Merge pull request torvalds#104 from coreosbot/v4.13.11-coreos

Rebase patches onto 4.13.11

Makefile

@@ -142,7 +142,8 @@ $(filter-out _all sub-make $(CURDIR)/Makefile, $(MAKECMDGOALS)) _all: sub-make
 
 # Invoke a second make in the output directory, passing relevant variables
 sub-make:
-	$(Q)$(MAKE) -C $(KBUILD_OUTPUT) KBUILD_SRC=$(CURDIR) \
+	$(Q)$(MAKE) -C $(KBUILD_OUTPUT) \
+	KBUILD_SRC=$(shell realpath --relative-to=$(KBUILD_OUTPUT) $(CURDIR)) \
 	-f $(CURDIR)/Makefile $(filter-out _all sub-make,$(MAKECMDGOALS))
 
 # Leave processing to above invocation of make

arch/arm64/kernel/efi-header.S

@@ -103,6 +103,11 @@ section_table:
 
 	.set	section_count, (. - section_table) / 40
 
+	/* CoreOS 64 byte verity hash value. */
+	.org	_head + 512
+	.ascii	"verity-hash"
+	.org	_head + 512 + 64
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_EFI
 	/*
 	 * The debug table is referenced via its Relative Virtual Address (RVA),

arch/x86/Kconfig

@@ -1836,6 +1836,18 @@ config EFI_MIXED
 
 	   If unsure, say N.
 
+config EFI_SECURE_BOOT_LOCK_DOWN
+	def_bool n
+	depends on EFI
+	prompt "Lock down the kernel when UEFI Secure Boot is enabled"
+	---help---
+	  UEFI Secure Boot provides a mechanism for ensuring that the firmware
+	  will only load signed bootloaders and kernels.  Certain use cases may
+	  also require that all kernel modules also be signed and that
+	  userspace is prevented from directly changing the running kernel
+	  image.  Say Y here to automatically lock down the kernel when a
+	  system boots with UEFI Secure Boot enabled.
+
 config SECCOMP
 	def_bool y
 	prompt "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"

arch/x86/kernel/ioport.c

@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_ioperm(unsigned long from, unsigned long num, int turn_on)
 
 	if ((from + num <= from) || (from + num > IO_BITMAP_BITS))
 		return -EINVAL;
-	if (turn_on && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
+	if (turn_on && (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || kernel_is_locked_down()))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	/*
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(iopl, unsigned int, level)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	/* Trying to gain more privileges? */
 	if (level > old) {
-		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
+		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || kernel_is_locked_down())
 			return -EPERM;
 	}
 	regs->flags = (regs->flags & ~X86_EFLAGS_IOPL) |

arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c

@@ -179,6 +179,7 @@ setup_efi_state(struct boot_params *params, unsigned long params_load_addr,
 	if (efi_enabled(EFI_OLD_MEMMAP))
 		return 0;
 
+	params->secure_boot = boot_params.secure_boot;
 	ei->efi_loader_signature = current_ei->efi_loader_signature;
 	ei->efi_systab = current_ei->efi_systab;
 	ei->efi_systab_hi = current_ei->efi_systab_hi;

arch/x86/kernel/msr.c

@@ -84,6 +84,9 @@ static ssize_t msr_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	int err = 0;
 	ssize_t bytes = 0;
 
+	if (kernel_is_locked_down())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (count % 8)
 		return -EINVAL;	/* Invalid chunk size */
 
@@ -131,6 +134,10 @@ static long msr_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioc, unsigned long arg)
 			err = -EBADF;
 			break;
 		}
+		if (kernel_is_locked_down()) {
+			err = -EPERM;
+			break;
+		}
 		if (copy_from_user(&regs, uregs, sizeof regs)) {
 			err = -EFAULT;
 			break;

arch/x86/kernel/setup.c

@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@
 #include <linux/crash_dump.h>
 #include <linux/tboot.h>
 #include <linux/jiffies.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 
 #include <linux/usb/xhci-dbgp.h>
 #include <video/edid.h>
@@ -1190,7 +1191,13 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
 			pr_info("Secure boot disabled\n");
 			break;
 		case efi_secureboot_mode_enabled:
-			pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
+			set_bit(EFI_SECURE_BOOT, &efi.flags);
+			if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT_LOCK_DOWN)) {
+				lock_kernel_down();
+				pr_info("Secure boot enabled and kernel locked down\n");
+			} else {
+				pr_info("Secure boot enabled\n");
+			}
 			break;
 		default:
 			pr_info("Secure boot could not be determined\n");

drivers/acpi/apei/einj.c

@@ -518,6 +518,9 @@ static int einj_error_inject(u32 type, u32 flags, u64 param1, u64 param2,
 	int rc;
 	u64 base_addr, size;
 
+	if (kernel_is_locked_down())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	/* If user manually set "flags", make sure it is legal */
 	if (flags && (flags &
 		~(SETWA_FLAGS_APICID|SETWA_FLAGS_MEM|SETWA_FLAGS_PCIE_SBDF)))

drivers/acpi/custom_method.c

@@ -29,6 +29,9 @@ static ssize_t cm_write(struct file *file, const char __user * user_buf,
 	struct acpi_table_header table;
 	acpi_status status;
 
+	if (kernel_is_locked_down())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (!(*ppos)) {
 		/* parse the table header to get the table length */
 		if (count <= sizeof(struct acpi_table_header))

drivers/acpi/osl.c

@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ acpi_physical_address __init acpi_os_get_root_pointer(void)
 	acpi_physical_address pa = 0;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC
-	if (acpi_rsdp)
+	if (acpi_rsdp && !kernel_is_locked_down())
 		return acpi_rsdp;
 #endif
 

drivers/acpi/tables.c

@@ -526,6 +526,11 @@ void __init acpi_table_upgrade(void)
 	if (table_nr == 0)
 		return;
 
+	if (kernel_is_locked_down()) {
+		pr_notice("kernel is locked down, ignoring table override\n");
+		return;
+	}
+
 	acpi_tables_addr =
 		memblock_find_in_range(0, ACPI_TABLE_UPGRADE_MAX_PHYS,
 				       all_tables_size, PAGE_SIZE);

drivers/char/mem.c

@@ -179,6 +179,9 @@ static ssize_t write_mem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	if (p != *ppos)
 		return -EFBIG;
 
+	if (kernel_is_locked_down())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (!valid_phys_addr_range(p, count))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
@@ -540,6 +543,9 @@ static ssize_t write_kmem(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	char *kbuf; /* k-addr because vwrite() takes vmlist_lock rwlock */
 	int err = 0;
 
+	if (kernel_is_locked_down())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (p < (unsigned long) high_memory) {
 		unsigned long to_write = min_t(unsigned long, count,
 					       (unsigned long)high_memory - p);
@@ -762,6 +768,8 @@ static loff_t memory_lseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int orig)
 
 static int open_port(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
 {
+	if (kernel_is_locked_down())
+		return -EPERM;
 	return capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) ? 0 : -EPERM;
 }
 

drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c

@@ -888,6 +888,9 @@ static ssize_t pci_write_config(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
 	loff_t init_off = off;
 	u8 *data = (u8 *) buf;
 
+	if (kernel_is_locked_down())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (off > dev->cfg_size)
 		return 0;
 	if (off + count > dev->cfg_size) {
@@ -1182,6 +1185,9 @@ static int pci_mmap_resource(struct kobject *kobj, struct bin_attribute *attr,
 	enum pci_mmap_state mmap_type;
 	struct resource *res = &pdev->resource[bar];
 
+	if (kernel_is_locked_down())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (res->flags & IORESOURCE_MEM && iomem_is_exclusive(res->start))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
@@ -1265,6 +1271,9 @@ static ssize_t pci_write_resource_io(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
 				     struct bin_attribute *attr, char *buf,
 				     loff_t off, size_t count)
 {
+	if (kernel_is_locked_down())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	return pci_resource_io(filp, kobj, attr, buf, off, count, true);
 }
 

drivers/pci/proc.c

@@ -116,6 +116,9 @@ static ssize_t proc_bus_pci_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	int size = dev->cfg_size;
 	int cnt;
 
+	if (kernel_is_locked_down())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (pos >= size)
 		return 0;
 	if (nbytes >= size)
@@ -195,6 +198,9 @@ static long proc_bus_pci_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 #endif /* HAVE_PCI_MMAP */
 	int ret = 0;
 
+	if (kernel_is_locked_down())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	switch (cmd) {
 	case PCIIOC_CONTROLLER:
 		ret = pci_domain_nr(dev->bus);
@@ -236,7 +242,7 @@ static int proc_bus_pci_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 	struct pci_filp_private *fpriv = file->private_data;
 	int i, ret, write_combine = 0, res_bit = IORESOURCE_MEM;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
+	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || kernel_is_locked_down())
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	if (fpriv->mmap_state == pci_mmap_io) {

drivers/pci/syscall.c

@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(pciconfig_write, unsigned long, bus, unsigned long, dfn,
 	u32 dword;
 	int err = 0;
 
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || kernel_is_locked_down())
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	dev = pci_get_bus_and_slot(bus, dfn);

drivers/pcmcia/cistpl.c

@@ -1578,6 +1578,11 @@ static ssize_t pccard_store_cis(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
 	struct pcmcia_socket *s;
 	int error;
 
+	if (kernel_is_locked_down()) {
+		pr_err("Direct CIS storage isn't permitted when the kernel is locked down\n");
+		return -EPERM;
+	}
+
 	s = to_socket(container_of(kobj, struct device, kobj));
 
 	if (off)

drivers/platform/x86/asus-wmi.c

@@ -1905,6 +1905,9 @@ static int show_dsts(struct seq_file *m, void *data)
 	int err;
 	u32 retval = -1;
 
+	if (kernel_is_locked_down())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	err = asus_wmi_get_devstate(asus, asus->debug.dev_id, &retval);
 
 	if (err < 0)
@@ -1921,6 +1924,9 @@ static int show_devs(struct seq_file *m, void *data)
 	int err;
 	u32 retval = -1;
 
+	if (kernel_is_locked_down())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	err = asus_wmi_set_devstate(asus->debug.dev_id, asus->debug.ctrl_param,
 				    &retval);
 
@@ -1945,6 +1951,9 @@ static int show_call(struct seq_file *m, void *data)
 	union acpi_object *obj;
 	acpi_status status;
 
+	if (kernel_is_locked_down())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	status = wmi_evaluate_method(ASUS_WMI_MGMT_GUID,
 				     1, asus->debug.method_id,
 				     &input, &output);

drivers/scsi/eata.c

@@ -1552,8 +1552,13 @@ static int eata2x_detect(struct scsi_host_template *tpnt)
 
 	tpnt->proc_name = "eata2x";
 
-	if (strlen(boot_options))
+	if (strlen(boot_options)) {
+		if (kernel_is_locked_down()) {
+			pr_err("Command line-specified device addresses, irqs and dma channels are not permitted when the kernel is locked down\n");
+			return -EPERM;
+		}
 		option_setup(boot_options);
+	}
 
 #if defined(MODULE)
 	/* io_port could have been modified when loading as a module */

drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c

@@ -821,6 +821,12 @@ static int uart_set_info(struct tty_struct *tty, struct tty_port *port,
 	new_flags = new_info->flags;
 	old_custom_divisor = uport->custom_divisor;
 
+	if ((change_port || change_irq) && kernel_is_locked_down()) {
+		pr_err("Using TIOCSSERIAL to change device addresses, irqs and dma channels is not permitted when the kernel is locked down\n");
+		retval = -EPERM;
+		goto exit;
+	}
+
 	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
 		retval = -EPERM;
 		if (change_irq || change_port ||

include/linux/efi.h

@@ -1081,6 +1081,7 @@ extern int __init efi_setup_pcdp_console(char *);
 #define EFI_DBG			8	/* Print additional debug info at runtime */
 #define EFI_NX_PE_DATA		9	/* Can runtime data regions be mapped non-executable? */
 #define EFI_MEM_ATTR		10	/* Did firmware publish an EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES table? */
+#define EFI_SECURE_BOOT		11	/* Are we in Secure Boot mode? */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_EFI
 /*

include/linux/kernel.h

@@ -277,6 +277,15 @@ extern int oops_may_print(void);
 void do_exit(long error_code) __noreturn;
 void complete_and_exit(struct completion *, long) __noreturn;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL
+extern bool kernel_is_locked_down(void);
+#else
+static inline bool kernel_is_locked_down(void)
+{
+	return false;
+}
+#endif
+
 /* Internal, do not use. */
 int __must_check _kstrtoul(const char *s, unsigned int base, unsigned long *res);
 int __must_check _kstrtol(const char *s, unsigned int base, long *res);

include/linux/security.h

@@ -1764,5 +1764,16 @@ static inline void free_secdata(void *secdata)
 { }
 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL
+extern void lock_kernel_down(void);
+#ifdef CONFIG_ALLOW_LOCKDOWN_LIFT
+extern void lift_kernel_lockdown(void);
+#endif
+#else
+static inline void lock_kernel_down(void)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
 #endif /* ! __LINUX_SECURITY_H */
 

kernel/kexec.c

@@ -201,6 +201,13 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(kexec_load, unsigned long, entry, unsigned long, nr_segments,
 	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) || kexec_load_disabled)
 		return -EPERM;
 
+	/*
+	 * kexec can be used to circumvent module loading restrictions, so
+	 * prevent loading in that case
+	 */
+	if (kernel_is_locked_down())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	/*
 	 * Verify we have a legal set of flags
 	 * This leaves us room for future extensions.

kernel/kexec_file.c

@@ -255,6 +255,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(kexec_file_load, int, kernel_fd, int, initrd_fd,
 	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) || kexec_load_disabled)
 		return -EPERM;
 
+	/* Don't permit images to be loaded into trusted kernels if we're not
+	 * going to verify the signature on them
+	 */
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG) && kernel_is_locked_down())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	/* Make sure we have a legal set of flags */
 	if (flags != (flags & KEXEC_FILE_FLAGS))
 		return -EINVAL;

kernel/module.c

@@ -2781,7 +2781,7 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
 	}
 
 	/* Not having a signature is only an error if we're strict. */
-	if (err == -ENOKEY && !sig_enforce)
+	if (err == -ENOKEY && !sig_enforce && !kernel_is_locked_down())
 		err = 0;
 
 	return err;