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Add section on timing attacks #196

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Sep 20, 2022
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Add section on timing attacks #196

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15 changes: 14 additions & 1 deletion draft-ietf-privacypass-architecture.md
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Expand Up @@ -728,7 +728,20 @@ hit:
Output resp
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## Centralization
## Side-Channel Attacks

Side-channel attacks, such as those based on timing correlation, could be
used to link attestation and redemption contexts together. In particular,
for interactive tokens that are bound to a Client-specific redemption
context, the anonymity set of Clients during the issuance protocol consists
of those Clients that started issuance between the time of the Origin's
challenge and the corresponding token redemption. Depending on the number
of Clients using a particular Issuer during that time window, the set can
be small. Appliations should take such side channels into consideration before
choosing a particular deployment model and type of token challenge and redemption
context.

# Centralization
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Did you intend to bump this up a level from ## to # ?

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Yeah, it didn't seem like a privacy consideration.


A consequence of limiting the number of participants (Attesters or Issuers) in
Privacy Pass deployments for meaningful privacy is that it forces concentrated
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