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Be verbose about MIT dump entry parsing failures
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(cherry picked from commit 2c16b0d)
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nicowilliams authored and jaltman committed Feb 15, 2014
1 parent b490d7b commit 0516a43
Showing 1 changed file with 77 additions and 37 deletions.
114 changes: 77 additions & 37 deletions lib/hdb/hdb-mitdb.c
Expand Up @@ -1153,7 +1153,7 @@ nexttoken(char **p)
#endif

static char *
nexttoken(char **p, size_t len)
nexttoken(char **p, size_t len, const char *what)
{
char *q;

Expand All @@ -1163,17 +1163,23 @@ nexttoken(char **p, size_t len)
q = *p;
*p += len;
/* Must be followed by a delimiter (right?) */
if (strsep(p, " \t") != q + len)
if (strsep(p, " \t") != q + len) {
warnx("No tokens left in dump entry while looking for %s", what);
return NULL;
}
if (*q == '\0')
warnx("Empty last token in dump entry while looking for %s", what);
return q;
}

static size_t
getdata(char **p, unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
getdata(char **p, unsigned char *buf, size_t len, const char *what)
{
size_t i;
int v;
char *q = nexttoken(p, 0);
char *q = nexttoken(p, 0, what);
if (q == NULL)
warnx("Failed to find hex-encoded binary data (%s) in dump", what);
i = 0;
while(*q && i < len) {
if(sscanf(q, "%02x", &v) != 1)
Expand All @@ -1185,23 +1191,27 @@ getdata(char **p, unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
}

static int
getint(char **p)
getint(char **p, const char *what)
{
int val;
char *q = nexttoken(p, 0);
if (!q)
char *q = nexttoken(p, 0, what);
if (!q) {
warnx("Failed to find a signed integer (%s) in dump", what);
return -1;
}
sscanf(q, "%d", &val);
return val;
}

static unsigned int
getuint(char **p)
getuint(char **p, const char *what)
{
int val;
char *q = nexttoken(p, 0);
if (!q)
char *q = nexttoken(p, 0, what);
if (!q) {
warnx("Failed to find an unsigned integer (%s) in dump", what);
return 0;
}
sscanf(q, "%u", &val);
return val;
}
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -1246,59 +1256,72 @@ _hdb_mit_dump2mitdb_entry(krb5_context context, char *line, krb5_storage *sp)

krb5_storage_set_byteorder(sp, KRB5_STORAGE_BYTEORDER_LE);

q = nexttoken(&p, 0);
q = nexttoken(&p, 0, "record type (princ or policy)");
if (strcmp(q, "kdb5_util") == 0 || strcmp(q, "policy") == 0 ||
strcmp(q, "princ") != 0) {
warnx("Supposed MIT dump entry does not start with 'kdb5_util', "
"'policy', nor 'princ'");
return -1;
}
if (getint(&p) != 38)
if (getint(&p, "constant '38'") != 38) {
warnx("Dump entry does not start with '38<TAB>'");
return EINVAL;
}
#define KDB_V1_BASE_LENGTH 38
ret = krb5_store_int16(sp, KDB_V1_BASE_LENGTH);
if (ret) return ret;

princ_len = getuint(&p); /* length of principal */
if (princ_len > (1<<15) - 1) return EINVAL;
num_tl_data = getuint(&p); /* number of tl-data */
num_key_data = getuint(&p); /* number of key-data */
getint(&p); /* length of extra data */
princ = nexttoken(&p, (int)princ_len); /* principal name */
princ_len = getuint(&p, "principal name length");
if (princ_len > (1<<15) - 1) {
warnx("Principal name in dump entry too long (%llu)",
(unsigned long long)princ_len);
return EINVAL;
}
num_tl_data = getuint(&p, "number of TL data");
num_key_data = getuint(&p, "number of key data");
getint(&p, "5th field, length of 'extra data'");
princ = nexttoken(&p, (int)princ_len, "principal name");
if (princ == NULL) {
warnx("Failed to read principal name (expected length %llu)",
(unsigned long long)princ_len);
return -1;
}

attributes = getuint(&p); /* attributes */
attributes = getuint(&p, "attributes");
ret = krb5_store_uint32(sp, attributes);
if (ret) return ret;

tmp = getint(&p); /* max life */
tmp = getint(&p, "max life");
CHECK_UINT(tmp);
ret = krb5_store_uint32(sp, tmp);
if (ret) return ret;

tmp = getint(&p); /* max renewable life */
tmp = getint(&p, "max renewable life");
CHECK_UINT(tmp);
ret = krb5_store_uint32(sp, tmp);
if (ret) return ret;

tmp = getint(&p); /* expiration */
tmp = getint(&p, "expiration");
CHECK_UINT(tmp);
ret = krb5_store_uint32(sp, tmp);
if (ret) return ret;

tmp = getint(&p); /* pw expiration */
tmp = getint(&p, "pw expiration");
CHECK_UINT(tmp);
ret = krb5_store_uint32(sp, tmp);
if (ret) return ret;

tmp = getint(&p); /* last auth */
tmp = getint(&p, "last auth");
CHECK_UINT(tmp);
ret = krb5_store_uint32(sp, tmp);
if (ret) return ret;

tmp = getint(&p); /* last failed auth */
tmp = getint(&p, "last failed auth");
CHECK_UINT(tmp);
ret = krb5_store_uint32(sp, tmp);
if (ret) return ret;

tmp = getint(&p); /* fail auth count */
tmp = getint(&p,"fail auth count");
CHECK_UINT(tmp);
ret = krb5_store_uint32(sp, tmp);
if (ret) return ret;
Expand All @@ -1323,12 +1346,21 @@ _hdb_mit_dump2mitdb_entry(krb5_context context, char *line, krb5_storage *sp)

/* scan and write TL data */
for (i = 0; i < num_tl_data; i++) {
char *reading_what;
int tl_type, tl_length;
unsigned char *buf;

tl_type = getint(&p); /* data type */
tl_length = getint(&p); /* data length */
tl_type = getint(&p, "TL data type");
tl_length = getint(&p, "data length");

if (asprintf(&reading_what, "TL data type %d (length %d)",
tl_type, tl_length) < 0)
return ENOMEM;

/*
* XXX Leaking reading_what, but only on ENOMEM cases anyways,
* so we don't care.
*/
CHECK_UINT16(tl_type);
ret = krb5_store_uint16(sp, tl_type);
if (ret) return ret;
Expand All @@ -1339,13 +1371,15 @@ _hdb_mit_dump2mitdb_entry(krb5_context context, char *line, krb5_storage *sp)
if (tl_length) {
buf = malloc(tl_length);
if (!buf) return ENOMEM;
if (getdata(&p, buf, tl_length) != tl_length) return EINVAL;
if (getdata(&p, buf, tl_length, reading_what) != tl_length)
return EINVAL;
sz = krb5_storage_write(sp, buf, tl_length);
free(buf);
if (sz == -1) return ENOMEM;
} else {
if (strcmp(nexttoken(&p, 0), "-1") != 0) return EINVAL;
if (strcmp(nexttoken(&p, 0, "'-1' field"), "-1") != 0) return EINVAL;
}
free(reading_what);
}

for (i = 0; i < num_key_data; i++) {
Expand All @@ -1356,44 +1390,50 @@ _hdb_mit_dump2mitdb_entry(krb5_context context, char *line, krb5_storage *sp)
int keylen;
size_t k;

key_versions = getint(&p); /* key data version */
key_versions = getint(&p, "key data 'version'");
CHECK_UINT16(key_versions);
ret = krb5_store_int16(sp, key_versions);
if (ret) return ret;

kvno = getint(&p);
kvno = getint(&p, "kvno");
CHECK_UINT16(kvno);
ret = krb5_store_int16(sp, kvno);
if (ret) return ret;

for (k = 0; k < key_versions; k++) {
keytype = getint(&p);
keytype = getint(&p, "enctype");
CHECK_UINT16(keytype);
ret = krb5_store_int16(sp, keytype);
if (ret) return ret;

keylen = getint(&p);
keylen = getint(&p, "encrypted key length");
CHECK_UINT16(keylen);
ret = krb5_store_int16(sp, keylen);
if (ret) return ret;

if (keylen) {
buf = malloc(keylen);
if (!buf) return ENOMEM;
if (getdata(&p, buf, keylen) != keylen) return EINVAL;
if (getdata(&p, buf, keylen, "key (or salt) data") != keylen)
return EINVAL;
sz = krb5_storage_write(sp, buf, keylen);
free(buf);
if (sz == -1) return ENOMEM;
} else {
if (strcmp(nexttoken(&p, 0), "-1") != 0) return EINVAL;
if (strcmp(nexttoken(&p, 0,
"'-1' zero-length key/salt field"),
"-1") != 0) {
warnx("Expected '-1' field because key/salt length is 0");
return -1;
}
}
}
}
/*
* The rest is "extra data", but there's never any and we wouldn't
* know what to do with it.
*/
/* nexttoken(&p, 0); */
/* nexttoken(&p, 0, "extra data"); */
return 0;
}

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