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RFE: Improve supported feature reporting #85

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WOnder93 opened this issue May 22, 2018 · 1 comment
Open

RFE: Improve supported feature reporting #85

WOnder93 opened this issue May 22, 2018 · 1 comment

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@WOnder93
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I was thinking about the problematic situation with the current feature bitmap approach and I think I came up with a viable long-term solution.

High-level description

My idea is to supersede the current 32-bit bitmap field with two fields:

  1. A 32-bit base feature counter (n). This number would represent the highest feature ID for which it holds that all features with lower and equal ID are implemented in the kernel.
  2. A 32-bit extra feature bitmap, where bit of order k would signal the presence of feature with ID n + 2 + k (we add two instead of one because if feature n + 1 is also present, then we can simply increment n).

In the upstream kernel we would simply increment n on every new feature, because it will always have all features implemented. Whenever we would branch-off the upstream kernel (e.g. for a new RHEL version), we would start with a clean feature bitmap, enabling us to backport up to 33 future features (less if some bits are reserved for special purpose). Even better, every time we would backport the oldest not-yet-backported feature, we would simply increment n (and shift the bitmap), effectively extending the window of features we can backport by one.

Notes / drawbacks

  1. We need to add two new 32-bit fields to the audit_status UAPI structure. We need to keep the old feature_bitmap (and just freeze it at the current list of features) for backwards compatibility. The userspace will need to be able to handle the two possible sizes of the audit_status structure, but this should be easily doable (and old versions should already correctly ignore any extra bytes sent by the kernel).
  2. We won't be able to easily remove (deprecate) a feature as we can now. (However I think this is just an 'accidental' feature of the current system – we probably don't need that ability.)
  3. The userspace 'formula' to determine if a feature is available will be more complex. Something like (example code):
    int has_feature(struct audit_status *status, u32 f)
    {
    	/* AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_V2 set in the old bitmap signals
    	 * the use of the new system: */
    	if (!(status->feature_bitmap & AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_V2))
    		/* Legacy feature system: */
    		return status->feature_bitmap & (1U << f);
    
    	if (f <= status->feature_base)
    		return 1; /* feature implemented */
    
    	if (f == status->feature_base + 1)
    		return 0; /* first feature after the last implemented one */
    
    	if (f > status->feature_base + 32 + 1 /* minus reserved bits */)
    		return 0; /* feature beyond window */
    
    	/* is feature backported? */
    	return status->feature_bitmap_v2 & (1U << (f - status->feature_base - 2));
    }
    
    //...
    if (has_feature(status, AUDIT_STATIC_FEATURE_SESSIONID_FILTER))
    	// do something
    vs. the current approach:
    if (status->feature_bitmap & AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_SESSIONID_FILTER)
    	// do something
  4. We need to add new macros for the current features, this time represented by incrementing sequence of numbers (not by the sequence of powers of two). For example, we could add the following to audit.h:
    #define AUDIT_STATIC_FEATURE_BACKLOG_LIMIT	0
    #define AUDIT_STATIC_FEATURE_BACKLOG_WAIT_TIME	1
    #define AUDIT_STATIC_FEATURE_EXECUTABLE_PATH	2
    #define AUDIT_STATIC_FEATURE_EXCLUDE_EXTEND	3
    #define AUDIT_STATIC_FEATURE_SESSIONID_FILTER	4
    #define AUDIT_STATIC_FEATURE_LOST_RESET		5
    #define AUDIT_STATIC_FEATURE_FILTER_FS		6
    //...
    (I use STATIC here to distinguish these features from the struct audit_features features, which can be dynamically enabled/disabled as I understand it.)

@pcmoore, @rgbriggs, @stevegrubb: What do you think about this idea?

@rgbriggs
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rgbriggs commented May 31, 2018 via email

pcmoore pushed a commit that referenced this issue Sep 17, 2019
This patch fixes an issue that the following error is
possible to happen when ohci hardware causes an interruption
and the system is shutting down at the same time.

[   34.851754] usb 2-1: USB disconnect, device number 2
[   35.166658] irq 156: nobody cared (try booting with the "irqpoll" option)
[   35.173445] CPU: 0 PID: 22 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 5.3.0-rc5 #85
[   35.179964] Hardware name: Renesas Salvator-X 2nd version board based on r8a77965 (DT)
[   35.187886] Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event
[   35.192063] Call trace:
[   35.194509]  dump_backtrace+0x0/0x150
[   35.198165]  show_stack+0x14/0x20
[   35.201475]  dump_stack+0xa0/0xc4
[   35.204785]  __report_bad_irq+0x34/0xe8
[   35.208614]  note_interrupt+0x2cc/0x318
[   35.212446]  handle_irq_event_percpu+0x5c/0x88
[   35.216883]  handle_irq_event+0x48/0x78
[   35.220712]  handle_fasteoi_irq+0xb4/0x188
[   35.224802]  generic_handle_irq+0x24/0x38
[   35.228804]  __handle_domain_irq+0x5c/0xb0
[   35.232893]  gic_handle_irq+0x58/0xa8
[   35.236548]  el1_irq+0xb8/0x180
[   35.239681]  __do_softirq+0x94/0x23c
[   35.243253]  irq_exit+0xd0/0xd8
[   35.246387]  __handle_domain_irq+0x60/0xb0
[   35.250475]  gic_handle_irq+0x58/0xa8
[   35.254130]  el1_irq+0xb8/0x180
[   35.257268]  kernfs_find_ns+0x5c/0x120
[   35.261010]  kernfs_find_and_get_ns+0x3c/0x60
[   35.265361]  sysfs_unmerge_group+0x20/0x68
[   35.269454]  dpm_sysfs_remove+0x2c/0x68
[   35.273284]  device_del+0x80/0x370
[   35.276683]  hid_destroy_device+0x28/0x60
[   35.280686]  usbhid_disconnect+0x4c/0x80
[   35.284602]  usb_unbind_interface+0x6c/0x268
[   35.288867]  device_release_driver_internal+0xe4/0x1b0
[   35.293998]  device_release_driver+0x14/0x20
[   35.298261]  bus_remove_device+0x110/0x128
[   35.302350]  device_del+0x148/0x370
[   35.305832]  usb_disable_device+0x8c/0x1d0
[   35.309921]  usb_disconnect+0xc8/0x2d0
[   35.313663]  hub_event+0x6e0/0x1128
[   35.317146]  process_one_work+0x1e0/0x320
[   35.321148]  worker_thread+0x40/0x450
[   35.324805]  kthread+0x124/0x128
[   35.328027]  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
[   35.331594] handlers:
[   35.333862] [<0000000079300c1d>] usb_hcd_irq
[   35.338126] [<0000000079300c1d>] usb_hcd_irq
[   35.342389] Disabling IRQ #156

ohci_shutdown() disables all the interrupt and rh_state is set to
OHCI_RH_HALTED. In other hand, ohci_irq() is possible to enable
OHCI_INTR_SF and OHCI_INTR_MIE on ohci_irq(). Note that OHCI_INTR_SF
is possible to be set by start_ed_unlink() which is called:
 ohci_irq()
  -> process_done_list()
   -> takeback_td()
    -> start_ed_unlink()

So, ohci_irq() has the following condition, the issue happens by
&ohci->regs->intrenable = OHCI_INTR_MIE | OHCI_INTR_SF and
ohci->rh_state = OHCI_RH_HALTED:

	/* interrupt for some other device? */
	if (ints == 0 || unlikely(ohci->rh_state == OHCI_RH_HALTED))
		return IRQ_NOTMINE;

To fix the issue, ohci_shutdown() holds the spin lock while disabling
the interruption and changing the rh_state flag to prevent reenable
the OHCI_INTR_MIE unexpectedly. Note that io_watchdog_func() also
calls the ohci_shutdown() and it already held the spin lock, so that
the patch makes a new function as _ohci_shutdown().

This patch is inspired by a Renesas R-Car Gen3 BSP patch
from Tho Vu.

Signed-off-by: Yoshihiro Shimoda <yoshihiro.shimoda.uh@renesas.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1566877910-6020-1-git-send-email-yoshihiro.shimoda.uh@renesas.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
pcmoore pushed a commit that referenced this issue May 17, 2022
…sted

The current EOI handler for LEVEL triggered interrupts calls clk_enable(),
register IO, clk_disable(). The clock manipulation requires locking which
happens with IRQs disabled in clk_enable_lock(). Instead of turning the
clock on and off all the time, enable the clock in case LEVEL interrupt is
requested and keep the clock enabled until all LEVEL interrupts are freed.
The LEVEL interrupts are an exception on this platform and seldom used, so
this does not affect the common case.

This simplifies the LEVEL interrupt handling considerably and also fixes
the following splat found when using preempt-rt:
 ------------[ cut here ]------------
 WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at kernel/locking/rtmutex.c:2040 __rt_mutex_trylock+0x37/0x62
 Modules linked in:
 CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.10.109-rt65-stable-standard-00068-g6a5afc4b1217 #85
 Hardware name: STM32 (Device Tree Support)
 [<c010a45d>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c010766f>] (show_stack+0xb/0xc)
 [<c010766f>] (show_stack) from [<c06353ab>] (dump_stack+0x6f/0x84)
 [<c06353ab>] (dump_stack) from [<c01145e3>] (__warn+0x7f/0xa4)
 [<c01145e3>] (__warn) from [<c063386f>] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0x3b/0x74)
 [<c063386f>] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [<c063b43d>] (__rt_mutex_trylock+0x37/0x62)
 [<c063b43d>] (__rt_mutex_trylock) from [<c063c053>] (rt_spin_trylock+0x7/0x16)
 [<c063c053>] (rt_spin_trylock) from [<c036a2f3>] (clk_enable_lock+0xb/0x80)
 [<c036a2f3>] (clk_enable_lock) from [<c036ba69>] (clk_core_enable_lock+0x9/0x18)
 [<c036ba69>] (clk_core_enable_lock) from [<c034e9f3>] (stm32_gpio_get+0x11/0x24)
 [<c034e9f3>] (stm32_gpio_get) from [<c034ef43>] (stm32_gpio_irq_trigger+0x1f/0x48)
 [<c034ef43>] (stm32_gpio_irq_trigger) from [<c014aa53>] (handle_fasteoi_irq+0x71/0xa8)
 [<c014aa53>] (handle_fasteoi_irq) from [<c0147111>] (generic_handle_irq+0x19/0x22)
 [<c0147111>] (generic_handle_irq) from [<c014752d>] (__handle_domain_irq+0x55/0x64)
 [<c014752d>] (__handle_domain_irq) from [<c0346f13>] (gic_handle_irq+0x53/0x64)
 [<c0346f13>] (gic_handle_irq) from [<c0100ba5>] (__irq_svc+0x65/0xc0)
 Exception stack(0xc0e01f18 to 0xc0e01f60)
 1f00:                                                       0000300c 00000000
 1f20: 0000300c c010ff01 00000000 00000000 c0e00000 c0e07714 00000001 c0e01f78
 1f40: c0e07758 00000000 ef7cd0ff c0e01f68 c010554b c0105542 40000033 ffffffff
 [<c0100ba5>] (__irq_svc) from [<c0105542>] (arch_cpu_idle+0xc/0x1e)
 [<c0105542>] (arch_cpu_idle) from [<c063be95>] (default_idle_call+0x21/0x3c)
 [<c063be95>] (default_idle_call) from [<c01324f7>] (do_idle+0xe3/0x1e4)
 [<c01324f7>] (do_idle) from [<c01327b3>] (cpu_startup_entry+0x13/0x14)
 [<c01327b3>] (cpu_startup_entry) from [<c0a00c13>] (start_kernel+0x397/0x3d4)
 [<c0a00c13>] (start_kernel) from [<00000000>] (0x0)
 ---[ end trace 0000000000000002 ]---

Power consumption measured on STM32MP157C DHCOM SoM is not increased or
is below noise threshold.

Fixes: 47beed5 ("pinctrl: stm32: Add level interrupt support to gpio irq chip")
Signed-off-by: Marek Vasut <marex@denx.de>
Cc: Alexandre Torgue <alexandre.torgue@foss.st.com>
Cc: Fabien Dessenne <fabien.dessenne@foss.st.com>
Cc: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-stm32@st-md-mailman.stormreply.com
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
To: linux-gpio@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Fabien Dessenne <fabien.dessenne@foss.st.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220421140827.214088-1-marex@denx.de
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
pcmoore pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jan 22, 2024
When I was testing mongodb over bcachefs with compression,
there is a lockdep warning when snapshotting mongodb data volume.

$ cat test.sh
prog=bcachefs

$prog subvolume create /mnt/data
$prog subvolume create /mnt/data/snapshots

while true;do
    $prog subvolume snapshot /mnt/data /mnt/data/snapshots/$(date +%s)
    sleep 1s
done

$ cat /etc/mongodb.conf
systemLog:
  destination: file
  logAppend: true
  path: /mnt/data/mongod.log

storage:
  dbPath: /mnt/data/

lockdep reports:
[ 3437.452330] ======================================================
[ 3437.452750] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[ 3437.453168] 6.7.0-rc7-custom+ #85 Tainted: G            E
[ 3437.453562] ------------------------------------------------------
[ 3437.453981] bcachefs/35533 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 3437.454325] ffffa0a02b2b1418 (sb_writers#10){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: filename_create+0x62/0x190
[ 3437.454875]
               but task is already holding lock:
[ 3437.455268] ffffa0a02b2b10e0 (&type->s_umount_key#48){.+.+}-{3:3}, at: bch2_fs_file_ioctl+0x232/0xc90 [bcachefs]
[ 3437.456009]
               which lock already depends on the new lock.

[ 3437.456553]
               the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[ 3437.457054]
               -> #3 (&type->s_umount_key#48){.+.+}-{3:3}:
[ 3437.457507]        down_read+0x3e/0x170
[ 3437.457772]        bch2_fs_file_ioctl+0x232/0xc90 [bcachefs]
[ 3437.458206]        __x64_sys_ioctl+0x93/0xd0
[ 3437.458498]        do_syscall_64+0x42/0xf0
[ 3437.458779]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76
[ 3437.459155]
               -> #2 (&c->snapshot_create_lock){++++}-{3:3}:
[ 3437.459615]        down_read+0x3e/0x170
[ 3437.459878]        bch2_truncate+0x82/0x110 [bcachefs]
[ 3437.460276]        bchfs_truncate+0x254/0x3c0 [bcachefs]
[ 3437.460686]        notify_change+0x1f1/0x4a0
[ 3437.461283]        do_truncate+0x7f/0xd0
[ 3437.461555]        path_openat+0xa57/0xce0
[ 3437.461836]        do_filp_open+0xb4/0x160
[ 3437.462116]        do_sys_openat2+0x91/0xc0
[ 3437.462402]        __x64_sys_openat+0x53/0xa0
[ 3437.462701]        do_syscall_64+0x42/0xf0
[ 3437.462982]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76
[ 3437.463359]
               -> #1 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#15){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[ 3437.463843]        down_write+0x3b/0xc0
[ 3437.464223]        bch2_write_iter+0x5b/0xcc0 [bcachefs]
[ 3437.464493]        vfs_write+0x21b/0x4c0
[ 3437.464653]        ksys_write+0x69/0xf0
[ 3437.464839]        do_syscall_64+0x42/0xf0
[ 3437.465009]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76
[ 3437.465231]
               -> #0 (sb_writers#10){.+.+}-{0:0}:
[ 3437.465471]        __lock_acquire+0x1455/0x21b0
[ 3437.465656]        lock_acquire+0xc6/0x2b0
[ 3437.465822]        mnt_want_write+0x46/0x1a0
[ 3437.465996]        filename_create+0x62/0x190
[ 3437.466175]        user_path_create+0x2d/0x50
[ 3437.466352]        bch2_fs_file_ioctl+0x2ec/0xc90 [bcachefs]
[ 3437.466617]        __x64_sys_ioctl+0x93/0xd0
[ 3437.466791]        do_syscall_64+0x42/0xf0
[ 3437.466957]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76
[ 3437.467180]
               other info that might help us debug this:

[ 3437.469670] 2 locks held by bcachefs/35533:
               other info that might help us debug this:

[ 3437.467507] Chain exists of:
                 sb_writers#10 --> &c->snapshot_create_lock --> &type->s_umount_key#48

[ 3437.467979]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

[ 3437.468223]        CPU0                    CPU1
[ 3437.468405]        ----                    ----
[ 3437.468585]   rlock(&type->s_umount_key#48);
[ 3437.468758]                                lock(&c->snapshot_create_lock);
[ 3437.469030]                                lock(&type->s_umount_key#48);
[ 3437.469291]   rlock(sb_writers#10);
[ 3437.469434]
                *** DEADLOCK ***

[ 3437.469670] 2 locks held by bcachefs/35533:
[ 3437.469838]  #0: ffffa0a02ce00a88 (&c->snapshot_create_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: bch2_fs_file_ioctl+0x1e3/0xc90 [bcachefs]
[ 3437.470294]  #1: ffffa0a02b2b10e0 (&type->s_umount_key#48){.+.+}-{3:3}, at: bch2_fs_file_ioctl+0x232/0xc90 [bcachefs]
[ 3437.470744]
               stack backtrace:
[ 3437.470922] CPU: 7 PID: 35533 Comm: bcachefs Kdump: loaded Tainted: G            E      6.7.0-rc7-custom+ #85
[ 3437.471313] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014
[ 3437.471694] Call Trace:
[ 3437.471795]  <TASK>
[ 3437.471884]  dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x90
[ 3437.472035]  check_noncircular+0x132/0x150
[ 3437.472202]  __lock_acquire+0x1455/0x21b0
[ 3437.472369]  lock_acquire+0xc6/0x2b0
[ 3437.472518]  ? filename_create+0x62/0x190
[ 3437.472683]  ? lock_is_held_type+0x97/0x110
[ 3437.472856]  mnt_want_write+0x46/0x1a0
[ 3437.473025]  ? filename_create+0x62/0x190
[ 3437.473204]  filename_create+0x62/0x190
[ 3437.473380]  user_path_create+0x2d/0x50
[ 3437.473555]  bch2_fs_file_ioctl+0x2ec/0xc90 [bcachefs]
[ 3437.473819]  ? lock_acquire+0xc6/0x2b0
[ 3437.474002]  ? __fget_files+0x2a/0x190
[ 3437.474195]  ? __fget_files+0xbc/0x190
[ 3437.474380]  ? lock_release+0xc5/0x270
[ 3437.474567]  ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0x93/0xd0
[ 3437.474764]  ? __pfx_bch2_fs_file_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [bcachefs]
[ 3437.475090]  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x93/0xd0
[ 3437.475277]  do_syscall_64+0x42/0xf0
[ 3437.475454]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76
[ 3437.475691] RIP: 0033:0x7f2743c313af
======================================================

In __bch2_ioctl_subvolume_create(), we grab s_umount unconditionally
and unlock it at the end of the function. There is a comment
"why do we need this lock?" about the lock coming from
commit 42d2373 ("bcachefs: Snapshot creation, deletion")
The reason is that __bch2_ioctl_subvolume_create() calls
sync_inodes_sb() which enforce locked s_umount to writeback all dirty
nodes before doing snapshot works.

Fix it by read locking s_umount for snapshotting only and unlocking
s_umount after sync_inodes_sb().

Signed-off-by: Su Yue <glass.su@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev>
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