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Cybersecurity in healthcare: A narrative review of trends, threats and ways forward

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ABSTRACT

Electronic healthcare technology is prevalent around the world and creates huge potential to improve clinical outcomes and transform care delivery. However, there are increasing concerns relating to the security of healthcare data and devices. Increased connectivity to existing computer networks has exposed medical devices to new cybersecurity vulnerabilities. Healthcare is an attractive target for cybercrime for two fundamental reasons: it is a rich source of valuable data and its defences are weak. Cybersecurity breaches include stealing health information and ransomware attacks on hospitals, and could include attacks on implanted medical devices. Breaches can reduce patient trust, cripple health systems and threaten human life. Ultimately, cybersecurity is critical to patient safety, yet has historically been lax. New legislation and regulations are in place to facilitate change. This requires cybersecurity to become an integral part of patient safety. Changes are required to human behaviour, technology and processes as part of a holistic solution.

1. Introduction

Healthcare technologies have the potential to extend, save and enhance lives. Technologies range from those providing storage of electronic health records (EHRs); devices that monitor health and deliver medication (including general purpose devices and wearables, and technology embedded within the human body); to telemedicine technology delivering care remotely – even across countries. Patients increasingly use their own mobile applications, which can now be integrated with telemedicine/telehealth into the medical Internet of Things [1] for collaborative disease management and care coordination.

As healthcare devices continue to evolve, so does their interconnectivity. Whilst traditionally standalone, many are now integrated into the hospital network. There are currently 10–15 connected devices per bed in US hospitals [2]. Interconnection has many benefits—e.g., efficiency, error reduction, automation and remote monitoring. These benefits are transforming the treatment of both acute and chronic long-term conditions. Interconnected technology outside of the clinical environment allow health professionals to monitor and adjust implanted devices without the need for a hospital visit or invasive procedures. EHRs can improve patient care by making health information more broadly available [3]. Unfortunately, interconnection introduces new cybersecurity vulnerabilities. Cybersecurity is concerned with safeguarding computer networks and the information they contain from penetration and accidental or malicious disruption. There are growing concerns that cybersecurity within healthcare is not sufficient and this has already resulted in a lack of medical information confidentiality [4] and integrity of data [5,6].

Of course, privacy breaches were a concern prior to the emergence of digital health records. However, the interconnectivity of today's records provides multiple potential gateways to access; the ability to access remotely (whereas historically paper records would have been safeguarded within hospitals and only accessible via physical breaches); the ability for data theft to go unnoticed; and access to a more complete health record providing a more valuable resource for potential attacks (whereas previously health records may have been split between many different hospital(s)/departments). Historically, misplaced paper records or a stolen laptop may have exposed hundreds or thousands of patients to a potential date breach, now that this information is electronic and available on numerous networks, a privacy breach has the potential to affect millions of people [7]. To illustrate further, celebrity health records have always been a target for breaches [8]. However prior to the emergence of electronic records, these breaches were limited to hospital staff who could gain access to the physical paperwork. Now celebrity health records can be potentially remotely accessed—increasing the potential for breaches. That said, electronic records also have a key privacy benefit over paper records—the ability to track staff access (a recent report suggests that over half of healthcare breaches come from inside the organisation [8]). Whereas previously it

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could be difficult to detect who had a 'sneak peek' at paper medical records, it is often easier to track who has accessed electronic records. Although there are ways around this for more sophisticated/external attackers.

As illustrated by breaches reported in the media, cybersecurity vulnerabilities are being exploited. Healthcare is currently one of the most targeted sectors. Reports highlight the growth of attacks and the rise in medical identity theft—with millions of medical records stolen globally [9–12]. Breaches can arise from hacking, malware and insider threats. Hacking is defined as unauthorised access to a computer system to gain information or cause disruption [13]. Malware ("malicious software") refers to programs designed to infiltrate computers without users' consent and includes threats such as viruses and ransomware. While insider threats are issues created by the mistakes or deliberate actions of staff (e.g., responding to phishing emails—a social engineering attack to extract login credentials or to launch a malware attack, erroneous security settings, misuse of passwords, losing laptops and sending unencrypted emails).

The aim of this narrative review is to explore the following questions:

1. Why is healthcare vulnerable?
2. Why is healthcare targeted?
3. What threats and consequences is healthcare currently experiencing?
4. What is the role of legislation and standards?
5. How can the healthcare sector move forward?

2. Method

2.1. Data sources and search strategy

The PubMed database was searched for full text, English language, peer-reviewed articles from April 2012 to April 2018. The keywords used were cybersecurity and healthcare. This returned 2475 hits. Since cybersecurity is constantly changing; this was changed to 2014–2018 which reduced the return to 1249 articles. The bibliographies of key texts were then used to source further articles.

Article titles and abstracts were screened by the principal researcher. Articles were retained where there was evidence of cybersecurity issues, clear implications for healthcare settings, organisational practice, individual practice or health technology development. Also included were systematic reviews regarding the education and behaviour of healthcare workers. Security research papers exploring future technological solutions were excluded as were articles relating to medical research. Key themes were agreed by consensus between the two researchers to limit bias.

3. Findings

The review of the literature revealed the following information relating to the research questions:

3.1. Why is healthcare vulnerable?

Traditionally people believed that no one would be motivated to attack healthcare systems and protective measures were not deemed necessary. No healthcare organisation exists to provide cybersecurity. Emphasis has traditionally—and understandably—been focused upon patient care. There are several issues that complicate healthcare cybersecurity and have increased vulnerability over time:

- Increasingly connected technology to provide efficient ways to care for patients, particularly with chronic conditions [14]. This provides multiple ways of connecting to medical devices [15]. Devices are often easily accessible which increases the likelihood that attackers will find them. A single device could provide a potential entry point to larger hospital networks, bypassing the firewalls. There also tends to be a time lag between an attack occurring and detection of the breach, helping to further increase vulnerability.
- More focus on keeping patients healthy leading to more continuous patient monitoring outside the clinical environment [14,16]. More devices being used in the wider healthcare setting increases vulnerability to breaches.
- Mobile consumer devices (e.g., smartphones) being widely adopted; making it difficult to protect health data from risks posed by general purpose devices [14].

Alongside this growth of new technologies, many healthcare organisations are still using legacy systems in other areas, for example Window XP has not been supported since 2014 [17] allowing hackers and malware to easily avoid detection—for instance, the recent Wannacry attack [18]. The propriety nature of medical device software means that healthcare IT teams may not be able to access the internal software in medical devices, so they depend on manufacturers to build and maintain security in those devices (which has been lacking).

Lack of funding for cybersecurity is also problematic, while organisations are spending funding to become more integrated; they are not spending enough time and money to keep software updated and systems secure. This is aggravated by a lack of cybersecurity expertise within the sector resulting from a general lack of technology and the prohibitive expense of cybersecurity personnel [14,19].

In summary, a rapid move to electronic health records and interconnected devices, alongside historic and continual lack of investment in cybersecurity and a failure to understand the security workaround behaviours of health staff has left the health sector vulnerable to attack.

3.2. Why is healthcare targeted?

While healthcare has vulnerabilities to exploit, attackers must be motivated to carry out attacks. Motivation includes the potential for financial and political gain and potentially to take lives in a form of cyberwarfare. The strongest of these motivations is financial gain. Healthcare data is substantially more valuable than any other data. The value for a full set of medical credentials can be over $1000 [20]. Stolen medical identities can be used to obtain health services and prescription medication by assuming someone's identity or insurance credentials. Uses extend to sophisticated fraud perpetrated by organized crime. Fraudsters have earned billions in the last few years by filing fraudulent claims and dispensing drugs to sell on the dark web [21–23]. Sometimes there is even sufficient information in medical records to open bank accounts, secure loans or obtain passports [24].

Data held within health organisations also has political value. For example, the World Anti-Doping Agency was attacked and the records of prominent athletes made public [25]. NHS websites are accessed by millions of citizens, making them a prime site for publishing propaganda, e.g., NHS websites were hacked by cyberterrorists and images of Syrian civil war were uploaded [26].

Over the past decade we have seen numerous headlines warning of the potential for medical devices to be used as part of a futuristic cyberwar campaign. Nation state actors could disrupt healthcare in a foreign country by denying access or targeting individuals through their medical devices, or by collecting sensitive data.

Those with cybersecurity skills enjoy the challenge of finding and exposing security vulnerabilities in networks and medical devices. For example, in 2016 an individual scanning for security vulnerabilities was able to access a file containing data of people who had registered with the Australian Blood Donor service [27].

In summary, healthcare is targeted due to the potential for financial or political gain, or to expose vulnerabilities by cybercriminals, hacktivists and political activists.

3.3. What threats and consequences is healthcare currently facing?

As of 2015, hacking has become the leading cause of health data breaches [28]. Malware including ransomware is also problematic. Hackers continue to take advantage of lax security to steal medical health records, deny access to health services or cause intentional harm. Over the last few years the health sector has experienced a dramatic rise in the number and size of data breaches [11,12,29]. Breaches result in financial loss, loss of reputation and reduced patient safety. In Australia the medical card number of every citizen is reportedly for sale on the dark web [30]. Ponemon Institute recently reported the average cost for each lost or stolen healthcare record containing sensitive and confidential information as $380 [31]. Ongoing publicity associated with large breaches may compromise patient trust which could result in less willingness to share data. This is particularly problematic for patients with stigmatising conditions such as sexual or mental health conditions [3].

Despite issued warnings and availability of security patches (many not installed), the scale of the 2017 WannaCry attack was unprecedented. WannaCry infected more than 300,000 computers across the world demanding that users pay bitcoin ransoms [32]. Fifty UK hospitals experienced system-wide lockouts, delays to patient care and function loss in connected devices such as MRI scanners and blood storage refrigerators. This attack was not specifically directed at healthcare organisations, yet the damage was widespread. Other ransomware has specifically targeted the healthcare sector. Mansfield-Devine reports that between 2015 and 2016, half of UK NHS trusts were hit by some form of ransomware [33]. While US media highlighted the case of the Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Centre shut down for 10 days until it paid a $17,000 ransom; in an attack thought to have originated from a phishing email [34].

Other malware attacks have led to major incidents, for example one UK healthcare trust suffered an unspecified cyberattack which led to the shutdown of its IT systems and cancellation of almost all planned operations and outpatient appointments for four days [35]. Another attack known as Medjack (“Medical Device Hijack”) is an exploit that injects malware into unprotected medical devices to move laterally across the hospital network [36]. Infected medical devices created weak links in hospital security defences, including diagnostic equipment (e.g., MRI machines), therapeutic equipment (e.g., infusion pumps) and life support equipment (e.g., ventilators). This equipment had not been previously identified as a launchpad for wider attacks. Infection can then spread to other devices, for instance to a nurse’s workstation—which has access to medical records and internet access to send the data to the attackers.

‘White hacker’ simulated attacks have highlighted that other vulnerabilities exist which mean that “Medical devices are the next security nightmare” [37]. There is potential for attacks akin to what was previously regarded as science fiction. For example, brainjacking—if it became possible to insert an appropriate device [38]. Simulated attacks have been made on devices including pacemakers and defibrillators [39], insulin pumps [40–42] and drug infusion pumps. These attacks have remotely manipulated devices to alter operation or send fatal drug doses. While currently only simulated, these attacks could happen in reality [43]. Risks will continue to grow if cybersecurity is not designed in from the beginning of the product or project lifecycle.

3.4. What is the role of legislation and standards?

The US Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 [44] implemented safeguards to ensure that certain electronic health information is protected. The Security Rule requires covered entities to maintain reasonable and appropriate administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of EHRs that they create, receive, maintain or transmit.

The upcoming General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) also comes into effect in the UK in May 2018. The GDPR is designed to harmonise data privacy laws across Europe to protect against privacy and data breaches [45]. The GDPR aims to accomplish this by addressing gaps in the current legislation, which was released in the 1990s prior to organisations holding vast electronic data. The GDPR applies to all personal data held by an organisation. As part of the new legislation, ‘all breaches which may result in a risk to peoples’ rights and freedoms’ must be reported to the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO). Breaches of health data would likely fall into this category, therefore they will need to be reported to the ICO within 72 h of the breach occurring. Non-compliance risks fines of up to €20m. Other changes include the need for all practices to have a data protection officer and the introduction of extra ‘transparency and fair processing’ legislation which need to be included in patient privacy notices [45]. This new legislation will significantly increase the cost of breaches (due to implemented fines) and may help to increase awareness around privacy issues and the need for improved cybersecurity. As the NHS moves towards its aspiration of EHRs – there are concerns around patient privacy and consent and the sharing of data with other organisations [46]. As part of the national data opt-out scheme, patients must be given the choice to opt out of their personal data being shared for purposes other than their individual care. Under the GDPR, any request for data from an external organisation must be given in clear and easily accessible language, including the purpose for requiring the data. This will allow clinicians to uphold patients’ data preferences. That said, it has been suggested that changes in infrastructure are required before EHRs will becoming a useful reality. This is due to the NHS using different providers and different systems, for example two labs may measure the same thing using very different scales; making it difficult for two separate labs to share data in any meaningful fashion [46].

When it comes to medical devices, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) places responsibility for cybersecurity with the medical product manufacturer. The FDA has published premarket [47] and postmarket guidelines [48] that contain recommendations for management of medical device cybersecurity risks throughout the product life cycle. This includes encouraging people to report cybersecurity issues and making it mandatory for manufacturers and device user facilities to report any device malfunction if it poses a risk to health.

European regulators have published high-level cybersecurity recommendations for industries including medical devices involved in the Internet of Things (IoT) paradigm. The recommendations are partially intended to help companies meet upcoming European data privacy requirements under the GDPR.

3.5. How can the healthcare sector move forward?

There is no 100% effective way to prevent all cybersecurity breaches but cybersecurity must form part of the risk management process and cyber resilience must be ensured. Cyber resilience is a holistic view of cyber risk, which looks at culture, people and processes, as well as technology [49]. Several factors have been identified as a means to improve the situation:

As a minimum, basic cyber-hygiene must be maintained, see the 10 steps from the National Cyber Security Centre [50]. This includes regular, secure backups (essential to maintain resilience and be able to recover quickly if attacked) and keeping software up to date to ensure security patches are in place. Confidentiality must be maintained. This can be achieved through anonymization of data (including images), removal of patient identifiers when used for research purposes, and limiting access to online patient information. This requires investing in systems and processes which support secure data transfer (e.g., e-mail encryption and protection of online data).

Security must be a core part of the product lifecycle. This requires considering the trade-offs between security and other requirements from the start [51]. Appropriate incentives should ensure that future

devices and networks have robust security designed in from the start and that these are not added later in a 'bolt on' fashion. This could be driven by security standards for information management, which take into consideration the unique healthcare context that tends to prioritise availability over confidentiality. Any standards, regulations or rules must ease burdensomeness and prevent temptation for staff to engage in insecure workarounds.

Cybersecurity should be a key part of patient care culture as convenient and insecure processes must be replaced with more secure, substantive approaches. This means not simply being seen to be secure (for example to comply with regulations) but building security into the culture. Levin & Christmann [52] point out that this may require active inspections and enforcement from accredited bodies. Culture change must be from the top-down and metrics should be applied through the Care Quality Commission [53] or similar to ensure effective engagement. An effective security culture has the potential to enhance employees acting in effect as a 'human firewall' that can help to protect electronic assets. This includes staff not being logged in as a domain administrator; no sharing of login credentials; and regular staff training to communicate the risks presented by lax security behaviours and how security can be attained without compromising patient care. It is possible that more sophisticated security logins (e.g., retinal imaging, fingerprints, face identification) could be used to prevent the sharing of logins and passwords. The recruitment of security personnel is also required.

Cyber-insurance is a rapidly growing business with estimated global sales of $7.5 billion by 2020 [49]. With the losses associated with cyber breaches, more companies are turning towards insurance. Security improvements may be driven through appropriate insurance incentives. Protection against the consequences of cyberattacks may be part of the liabilities insured against in the same way as hospitals are insured against claims of criminal negligence [53]

Ponemon Institute [31] suggests the cost of a data breach could be reduced through participation in threat sharing. This could be facilitated through national support for incident reporting and management. For instance in the UK, a Care CERT has been set up [54]. However, a joined up approach to the creation of local and national response plans for major cyber-incidents should be in place [55].

3.6. Limitations of this review

Due to the scope of this review, only English publications were included for analysis. Future work should seek to broaden this further. Whilst we acknowledge that viewpoints and commentaries are not scientific evidence, this is where the majority of information around healthcare technology currently lies. Therefore, this approach was deemed appropriate to provide an overall view of the current body of knowledge, the key issues around health technology security and to highlight areas for moving forward.

4. Conclusions

While healthcare technologies play key roles in our population's health they are vulnerable to security threats due to interconnected, easily accessible access points, outdated systems, and a lack of emphasis upon cybersecurity. Focus has tended to be placed upon patient care, however healthcare technologies hold vast amounts of valuable, sensitive data. In many cases financial gain is the motivation for attacks, as medical identity is more valuable than other identity credentials. Other attacks may be motivated by political gain, even cyberwarfare. However if critical health systems are attacked, human lives are at risk. An attack could result in loss of functioning of critical equipment within hospitals such as intensive care units or even at home where interventions rely on power such as nebulisers [56].

The escalation of ransomware attacks on hospitals can bring whole health systems to a standstill as seen in both the UK and US [57,58]. Concern has been further increased by 'White Hacker' identification of health technology security weaknesses, which suggest that the remote manipulation of medical devices such as pace makers and insulin pumps is an unnerving possibility.

Cybersecurity is an essential part of maintaining the safety, privacy and trust of patients. More money and effort must be invested into ensuring the security of healthcare technologies and patient information. Security must be designed into the product from conception and not be an afterthought. Cybersecurity must become part of the patient care culture.

Contributors

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Conflict of interest

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