 2.341926] x17: 0000000000000001 x16: 0000000000000001 [ 2.347230] x15: ffffffffffffffff x14: ffffff0000000000 [ 2.352535] x13: ffffffffffffffff x12: 0000000000000028 [ 2.357839] x11: 0000000000000003 x10: ffff800011295ec8 [ 2.363143] x9 : 000000000000291b x8 : 0000000000000002 [ 2.368447] x7 : 00000000000000a8 x6 : 0000000000000004 [ 2.373751] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : ffff800011295cb0 [ 2.379055] x3 : 0000000000000002 x2 : ffff8000125f5001 [ 2.384359] x1 : 0000000000000001 x0 : ffff0000f9550a80 [ 2.389665] Call trace: [ 2.392105] mtk_read_temp+0xb8/0x1c8 [ 2.395760] of_thermal_get_temp+0x2c/0x40 [ 2.399849] thermal_zone_get_temp+0x78/0x160 [ 2.404198] thermal_zone_device_update.part.0+0x3c/0x1f8 [ 2.409589] thermal_zone_device_update+0x34/0x48 [ 2.414286] of_thermal_set_mode+0x58/0x88 [ 2.418375] thermal_zone_of_sensor_register+0x1a8/0x1d8 [ 2.423679] devm_thermal_zone_of_sensor_register+0x64/0xb0 [ 2.429242] mtk_thermal_probe+0x690/0x7d0 [ 2.433333] platform_drv_probe+0x5c/0xb0 [ 2.437335] really_probe+0xe4/0x448 [ 2.440901] driver_probe_device+0xe8/0x140 [ 2.445077] device_driver_attach+0x7c/0x88 [ 2.449252] __driver_attach+0xac/0x178 [ 2.453082] bus_for_each_dev+0x78/0xc8 [ 2.456909] driver_attach+0x2c/0x38 [ 2.460476] bus_add_driver+0x14c/0x230 [ 2.464304] driver_register+0x6c/0x128 [ 2.468131] __platform_driver_register+0x50/0x60 [ 2.472831] mtk_thermal_driver_init+0x24/0x30 [ 2.477268] do_one_initcall+0x50/0x298 [ 2.481098] kernel_init_freeable+0x1ec/0x264 [ 2.485450] kernel_init+0x1c/0x110 [ 2.488931] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x1c [ 2.492502] Code: f9401081 f9400402 b8a67821 8b010042 (b9400042) [ 2.498599] ---[ end trace e43e3105ed27dc99 ]--- [ 2.503367] Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b [ 2.511020] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs [ 2.514941] Kernel Offset: disabled [ 2.518421] CPU features: 0x090002,25006005 [ 2.522595] Memory Limit: none [ 2.525644] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b ]-- Cc: Michael Kao <michael.kao@mediatek.com> Fixes: eb9aecd ("thermal: mediatek: fix register index error") Signed-off-by: Enric Balletbo i Serra <enric.balletbo@collabora.com> Reviewed-by: Matthias Brugger <matthias.bgg@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@linaro.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200707103412.1010823-1-enric.balletbo@collabora.com
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Although mmiowb() is concerned only with serialising MMIO writes occuring in contexts where a spinlock is held, the call to mmiowb_set_pending() from the MMIO write accessors can occur in preemptible contexts, such as during driver probe() functions where ordering between CPUs is not usually a concern, assuming that the task migration path provides the necessary ordering guarantees. Unfortunately, the default implementation of mmiowb_set_pending() is not preempt-safe, as it makes use of a a per-cpu variable to track its internal state. This has been reported to generate the following splat on riscv: | BUG: using smp_processor_id() in preemptible [00000000] code: swapper/0/1 | caller is regmap_mmio_write32le+0x1c/0x46 | CPU: 3 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.8.0-rc3-hfu+ #1 | Call Trace: | walk_stackframe+0x0/0x7a | dump_stack+0x6e/0x88 | regmap_mmio_write32le+0x18/0x46 | check_preemption_disabled+0xa4/0xaa | regmap_mmio_write32le+0x18/0x46 | regmap_mmio_write+0x26/0x44 | regmap_write+0x28/0x48 | sifive_gpio_probe+0xc0/0x1da Although it's possible to fix the driver in this case, other splats have been seen from other drivers, including the infamous 8250 UART, and so it's better to address this problem in the mmiowb core itself. Fix mmiowb_set_pending() by using the raw_cpu_ptr() to get at the mmiowb state and then only updating the 'mmiowb_pending' field if we are not preemptible (i.e. we have a non-zero nesting count). Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Reported-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Reported-by: Emil Renner Berthing <kernel@esmil.dk> Tested-by: Emil Renner Berthing <kernel@esmil.dk> Reviewed-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com> Acked-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200716112816.7356-1-will@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
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Nov 2, 2020
When doing a fallocate() we have a short time window, after reserving an extent and before starting a transaction, where if relocation for the block group containing the reserved extent happens, we can end up missing the extent in the data relocation inode causing relocation to fail later. This only happens when we don't pass a transaction to the internal fallocate function __btrfs_prealloc_file_range(), which is for all the cases where fallocate() is called from user space (the internal use cases include space cache extent allocation and relocation). When the race triggers the relocation failure, it produces a trace like the following: [200611.995995] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [200611.997084] BTRFS: Transaction aborted (error -2) [200611.998208] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 235845 at fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1074 __btrfs_cow_block+0x3a0/0x5b0 [btrfs] [200611.999042] Modules linked in: dm_thin_pool dm_persistent_data (...) [200612.003287] CPU: 3 PID: 235845 Comm: btrfs Not tainted 5.9.0-rc6-btrfs-next-69 #1 [200612.004442] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [200612.006186] RIP: 0010:__btrfs_cow_block+0x3a0/0x5b0 [btrfs] [200612.007110] Code: 1b 00 00 02 72 2a 83 f8 fb 0f 84 b8 01 (...) [200612.007341] BTRFS warning (device sdb): Skipping commit of aborted transaction. [200612.008959] RSP: 0018:ffffaee38550f918 EFLAGS: 00010286 [200612.009672] BTRFS: error (device sdb) in cleanup_transaction:1901: errno=-30 Readonly filesystem [200612.010428] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9174d96f4000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [200612.011078] BTRFS info (device sdb): forced readonly [200612.011862] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffffa8161978 RDI: 00000000ffffffff [200612.013215] RBP: ffff9172569a0f80 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [200612.014263] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9174b8403b88 [200612.015203] R13: ffff9174b8400a88 R14: ffff9174c90f1000 R15: ffff9174a5a60e08 [200612.016182] FS: 00007fa55cf878c0(0000) GS:ffff9174ece00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [200612.017174] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [200612.018418] CR2: 00007f8fb8048148 CR3: 0000000428a46003 CR4: 00000000003706e0 [200612.019510] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [200612.020648] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [200612.021520] Call Trace: [200612.022434] btrfs_cow_block+0x10b/0x250 [btrfs] [200612.023407] do_relocation+0x54e/0x7b0 [btrfs] [200612.024343] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x4b/0xc0 [200612.025280] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x29/0x40 [200612.026200] relocate_tree_blocks+0x3bc/0x6d0 [btrfs] [200612.027088] relocate_block_group+0x2f3/0x600 [btrfs] [200612.027961] btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x15e/0x340 [btrfs] [200612.028896] btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x38/0x110 [btrfs] [200612.029772] btrfs_balance+0xb22/0x1790 [btrfs] [200612.030601] ? btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x253/0x380 [btrfs] [200612.031414] btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x2cf/0x380 [btrfs] [200612.032279] btrfs_ioctl+0x620/0x36f0 [btrfs] [200612.033077] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x29/0x40 [200612.033948] ? handle_mm_fault+0x116d/0x1ca0 [200612.034749] ? up_read+0x18/0x240 [200612.035542] ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0 [200612.036244] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0 [200612.037269] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 [200612.038190] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [200612.038976] RIP: 0033:0x7fa55d07ed87 [200612.040127] Code: 00 00 00 48 8b 05 09 91 0c 00 64 c7 00 26 (...) [200612.041669] RSP: 002b:00007ffd5ebf03e8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 [200612.042437] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 00007fa55d07ed87 [200612.043511] RDX: 00007ffd5ebf0470 RSI: 00000000c4009420 RDI: 0000000000000003 [200612.044250] RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 000055d8362642a0 R09: 00007fa55d148be0 [200612.044963] R10: fffffffffffff52e R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffd5ebf1614 [200612.045683] R13: 00007ffd5ebf0470 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: 00007ffd5ebf0470 [200612.046361] irq event stamp: 0 [200612.047040] hardirqs last enabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 [200612.047725] hardirqs last disabled at (0): [<ffffffffa6eb5ab3>] copy_process+0x823/0x1bc0 [200612.048387] softirqs last enabled at (0): [<ffffffffa6eb5ab3>] copy_process+0x823/0x1bc0 [200612.049024] softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 [200612.049722] ---[ end trace 49006c6876e65227 ]--- The race happens like this: 1) Task A starts an fallocate() (plain or zero range) and it calls __btrfs_prealloc_file_range() with the 'trans' parameter set to NULL; 2) Task A calls btrfs_reserve_extent() and gets an extent that belongs to block group X; 3) Before task A gets into btrfs_replace_file_extents(), through the call to insert_prealloc_file_extent(), task B starts relocation of block group X; 4) Task B enters btrfs_relocate_block_group() and it sets block group X to RO mode; 5) Task B enters relocate_block_group(), it calls prepare_to_relocate() whichs joins/starts a transaction and then commits the transaction; 6) Task B then starts scanning the extent tree looking for extents that belong to block group X - it does not find yet the extent reserved by task A, since that extent was not yet added to the extent tree, as its delayed reference was not even yet created at this point; 7) The data relocation inode ends up not having the extent reserved by task A associated to it; 8) Task A then starts a transaction through btrfs_replace_file_extents(), inserts a file extent item in the subvolume tree pointing to the reserved extent and creates a delayed reference for it; 9) Task A finishes and returns success to user space; 10) Later on, while relocation is still in progress, the leaf where task A inserted the new file extent item is COWed, so we end up at __btrfs_cow_block(), which calls btrfs_reloc_cow_block(), and that in turn calls relocation.c:replace_file_extents(); 11) At relocation.c:replace_file_extents() we iterate over all the items in the leaf and find the file extent item pointing to the extent that was allocated by task A, and then call relocation.c:get_new_location(), to find the new location for the extent; 12) However relocation.c:get_new_location() fails, returning -ENOENT, because it couldn't find a corresponding file extent item associated with the data relocation inode. This is because the extent was not seen in the extent tree at step 6). The -ENOENT error is propagated to __btrfs_cow_block(), which aborts the transaction. So fix this simply by decrementing the block group's number of reservations after calling insert_prealloc_file_extent(), as relocation waits for that counter to go down to zero before calling prepare_to_relocate() and start looking for extents in the extent tree. This issue only started to happen recently as of commit 8fccebf ("btrfs: fix metadata reservation for fallocate that leads to transaction aborts"), because now we can reserve an extent before starting/joining a transaction, and previously we always did it after that, so relocation ended up waiting for a concurrent fallocate() to finish because before searching for the extents of the block group, it starts/joins a transaction and then commits it (at prepare_to_relocate()), which made it wait for the fallocate task to complete first. Fixes: 8fccebf ("btrfs: fix metadata reservation for fallocate that leads to transaction aborts") Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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With SO_RCVLOWAT, under memory pressure, it is possible to enter a state where: 1. We have not received enough bytes to satisfy SO_RCVLOWAT. 2. We have not entered buffer pressure (see tcp_rmem_pressure()). 3. But, we do not have enough buffer space to accept more packets. In this case, we advertise 0 rwnd (due to #3) but the application does not drain the receive queue (no wakeup because of #1 and #2) so the flow stalls. Modify the heuristic for SO_RCVLOWAT so that, if we are advertising rwnd<=rcv_mss, force a wakeup to prevent a stall. Without this patch, setting tcp_rmem to 6143 and disabling TCP autotune causes a stalled flow. With this patch, no stall occurs. This is with RPC-style traffic with large messages. Fixes: 03f45c8 ("tcp: avoid extra wakeups for SO_RCVLOWAT users") Signed-off-by: Arjun Roy <arjunroy@google.com> Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com> Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201023184709.217614-1-arjunroy.kdev@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Dave reported a problem with my rwsem conversion patch where we got the following lockdep splat: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.9.0-default+ #1297 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ kswapd0/76 is trying to acquire lock: ffff9d5d25df2530 (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x320 [btrfs] but task is already holding lock: ffffffffa40cbba0 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __fs_reclaim_acquire+0x5/0x30 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #4 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x582/0xac0 lock_acquire+0xca/0x430 fs_reclaim_acquire.part.0+0x25/0x30 kmem_cache_alloc+0x30/0x9c0 alloc_inode+0x81/0x90 iget_locked+0xcd/0x1a0 kernfs_get_inode+0x1b/0x130 kernfs_get_tree+0x136/0x210 sysfs_get_tree+0x1a/0x50 vfs_get_tree+0x1d/0xb0 path_mount+0x70f/0xa80 do_mount+0x75/0x90 __x64_sys_mount+0x8e/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #3 (kernfs_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x582/0xac0 lock_acquire+0xca/0x430 __mutex_lock+0xa0/0xaf0 kernfs_add_one+0x23/0x150 kernfs_create_dir_ns+0x58/0x80 sysfs_create_dir_ns+0x70/0xd0 kobject_add_internal+0xbb/0x2d0 kobject_add+0x7a/0xd0 btrfs_sysfs_add_block_group_type+0x141/0x1d0 [btrfs] btrfs_read_block_groups+0x1f1/0x8c0 [btrfs] open_ctree+0x981/0x1108 [btrfs] btrfs_mount_root.cold+0xe/0xb0 [btrfs] legacy_get_tree+0x2d/0x60 vfs_get_tree+0x1d/0xb0 fc_mount+0xe/0x40 vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0x90 btrfs_mount+0x13b/0x3e0 [btrfs] legacy_get_tree+0x2d/0x60 vfs_get_tree+0x1d/0xb0 path_mount+0x70f/0xa80 do_mount+0x75/0x90 __x64_sys_mount+0x8e/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #2 (btrfs-extent-00){++++}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x582/0xac0 lock_acquire+0xca/0x430 down_read_nested+0x45/0x220 __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x35/0x1c0 [btrfs] __btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x3a/0x50 [btrfs] btrfs_search_slot+0x6d4/0xfd0 [btrfs] check_committed_ref+0x69/0x200 [btrfs] btrfs_cross_ref_exist+0x65/0xb0 [btrfs] run_delalloc_nocow+0x446/0x9b0 [btrfs] btrfs_run_delalloc_range+0x61/0x6a0 [btrfs] writepage_delalloc+0xae/0x160 [btrfs] __extent_writepage+0x262/0x420 [btrfs] extent_write_cache_pages+0x2b6/0x510 [btrfs] extent_writepages+0x43/0x90 [btrfs] do_writepages+0x40/0xe0 __writeback_single_inode+0x62/0x610 writeback_sb_inodes+0x20f/0x500 wb_writeback+0xef/0x4a0 wb_do_writeback+0x49/0x2e0 wb_workfn+0x81/0x340 process_one_work+0x233/0x5d0 worker_thread+0x50/0x3b0 kthread+0x137/0x150 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 -> #1 (btrfs-fs-00){++++}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x582/0xac0 lock_acquire+0xca/0x430 down_read_nested+0x45/0x220 __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x35/0x1c0 [btrfs] __btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x3a/0x50 [btrfs] btrfs_search_slot+0x6d4/0xfd0 [btrfs] btrfs_lookup_inode+0x3a/0xc0 [btrfs] __btrfs_update_delayed_inode+0x93/0x2c0 [btrfs] __btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_items+0x7de/0x850 [btrfs] __btrfs_run_delayed_items+0x8e/0x140 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x367/0xbc0 [btrfs] btrfs_mksubvol+0x2db/0x470 [btrfs] btrfs_mksnapshot+0x7b/0xb0 [btrfs] __btrfs_ioctl_snap_create+0x16f/0x1a0 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_v2+0xb0/0xf0 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl+0xd0b/0x2690 [btrfs] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x6f/0xa0 do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #0 (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: check_prev_add+0x91/0xc60 validate_chain+0xa6e/0x2a20 __lock_acquire+0x582/0xac0 lock_acquire+0xca/0x430 __mutex_lock+0xa0/0xaf0 __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x320 [btrfs] btrfs_evict_inode+0x3cc/0x560 [btrfs] evict+0xd6/0x1c0 dispose_list+0x48/0x70 prune_icache_sb+0x54/0x80 super_cache_scan+0x121/0x1a0 do_shrink_slab+0x16d/0x3b0 shrink_slab+0xb1/0x2e0 shrink_node+0x230/0x6a0 balance_pgdat+0x325/0x750 kswapd+0x206/0x4d0 kthread+0x137/0x150 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &delayed_node->mutex --> kernfs_mutex --> fs_reclaim Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(fs_reclaim); lock(kernfs_mutex); lock(fs_reclaim); lock(&delayed_node->mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by kswapd0/76: #0: ffffffffa40cbba0 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __fs_reclaim_acquire+0x5/0x30 #1: ffffffffa40b8b58 (shrinker_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: shrink_slab+0x54/0x2e0 #2: ffff9d5d322390e8 (&type->s_umount_key#26){++++}-{3:3}, at: trylock_super+0x16/0x50 stack backtrace: CPU: 2 PID: 76 Comm: kswapd0 Not tainted 5.9.0-default+ #1297 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-59-gc9ba527-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x77/0x97 check_noncircular+0xff/0x110 ? save_trace+0x50/0x470 check_prev_add+0x91/0xc60 validate_chain+0xa6e/0x2a20 ? save_trace+0x50/0x470 __lock_acquire+0x582/0xac0 lock_acquire+0xca/0x430 ? __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x320 [btrfs] __mutex_lock+0xa0/0xaf0 ? __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x320 [btrfs] ? __lock_acquire+0x582/0xac0 ? __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x320 [btrfs] ? btrfs_evict_inode+0x30b/0x560 [btrfs] ? __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x320 [btrfs] __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x320 [btrfs] btrfs_evict_inode+0x3cc/0x560 [btrfs] evict+0xd6/0x1c0 dispose_list+0x48/0x70 prune_icache_sb+0x54/0x80 super_cache_scan+0x121/0x1a0 do_shrink_slab+0x16d/0x3b0 shrink_slab+0xb1/0x2e0 shrink_node+0x230/0x6a0 balance_pgdat+0x325/0x750 kswapd+0x206/0x4d0 ? finish_wait+0x90/0x90 ? balance_pgdat+0x750/0x750 kthread+0x137/0x150 ? kthread_mod_delayed_work+0xc0/0xc0 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 This happens because we are still holding the path open when we start adding the sysfs files for the block groups, which creates a dependency on fs_reclaim via the tree lock. Fix this by dropping the path before we start doing anything with sysfs. Reported-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.8+ Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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If we fail to find suitable zones for a new readahead extent, we end up leaving a stale pointer in the global readahead extents radix tree (fs_info->reada_tree), which can trigger the following trace later on: [13367.696354] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000b0 [13367.696802] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [13367.697249] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [13367.697721] PGD 0 P4D 0 [13367.698171] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC PTI [13367.698632] CPU: 6 PID: 851214 Comm: btrfs Tainted: G W 5.9.0-rc6-btrfs-next-69 #1 [13367.699100] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [13367.700069] RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x20a/0x3970 [13367.700562] Code: ff 1f 0f b7 c0 48 0f (...) [13367.701609] RSP: 0018:ffffb14448f57790 EFLAGS: 00010046 [13367.702140] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 29b935140c15e8cf RCX: 0000000000000000 [13367.702698] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: ffffffffb3d66bd0 RDI: 0000000000000046 [13367.703240] RBP: ffff8a52ba8ac040 R08: 00000c2866ad9288 R09: 0000000000000001 [13367.703783] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 00000000b66d9b53 R12: ffff8a52ba8ac9b0 [13367.704330] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8a532b6333e8 R15: 0000000000000000 [13367.704880] FS: 00007fe1df6b5700(0000) GS:ffff8a5376600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [13367.705438] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [13367.705995] CR2: 00000000000000b0 CR3: 000000022cca8004 CR4: 00000000003706e0 [13367.706565] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [13367.707127] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [13367.707686] Call Trace: [13367.708246] ? ___slab_alloc+0x395/0x740 [13367.708820] ? reada_add_block+0xae/0xee0 [btrfs] [13367.709383] lock_acquire+0xb1/0x480 [13367.709955] ? reada_add_block+0xe0/0xee0 [btrfs] [13367.710537] ? reada_add_block+0xae/0xee0 [btrfs] [13367.711097] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x5d/0x90 [13367.711659] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x8d2/0x990 [13367.712221] ? lock_acquired+0x33b/0x470 [13367.712784] _raw_spin_lock+0x34/0x80 [13367.713356] ? reada_add_block+0xe0/0xee0 [btrfs] [13367.713966] reada_add_block+0xe0/0xee0 [btrfs] [13367.714529] ? btrfs_root_node+0x15/0x1f0 [btrfs] [13367.715077] btrfs_reada_add+0x117/0x170 [btrfs] [13367.715620] scrub_stripe+0x21e/0x10d0 [btrfs] [13367.716141] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x5/0x10 [13367.716657] ? __lock_acquire+0x41e/0x3970 [13367.717184] ? scrub_chunk+0x60/0x140 [btrfs] [13367.717697] ? find_held_lock+0x32/0x90 [13367.718254] ? scrub_chunk+0x60/0x140 [btrfs] [13367.718773] ? lock_acquired+0x33b/0x470 [13367.719278] ? scrub_chunk+0xcd/0x140 [btrfs] [13367.719786] scrub_chunk+0xcd/0x140 [btrfs] [13367.720291] scrub_enumerate_chunks+0x270/0x5c0 [btrfs] [13367.720787] ? finish_wait+0x90/0x90 [13367.721281] btrfs_scrub_dev+0x1ee/0x620 [btrfs] [13367.721762] ? rcu_read_lock_any_held+0x8e/0xb0 [13367.722235] ? preempt_count_add+0x49/0xa0 [13367.722710] ? __sb_start_write+0x19b/0x290 [13367.723192] btrfs_ioctl+0x7f5/0x36f0 [btrfs] [13367.723660] ? __fget_files+0x101/0x1d0 [13367.724118] ? find_held_lock+0x32/0x90 [13367.724559] ? __fget_files+0x101/0x1d0 [13367.724982] ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0 [13367.725399] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0 [13367.725802] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 [13367.726188] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [13367.726574] RIP: 0033:0x7fe1df7add87 [13367.726948] Code: 00 00 00 48 8b 05 09 91 (...) [13367.727763] RSP: 002b:00007fe1df6b4d48 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 [13367.728179] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055ce1fb596a0 RCX: 00007fe1df7add87 [13367.728604] RDX: 000055ce1fb596a0 RSI: 00000000c400941b RDI: 0000000000000003 [13367.729021] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 00007fe1df6b5700 R09: 0000000000000000 [13367.729431] R10: 00007fe1df6b5700 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffd922b07de [13367.729842] R13: 00007ffd922b07df R14: 00007fe1df6b4e40 R15: 0000000000802000 [13367.730275] Modules linked in: btrfs blake2b_generic xor (...) [13367.732638] CR2: 00000000000000b0 [13367.733166] ---[ end trace d298b6805556acd9 ]--- What happens is the following: 1) At reada_find_extent() we don't find any existing readahead extent for the metadata extent starting at logical address X; 2) So we proceed to create a new one. We then call btrfs_map_block() to get information about which stripes contain extent X; 3) After that we iterate over the stripes and create only one zone for the readahead extent - only one because reada_find_zone() returned NULL for all iterations except for one, either because a memory allocation failed or it couldn't find the block group of the extent (it may have just been deleted); 4) We then add the new readahead extent to the readahead extents radix tree at fs_info->reada_tree; 5) Then we iterate over each zone of the new readahead extent, and find that the device used for that zone no longer exists, because it was removed or it was the source device of a device replace operation. Since this left 'have_zone' set to 0, after finishing the loop we jump to the 'error' label, call kfree() on the new readahead extent and return without removing it from the radix tree at fs_info->reada_tree; 6) Any future call to reada_find_extent() for the logical address X will find the stale pointer in the readahead extents radix tree, increment its reference counter, which can trigger the use-after-free right away or return it to the caller reada_add_block() that results in the use-after-free of the example trace above. So fix this by making sure we delete the readahead extent from the radix tree if we fail to setup zones for it (when 'have_zone = 0'). Fixes: 3194502 ("btrfs: reada: bypass adding extent when all zone failed") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9+ Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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Very sporadically I had test case btrfs/069 from fstests hanging (for years, it is not a recent regression), with the following traces in dmesg/syslog: [162301.160628] BTRFS info (device sdc): dev_replace from /dev/sdd (devid 2) to /dev/sdg started [162301.181196] BTRFS info (device sdc): scrub: finished on devid 4 with status: 0 [162301.287162] BTRFS info (device sdc): dev_replace from /dev/sdd (devid 2) to /dev/sdg finished [162513.513792] INFO: task btrfs-transacti:1356167 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [162513.514318] Not tainted 5.9.0-rc6-btrfs-next-69 #1 [162513.514522] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [162513.514747] task:btrfs-transacti state:D stack: 0 pid:1356167 ppid: 2 flags:0x00004000 [162513.514751] Call Trace: [162513.514761] __schedule+0x5ce/0xd00 [162513.514765] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3c/0x60 [162513.514771] schedule+0x46/0xf0 [162513.514844] wait_current_trans+0xde/0x140 [btrfs] [162513.514850] ? finish_wait+0x90/0x90 [162513.514864] start_transaction+0x37c/0x5f0 [btrfs] [162513.514879] transaction_kthread+0xa4/0x170 [btrfs] [162513.514891] ? btrfs_cleanup_transaction+0x660/0x660 [btrfs] [162513.514894] kthread+0x153/0x170 [162513.514897] ? kthread_stop+0x2c0/0x2c0 [162513.514902] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [162513.514916] INFO: task fsstress:1356184 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [162513.515192] Not tainted 5.9.0-rc6-btrfs-next-69 #1 [162513.515431] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [162513.515680] task:fsstress state:D stack: 0 pid:1356184 ppid:1356177 flags:0x00004000 [162513.515682] Call Trace: [162513.515688] __schedule+0x5ce/0xd00 [162513.515691] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3c/0x60 [162513.515697] schedule+0x46/0xf0 [162513.515712] wait_current_trans+0xde/0x140 [btrfs] [162513.515716] ? finish_wait+0x90/0x90 [162513.515729] start_transaction+0x37c/0x5f0 [btrfs] [162513.515743] btrfs_attach_transaction_barrier+0x1f/0x50 [btrfs] [162513.515753] btrfs_sync_fs+0x61/0x1c0 [btrfs] [162513.515758] ? __ia32_sys_fdatasync+0x20/0x20 [162513.515761] iterate_supers+0x87/0xf0 [162513.515765] ksys_sync+0x60/0xb0 [162513.515768] __do_sys_sync+0xa/0x10 [162513.515771] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 [162513.515774] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [162513.515781] RIP: 0033:0x7f5238f50bd7 [162513.515782] Code: Bad RIP value. [162513.515784] RSP: 002b:00007fff67b978e8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a2 [162513.515786] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055b1fad2c560 RCX: 00007f5238f50bd7 [162513.515788] RDX: 00000000ffffffff RSI: 000000000daf0e74 RDI: 000000000000003a [162513.515789] RBP: 0000000000000032 R08: 000000000000000a R09: 00007f5239019be0 [162513.515791] R10: fffffffffffff24f R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 000000000000003a [162513.515792] R13: 00007fff67b97950 R14: 00007fff67b97906 R15: 000055b1fad1a340 [162513.515804] INFO: task fsstress:1356185 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [162513.516064] Not tainted 5.9.0-rc6-btrfs-next-69 #1 [162513.516329] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [162513.516617] task:fsstress state:D stack: 0 pid:1356185 ppid:1356177 flags:0x00000000 [162513.516620] Call Trace: [162513.516625] __schedule+0x5ce/0xd00 [162513.516628] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3c/0x60 [162513.516634] schedule+0x46/0xf0 [162513.516647] wait_current_trans+0xde/0x140 [btrfs] [162513.516650] ? finish_wait+0x90/0x90 [162513.516662] start_transaction+0x4d7/0x5f0 [btrfs] [162513.516679] btrfs_setxattr_trans+0x3c/0x100 [btrfs] [162513.516686] __vfs_setxattr+0x66/0x80 [162513.516691] __vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x70/0x200 [162513.516697] vfs_setxattr+0x6b/0x120 [162513.516703] setxattr+0x125/0x240 [162513.516709] ? lock_acquire+0xb1/0x480 [162513.516712] ? mnt_want_write+0x20/0x50 [162513.516721] ? rcu_read_lock_any_held+0x8e/0xb0 [162513.516723] ? preempt_count_add+0x49/0xa0 [162513.516725] ? __sb_start_write+0x19b/0x290 [162513.516727] ? preempt_count_add+0x49/0xa0 [162513.516732] path_setxattr+0xba/0xd0 [162513.516739] __x64_sys_setxattr+0x27/0x30 [162513.516741] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 [162513.516743] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [162513.516745] RIP: 0033:0x7f5238f56d5a [162513.516746] Code: Bad RIP value. [162513.516748] RSP: 002b:00007fff67b97868 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000bc [162513.516750] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 00007f5238f56d5a [162513.516751] RDX: 000055b1fbb0d5a0 RSI: 00007fff67b978a0 RDI: 000055b1fbb0d470 [162513.516753] RBP: 000055b1fbb0d5a0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00007fff67b97700 [162513.516754] R10: 0000000000000004 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000004 [162513.516756] R13: 0000000000000024 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 00007fff67b978a0 [162513.516767] INFO: task fsstress:1356196 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [162513.517064] Not tainted 5.9.0-rc6-btrfs-next-69 #1 [162513.517365] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [162513.517763] task:fsstress state:D stack: 0 pid:1356196 ppid:1356177 flags:0x00004000 [162513.517780] Call Trace: [162513.517786] __schedule+0x5ce/0xd00 [162513.517789] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3c/0x60 [162513.517796] schedule+0x46/0xf0 [162513.517810] wait_current_trans+0xde/0x140 [btrfs] [162513.517814] ? finish_wait+0x90/0x90 [162513.517829] start_transaction+0x37c/0x5f0 [btrfs] [162513.517845] btrfs_attach_transaction_barrier+0x1f/0x50 [btrfs] [162513.517857] btrfs_sync_fs+0x61/0x1c0 [btrfs] [162513.517862] ? __ia32_sys_fdatasync+0x20/0x20 [162513.517865] iterate_supers+0x87/0xf0 [162513.517869] ksys_sync+0x60/0xb0 [162513.517872] __do_sys_sync+0xa/0x10 [162513.517875] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 [162513.517878] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [162513.517881] RIP: 0033:0x7f5238f50bd7 [162513.517883] Code: Bad RIP value. [162513.517885] RSP: 002b:00007fff67b978e8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a2 [162513.517887] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055b1fad2c560 RCX: 00007f5238f50bd7 [162513.517889] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000007660add2 RDI: 0000000000000053 [162513.517891] RBP: 0000000000000032 R08: 0000000000000067 R09: 00007f5239019be0 [162513.517893] R10: fffffffffffff24f R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000000053 [162513.517895] R13: 00007fff67b97950 R14: 00007fff67b97906 R15: 000055b1fad1a340 [162513.517908] INFO: task fsstress:1356197 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [162513.518298] Not tainted 5.9.0-rc6-btrfs-next-69 #1 [162513.518672] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [162513.519157] task:fsstress state:D stack: 0 pid:1356197 ppid:1356177 flags:0x00000000 [162513.519160] Call Trace: [162513.519165] __schedule+0x5ce/0xd00 [162513.519168] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3c/0x60 [162513.519174] schedule+0x46/0xf0 [162513.519190] wait_current_trans+0xde/0x140 [btrfs] [162513.519193] ? finish_wait+0x90/0x90 [162513.519206] start_transaction+0x4d7/0x5f0 [btrfs] [162513.519222] btrfs_create+0x57/0x200 [btrfs] [162513.519230] lookup_open+0x522/0x650 [162513.519246] path_openat+0x2b8/0xa50 [162513.519270] do_filp_open+0x91/0x100 [162513.519275] ? find_held_lock+0x32/0x90 [162513.519280] ? lock_acquired+0x33b/0x470 [162513.519285] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x4b/0xc0 [162513.519287] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x29/0x40 [162513.519295] do_sys_openat2+0x20d/0x2d0 [162513.519300] do_sys_open+0x44/0x80 [162513.519304] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 [162513.519307] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [162513.519309] RIP: 0033:0x7f5238f4a903 [162513.519310] Code: Bad RIP value. [162513.519312] RSP: 002b:00007fff67b97758 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000055 [162513.519314] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000ffffffff RCX: 00007f5238f4a903 [162513.519316] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000000001b6 RDI: 000055b1fbb0d470 [162513.519317] RBP: 00007fff67b978c0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000002 [162513.519319] R10: 00007fff67b974f7 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000013 [162513.519320] R13: 00000000000001b6 R14: 00007fff67b97906 R15: 000055b1fad1c620 [162513.519332] INFO: task btrfs:1356211 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [162513.519727] Not tainted 5.9.0-rc6-btrfs-next-69 #1 [162513.520115] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [162513.520508] task:btrfs state:D stack: 0 pid:1356211 ppid:1356178 flags:0x00004002 [162513.520511] Call Trace: [162513.520516] __schedule+0x5ce/0xd00 [162513.520519] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3c/0x60 [162513.520525] schedule+0x46/0xf0 [162513.520544] btrfs_scrub_pause+0x11f/0x180 [btrfs] [162513.520548] ? finish_wait+0x90/0x90 [162513.520562] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x45a/0xc30 [btrfs] [162513.520574] ? start_transaction+0xe0/0x5f0 [btrfs] [162513.520596] btrfs_dev_replace_finishing+0x6d8/0x711 [btrfs] [162513.520619] btrfs_dev_replace_by_ioctl.cold+0x1cc/0x1fd [btrfs] [162513.520639] btrfs_ioctl+0x2a25/0x36f0 [btrfs] [162513.520643] ? do_sigaction+0xf3/0x240 [162513.520645] ? find_held_lock+0x32/0x90 [162513.520648] ? do_sigaction+0xf3/0x240 [162513.520651] ? lock_acquired+0x33b/0x470 [162513.520655] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x50 [162513.520657] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7d/0x100 [162513.520660] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x35/0x50 [162513.520662] ? do_sigaction+0xf3/0x240 [162513.520671] ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0 [162513.520672] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0 [162513.520677] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 [162513.520679] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [162513.520681] RIP: 0033:0x7fc3cd307d87 [162513.520682] Code: Bad RIP value. [162513.520684] RSP: 002b:00007ffe30a56bb8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 [162513.520686] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 00007fc3cd307d87 [162513.520687] RDX: 00007ffe30a57a30 RSI: 00000000ca289435 RDI: 0000000000000003 [162513.520689] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [162513.520690] R10: 0000000000000008 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000003 [162513.520692] R13: 0000557323a212e0 R14: 00007ffe30a5a520 R15: 0000000000000001 [162513.520703] Showing all locks held in the system: [162513.520712] 1 lock held by khungtaskd/54: [162513.520713] #0: ffffffffb40a91a0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x15/0x197 [162513.520728] 1 lock held by in:imklog/596: [162513.520729] #0: ffff8f3f0d781400 (&f->f_pos_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __fdget_pos+0x4d/0x60 [162513.520782] 1 lock held by btrfs-transacti/1356167: [162513.520784] #0: ffff8f3d810cc848 (&fs_info->transaction_kthread_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: transaction_kthread+0x4a/0x170 [btrfs] [162513.520798] 1 lock held by btrfs/1356190: [162513.520800] #0: ffff8f3d57644470 (sb_writers#15){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: mnt_want_write_file+0x22/0x60 [162513.520805] 1 lock held by fsstress/1356184: [162513.520806] #0: ffff8f3d576440e8 (&type->s_umount_key#62){++++}-{3:3}, at: iterate_supers+0x6f/0xf0 [162513.520811] 3 locks held by fsstress/1356185: [162513.520812] #0: ffff8f3d57644470 (sb_writers#15){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: mnt_want_write+0x20/0x50 [162513.520815] #1: ffff8f3d80a650b8 (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#10){++++}-{3:3}, at: vfs_setxattr+0x50/0x120 [162513.520820] #2: ffff8f3d57644690 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: start_transaction+0x40e/0x5f0 [btrfs] [162513.520833] 1 lock held by fsstress/1356196: [162513.520834] #0: ffff8f3d576440e8 (&type->s_umount_key#62){++++}-{3:3}, at: iterate_supers+0x6f/0xf0 [162513.520838] 3 locks held by fsstress/1356197: [162513.520839] #0: ffff8f3d57644470 (sb_writers#15){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: mnt_want_write+0x20/0x50 [162513.520843] #1: ffff8f3d506465e8 (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#10){++++}-{3:3}, at: path_openat+0x2a7/0xa50 [162513.520846] #2: ffff8f3d57644690 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: start_transaction+0x40e/0x5f0 [btrfs] [162513.520858] 2 locks held by btrfs/1356211: [162513.520859] #0: ffff8f3d810cde30 (&fs_info->dev_replace.lock_finishing_cancel_unmount){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_dev_replace_finishing+0x52/0x711 [btrfs] [162513.520877] #1: ffff8f3d57644690 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: start_transaction+0x40e/0x5f0 [btrfs] This was weird because the stack traces show that a transaction commit, triggered by a device replace operation, is blocking trying to pause any running scrubs but there are no stack traces of blocked tasks doing a scrub. After poking around with drgn, I noticed there was a scrub task that was constantly running and blocking for shorts periods of time: >>> t = find_task(prog, 1356190) >>> prog.stack_trace(t) #0 __schedule+0x5ce/0xcfc #1 schedule+0x46/0xe4 #2 schedule_timeout+0x1df/0x475 #3 btrfs_reada_wait+0xda/0x132 #4 scrub_stripe+0x2a8/0x112f #5 scrub_chunk+0xcd/0x134 #6 scrub_enumerate_chunks+0x29e/0x5ee #7 btrfs_scrub_dev+0x2d5/0x91b #8 btrfs_ioctl+0x7f5/0x36e7 #9 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0 #10 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x77 #11 entry_SYSCALL_64+0x7c/0x156 Which corresponds to: int btrfs_reada_wait(void *handle) { struct reada_control *rc = handle; struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info = rc->fs_info; while (atomic_read(&rc->elems)) { if (!atomic_read(&fs_info->reada_works_cnt)) reada_start_machine(fs_info); wait_event_timeout(rc->wait, atomic_read(&rc->elems) == 0, (HZ + 9) / 10); } (...) So the counter "rc->elems" was set to 1 and never decreased to 0, causing the scrub task to loop forever in that function. Then I used the following script for drgn to check the readahead requests: $ cat dump_reada.py import sys import drgn from drgn import NULL, Object, cast, container_of, execscript, \ reinterpret, sizeof from drgn.helpers.linux import * mnt_path = b"/home/fdmanana/btrfs-tests/scratch_1" mnt = None for mnt in for_each_mount(prog, dst = mnt_path): pass if mnt is None: sys.stderr.write(f'Error: mount point {mnt_path} not found\n') sys.exit(1) fs_info = cast('struct btrfs_fs_info *', mnt.mnt.mnt_sb.s_fs_info) def dump_re(re): nzones = re.nzones.value_() print(f're at {hex(re.value_())}') print(f'\t logical {re.logical.value_()}') print(f'\t refcnt {re.refcnt.value_()}') print(f'\t nzones {nzones}') for i in range(nzones): dev = re.zones[i].device name = dev.name.str.string_() print(f'\t\t dev id {dev.devid.value_()} name {name}') print() for _, e in radix_tree_for_each(fs_info.reada_tree): re = cast('struct reada_extent *', e) dump_re(re) $ drgn dump_reada.py re at 0xffff8f3da9d25ad8 logical 38928384 refcnt 1 nzones 1 dev id 0 name b'/dev/sdd' $ So there was one readahead extent with a single zone corresponding to the source device of that last device replace operation logged in dmesg/syslog. Also the ID of that zone's device was 0 which is a special value set in the source device of a device replace operation when the operation finishes (constant BTRFS_DEV_REPLACE_DEVID set at btrfs_dev_replace_finishing()), confirming again that device /dev/sdd was the source of a device replace operation. Normally there should be as many zones in the readahead extent as there are devices, and I wasn't expecting the extent to be in a block group with a 'single' profile, so I went and confirmed with the following drgn script that there weren't any single profile block groups: $ cat dump_block_groups.py import sys import drgn from drgn import NULL, Object, cast, container_of, execscript, \ reinterpret, sizeof from drgn.helpers.linux import * mnt_path = b"/home/fdmanana/btrfs-tests/scratch_1" mnt = None for mnt in for_each_mount(prog, dst = mnt_path): pass if mnt is None: sys.stderr.write(f'Error: mount point {mnt_path} not found\n') sys.exit(1) fs_info = cast('struct btrfs_fs_info *', mnt.mnt.mnt_sb.s_fs_info) BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_DATA = (1 << 0) BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_SYSTEM = (1 << 1) BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_METADATA = (1 << 2) BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_RAID0 = (1 << 3) BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_RAID1 = (1 << 4) BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_DUP = (1 << 5) BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_RAID10 = (1 << 6) BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_RAID5 = (1 << 7) BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_RAID6 = (1 << 8) BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_RAID1C3 = (1 << 9) BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_RAID1C4 = (1 << 10) def bg_flags_string(bg): flags = bg.flags.value_() ret = '' if flags & BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_DATA: ret = 'data' if flags & BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_METADATA: if len(ret) > 0: ret += '|' ret += 'meta' if flags & BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_SYSTEM: if len(ret) > 0: ret += '|' ret += 'system' if flags & BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_RAID0: ret += ' raid0' elif flags & BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_RAID1: ret += ' raid1' elif flags & BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_DUP: ret += ' dup' elif flags & BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_RAID10: ret += ' raid10' elif flags & BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_RAID5: ret += ' raid5' elif flags & BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_RAID6: ret += ' raid6' elif flags & BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_RAID1C3: ret += ' raid1c3' elif flags & BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_RAID1C4: ret += ' raid1c4' else: ret += ' single' return ret def dump_bg(bg): print() print(f'block group at {hex(bg.value_())}') print(f'\t start {bg.start.value_()} length {bg.length.value_()}') print(f'\t flags {bg.flags.value_()} - {bg_flags_string(bg)}') bg_root = fs_info.block_group_cache_tree.address_of_() for bg in rbtree_inorder_for_each_entry('struct btrfs_block_group', bg_root, 'cache_node'): dump_bg(bg) $ drgn dump_block_groups.py block group at 0xffff8f3d673b0400 start 22020096 length 16777216 flags 258 - system raid6 block group at 0xffff8f3d53ddb400 start 38797312 length 536870912 flags 260 - meta raid6 block group at 0xffff8f3d5f4d9c00 start 575668224 length 2147483648 flags 257 - data raid6 block group at 0xffff8f3d08189000 start 2723151872 length 67108864 flags 258 - system raid6 block group at 0xffff8f3db70ff000 start 2790260736 length 1073741824 flags 260 - meta raid6 block group at 0xffff8f3d5f4dd800 start 3864002560 length 67108864 flags 258 - system raid6 block group at 0xffff8f3d67037000 start 3931111424 length 2147483648 flags 257 - data raid6 $ So there were only 2 reasons left for having a readahead extent with a single zone: reada_find_zone(), called when creating a readahead extent, returned NULL either because we failed to find the corresponding block group or because a memory allocation failed. With some additional and custom tracing I figured out that on every further ocurrence of the problem the block group had just been deleted when we were looping to create the zones for the readahead extent (at reada_find_extent()), so we ended up with only one zone in the readahead extent, corresponding to a device that ends up getting replaced. So after figuring that out it became obvious why the hang happens: 1) Task A starts a scrub on any device of the filesystem, except for device /dev/sdd; 2) Task B starts a device replace with /dev/sdd as the source device; 3) Task A calls btrfs_reada_add() from scrub_stripe() and it is currently starting to scrub a stripe from block group X. This call to btrfs_reada_add() is the one for the extent tree. When btrfs_reada_add() calls reada_add_block(), it passes the logical address of the extent tree's root node as its 'logical' argument - a value of 38928384; 4) Task A then enters reada_find_extent(), called from reada_add_block(). It finds there isn't any existing readahead extent for the logical address 38928384, so it proceeds to the path of creating a new one. It calls btrfs_map_block() to find out which stripes exist for the block group X. On the first iteration of the for loop that iterates over the stripes, it finds the stripe for device /dev/sdd, so it creates one zone for that device and adds it to the readahead extent. Before getting into the second iteration of the loop, the cleanup kthread deletes block group X because it was empty. So in the iterations for the remaining stripes it does not add more zones to the readahead extent, because the calls to reada_find_zone() returned NULL because they couldn't find block group X anymore. As a result the new readahead extent has a single zone, corresponding to the device /dev/sdd; 4) Before task A returns to btrfs_reada_add() and queues the readahead job for the readahead work queue, task B finishes the device replace and at btrfs_dev_replace_finishing() swaps the device /dev/sdd with the new device /dev/sdg; 5) Task A returns to reada_add_block(), which increments the counter "->elems" of the reada_control structure allocated at btrfs_reada_add(). Then it returns back to btrfs_reada_add() and calls reada_start_machine(). This queues a job in the readahead work queue to run the function reada_start_machine_worker(), which calls __reada_start_machine(). At __reada_start_machine() we take the device list mutex and for each device found in the current device list, we call reada_start_machine_dev() to start the readahead work. However at this point the device /dev/sdd was already freed and is not in the device list anymore. This means the corresponding readahead for the extent at 38928384 is never started, and therefore the "->elems" counter of the reada_control structure allocated at btrfs_reada_add() never goes down to 0, causing the call to btrfs_reada_wait(), done by the scrub task, to wait forever. Note that the readahead request can be made either after the device replace started or before it started, however in pratice it is very unlikely that a device replace is able to start after a readahead request is made and is able to complete before the readahead request completes - maybe only on a very small and nearly empty filesystem. This hang however is not the only problem we can have with readahead and device removals. When the readahead extent has other zones other than the one corresponding to the device that is being removed (either by a device replace or a device remove operation), we risk having a use-after-free on the device when dropping the last reference of the readahead extent. For example if we create a readahead extent with two zones, one for the device /dev/sdd and one for the device /dev/sde: 1) Before the readahead worker starts, the device /dev/sdd is removed, and the corresponding btrfs_device structure is freed. However the readahead extent still has the zone pointing to the device structure; 2) When the readahead worker starts, it only finds device /dev/sde in the current device list of the filesystem; 3) It starts the readahead work, at reada_start_machine_dev(), using the device /dev/sde; 4) Then when it finishes reading the extent from device /dev/sde, it calls __readahead_hook() which ends up dropping the last reference on the readahead extent through the last call to reada_extent_put(); 5) At reada_extent_put() it iterates over each zone of the readahead extent and attempts to delete an element from the device's 'reada_extents' radix tree, resulting in a use-after-free, as the device pointer of the zone for /dev/sdd is now stale. We can also access the device after dropping the last reference of a zone, through reada_zone_release(), also called by reada_extent_put(). And a device remove suffers the same problem, however since it shrinks the device size down to zero before removing the device, it is very unlikely to still have readahead requests not completed by the time we free the device, the only possibility is if the device has a very little space allocated. While the hang problem is exclusive to scrub, since it is currently the only user of btrfs_reada_add() and btrfs_reada_wait(), the use-after-free problem affects any path that triggers readhead, which includes btree_readahead_hook() and __readahead_hook() (a readahead worker can trigger readahed for the children of a node) for example - any path that ends up calling reada_add_block() can trigger the use-after-free after a device is removed. So fix this by waiting for any readahead requests for a device to complete before removing a device, ensuring that while waiting for existing ones no new ones can be made. This problem has been around for a very long time - the readahead code was added in 2011, device remove exists since 2008 and device replace was introduced in 2013, hard to pick a specific commit for a git Fixes tag. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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When enabling qgroups we walk the tree_root and then add a qgroup item for every root that we have. This creates a lock dependency on the tree_root and qgroup_root, which results in the following lockdep splat (with tree locks using rwsem), eg. in tests btrfs/017 or btrfs/022: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.9.0-default+ #1299 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ btrfs/24552 is trying to acquire lock: ffff9142dfc5f630 (btrfs-quota-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x35/0x1c0 [btrfs] but task is already holding lock: ffff9142dfc5d0b0 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x35/0x1c0 [btrfs] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x3fb/0x730 lock_acquire.part.0+0x6a/0x130 down_read_nested+0x46/0x130 __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x35/0x1c0 [btrfs] __btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x3a/0x50 [btrfs] btrfs_search_slot_get_root+0x11d/0x290 [btrfs] btrfs_search_slot+0xc3/0x9f0 [btrfs] btrfs_insert_item+0x6e/0x140 [btrfs] btrfs_create_tree+0x1cb/0x240 [btrfs] btrfs_quota_enable+0xcd/0x790 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl_quota_ctl+0xc9/0xe0 [btrfs] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xa0 do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #0 (btrfs-quota-00){++++}-{3:3}: check_prev_add+0x91/0xc30 validate_chain+0x491/0x750 __lock_acquire+0x3fb/0x730 lock_acquire.part.0+0x6a/0x130 down_read_nested+0x46/0x130 __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x35/0x1c0 [btrfs] __btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x3a/0x50 [btrfs] btrfs_search_slot_get_root+0x11d/0x290 [btrfs] btrfs_search_slot+0xc3/0x9f0 [btrfs] btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x58/0xa0 [btrfs] add_qgroup_item.part.0+0x72/0x210 [btrfs] btrfs_quota_enable+0x3bb/0x790 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl_quota_ctl+0xc9/0xe0 [btrfs] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xa0 do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(btrfs-root-00); lock(btrfs-quota-00); lock(btrfs-root-00); lock(btrfs-quota-00); *** DEADLOCK *** 5 locks held by btrfs/24552: #0: ffff9142df431478 (sb_writers#10){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: mnt_want_write_file+0x22/0xa0 #1: ffff9142f9b10cc0 (&fs_info->subvol_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_ioctl_quota_ctl+0x7b/0xe0 [btrfs] #2: ffff9142f9b11a08 (&fs_info->qgroup_ioctl_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_quota_enable+0x3b/0x790 [btrfs] #3: ffff9142df431698 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: start_transaction+0x406/0x510 [btrfs] #4: ffff9142dfc5d0b0 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x35/0x1c0 [btrfs] stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 24552 Comm: btrfs Not tainted 5.9.0-default+ #1299 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-59-gc9ba527-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x77/0x97 check_noncircular+0xf3/0x110 check_prev_add+0x91/0xc30 validate_chain+0x491/0x750 __lock_acquire+0x3fb/0x730 lock_acquire.part.0+0x6a/0x130 ? __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x35/0x1c0 [btrfs] ? lock_acquire+0xc4/0x140 ? __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x35/0x1c0 [btrfs] down_read_nested+0x46/0x130 ? __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x35/0x1c0 [btrfs] __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x35/0x1c0 [btrfs] ? btrfs_root_node+0xd9/0x200 [btrfs] __btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x3a/0x50 [btrfs] btrfs_search_slot_get_root+0x11d/0x290 [btrfs] btrfs_search_slot+0xc3/0x9f0 [btrfs] btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x58/0xa0 [btrfs] add_qgroup_item.part.0+0x72/0x210 [btrfs] btrfs_quota_enable+0x3bb/0x790 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl_quota_ctl+0xc9/0xe0 [btrfs] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xa0 do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Fix this by dropping the path whenever we find a root item, add the qgroup item, and then re-lookup the root item we found and continue processing roots. Reported-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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I got the following lockdep splat with tree locks converted to rwsem patches on btrfs/104: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.9.0+ #102 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ btrfs-cleaner/903 is trying to acquire lock: ffff8e7fab6ffe30 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x32/0x170 but task is already holding lock: ffff8e7fab628a88 (&fs_info->commit_root_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_find_all_roots+0x41/0x80 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #3 (&fs_info->commit_root_sem){++++}-{3:3}: down_read+0x40/0x130 caching_thread+0x53/0x5a0 btrfs_work_helper+0xfa/0x520 process_one_work+0x238/0x540 worker_thread+0x55/0x3c0 kthread+0x13a/0x150 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 -> #2 (&caching_ctl->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x7e/0x7b0 btrfs_cache_block_group+0x1e0/0x510 find_free_extent+0xb6e/0x12f0 btrfs_reserve_extent+0xb3/0x1b0 btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0xb1/0x330 alloc_tree_block_no_bg_flush+0x4f/0x60 __btrfs_cow_block+0x11d/0x580 btrfs_cow_block+0x10c/0x220 commit_cowonly_roots+0x47/0x2e0 btrfs_commit_transaction+0x595/0xbd0 sync_filesystem+0x74/0x90 generic_shutdown_super+0x22/0x100 kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 deactivate_locked_super+0x36/0xa0 cleanup_mnt+0x12d/0x190 task_work_run+0x5c/0xa0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1df/0x200 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x54/0x280 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #1 (&space_info->groups_sem){++++}-{3:3}: down_read+0x40/0x130 find_free_extent+0x2ed/0x12f0 btrfs_reserve_extent+0xb3/0x1b0 btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0xb1/0x330 alloc_tree_block_no_bg_flush+0x4f/0x60 __btrfs_cow_block+0x11d/0x580 btrfs_cow_block+0x10c/0x220 commit_cowonly_roots+0x47/0x2e0 btrfs_commit_transaction+0x595/0xbd0 sync_filesystem+0x74/0x90 generic_shutdown_super+0x22/0x100 kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 deactivate_locked_super+0x36/0xa0 cleanup_mnt+0x12d/0x190 task_work_run+0x5c/0xa0 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1df/0x200 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x54/0x280 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #0 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x1167/0x2150 lock_acquire+0xb9/0x3d0 down_read_nested+0x43/0x130 __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x32/0x170 __btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x3a/0x50 btrfs_search_slot+0x614/0x9d0 btrfs_find_root+0x35/0x1b0 btrfs_read_tree_root+0x61/0x120 btrfs_get_root_ref+0x14b/0x600 find_parent_nodes+0x3e6/0x1b30 btrfs_find_all_roots_safe+0xb4/0x130 btrfs_find_all_roots+0x60/0x80 btrfs_qgroup_trace_extent_post+0x27/0x40 btrfs_add_delayed_data_ref+0x3fd/0x460 btrfs_free_extent+0x42/0x100 __btrfs_mod_ref+0x1d7/0x2f0 walk_up_proc+0x11c/0x400 walk_up_tree+0xf0/0x180 btrfs_drop_snapshot+0x1c7/0x780 btrfs_clean_one_deleted_snapshot+0xfb/0x110 cleaner_kthread+0xd4/0x140 kthread+0x13a/0x150 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: btrfs-root-00 --> &caching_ctl->mutex --> &fs_info->commit_root_sem Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&fs_info->commit_root_sem); lock(&caching_ctl->mutex); lock(&fs_info->commit_root_sem); lock(btrfs-root-00); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by btrfs-cleaner/903: #0: ffff8e7fab628838 (&fs_info->cleaner_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cleaner_kthread+0x6e/0x140 #1: ffff8e7faadac640 (sb_internal){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: start_transaction+0x40b/0x5c0 #2: ffff8e7fab628a88 (&fs_info->commit_root_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_find_all_roots+0x41/0x80 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 903 Comm: btrfs-cleaner Not tainted 5.9.0+ #102 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x8b/0xb0 check_noncircular+0xcf/0xf0 __lock_acquire+0x1167/0x2150 ? __bfs+0x42/0x210 lock_acquire+0xb9/0x3d0 ? __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x32/0x170 down_read_nested+0x43/0x130 ? __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x32/0x170 __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x32/0x170 __btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x3a/0x50 btrfs_search_slot+0x614/0x9d0 ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 btrfs_find_root+0x35/0x1b0 ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x4b/0xa0 btrfs_read_tree_root+0x61/0x120 btrfs_get_root_ref+0x14b/0x600 find_parent_nodes+0x3e6/0x1b30 btrfs_find_all_roots_safe+0xb4/0x130 btrfs_find_all_roots+0x60/0x80 btrfs_qgroup_trace_extent_post+0x27/0x40 btrfs_add_delayed_data_ref+0x3fd/0x460 btrfs_free_extent+0x42/0x100 __btrfs_mod_ref+0x1d7/0x2f0 walk_up_proc+0x11c/0x400 walk_up_tree+0xf0/0x180 btrfs_drop_snapshot+0x1c7/0x780 ? btrfs_clean_one_deleted_snapshot+0x73/0x110 btrfs_clean_one_deleted_snapshot+0xfb/0x110 cleaner_kthread+0xd4/0x140 ? btrfs_alloc_root+0x50/0x50 kthread+0x13a/0x150 ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x40/0x40 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 BTRFS info (device sdb): disk space caching is enabled BTRFS info (device sdb): has skinny extents This happens because qgroups does a backref lookup when we create a delayed ref. From here it may have to look up a root from an indirect ref, which does a normal lookup on the tree_root, which takes the read lock on the tree_root nodes. To fix this we need to add a variant for looking up roots that searches the commit root of the tree_root. Then when we do the backref search using the commit root we are sure to not take any locks on the tree_root nodes. This gets rid of the lockdep splat when running btrfs/104. Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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Ido Schimmel says: ==================== mlxsw: Various fixes This patch set contains various fixes for mlxsw. Patch #1 ensures that only link modes that are supported by both the device and the driver are advertised. When a link mode that is not supported by the driver is negotiated by the device, it will be presented as an unknown speed by ethtool, causing the bond driver to wrongly assume that the link is down. Patch #2 fixes a trivial memory leak upon module removal. Patch #3 fixes a use-after-free that syzkaller was able to trigger once on a slow emulator after a few months of fuzzing. ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201024133733.2107509-1-idosch@idosch.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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bnxt_open_nic() is called during configuration changes that require the NIC to be closed and then opened. This call is protected by rtnl_lock. Firmware reset can be happening at the same time. Only critical portions of the entire firmware reset sequence are protected by the rtnl_lock. It is possible that bnxt_open_nic() can be called when the firmware reset sequence is aborting. In that case, bnxt_open_nic() needs to check if the ABORT_ERR flag is set and abort if it is. The configuration change that resulted in the bnxt_open_nic() call will fail but the NIC will be brought to a consistent IF_DOWN state. Without this patch, if bnxt_open_nic() were to continue in this error state, it may crash like this: [ 1648.659736] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) [ 1648.659768] IP: [<ffffffffc01e9b3a>] bnxt_alloc_mem+0x50a/0x1140 [bnxt_en] [ 1648.659796] PGD 101e1b3067 PUD 101e1b2067 PMD 0 [ 1648.659813] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 1648.659825] Modules linked in: xt_CHECKSUM iptable_mangle ipt_MASQUERADE nf_nat_masquerade_ipv4 iptable_nat nf_nat_ipv4 nf_nat nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_conntrack nf_conntrack ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 tun bridge stp llc ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_filter sunrpc dell_smbios dell_wmi_descriptor dcdbas amd64_edac_mod edac_mce_amd kvm_amd kvm irqbypass crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel lrw gf128mul glue_helper ablk_helper vfat cryptd fat pcspkr ipmi_ssif sg k10temp i2c_piix4 wmi ipmi_si ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler tpm_crb acpi_power_meter sch_fq_codel ip_tables xfs libcrc32c sd_mod crc_t10dif crct10dif_generic mgag200 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm ahci drm libahci megaraid_sas crct10dif_pclmul crct10dif_common [ 1648.660063] tg3 libata crc32c_intel bnxt_en(OE) drm_panel_orientation_quirks devlink ptp pps_core dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod fuse [ 1648.660105] CPU: 13 PID: 3867 Comm: ethtool Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE ------------ 3.10.0-1152.el7.x86_64 #1 [ 1648.660911] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R7515/0R4CNN, BIOS 1.2.14 01/28/2020 [ 1648.661662] task: ffff94e64cbc9080 ti: ffff94f55df1c000 task.ti: ffff94f55df1c000 [ 1648.662409] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffc01e9b3a>] [<ffffffffc01e9b3a>] bnxt_alloc_mem+0x50a/0x1140 [bnxt_en] [ 1648.663171] RSP: 0018:ffff94f55df1fba8 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 1648.663927] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff94e6827e0000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 1648.664684] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff94e6827e08c0 [ 1648.665433] RBP: ffff94f55df1fc20 R08: 00000000000001ff R09: 0000000000000008 [ 1648.666184] R10: 0000000000000d53 R11: ffff94f55df1f7ce R12: ffff94e6827e08c0 [ 1648.666940] R13: ffff94e6827e08c0 R14: ffff94e6827e08c0 R15: ffffffffb9115e40 [ 1648.667695] FS: 00007f8aadba5740(0000) GS:ffff94f57eb40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 1648.668447] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 1648.669202] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000001022772000 CR4: 0000000000340fe0 [ 1648.669966] Call Trace: [ 1648.670730] [<ffffffffc01f1d5d>] ? bnxt_need_reserve_rings+0x9d/0x170 [bnxt_en] [ 1648.671496] [<ffffffffc01fa7ea>] __bnxt_open_nic+0x8a/0x9a0 [bnxt_en] [ 1648.672263] [<ffffffffc01f7479>] ? bnxt_close_nic+0x59/0x1b0 [bnxt_en] [ 1648.673031] [<ffffffffc01fb11b>] bnxt_open_nic+0x1b/0x50 [bnxt_en] [ 1648.673793] [<ffffffffc020037c>] bnxt_set_ringparam+0x6c/0xa0 [bnxt_en] [ 1648.674550] [<ffffffffb8a5f564>] dev_ethtool+0x1334/0x21a0 [ 1648.675306] [<ffffffffb8a719ff>] dev_ioctl+0x1ef/0x5f0 [ 1648.676061] [<ffffffffb8a324bd>] sock_do_ioctl+0x4d/0x60 [ 1648.676810] [<ffffffffb8a326bb>] sock_ioctl+0x1eb/0x2d0 [ 1648.677548] [<ffffffffb8663230>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x3a0/0x5b0 [ 1648.678282] [<ffffffffb8b8e678>] ? __do_page_fault+0x238/0x500 [ 1648.679016] [<ffffffffb86634e1>] SyS_ioctl+0xa1/0xc0 [ 1648.679745] [<ffffffffb8b93f92>] system_call_fastpath+0x25/0x2a [ 1648.680461] Code: 9e 60 01 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 45 8b 8e 48 01 00 00 31 c9 45 85 c9 0f 8e 73 01 00 00 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 8b 86 a8 00 00 00 48 63 d1 <48> 8b 14 d0 48 85 d2 0f 84 46 01 00 00 41 8b 86 44 01 00 00 c7 [ 1648.681986] RIP [<ffffffffc01e9b3a>] bnxt_alloc_mem+0x50a/0x1140 [bnxt_en] [ 1648.682724] RSP <ffff94f55df1fba8> [ 1648.683451] CR2: 0000000000000000 Fixes: ec5d31e ("bnxt_en: Handle firmware reset status during IF_UP.") Reviewed-by: Vasundhara Volam <vasundhara-v.volam@broadcom.com> Reviewed-by: Pavan Chebbi <pavan.chebbi@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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When unbinding the hns3 driver with the HNS3 VF, I got the following kernel panic: [ 265.709989] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff800054627000 [ 265.717928] Mem abort info: [ 265.720740] ESR = 0x96000047 [ 265.723810] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 265.729126] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 265.732195] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 265.735351] Data abort info: [ 265.738227] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000047 [ 265.742071] CM = 0, WnR = 1 [ 265.745055] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000009b54000 [ 265.751753] [ffff800054627000] pgd=0000202ffffff003, p4d=0000202ffffff003, pud=00002020020eb003, pmd=00000020a0dfc003, pte=0000000000000000 [ 265.764314] Internal error: Oops: 96000047 [#1] SMP [ 265.830357] CPU: 61 PID: 20319 Comm: bash Not tainted 5.9.0+ #206 [ 265.836423] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 V2/BC82AMDDA, BIOS 1.05 09/18/2019 [ 265.843873] pstate: 80400009 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--) [ 265.843890] pc : hclgevf_cmd_uninit+0xbc/0x300 [ 265.861988] lr : hclgevf_cmd_uninit+0xb0/0x300 [ 265.861992] sp : ffff80004c983b50 [ 265.881411] pmr_save: 000000e0 [ 265.884453] x29: ffff80004c983b50 x28: ffff20280bbce500 [ 265.889744] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: 0000000000000000 [ 265.895034] x25: ffff800011a1f000 x24: ffff800011a1fe90 [ 265.900325] x23: ffff0020ce9b00d8 x22: ffff0020ce9b0150 [ 265.905616] x21: ffff800010d70e90 x20: ffff800010d70e90 [ 265.910906] x19: ffff0020ce9b0080 x18: 0000000000000004 [ 265.916198] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffff800011ae32e8 [ 265.916201] x15: 0000000000000028 x14: 0000000000000002 [ 265.916204] x13: ffff800011ae32e8 x12: 0000000000012ad8 [ 265.946619] x11: ffff80004c983b50 x10: 0000000000000000 [ 265.951911] x9 : ffff8000115d0888 x8 : 0000000000000000 [ 265.951914] x7 : ffff800011890b20 x6 : c0000000ffff7fff [ 265.951917] x5 : ffff80004c983930 x4 : 0000000000000001 [ 265.951919] x3 : ffffa027eec1b000 x2 : 2b78ccbbff369100 [ 265.964487] x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff800054627000 [ 265.964491] Call trace: [ 265.964494] hclgevf_cmd_uninit+0xbc/0x300 [ 265.964496] hclgevf_uninit_ae_dev+0x9c/0xe8 [ 265.964501] hnae3_unregister_ae_dev+0xb0/0x130 [ 265.964516] hns3_remove+0x34/0x88 [hns3] [ 266.009683] pci_device_remove+0x48/0xf0 [ 266.009692] device_release_driver_internal+0x114/0x1e8 [ 266.030058] device_driver_detach+0x28/0x38 [ 266.034224] unbind_store+0xd4/0x108 [ 266.037784] drv_attr_store+0x40/0x58 [ 266.041435] sysfs_kf_write+0x54/0x80 [ 266.045081] kernfs_fop_write+0x12c/0x250 [ 266.049076] vfs_write+0xc4/0x248 [ 266.052378] ksys_write+0x74/0xf8 [ 266.055677] __arm64_sys_write+0x24/0x30 [ 266.059584] el0_svc_common.constprop.3+0x84/0x270 [ 266.064354] do_el0_svc+0x34/0xa0 [ 266.067658] el0_svc+0x38/0x40 [ 266.070700] el0_sync_handler+0x8c/0xb0 [ 266.074519] el0_sync+0x140/0x180 It looks like the BAR memory region had already been unmapped before we start clearing CMDQ registers in it, which is pretty bad and the kernel happily kills itself because of a Current EL Data Abort (on arm64). Moving the CMDQ uninitialization a bit early fixes the issue for me. Fixes: 862d969 ("net: hns3: do VF's pci re-initialization while PF doing FLR") Signed-off-by: Zenghui Yu <yuzenghui@huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201023051550.793-1-yuzenghui@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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When target side trace in turned on and flush command is issued from the host it results in the following Oops. [ 856.789724] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000068 [ 856.790686] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 856.791262] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 856.791863] PGD 6d7110067 P4D 6d7110067 PUD 66f0ad067 PMD 0 [ 856.792527] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 856.792950] CPU: 15 PID: 7034 Comm: nvme Tainted: G OE 5.9.0nvme-5.9+ #71 [ 856.793790] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-59-gc9ba5276e3214 [ 856.794956] RIP: 0010:trace_event_raw_event_nvmet_req_init+0x13e/0x170 [nvmet] [ 856.795734] Code: 41 5c 41 5d c3 31 d2 31 f6 e8 4e 9b b8 e0 e9 0e ff ff ff 49 8b 55 00 48 8b 38 8b 0 [ 856.797740] RSP: 0018:ffffc90001be3a60 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 856.798375] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8887e7d2c01c RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 856.799234] RDX: 0000000000000020 RSI: 0000000057e70ea2 RDI: ffff8887e7d2c034 [ 856.800088] RBP: ffff88869f710578 R08: ffff888807500d40 R09: 00000000fffffffe [ 856.800951] R10: 0000000064c66670 R11: 00000000ef955201 R12: ffff8887e7d2c034 [ 856.801807] R13: ffff88869f7105c8 R14: 0000000000000040 R15: ffff88869f710440 [ 856.802667] FS: 00007f6a22bd8780(0000) GS:ffff888813a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 856.803635] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 856.804367] CR2: 0000000000000068 CR3: 00000006d73e0000 CR4: 00000000003506e0 [ 856.805283] Call Trace: [ 856.805613] nvmet_req_init+0x27c/0x480 [nvmet] [ 856.806200] nvme_loop_queue_rq+0xcb/0x1d0 [nvme_loop] [ 856.806862] blk_mq_dispatch_rq_list+0x123/0x7b0 [ 856.807459] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x14/0x30 [ 856.808025] __blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0xc7/0x170 [ 856.808708] blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0x30/0x60 [ 856.809372] __blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0x70/0x100 [ 856.809935] __blk_mq_delay_run_hw_queue+0x156/0x170 [ 856.810574] blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0x86/0xe0 [ 856.811104] blk_mq_sched_insert_request+0xef/0x160 [ 856.811733] blk_execute_rq+0x69/0xc0 [ 856.812212] ? blk_mq_rq_ctx_init+0xd0/0x230 [ 856.812784] nvme_execute_passthru_rq+0x57/0x130 [nvme_core] [ 856.813461] nvme_submit_user_cmd+0xeb/0x300 [nvme_core] [ 856.814099] nvme_user_cmd.isra.82+0x11e/0x1a0 [nvme_core] [ 856.814752] blkdev_ioctl+0x1dc/0x2c0 [ 856.815197] block_ioctl+0x3f/0x50 [ 856.815606] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x84/0xc0 [ 856.816074] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 [ 856.816533] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 856.817168] RIP: 0033:0x7f6a222ed107 [ 856.817617] Code: 44 00 00 48 8b 05 81 cd 2c 00 64 c7 00 26 00 00 00 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 8 [ 856.819901] RSP: 002b:00007ffca848f058 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 [ 856.820846] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007f6a222ed107 [ 856.821726] RDX: 00007ffca848f060 RSI: 00000000c0484e43 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 856.822603] RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 000000000000003f R09: 0000000000000005 [ 856.823478] R10: 00007ffca848ece0 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007ffca84912d3 [ 856.824359] R13: 00007ffca848f4d0 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: 000000000067e900 [ 856.825236] Modules linked in: nvme_loop(OE) nvmet(OE) nvme_fabrics(OE) null_blk nvme(OE) nvme_corel Move the nvmet_req_init() tracepoint after we parse the command in nvmet_req_init() so that we can get rid of the duplicate nvmet_find_namespace() call. Rename __assign_disk_name() -> __assign_req_name(). Now that we call tracepoint after parsing the command simplify the newly added __assign_req_name() which fixes this bug. Signed-off-by: Chaitanya Kulkarni <chaitanya.kulkarni@wdc.com> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
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The tcf_block_unbind() expects that the caller will take block->cb_lock before calling it, however the code took RTNL lock and dropped cb_lock instead. This causes to the following kernel panic. WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 13524 at net/sched/cls_api.c:1488 tcf_block_unbind+0x2db/0x420 Modules linked in: mlx5_ib mlx5_core mlxfw ptp pps_core act_mirred act_tunnel_key cls_flower vxlan ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel dummy sch_ingress openvswitch nsh xt_conntrack xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink nfnetlink xt_addrtype iptable_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 br_netfilter rpcrdma rdma_ucm ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ib_umad ib_ipoib rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_uverbs ib_core overlay [last unloaded: mlxfw] CPU: 1 PID: 13524 Comm: test-ecmp-add-v Tainted: G W 5.9.0+ #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:tcf_block_unbind+0x2db/0x420 Code: ff 48 83 c4 40 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 49 8d bc 24 30 01 00 00 be ff ff ff ff e8 7d 7f 70 00 85 c0 0f 85 7b fd ff ff <0f> 0b e9 74 fd ff ff 48 c7 c7 dc 6a 24 84 e8 02 ec fe fe e9 55 fd RSP: 0018:ffff888117d17968 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88812f713c00 RCX: 1ffffffff0848d5b RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff88814fbc8130 RDI: ffff888107f2b878 RBP: 1ffff11022fa2f3f R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffff84115a87 R10: fffffbfff0822b50 R11: ffff888107f2b898 R12: ffff88814fbc8000 R13: ffff88812f713c10 R14: ffff888117d17a38 R15: ffff88814fbc80c0 FS: 00007f6593d36740(0000) GS:ffff8882a4f00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00005607a00758f8 CR3: 0000000131aea006 CR4: 0000000000170ea0 Call Trace: tc_block_indr_cleanup+0x3e0/0x5a0 ? tcf_block_unbind+0x420/0x420 ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0xe7/0x610 flow_indr_dev_unregister+0x5e2/0x930 ? mlx5e_restore_tunnel+0xdf0/0xdf0 [mlx5_core] ? mlx5e_restore_tunnel+0xdf0/0xdf0 [mlx5_core] ? flow_indr_block_cb_alloc+0x3c0/0x3c0 ? mlx5_db_free+0x37c/0x4b0 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_cleanup_rep_tx+0x8b/0xc0 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_detach_netdev+0xe5/0x120 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_vport_rep_unload+0x155/0x260 [mlx5_core] esw_offloads_disable+0x227/0x2b0 [mlx5_core] mlx5_eswitch_disable_locked.cold+0x38e/0x699 [mlx5_core] mlx5_eswitch_disable+0x94/0xf0 [mlx5_core] mlx5_device_disable_sriov+0x183/0x1f0 [mlx5_core] mlx5_core_sriov_configure+0xfd/0x230 [mlx5_core] sriov_numvfs_store+0x261/0x2f0 ? sriov_drivers_autoprobe_store+0x110/0x110 ? sysfs_file_ops+0x170/0x170 ? sysfs_file_ops+0x117/0x170 ? sysfs_file_ops+0x170/0x170 kernfs_fop_write+0x1ff/0x3f0 ? rcu_read_lock_any_held+0x6e/0x90 vfs_write+0x1f3/0x620 ksys_write+0xf9/0x1d0 ? __x64_sys_read+0xb0/0xb0 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x273/0x3f0 ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x1d/0x50 do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 <...> ---[ end trace bfdd028ada702879 ]--- Fixes: 0fdcf78 ("net: use flow_indr_dev_setup_offload()") Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201026123327.1141066-1-leon@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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…/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD KVM/arm64 fixes for 5.10, take #1 - Force PTE mapping on device pages provided via VFIO - Fix detection of cacheable mapping at S2 - Fallback to PMD/PTE mappings for composite huge pages - Fix accounting of Stage-2 PGD allocation - Fix AArch32 handling of some of the debug registers - Simplify host HYP entry - Fix stray pointer conversion on nVHE TLB invalidation - Fix initialization of the nVHE code - Simplify handling of capabilities exposed to HYP - Nuke VCPUs caught using a forbidden AArch32 EL0
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Nov 10, 2020
This is a copy of commit 5c5f1ba ("ASoC: Intel: kbl_rt5663_rt5514_max98927: Fix kabylake_ssp_fixup function") applied to the kbl_rt5663_max98927 board file. Original explanation of the change: kabylake_ssp_fixup function uses snd_soc_dpcm to identify the codecs DAIs. The HW parameters are changed based on the codec DAI of the stream. The earlier approach to get snd_soc_dpcm was using container_of() macro on snd_pcm_hw_params. The structures have been modified over time and snd_soc_dpcm does not have snd_pcm_hw_params as a reference but as a copy. This causes the current driver to crash when used. This patch changes the way snd_soc_dpcm is extracted. snd_soc_pcm_runtime holds 2 dpcm instances (one for playback and one for capture). 2 codecs on the SSP are dmic (capture) and speakers (playback). Based on the stream direction, snd_soc_dpcm is extracted from snd_soc_pcm_runtime. Fixes a boot crash on a HP Chromebook x2: [ 16.582225] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000050 [ 16.582231] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 16.582233] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 16.582234] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 16.582238] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI [ 16.582241] CPU: 0 PID: 1980 Comm: cras Tainted: G C 5.4.58 #1 [ 16.582243] Hardware name: HP Soraka/Soraka, BIOS Google_Soraka.10431.75.0 08/30/2018 [ 16.582247] RIP: 0010:kabylake_ssp_fixup+0x19/0xbb [snd_soc_kbl_rt5663_max98927] [ 16.582250] Code: c6 6f c5 80 c0 44 89 f2 31 c0 e8 3e c9 4c d6 eb de 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56 53 48 89 f3 48 8b 46 c8 48 8b 4e d0 <48> 8b 49 10 4c 8b 78 10 4c 8b 31 4c 89 f7 48 c7 c6 4b c2 80 c0 e8 [ 16.582252] RSP: 0000:ffffaf7e81e0b958 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 16.582254] RAX: ffffffff96f13e0d RBX: ffffaf7e81e0ba00 RCX: 0000000000000040 [ 16.582256] RDX: ffffaf7e81e0ba00 RSI: ffffaf7e81e0ba00 RDI: ffffa3b208558028 [ 16.582258] RBP: ffffaf7e81e0b970 R08: ffffa3b203b54160 R09: ffffaf7e81e0ba00 [ 16.582259] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffffc080b345 R12: ffffa3b209fb6e00 [ 16.582261] R13: ffffa3b1b1a47838 R14: ffffa3b1e6197f28 R15: ffffaf7e81e0ba00 [ 16.582263] FS: 00007eb3f25aaf80(0000) GS:ffffa3b236a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 16.582265] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 16.582267] CR2: 0000000000000050 CR3: 0000000246bc8006 CR4: 00000000003606f0 [ 16.582269] Call Trace: [ 16.582275] snd_soc_link_be_hw_params_fixup+0x21/0x68 [ 16.582278] snd_soc_dai_hw_params+0x25/0x94 [ 16.582282] soc_pcm_hw_params+0x2d8/0x583 [ 16.582288] dpcm_be_dai_hw_params+0x172/0x29e [ 16.582291] dpcm_fe_dai_hw_params+0x9f/0x12f [ 16.582295] snd_pcm_hw_params+0x137/0x41c [ 16.582298] snd_pcm_hw_params_user+0x3c/0x71 [ 16.582301] snd_pcm_common_ioctl+0x2c6/0x565 [ 16.582304] snd_pcm_ioctl+0x32/0x36 [ 16.582307] do_vfs_ioctl+0x506/0x783 [ 16.582311] ksys_ioctl+0x58/0x83 [ 16.582313] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x1a/0x1e [ 16.582316] do_syscall_64+0x54/0x7e [ 16.582319] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 16.582322] RIP: 0033:0x7eb3f1886157 [ 16.582324] Code: 8a 66 90 48 8b 05 11 dd 2b 00 64 c7 00 26 00 00 00 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d e1 dc 2b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 16.582326] RSP: 002b:00007ffff7559818 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 [ 16.582329] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005acc9188b140 RCX: 00007eb3f1886157 [ 16.582330] RDX: 00007ffff7559940 RSI: 00000000c2604111 RDI: 000000000000001e [ 16.582332] RBP: 00007ffff7559840 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 16.582333] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000000bb80 [ 16.582335] R13: 00005acc91702e80 R14: 00007ffff7559940 R15: 00005acc91702e80 [ 16.582337] Modules linked in: rfcomm cmac algif_hash algif_skcipher af_alg uinput hid_google_hammer snd_soc_kbl_rt5663_max98927 snd_soc_hdac_hdmi snd_soc_dmic snd_soc_skl_ssp_clk snd_soc_skl snd_soc_sst_ipc snd_soc_sst_dsp snd_soc_hdac_hda snd_soc_acpi_intel_match snd_soc_acpi snd_hda_ext_core snd_intel_dspcfg snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_hda_core ipu3_cio2 ipu3_imgu(C) videobuf2_v4l2 videobuf2_common videobuf2_dma_sg videobuf2_memops snd_soc_rt5663 snd_soc_max98927 snd_soc_rl6231 ov5670 ov13858 acpi_als v4l2_fwnode dw9714 fuse xt_MASQUERADE iio_trig_sysfs cros_ec_light_prox cros_ec_sensors cros_ec_sensors_core cros_ec_sensors_ring industrialio_triggered_buffer kfifo_buf industrialio cros_ec_sensorhub cdc_ether usbnet btusb btrtl btintel btbcm bluetooth ecdh_generic ecc lzo_rle lzo_compress iwlmvm zram iwl7000_mac80211 r8152 mii iwlwifi cfg80211 joydev [ 16.584243] gsmi: Log Shutdown Reason 0x03 [ 16.584246] CR2: 0000000000000050 [ 16.584248] ---[ end trace c8511d090c11edff ]--- Suggested-by: Łukasz Majczak <lmajczak@google.com> Fixes: 2e5894d ("ASoC: pcm: Add support for DAI multicodec") Signed-off-by: Tomasz Figa <tfiga@chromium.org> Acked-by: Pierre-Louis Bossart <pierre-louis.bossart@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201014141624.4143453-1-tfiga@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
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spi_nor_parse_sfdp() modifies the passed structure so that it points to itself (params.erase_map.regions to params.erase_map.uniform_region). This makes it impossible to copy the local struct anywhere else. Therefore only use memcpy() in backup-restore scenario. The bug may show up like below: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc90000b377f8 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 4 PID: 3500 Comm: flashcp Tainted: G O 5.4.53-... #1 ... RIP: 0010:spi_nor_erase+0x8e/0x5c0 Code: 64 24 18 89 db 4d 8b b5 d0 04 00 00 4c 89 64 24 18 4c 89 64 24 20 eb 12 a8 10 0f 85 59 02 00 00 49 83 c6 10 0f 84 4f 02 00 00 <49> 8b 06 48 89 c2 48 83 e2 c0 48 89 d1 49 03 4e 08 48 39 cb 73 d8 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000217fc48 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: 0000000000740000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000740000 RDX: ffff8884550c9980 RSI: ffff88844f9c0bc0 RDI: ffff88844ede7bb8 RBP: 0000000000740000 R08: ffffffff815bfbe0 R09: ffff88844f9c0bc0 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffc9000217fc60 R13: ffff88844ede7818 R14: ffffc90000b377f8 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f4699780500(0000) GS:ffff88846ff00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffc90000b377f8 CR3: 00000004538ee000 CR4: 0000000000340fe0 Call Trace: part_erase+0x27/0x50 mtdchar_ioctl+0x831/0xba0 ? filemap_map_pages+0x186/0x3d0 ? do_filp_open+0xad/0x110 ? _copy_to_user+0x22/0x30 ? cp_new_stat+0x150/0x180 mtdchar_unlocked_ioctl+0x2a/0x40 do_vfs_ioctl+0xa0/0x630 ? __do_sys_newfstat+0x3c/0x60 ksys_ioctl+0x70/0x80 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x6a/0x200 ? prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x50/0xd0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7f46996b6817 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: c468721 ("mtd: spi-nor: Move erase_map to 'struct spi_nor_flash_parameter'") Co-developed-by: Matija Glavinic Pecotic <matija.glavinic-pecotic.ext@nokia.com> Signed-off-by: Matija Glavinic Pecotic <matija.glavinic-pecotic.ext@nokia.com> Signed-off-by: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin@nokia.com> Signed-off-by: Vignesh Raghavendra <vigneshr@ti.com> Tested-by: Baurzhan Ismagulov <ibr@radix50.net> Reviewed-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@microchip.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201005084803.23460-1-alexander.sverdlin@nokia.com
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In my test setup, I had a SAMA5D27 device configured with ip forwarding, and second device with usb ethernet (r8152) sending ICMP packets. If the packet was larger than about 220 bytes, the SAMA5 device would "oops" with the following trace: kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:1863! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] ARM Modules linked in: xt_MASQUERADE ppp_async ppp_generic slhc iptable_nat xt_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 can_raw can bridge stp llc ipt_REJECT nf_reject_ipv4 sd_mod cdc_ether usbnet usb_storage r8152 scsi_mod mii o ption usb_wwan usbserial micrel macb at91_sama5d2_adc phylink gpio_sama5d2_piobu m_can_platform m_can industrialio_triggered_buffer kfifo_buf of_mdio can_dev fixed_phy sdhci_of_at91 sdhci_pltfm libphy sdhci mmc_core ohci_at91 ehci_atmel o hci_hcd iio_rescale industrialio sch_fq_codel spidev prox2_hal(O) CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Tainted: G O 5.9.1-prox2+ #1 Hardware name: Atmel SAMA5 PC is at skb_put+0x3c/0x50 LR is at macb_start_xmit+0x134/0xad0 [macb] pc : [<c05258cc>] lr : [<bf0ea5b8>] psr: 20070113 sp : c0d01a60 ip : c07232c0 fp : c4250000 r10: c0d03cc8 r9 : 00000000 r8 : c0d038c0 r7 : 00000000 r6 : 00000008 r5 : c59b66c0 r4 : 0000002a r3 : 8f659eff r2 : c59e9eea r1 : 00000001 r0 : c59b66c0 Flags: nzCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment none Control: 10c53c7d Table: 2640c059 DAC: 00000051 Process swapper (pid: 0, stack limit = 0x75002d81) <snipped stack> [<c05258cc>] (skb_put) from [<bf0ea5b8>] (macb_start_xmit+0x134/0xad0 [macb]) [<bf0ea5b8>] (macb_start_xmit [macb]) from [<c053e504>] (dev_hard_start_xmit+0x90/0x11c) [<c053e504>] (dev_hard_start_xmit) from [<c0571180>] (sch_direct_xmit+0x124/0x260) [<c0571180>] (sch_direct_xmit) from [<c053eae4>] (__dev_queue_xmit+0x4b0/0x6d0) [<c053eae4>] (__dev_queue_xmit) from [<c05a5650>] (ip_finish_output2+0x350/0x580) [<c05a5650>] (ip_finish_output2) from [<c05a7e24>] (ip_output+0xb4/0x13c) [<c05a7e24>] (ip_output) from [<c05a39d0>] (ip_forward+0x474/0x500) [<c05a39d0>] (ip_forward) from [<c05a13d8>] (ip_sublist_rcv_finish+0x3c/0x50) [<c05a13d8>] (ip_sublist_rcv_finish) from [<c05a19b8>] (ip_sublist_rcv+0x11c/0x188) [<c05a19b8>] (ip_sublist_rcv) from [<c05a2494>] (ip_list_rcv+0xf8/0x124) [<c05a2494>] (ip_list_rcv) from [<c05403c4>] (__netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x1a0/0x20c) [<c05403c4>] (__netif_receive_skb_list_core) from [<c05405c4>] (netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x194/0x230) [<c05405c4>] (netif_receive_skb_list_internal) from [<c0540684>] (gro_normal_list.part.0+0x14/0x28) [<c0540684>] (gro_normal_list.part.0) from [<c0541280>] (napi_complete_done+0x16c/0x210) [<c0541280>] (napi_complete_done) from [<bf14c1c0>] (r8152_poll+0x684/0x708 [r8152]) [<bf14c1c0>] (r8152_poll [r8152]) from [<c0541424>] (net_rx_action+0x100/0x328) [<c0541424>] (net_rx_action) from [<c01012ec>] (__do_softirq+0xec/0x274) [<c01012ec>] (__do_softirq) from [<c012d6d4>] (irq_exit+0xcc/0xd0) [<c012d6d4>] (irq_exit) from [<c0160960>] (__handle_domain_irq+0x58/0xa4) [<c0160960>] (__handle_domain_irq) from [<c0100b0c>] (__irq_svc+0x6c/0x90) Exception stack(0xc0d01ef0 to 0xc0d01f38) 1ee0: 00000000 0000003d 0c31f383 c0d0fa00 1f00: c0d2eb80 00000000 c0d2e630 4dad8c49 4da967b0 0000003d 0000003d 00000000 1f20: fffffff5 c0d01f40 c04e0f88 c04e0f8c 30070013 ffffffff [<c0100b0c>] (__irq_svc) from [<c04e0f8c>] (cpuidle_enter_state+0x7c/0x378) [<c04e0f8c>] (cpuidle_enter_state) from [<c04e12c4>] (cpuidle_enter+0x28/0x38) [<c04e12c4>] (cpuidle_enter) from [<c014f710>] (do_idle+0x194/0x214) [<c014f710>] (do_idle) from [<c014fa50>] (cpu_startup_entry+0xc/0x14) [<c014fa50>] (cpu_startup_entry) from [<c0a00dc8>] (start_kernel+0x46c/0x4a0) Code: e580c054 8a000002 e1a00002 e8bd8070 (e7f001f2) ---[ end trace 146c8a334115490c ]--- The solution was to force nonlinear buffers to be cloned. This was previously reported by Klaus Doth (https://www.spinics.net/lists/netdev/msg556937.html) but never formally submitted as a patch. This is the third revision, hopefully the formatting is correct this time! Suggested-by: Klaus Doth <krnl@doth.eu> Fixes: 653e92a ("net: macb: add support for padding and fcs computation") Signed-off-by: Mark Deneen <mdeneen@saucontech.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201030155814.622831-1-mdeneen@saucontech.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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If calling find_domain() for a device which hasn't been probed by the iommu core, below kernel NULL pointer dereference issue happens. [ 362.736947] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000038 [ 362.743953] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 362.749115] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 362.754278] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 362.756843] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 362.760528] CPU: 0 PID: 844 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.9.0-rc4-intel-next+ #1 [ 362.767428] Hardware name: Intel Corporation Ice Lake Client Platform/IceLake U DDR4 SODIMM PD RVP TLC, BIOS ICLSFWR1.R00.3384.A02.1909200816 09/20/2019 [ 362.781109] RIP: 0010:find_domain+0xd/0x40 [ 362.785234] Code: 48 81 fb 60 28 d9 b2 75 de 5b 41 5c 41 5d 5d c3 0f 1f 00 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8b 87 e0 02 00 00 55 <48> 8b 40 38 48 89 e5 48 83 f8 fe 0f 94 c1 48 85 ff 0f 94 c2 08 d1 [ 362.804041] RSP: 0018:ffffb09cc1f0bd38 EFLAGS: 00010046 [ 362.809292] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff905b98e4fac8 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 362.816452] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff905b98e4fac8 RDI: ffff905b9ccd40d0 [ 362.823617] RBP: ffffb09cc1f0bda0 R08: ffffb09cc1f0bd48 R09: 000000000000000f [ 362.830778] R10: ffffffffb266c080 R11: ffff905b9042602d R12: ffff905b98e4fac8 [ 362.837944] R13: ffffb09cc1f0bd48 R14: ffff905b9ccd40d0 R15: ffff905b98e4fac8 [ 362.845108] FS: 00007f8485460740(0000) GS:ffff905b9fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 362.853227] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 362.858996] CR2: 0000000000000038 CR3: 00000004627a6003 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 [ 362.866161] PKRU: fffffffc [ 362.868890] Call Trace: [ 362.871363] ? show_device_domain_translation+0x32/0x100 [ 362.876700] ? bind_store+0x110/0x110 [ 362.880387] ? klist_next+0x91/0x120 [ 362.883987] ? domain_translation_struct_show+0x50/0x50 [ 362.889237] bus_for_each_dev+0x79/0xc0 [ 362.893121] domain_translation_struct_show+0x36/0x50 [ 362.898204] seq_read+0x135/0x410 [ 362.901545] ? handle_mm_fault+0xeb8/0x1750 [ 362.905755] full_proxy_read+0x5c/0x90 [ 362.909526] vfs_read+0xa6/0x190 [ 362.912782] ksys_read+0x61/0xe0 [ 362.916037] __x64_sys_read+0x1a/0x20 [ 362.919725] do_syscall_64+0x37/0x80 [ 362.923329] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 [ 362.928405] RIP: 0033:0x7f84855c5e95 Filter out those devices to avoid such error. Fixes: e2726da ("iommu/vt-d: debugfs: Add support to show page table internals") Reported-and-tested-by: Xu Pengfei <pengfei.xu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org#v5.6+ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201028070725.24979-1-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
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The cleanup for the yfs_store_opaque_acl2_operation calls the wrong function to destroy the ACL content buffer. It's an afs_acl struct, not a yfs_acl struct - and the free function for latter may pass invalid pointers to kfree(). Fix this by using the afs_acl_put() function. The yfs_acl_put() function is then no longer used and can be removed. general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x7ebde00000000: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI ... RIP: 0010:compound_head+0x0/0x11 ... Call Trace: virt_to_cache+0x8/0x51 kfree+0x5d/0x79 yfs_free_opaque_acl+0x16/0x29 afs_put_operation+0x60/0x114 __vfs_setxattr+0x67/0x72 __vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x66/0xe9 vfs_setxattr+0x67/0xce setxattr+0x14e/0x184 __do_sys_fsetxattr+0x66/0x8f do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x3a entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Fixes: e49c7b2 ("afs: Build an abstraction around an "operation" concept") Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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…lone() All user space generated SKBs are owned by a socket (unless injected into the key via AF_PACKET). If a socket is closed, all associated skbs will be cleaned up. This leads to a problem when a CAN driver calls can_put_echo_skb() on a unshared SKB. If the socket is closed prior to the TX complete handler, can_get_echo_skb() and the subsequent delivering of the echo SKB to all registered callbacks, a SKB with a refcount of 0 is delivered. To avoid the problem, in can_get_echo_skb() the original SKB is now always cloned, regardless of shared SKB or not. If the process exists it can now safely discard its SKBs, without disturbing the delivery of the echo SKB. The problem shows up in the j1939 stack, when it clones the incoming skb, which detects the already 0 refcount. We can easily reproduce this with following example: testj1939 -B -r can0: & cansend can0 1823ff40#0123 WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 293 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0x108/0x174 refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. Modules linked in: coda_vpu imx_vdoa videobuf2_vmalloc dw_hdmi_ahb_audio vcan CPU: 0 PID: 293 Comm: cansend Not tainted 5.5.0-rc6-00376-g9e20dcb7040d #1 Hardware name: Freescale i.MX6 Quad/DualLite (Device Tree) Backtrace: [<c010f570>] (dump_backtrace) from [<c010f90c>] (show_stack+0x20/0x24) [<c010f8ec>] (show_stack) from [<c0c3e1a4>] (dump_stack+0x8c/0xa0) [<c0c3e118>] (dump_stack) from [<c0127fec>] (__warn+0xe0/0x108) [<c0127f0c>] (__warn) from [<c01283c8>] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0xa8/0xcc) [<c0128324>] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [<c0539c0c>] (refcount_warn_saturate+0x108/0x174) [<c0539b04>] (refcount_warn_saturate) from [<c0ad2cac>] (j1939_can_recv+0x20c/0x210) [<c0ad2aa0>] (j1939_can_recv) from [<c0ac9dc8>] (can_rcv_filter+0xb4/0x268) [<c0ac9d14>] (can_rcv_filter) from [<c0aca2cc>] (can_receive+0xb0/0xe4) [<c0aca21c>] (can_receive) from [<c0aca348>] (can_rcv+0x48/0x98) [<c0aca300>] (can_rcv) from [<c09b1fdc>] (__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x64/0x88) [<c09b1f78>] (__netif_receive_skb_one_core) from [<c09b2070>] (__netif_receive_skb+0x38/0x94) [<c09b2038>] (__netif_receive_skb) from [<c09b2130>] (netif_receive_skb_internal+0x64/0xf8) [<c09b20cc>] (netif_receive_skb_internal) from [<c09b21f8>] (netif_receive_skb+0x34/0x19c) [<c09b21c4>] (netif_receive_skb) from [<c0791278>] (can_rx_offload_napi_poll+0x58/0xb4) Fixes: 0ae89be ("can: add destructor for self generated skbs") Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Link: http://lore.kernel.org/r/20200124132656.22156-1-o.rempel@pengutronix.de Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net> Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
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Nov 10, 2020
The atomic check hooks must look up the encoder to be used with a connector from the connector's atomic state, and not assume that it's the connector's current attached encoder. The latter one can change under the atomic check func, or can be unset yet as in the case of MST connectors. This fixes [ 7.940719] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 7.944407] CPU: 2 PID: 143 Comm: kworker/2:2 Not tainted 5.6.0-1023-oem #23-Ubuntu [ 7.952102] Hardware name: Dell Inc. Latitude 7320/, BIOS 88.87.11 09/07/2020 [ 7.959278] Workqueue: events output_poll_execute [drm_kms_helper] [ 7.965511] RIP: 0010:intel_psr_atomic_check+0x37/0xa0 [i915] [ 7.971327] Code: 80 2d 06 00 00 20 74 42 80 b8 34 71 00 00 00 74 39 48 8b 72 08 48 85 f6 74 30 80 b8 f8 71 00 00 00 74 27 4c 8b 87 80 04 00 00 <41> 8b 78 78 83 ff 08 77 19 31 c9 83 ff 05 77 19 48 81 c1 20 01 00 [ 7.977541] input: PS/2 Generic Mouse as /devices/platform/i8042/serio1/input/input5 [ 7.990154] RSP: 0018:ffffb864c073fac8 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 7.990155] RAX: ffff8c5d55ce0000 RBX: ffff8c5d54519000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 7.990155] RDX: ffff8c5d55cb30c0 RSI: ffff8c5d89a0c800 RDI: ffff8c5d55fcf800 [ 7.990156] RBP: ffffb864c073fac8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff8c5d55d9f3a0 [ 7.990156] R10: ffff8c5d55cb30c0 R11: 0000000000000009 R12: ffff8c5d55fcf800 [ 7.990156] R13: ffff8c5d55cb30c0 R14: ffff8c5d56989cc0 R15: ffff8c5d56989cc0 [ 7.990158] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8c5d8e480000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 8.047193] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 8.052970] CR2: 0000000000000078 CR3: 0000000856500005 CR4: 0000000000760ee0 [ 8.060137] PKRU: 55555554 [ 8.062867] Call Trace: [ 8.065361] intel_digital_connector_atomic_check+0x53/0x130 [i915] [ 8.071703] intel_dp_mst_atomic_check+0x5b/0x200 [i915] [ 8.077074] drm_atomic_helper_check_modeset+0x1db/0x790 [drm_kms_helper] [ 8.083942] intel_atomic_check+0x92/0xc50 [i915] [ 8.088705] ? drm_plane_check_pixel_format+0x4f/0xb0 [drm] [ 8.094345] ? drm_atomic_plane_check+0x7a/0x3a0 [drm] [ 8.099548] drm_atomic_check_only+0x2b1/0x450 [drm] [ 8.104573] drm_atomic_commit+0x18/0x50 [drm] [ 8.109070] drm_client_modeset_commit_atomic+0x1c9/0x200 [drm] [ 8.115056] drm_client_modeset_commit_force+0x55/0x160 [drm] [ 8.120866] drm_fb_helper_restore_fbdev_mode_unlocked+0x54/0xb0 [drm_kms_helper] [ 8.128415] drm_fb_helper_set_par+0x34/0x50 [drm_kms_helper] [ 8.134225] drm_fb_helper_hotplug_event.part.0+0xb4/0xe0 [drm_kms_helper] [ 8.141150] drm_fb_helper_hotplug_event+0x1c/0x30 [drm_kms_helper] [ 8.147481] intel_fbdev_output_poll_changed+0x6f/0xa0 [i915] [ 8.153287] drm_kms_helper_hotplug_event+0x2c/0x40 [drm_kms_helper] [ 8.159709] output_poll_execute+0x1aa/0x1c0 [drm_kms_helper] [ 8.165506] process_one_work+0x1e8/0x3b0 [ 8.169561] worker_thread+0x4d/0x400 [ 8.173249] kthread+0x104/0x140 [ 8.176515] ? process_one_work+0x3b0/0x3b0 [ 8.180726] ? kthread_park+0x90/0x90 [ 8.184416] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40 Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/-/issues/2361 References: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/-/issues/2486 Reported-by: William Tseng <william.tseng@intel.com> Reported-by: Cooper Chiou <cooper.chiou@intel.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Imre Deak <imre.deak@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Anshuman Gupta <anshuman.gupta@intel.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20201027160928.3665377-1-imre.deak@intel.com (cherry picked from commit 00e5deb) Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
melver
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Nov 10, 2020
Mimic the pre-existing ACPI and Device Tree event log behavior by not creating the binary_bios_measurements file when the EFI TPM event log is empty. This fixes the following NULL pointer dereference that can occur when reading /sys/kernel/security/tpm0/binary_bios_measurements after the kernel received an empty event log from the firmware: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000002c #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 2 PID: 3932 Comm: fwupdtpmevlog Not tainted 5.9.0-00003-g629990edad62 #17 Hardware name: LENOVO 20LCS03L00/20LCS03L00, BIOS N27ET38W (1.24 ) 11/28/2019 RIP: 0010:tpm2_bios_measurements_start+0x3a/0x550 Code: 54 53 48 83 ec 68 48 8b 57 70 48 8b 1e 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 45 d0 31 c0 48 8b 82 c0 06 00 00 48 8b 8a c8 06 00 00 <44> 8b 60 1c 48 89 4d a0 4c 89 e2 49 83 c4 20 48 83 fb 00 75 2a 49 RSP: 0018:ffffa9c901203db0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000010 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000010 RDX: ffff8ba1eb99c000 RSI: ffff8ba1e4ce8280 RDI: ffff8ba1e4ce8258 RBP: ffffa9c901203e40 R08: ffffa9c901203dd8 R09: ffff8ba1ec443300 R10: ffffa9c901203e50 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8ba1e4ce8280 R13: ffffa9c901203ef0 R14: ffffa9c901203ef0 R15: ffff8ba1e4ce8258 FS: 00007f6595460880(0000) GS:ffff8ba1ef880000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000000000002c CR3: 00000007d8d18003 CR4: 00000000003706e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: ? __kmalloc_node+0x113/0x320 ? kvmalloc_node+0x31/0x80 seq_read+0x94/0x420 vfs_read+0xa7/0x190 ksys_read+0xa7/0xe0 __x64_sys_read+0x1a/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x37/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 In this situation, the bios_event_log pointer in the tpm_bios_log struct was not NULL but was equal to the ZERO_SIZE_PTR (0x10) value. This was due to the following kmemdup() in tpm_read_log_efi(): int tpm_read_log_efi(struct tpm_chip *chip) { ... /* malloc EventLog space */ log->bios_event_log = kmemdup(log_tbl->log, log_size, GFP_KERNEL); if (!log->bios_event_log) { ret = -ENOMEM; goto out; } ... } When log_size is zero, due to an empty event log from firmware, ZERO_SIZE_PTR is returned from kmemdup(). Upon a read of the binary_bios_measurements file, the tpm2_bios_measurements_start() function does not perform a ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR() check on the bios_event_log pointer before dereferencing it. Rather than add a ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR() check in functions that make use of the bios_event_log pointer, simply avoid creating the binary_bios_measurements_file as is done in other event log retrieval backends. Explicitly ignore all of the events in the final event log when the main event log is empty. The list of events in the final event log cannot be accurately parsed without referring to the first event in the main event log (the event log header) so the final event log is useless in such a situation. Fixes: 58cc1e4 ("tpm: parse TPM event logs based on EFI table") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/E1FDCCCB-CA51-4AEE-AC83-9CDE995EAE52@canonical.com/ Reported-by: Kai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng@canonical.com> Reported-by: Kenneth R. Crudup <kenny@panix.com> Reported-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Thiébaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Update kasan to 3.14-rc7, fix slab.c after change of return type of kmem_getpages()