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RFE: add a tty field to the AUDIT_LOGIN event #2
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We should be able to record the tty information using logic similar to what we use in audit_log_task_info(), in fact it might be a good idea to split this out into a helper function, e.g. audit_get_tty(). Snippet from audit_log_task_info():
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While an RFE, this is a rather minor addition and a feature page isn't required, just the usual verbose patch description. However, as with all new changes a corresponding patch for the test suite will be required for kernel patch acceptance. |
test: RFE: add a tty field to the AUDIT_LOGIN event linux-audit#2 linux-audit/audit-kernel#2 Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Pull request for a test: linux-audit/audit-testsuite@a76cc13 Posted a code patch to the mailing list: https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2016-April/msg00072.html |
test: RFE: add a tty field to the AUDIT_LOGIN event linux-audit#2 linux-audit/audit-kernel#2 v2: provoke a LOGIN record if one wasn't triggered since the last boot by login Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
test: RFE: add a tty field to the AUDIT_LOGIN event linux-audit#2 linux-audit/audit-kernel#2 v3: escape "$" in LOGIN record provoking system command. v2: provoke a LOGIN record if one wasn't triggered since the last boot by login Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
test: RFE: add a tty field to the AUDIT_LOGIN event linux-audit#2 linux-audit/audit-kernel#2 v4: use a new filehandle for tty and test PID of LOGIN test command. v3: escape "$" in LOGIN record provoking system command. v2: provoke a LOGIN record if one wasn't triggered since the last boot by login Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
test: RFE: add a tty field to the AUDIT_LOGIN event #2 linux-audit/audit-kernel#2 v4: use a new filehandle for tty and test PID of LOGIN test command. v3: escape "$" in LOGIN record provoking system command. v2: provoke a LOGIN record if one wasn't triggered since the last boot by login Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
…it (#2) Richard made this change some time ago but Eric backed it out because the rest of the supporting code wasn't ready. In order to move the netlink multicast send to kauditd_thread we need to ensure the kauditd_thread is always running, so restore commit 6ff5e45 ("audit: move kaudit thread start from auditd registration to kaudit init"). Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rbriggs@redhat.com> [PM: brought forward and merged based on Richard's old patch] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
…it (#2) Richard made this change some time ago but Eric backed it out because the rest of the supporting code wasn't ready. In order to move the netlink multicast send to kauditd_thread we need to ensure the kauditd_thread is always running, so restore commit 6ff5e45 ("audit: move kaudit thread start from auditd registration to kaudit init"). Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rbriggs@redhat.com> [PM: brought forward and merged based on Richard's old patch] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The code where sk_clone() came from created a new socket and locked it, but then, on the error path didn't unlock it. This problem stayed there for a long while, till b0691c8 ("net: Unlock sock before calling sk_free()") fixed it, but unfortunately the callers of sk_clone() (now sk_clone_locked()) were not audited and the one in dccp_create_openreq_child() remained. Now in the age of the syskaller fuzzer, this was finally uncovered, as reported by Dmitry: ---- 8< ---- I've got the following report while running syzkaller fuzzer on 86292b3 ("Merge branch 'akpm' (patches from Andrew)") [ BUG: held lock freed! ] 4.10.0+ #234 Not tainted ------------------------- syz-executor6/6898 is freeing memory ffff88006286cac0-ffff88006286d3b7, with a lock still held there! (slock-AF_INET6){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8362c2c9>] spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline] (slock-AF_INET6){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8362c2c9>] sk_clone_lock+0x3d9/0x12c0 net/core/sock.c:1504 5 locks held by syz-executor6/6898: #0: (sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff839a34b4>] lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1460 [inline] #0: (sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff839a34b4>] inet_stream_connect+0x44/0xa0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:681 #1: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff83bc1c2a>] inet6_csk_xmit+0x12a/0x5d0 net/ipv6/inet6_connection_sock.c:126 #2: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff8369b424>] __skb_unlink include/linux/skbuff.h:1767 [inline] #2: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff8369b424>] __skb_dequeue include/linux/skbuff.h:1783 [inline] #2: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff8369b424>] process_backlog+0x264/0x730 net/core/dev.c:4835 #3: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff83aeb5c0>] ip6_input_finish+0x0/0x1700 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:59 #4: (slock-AF_INET6){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8362c2c9>] spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline] #4: (slock-AF_INET6){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8362c2c9>] sk_clone_lock+0x3d9/0x12c0 net/core/sock.c:1504 Fix it just like was done by b0691c8 ("net: Unlock sock before calling sk_free()"). Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Gerrit Renker <gerrit@erg.abdn.ac.uk> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170301153510.GE15145@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The locking in lirc needs improvement, but for now just fix this potential deadlock. ====================================================== [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] 4.10.0-rc1+ #1 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------- bash/2502 is trying to acquire lock: (ir_raw_handler_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffc06f6a5e>] ir_raw_encode_scancode+0x3e/0xb0 [rc_core] but task is already holding lock: (&dev->lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffc06f511f>] store_filter+0x9f/0x240 [rc_core] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (&dev->lock){+.+.+.}: [<ffffffffa110adad>] lock_acquire+0xfd/0x200 [<ffffffffa1921327>] mutex_lock_nested+0x77/0x6d0 [<ffffffffc06f436a>] rc_open+0x2a/0x80 [rc_core] [<ffffffffc07114ca>] lirc_dev_fop_open+0xda/0x1e0 [lirc_dev] [<ffffffffa12975e0>] chrdev_open+0xb0/0x210 [<ffffffffa128eb5a>] do_dentry_open+0x20a/0x2f0 [<ffffffffa128ffcc>] vfs_open+0x4c/0x80 [<ffffffffa12a35ec>] path_openat+0x5bc/0xc00 [<ffffffffa12a5271>] do_filp_open+0x91/0x100 [<ffffffffa12903f0>] do_sys_open+0x130/0x220 [<ffffffffa12904fe>] SyS_open+0x1e/0x20 [<ffffffffa19278c1>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2 -> #1 (lirc_dev_lock){+.+.+.}: [<ffffffffa110adad>] lock_acquire+0xfd/0x200 [<ffffffffa1921327>] mutex_lock_nested+0x77/0x6d0 [<ffffffffc0711f47>] lirc_register_driver+0x67/0x59b [lirc_dev] [<ffffffffc06db7f4>] ir_lirc_register+0x1f4/0x260 [ir_lirc_codec] [<ffffffffc06f6cac>] ir_raw_handler_register+0x7c/0xb0 [rc_core] [<ffffffffc0398010>] 0xffffffffc0398010 [<ffffffffa1002192>] do_one_initcall+0x52/0x1b0 [<ffffffffa11ef5c8>] do_init_module+0x5f/0x1fa [<ffffffffa11566b5>] load_module+0x2675/0x2b00 [<ffffffffa1156dcf>] SYSC_finit_module+0xdf/0x110 [<ffffffffa1156e1e>] SyS_finit_module+0xe/0x10 [<ffffffffa1003f5c>] do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x1f0 [<ffffffffa1927989>] return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x7a -> #0 (ir_raw_handler_lock){+.+.+.}: [<ffffffffa110a7b7>] __lock_acquire+0x10f7/0x1290 [<ffffffffa110adad>] lock_acquire+0xfd/0x200 [<ffffffffa1921327>] mutex_lock_nested+0x77/0x6d0 [<ffffffffc06f6a5e>] ir_raw_encode_scancode+0x3e/0xb0 [rc_core] [<ffffffffc0b0f492>] loop_set_wakeup_filter+0x62/0xbd [rc_loopback] [<ffffffffc06f522a>] store_filter+0x1aa/0x240 [rc_core] [<ffffffffa15e46f8>] dev_attr_store+0x18/0x30 [<ffffffffa13318e5>] sysfs_kf_write+0x45/0x60 [<ffffffffa1330b55>] kernfs_fop_write+0x155/0x1e0 [<ffffffffa1290797>] __vfs_write+0x37/0x160 [<ffffffffa12921f8>] vfs_write+0xc8/0x1e0 [<ffffffffa12936e8>] SyS_write+0x58/0xc0 [<ffffffffa19278c1>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: ir_raw_handler_lock --> lirc_dev_lock --> &dev->lock Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&dev->lock); lock(lirc_dev_lock); lock(&dev->lock); lock(ir_raw_handler_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 4 locks held by bash/2502: #0: (sb_writers#4){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffffa12922c5>] vfs_write+0x195/0x1e0 #1: (&of->mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa1330b1f>] kernfs_fop_write+0x11f/0x1e0 #2: (s_active#215){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffffa1330b28>] kernfs_fop_write+0x128/0x1e0 #3: (&dev->lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffc06f511f>] store_filter+0x9f/0x240 [rc_core] stack backtrace: CPU: 3 PID: 2502 Comm: bash Not tainted 4.10.0-rc1+ #1 Hardware name: /DG45ID, BIOS IDG4510H.86A.0135.2011.0225.1100 02/25/2011 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x86/0xc3 print_circular_bug+0x1be/0x210 __lock_acquire+0x10f7/0x1290 lock_acquire+0xfd/0x200 ? ir_raw_encode_scancode+0x3e/0xb0 [rc_core] ? ir_raw_encode_scancode+0x3e/0xb0 [rc_core] mutex_lock_nested+0x77/0x6d0 ? ir_raw_encode_scancode+0x3e/0xb0 [rc_core] ? loop_set_wakeup_filter+0x44/0xbd [rc_loopback] ir_raw_encode_scancode+0x3e/0xb0 [rc_core] loop_set_wakeup_filter+0x62/0xbd [rc_loopback] ? loop_set_tx_duty_cycle+0x70/0x70 [rc_loopback] store_filter+0x1aa/0x240 [rc_core] dev_attr_store+0x18/0x30 sysfs_kf_write+0x45/0x60 kernfs_fop_write+0x155/0x1e0 __vfs_write+0x37/0x160 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x4a/0x80 ? rcu_sync_lockdep_assert+0x2f/0x60 ? __sb_start_write+0x10c/0x220 ? vfs_write+0x195/0x1e0 ? security_file_permission+0x3b/0xc0 vfs_write+0xc8/0x1e0 SyS_write+0x58/0xc0 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2 Signed-off-by: Sean Young <sean@mess.org> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
Paul Durrant says: ==================== xen-netback: update memory leak fix to avoid BUG Commit 9a6cdf5 "xen-netback: fix memory leaks on XenBus disconnect" added missing code to fix a memory leak by calling vfree() in the appropriate place. Unfortunately subsequent commit f16f1df "xen-netback: protect resource cleaning on XenBus disconnect" then wrapped this call to vfree() in a spin lock, leading to a BUG due to incorrect context. Patch #1 makes the existing code more readable Patch #2 fixes the problem ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Dmitry reported a lockdep splat [1] (false positive) that we can fix by releasing the spinlock before calling icmp_send() from ip_expire() This is a false positive because sending an ICMP message can not possibly re-enter the IP frag engine. [1] [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] 4.10.0+ #29 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------- modprobe/12392 is trying to acquire lock: (_xmit_ETHER#2){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff837a8182>] spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline] (_xmit_ETHER#2){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff837a8182>] __netif_tx_lock include/linux/netdevice.h:3486 [inline] (_xmit_ETHER#2){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff837a8182>] sch_direct_xmit+0x282/0x6d0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:180 but task is already holding lock: (&(&q->lock)->rlock){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8389a4d1>] spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline] (&(&q->lock)->rlock){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8389a4d1>] ip_expire+0x51/0x6c0 net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c:201 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&(&q->lock)->rlock){+.-...}: validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2267 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x2149/0x3430 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3340 lock_acquire+0x2a1/0x630 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3755 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:142 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x33/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:151 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline] ip_defrag+0x3a2/0x4130 net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c:669 ip_check_defrag+0x4e3/0x8b0 net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c:713 packet_rcv_fanout+0x282/0x800 net/packet/af_packet.c:1459 deliver_skb net/core/dev.c:1834 [inline] dev_queue_xmit_nit+0x294/0xa90 net/core/dev.c:1890 xmit_one net/core/dev.c:2903 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x16b/0xab0 net/core/dev.c:2923 sch_direct_xmit+0x31f/0x6d0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:182 __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3092 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0x13e5/0x1e60 net/core/dev.c:3358 dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3423 neigh_resolve_output+0x6b9/0xb10 net/core/neighbour.c:1308 neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:478 [inline] ip_finish_output2+0x8b8/0x15a0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:228 ip_do_fragment+0x1d93/0x2720 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:672 ip_fragment.constprop.54+0x145/0x200 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:545 ip_finish_output+0x82d/0xe10 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:314 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:246 [inline] ip_output+0x1f0/0x7a0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:404 dst_output include/net/dst.h:486 [inline] ip_local_out+0x95/0x170 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:124 ip_send_skb+0x3c/0xc0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1492 ip_push_pending_frames+0x64/0x80 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1512 raw_sendmsg+0x26de/0x3a00 net/ipv4/raw.c:655 inet_sendmsg+0x164/0x5b0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:761 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:633 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:643 ___sys_sendmsg+0x4a3/0x9f0 net/socket.c:1985 __sys_sendmmsg+0x25c/0x750 net/socket.c:2075 SYSC_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2106 [inline] SyS_sendmmsg+0x35/0x60 net/socket.c:2101 do_syscall_64+0x2e8/0x930 arch/x86/entry/common.c:281 return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x7a -> #0 (_xmit_ETHER#2){+.-...}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1830 [inline] check_prevs_add+0xa8f/0x19f0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1940 validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2267 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x2149/0x3430 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3340 lock_acquire+0x2a1/0x630 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3755 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:142 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x33/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:151 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline] __netif_tx_lock include/linux/netdevice.h:3486 [inline] sch_direct_xmit+0x282/0x6d0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:180 __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3092 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0x13e5/0x1e60 net/core/dev.c:3358 dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3423 neigh_hh_output include/net/neighbour.h:468 [inline] neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:476 [inline] ip_finish_output2+0xf6c/0x15a0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:228 ip_finish_output+0xa29/0xe10 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:316 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:246 [inline] ip_output+0x1f0/0x7a0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:404 dst_output include/net/dst.h:486 [inline] ip_local_out+0x95/0x170 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:124 ip_send_skb+0x3c/0xc0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1492 ip_push_pending_frames+0x64/0x80 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1512 icmp_push_reply+0x372/0x4d0 net/ipv4/icmp.c:394 icmp_send+0x156c/0x1c80 net/ipv4/icmp.c:754 ip_expire+0x40e/0x6c0 net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c:239 call_timer_fn+0x241/0x820 kernel/time/timer.c:1268 expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1307 [inline] __run_timers+0x960/0xcf0 kernel/time/timer.c:1601 run_timer_softirq+0x21/0x80 kernel/time/timer.c:1614 __do_softirq+0x31f/0xbe7 kernel/softirq.c:284 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:364 [inline] irq_exit+0x1cc/0x200 kernel/softirq.c:405 exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:657 [inline] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x76/0xa0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:962 apic_timer_interrupt+0x93/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:707 __read_once_size include/linux/compiler.h:254 [inline] atomic_read arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:26 [inline] rcu_dynticks_curr_cpu_in_eqs kernel/rcu/tree.c:350 [inline] __rcu_is_watching kernel/rcu/tree.c:1133 [inline] rcu_is_watching+0x83/0x110 kernel/rcu/tree.c:1147 rcu_read_lock_held+0x87/0xc0 kernel/rcu/update.c:293 radix_tree_deref_slot include/linux/radix-tree.h:238 [inline] filemap_map_pages+0x6d4/0x1570 mm/filemap.c:2335 do_fault_around mm/memory.c:3231 [inline] do_read_fault mm/memory.c:3265 [inline] do_fault+0xbd5/0x2080 mm/memory.c:3370 handle_pte_fault mm/memory.c:3600 [inline] __handle_mm_fault+0x1062/0x2cb0 mm/memory.c:3714 handle_mm_fault+0x1e2/0x480 mm/memory.c:3751 __do_page_fault+0x4f6/0xb60 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1397 do_page_fault+0x54/0x70 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1460 page_fault+0x28/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:1011 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&(&q->lock)->rlock); lock(_xmit_ETHER#2); lock(&(&q->lock)->rlock); lock(_xmit_ETHER#2); *** DEADLOCK *** 10 locks held by modprobe/12392: #0: (&mm->mmap_sem){++++++}, at: [<ffffffff81329758>] __do_page_fault+0x2b8/0xb60 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1336 #1: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff8188cab6>] filemap_map_pages+0x1e6/0x1570 mm/filemap.c:2324 #2: (&(ptlock_ptr(page))->rlock#2){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff81984a78>] spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline] #2: (&(ptlock_ptr(page))->rlock#2){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff81984a78>] pte_alloc_one_map mm/memory.c:2944 [inline] #2: (&(ptlock_ptr(page))->rlock#2){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff81984a78>] alloc_set_pte+0x13b8/0x1b90 mm/memory.c:3072 #3: (((&q->timer))){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff81627e72>] lockdep_copy_map include/linux/lockdep.h:175 [inline] #3: (((&q->timer))){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff81627e72>] call_timer_fn+0x1c2/0x820 kernel/time/timer.c:1258 #4: (&(&q->lock)->rlock){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8389a4d1>] spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline] #4: (&(&q->lock)->rlock){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8389a4d1>] ip_expire+0x51/0x6c0 net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c:201 #5: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffffff8389a633>] ip_expire+0x1b3/0x6c0 net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c:216 #6: (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff839b3313>] spin_trylock include/linux/spinlock.h:309 [inline] #6: (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff839b3313>] icmp_xmit_lock net/ipv4/icmp.c:219 [inline] #6: (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff839b3313>] icmp_send+0x803/0x1c80 net/ipv4/icmp.c:681 #7: (rcu_read_lock_bh){......}, at: [<ffffffff838ab9a1>] ip_finish_output2+0x2c1/0x15a0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:198 #8: (rcu_read_lock_bh){......}, at: [<ffffffff836d1dee>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x23e/0x1e60 net/core/dev.c:3324 #9: (dev->qdisc_running_key ?: &qdisc_running_key){+.....}, at: [<ffffffff836d3a27>] dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3423 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 12392 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 4.10.0+ #29 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16 [inline] dump_stack+0x2ee/0x3ef lib/dump_stack.c:52 print_circular_bug+0x307/0x3b0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1204 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1830 [inline] check_prevs_add+0xa8f/0x19f0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:1940 validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2267 [inline] __lock_acquire+0x2149/0x3430 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3340 lock_acquire+0x2a1/0x630 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3755 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:142 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x33/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:151 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:299 [inline] __netif_tx_lock include/linux/netdevice.h:3486 [inline] sch_direct_xmit+0x282/0x6d0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:180 __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3092 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0x13e5/0x1e60 net/core/dev.c:3358 dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3423 neigh_hh_output include/net/neighbour.h:468 [inline] neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:476 [inline] ip_finish_output2+0xf6c/0x15a0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:228 ip_finish_output+0xa29/0xe10 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:316 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:246 [inline] ip_output+0x1f0/0x7a0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:404 dst_output include/net/dst.h:486 [inline] ip_local_out+0x95/0x170 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:124 ip_send_skb+0x3c/0xc0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1492 ip_push_pending_frames+0x64/0x80 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1512 icmp_push_reply+0x372/0x4d0 net/ipv4/icmp.c:394 icmp_send+0x156c/0x1c80 net/ipv4/icmp.c:754 ip_expire+0x40e/0x6c0 net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c:239 call_timer_fn+0x241/0x820 kernel/time/timer.c:1268 expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1307 [inline] __run_timers+0x960/0xcf0 kernel/time/timer.c:1601 run_timer_softirq+0x21/0x80 kernel/time/timer.c:1614 __do_softirq+0x31f/0xbe7 kernel/softirq.c:284 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:364 [inline] irq_exit+0x1cc/0x200 kernel/softirq.c:405 exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:657 [inline] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x76/0xa0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:962 apic_timer_interrupt+0x93/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:707 RIP: 0010:__read_once_size include/linux/compiler.h:254 [inline] RIP: 0010:atomic_read arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:26 [inline] RIP: 0010:rcu_dynticks_curr_cpu_in_eqs kernel/rcu/tree.c:350 [inline] RIP: 0010:__rcu_is_watching kernel/rcu/tree.c:1133 [inline] RIP: 0010:rcu_is_watching+0x83/0x110 kernel/rcu/tree.c:1147 RSP: 0000:ffff8801c391f120 EFLAGS: 00000a03 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff10 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff8801c391f148 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000055edd4374000 RDI: ffff8801dbe1ae0c RBP: ffff8801c391f1a0 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 1ffff10038723e25 R13: ffff8801dbe1ae00 R14: ffff8801c391f680 R15: dffffc0000000000 </IRQ> rcu_read_lock_held+0x87/0xc0 kernel/rcu/update.c:293 radix_tree_deref_slot include/linux/radix-tree.h:238 [inline] filemap_map_pages+0x6d4/0x1570 mm/filemap.c:2335 do_fault_around mm/memory.c:3231 [inline] do_read_fault mm/memory.c:3265 [inline] do_fault+0xbd5/0x2080 mm/memory.c:3370 handle_pte_fault mm/memory.c:3600 [inline] __handle_mm_fault+0x1062/0x2cb0 mm/memory.c:3714 handle_mm_fault+0x1e2/0x480 mm/memory.c:3751 __do_page_fault+0x4f6/0xb60 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1397 do_page_fault+0x54/0x70 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1460 page_fault+0x28/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:1011 RIP: 0033:0x7f83172f2786 RSP: 002b:00007fffe859ae80 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 000055edd4373040 RBX: 00007f83175111c8 RCX: 000055edd4373238 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00007f8317510970 RBP: 00007fffe859afd0 R08: 0000000000000009 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000064 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 000055edd4373040 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fffe859afe8 R15: 0000000000000000 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
xhci needs to take care of four scenarios when asked to cancel a URB. 1 URB is not queued or already given back. usb_hcd_check_unlink_urb() will return an error, we pass the error on 2 We fail to find xhci internal structures from urb private data such as virtual device and endpoint ring. Give back URB immediately, can't do anything about internal structures. 3 URB private data has valid pointers to xhci internal data, but host is not responding. give back URB immedately and remove the URB from the endpoint lists. 4 Everyting is working add URB to cancel list, queue a command to stop the endpoint, after which the URB can be turned to no-op or skipped, removed from lists, and given back. We failed to give back the urb in case 2 where the correct device and endpoint pointers could not be retrieved from URB private data. This caused a hang on Dell Inspiron 5558/0VNM2T at resume from suspend as urb was never returned. [ 245.270505] INFO: task rtsx_usb_ms_1:254 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [ 245.272244] Tainted: G W 4.11.0-rc3-ARCH #2 [ 245.273983] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 245.275737] rtsx_usb_ms_1 D 0 254 2 0x00000000 [ 245.277524] Call Trace: [ 245.279278] __schedule+0x2d3/0x8a0 [ 245.281077] schedule+0x3d/0x90 [ 245.281961] usb_kill_urb.part.3+0x6c/0xa0 [usbcore] [ 245.282861] ? wake_atomic_t_function+0x60/0x60 [ 245.283760] usb_kill_urb+0x21/0x30 [usbcore] [ 245.284649] usb_start_wait_urb+0xe5/0x170 [usbcore] [ 245.285541] ? try_to_del_timer_sync+0x53/0x80 [ 245.286434] usb_bulk_msg+0xbd/0x160 [usbcore] [ 245.287326] rtsx_usb_send_cmd+0x63/0x90 [rtsx_usb] Reported-by: diego.viola@gmail.com Tested-by: diego.viola@gmail.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
…e_pmd() I found the race condition which triggers the following bug when move_pages() and soft offline are called on a single hugetlb page concurrently. Soft offlining page 0x119400 at 0x700000000000 BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffea0011943820 IP: follow_huge_pmd+0x143/0x190 PGD 7ffd2067 PUD 7ffd1067 PMD 0 [61163.582052] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: binfmt_misc ppdev virtio_balloon parport_pc pcspkr i2c_piix4 parport i2c_core acpi_cpufreq ip_tables xfs libcrc32c ata_generic pata_acpi virtio_blk 8139too crc32c_intel ata_piix serio_raw libata virtio_pci 8139cp virtio_ring virtio mii floppy dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod [last unloaded: cap_check] CPU: 0 PID: 22573 Comm: iterate_numa_mo Tainted: P OE 4.11.0-rc2-mm1+ #2 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:follow_huge_pmd+0x143/0x190 RSP: 0018:ffffc90004bdbcd0 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000465003e80 RBX: ffffea0004e34d30 RCX: 00003ffffffff000 RDX: 0000000011943800 RSI: 0000000000080001 RDI: 0000000465003e80 RBP: ffffc90004bdbd18 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff880138d34000 R10: ffffea0004650000 R11: 0000000000c363b0 R12: ffffea0011943800 R13: ffff8801b8d34000 R14: ffffea0000000000 R15: 000077ff80000000 FS: 00007fc977710740(0000) GS:ffff88007dc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffea0011943820 CR3: 000000007a746000 CR4: 00000000001406f0 Call Trace: follow_page_mask+0x270/0x550 SYSC_move_pages+0x4ea/0x8f0 SyS_move_pages+0xe/0x10 do_syscall_64+0x67/0x180 entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 RIP: 0033:0x7fc976e03949 RSP: 002b:00007ffe72221d88 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000117 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fc976e03949 RDX: 0000000000c22390 RSI: 0000000000001400 RDI: 0000000000005827 RBP: 00007ffe72221e00 R08: 0000000000c2c3a0 R09: 0000000000000004 R10: 0000000000c363b0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400650 R13: 00007ffe72221ee0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Code: 81 e4 ff ff 1f 00 48 21 c2 49 c1 ec 0c 48 c1 ea 0c 4c 01 e2 49 bc 00 00 00 00 00 ea ff ff 48 c1 e2 06 49 01 d4 f6 45 bc 04 74 90 <49> 8b 7c 24 20 40 f6 c7 01 75 2b 4c 89 e7 8b 47 1c 85 c0 7e 2a RIP: follow_huge_pmd+0x143/0x190 RSP: ffffc90004bdbcd0 CR2: ffffea0011943820 ---[ end trace e4f81353a2d23232 ]--- Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Kernel Offset: disabled This bug is triggered when pmd_present() returns true for non-present hugetlb, so fixing the present check in follow_huge_pmd() prevents it. Using pmd_present() to determine present/non-present for hugetlb is not correct, because pmd_present() checks multiple bits (not only _PAGE_PRESENT) for historical reason and it can misjudge hugetlb state. Fixes: e66f17f ("mm/hugetlb: take page table lock in follow_huge_pmd()") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1490149898-20231-1-git-send-email-n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Acked-by: Hillf Danton <hillf.zj@alibaba-inc.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Cc: Gerald Schaefer <gerald.schaefer@de.ibm.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [4.0+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
mipsxx_pmu_handle_shared_irq() calls irq_work_run() while holding the pmuint_rwlock for read. irq_work_run() can, via perf_pending_event(), call try_to_wake_up() which can try to take rq->lock. However, perf can also call perf_pmu_enable() (and thus take the pmuint_rwlock for write) while holding the rq->lock, from finish_task_switch() via perf_event_context_sched_in(). This leads to an ABBA deadlock: PID: 3855 TASK: 8f7ce288 CPU: 2 COMMAND: "process" #0 [89c39ac8] __delay at 803b5be4 #1 [89c39ac8] do_raw_spin_lock at 8008fdcc #2 [89c39af8] try_to_wake_up at 8006e47c #3 [89c39b38] pollwake at 8018eab0 #4 [89c39b68] __wake_up_common at 800879f4 #5 [89c39b98] __wake_up at 800880e4 #6 [89c39bc8] perf_event_wakeup at 8012109c #7 [89c39be8] perf_pending_event at 80121184 #8 [89c39c08] irq_work_run_list at 801151f0 #9 [89c39c38] irq_work_run at 80115274 #10 [89c39c50] mipsxx_pmu_handle_shared_irq at 8002cc7c PID: 1481 TASK: 8eaac6a8 CPU: 3 COMMAND: "process" #0 [8de7f900] do_raw_write_lock at 800900e0 #1 [8de7f918] perf_event_context_sched_in at 80122310 #2 [8de7f938] __perf_event_task_sched_in at 80122608 #3 [8de7f958] finish_task_switch at 8006b8a4 #4 [8de7f998] __schedule at 805e4dc4 #5 [8de7f9f8] schedule at 805e5558 #6 [8de7fa10] schedule_hrtimeout_range_clock at 805e9984 #7 [8de7fa70] poll_schedule_timeout at 8018e8f8 #8 [8de7fa88] do_select at 8018f338 #9 [8de7fd88] core_sys_select at 8018f5cc #10 [8de7fee0] sys_select at 8018f854 #11 [8de7ff28] syscall_common at 80028fc8 The lock seems to be there to protect the hardware counters so there is no need to hold it across irq_work_run(). Signed-off-by: Rabin Vincent <rabinv@axis.com> Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Holding the reconfig_mutex over a potential userspace fault sets up a lockdep dependency chain between filesystem-DAX and the libnvdimm ioctl path. Move the user access outside of the lock. [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] 4.11.0-rc3+ #13 Tainted: G W O ------------------------------------------------------- fallocate/16656 is trying to acquire lock: (&nvdimm_bus->reconfig_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffffa00080b1>] nvdimm_bus_lock+0x21/0x30 [libnvdimm] but task is already holding lock: (jbd2_handle){++++..}, at: [<ffffffff813b4944>] start_this_handle+0x104/0x460 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (jbd2_handle){++++..}: lock_acquire+0xbd/0x200 start_this_handle+0x16a/0x460 jbd2__journal_start+0xe9/0x2d0 __ext4_journal_start_sb+0x89/0x1c0 ext4_dirty_inode+0x32/0x70 __mark_inode_dirty+0x235/0x670 generic_update_time+0x87/0xd0 touch_atime+0xa9/0xd0 ext4_file_mmap+0x90/0xb0 mmap_region+0x370/0x5b0 do_mmap+0x415/0x4f0 vm_mmap_pgoff+0xd7/0x120 SyS_mmap_pgoff+0x1c5/0x290 SyS_mmap+0x22/0x30 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2 -> #1 (&mm->mmap_sem){++++++}: lock_acquire+0xbd/0x200 __might_fault+0x70/0xa0 __nd_ioctl+0x683/0x720 [libnvdimm] nvdimm_ioctl+0x8b/0xe0 [libnvdimm] do_vfs_ioctl+0xa8/0x740 SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90 do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x200 return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x7a -> #0 (&nvdimm_bus->reconfig_mutex){+.+.+.}: __lock_acquire+0x16b6/0x1730 lock_acquire+0xbd/0x200 __mutex_lock+0x88/0x9b0 mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20 nvdimm_bus_lock+0x21/0x30 [libnvdimm] nvdimm_forget_poison+0x25/0x50 [libnvdimm] nvdimm_clear_poison+0x106/0x140 [libnvdimm] pmem_do_bvec+0x1c2/0x2b0 [nd_pmem] pmem_make_request+0xf9/0x270 [nd_pmem] generic_make_request+0x118/0x3b0 submit_bio+0x75/0x150 Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Fixes: 62232e4 ("libnvdimm: control (ioctl) messages for nvdimm_bus and nvdimm devices") Cc: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com> Reported-by: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
[ Upstream commit ddc665a ] When the instruction right before the branch destination is a 64 bit load immediate, we currently calculate the wrong jump offset in the ctx->offset[] array as we only account one instruction slot for the 64 bit load immediate although it uses two BPF instructions. Fix it up by setting the offset into the right slot after we incremented the index. Before (ldimm64 test 1): [...] 00000020: 52800007 mov w7, #0x0 // #0 00000024: d2800060 mov x0, #0x3 // #3 00000028: d2800041 mov x1, #0x2 // #2 0000002c: eb01001f cmp x0, x1 00000030: 54ffff82 b.cs 0x00000020 00000034: d29fffe7 mov x7, #0xffff // #65535 00000038: f2bfffe7 movk x7, #0xffff, lsl #16 0000003c: f2dfffe7 movk x7, #0xffff, lsl #32 00000040: f2ffffe7 movk x7, #0xffff, lsl #48 00000044: d29dddc7 mov x7, #0xeeee // #61166 00000048: f2bdddc7 movk x7, #0xeeee, lsl #16 0000004c: f2ddddc7 movk x7, #0xeeee, lsl #32 00000050: f2fdddc7 movk x7, #0xeeee, lsl #48 [...] After (ldimm64 test 1): [...] 00000020: 52800007 mov w7, #0x0 // #0 00000024: d2800060 mov x0, #0x3 // #3 00000028: d2800041 mov x1, #0x2 // #2 0000002c: eb01001f cmp x0, x1 00000030: 540000a2 b.cs 0x00000044 00000034: d29fffe7 mov x7, #0xffff // #65535 00000038: f2bfffe7 movk x7, #0xffff, lsl #16 0000003c: f2dfffe7 movk x7, #0xffff, lsl #32 00000040: f2ffffe7 movk x7, #0xffff, lsl #48 00000044: d29dddc7 mov x7, #0xeeee // #61166 00000048: f2bdddc7 movk x7, #0xeeee, lsl #16 0000004c: f2ddddc7 movk x7, #0xeeee, lsl #32 00000050: f2fdddc7 movk x7, #0xeeee, lsl #48 [...] Also, add a couple of test cases to make sure JITs pass this test. Tested on Cavium ThunderX ARMv8. The added test cases all pass after the fix. Fixes: 8eee539 ("arm64: bpf: fix out-of-bounds read in bpf2a64_offset()") Reported-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Andre Wild reported the following warning: WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1205 at kernel/cpu.c:240 lockdep_assert_cpus_held+0x4c/0x60 Modules linked in: CPU: 2 PID: 1205 Comm: bash Not tainted 4.13.0-rc2-00022-gfd2b2c57ec20 #10 Hardware name: IBM 2964 N96 702 (z/VM 6.4.0) task: 00000000701d8100 task.stack: 0000000073594000 Krnl PSW : 0704f00180000000 0000000000145e24 (lockdep_assert_cpus_held+0x4c/0x60) ... Call Trace: lockdep_assert_cpus_held+0x42/0x60) stop_machine_cpuslocked+0x62/0xf0 build_all_zonelists+0x92/0x150 numa_zonelist_order_handler+0x102/0x150 proc_sys_call_handler.isra.12+0xda/0x118 proc_sys_write+0x34/0x48 __vfs_write+0x3c/0x178 vfs_write+0xbc/0x1a0 SyS_write+0x66/0xc0 system_call+0xc4/0x2b0 locks held by bash/1205: #0: (sb_writers#4){.+.+.+}, at: vfs_write+0xa6/0x1a0 #1: (zl_order_mutex){+.+...}, at: numa_zonelist_order_handler+0x44/0x150 #2: (zonelists_mutex){+.+...}, at: numa_zonelist_order_handler+0xf4/0x150 Last Breaking-Event-Address: lockdep_assert_cpus_held+0x48/0x60 This can be easily triggered with e.g. echo n > /proc/sys/vm/numa_zonelist_order In commit 3f906ba ("mm/memory-hotplug: switch locking to a percpu rwsem") memory hotplug locking was changed to fix a potential deadlock. This also switched the stop_machine() invocation within build_all_zonelists() to stop_machine_cpuslocked() which now expects that online cpus are locked when being called. This assumption is not true if build_all_zonelists() is being called from numa_zonelist_order_handler(). In order to fix this simply add a mem_hotplug_begin()/mem_hotplug_done() pair to numa_zonelist_order_handler(). Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170726111738.38768-1-heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com Fixes: 3f906ba ("mm/memory-hotplug: switch locking to a percpu rwsem") Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Reported-by: Andre Wild <wild@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patch fixes a bug associated with iscsit_reset_np_thread() that can occur during parallel configfs rmdir of a single iscsi_np used across multiple iscsi-target instances, that would result in hung task(s) similar to below where configfs rmdir process context was blocked indefinately waiting for iscsi_np->np_restart_comp to finish: [ 6726.112076] INFO: task dcp_proxy_node_:15550 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [ 6726.119440] Tainted: G W O 4.1.26-3321 #2 [ 6726.125045] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 6726.132927] dcp_proxy_node_ D ffff8803f202bc88 0 15550 1 0x00000000 [ 6726.140058] ffff8803f202bc88 ffff88085c64d960 ffff88083b3b1ad0 ffff88087fffeb08 [ 6726.147593] ffff8803f202c000 7fffffffffffffff ffff88083f459c28 ffff88083b3b1ad0 [ 6726.155132] ffff88035373c100 ffff8803f202bca8 ffffffff8168ced2 ffff8803f202bcb8 [ 6726.162667] Call Trace: [ 6726.165150] [<ffffffff8168ced2>] schedule+0x32/0x80 [ 6726.170156] [<ffffffff8168f5b4>] schedule_timeout+0x214/0x290 [ 6726.176030] [<ffffffff810caef2>] ? __send_signal+0x52/0x4a0 [ 6726.181728] [<ffffffff8168d7d6>] wait_for_completion+0x96/0x100 [ 6726.187774] [<ffffffff810e7c80>] ? wake_up_state+0x10/0x10 [ 6726.193395] [<ffffffffa035d6e2>] iscsit_reset_np_thread+0x62/0xe0 [iscsi_target_mod] [ 6726.201278] [<ffffffffa0355d86>] iscsit_tpg_disable_portal_group+0x96/0x190 [iscsi_target_mod] [ 6726.210033] [<ffffffffa0363f7f>] lio_target_tpg_store_enable+0x4f/0xc0 [iscsi_target_mod] [ 6726.218351] [<ffffffff81260c5a>] configfs_write_file+0xaa/0x110 [ 6726.224392] [<ffffffff811ea364>] vfs_write+0xa4/0x1b0 [ 6726.229576] [<ffffffff811eb111>] SyS_write+0x41/0xb0 [ 6726.234659] [<ffffffff8169042e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71 It would happen because each iscsit_reset_np_thread() sets state to ISCSI_NP_THREAD_RESET, sends SIGINT, and then blocks waiting for completion on iscsi_np->np_restart_comp. However, if iscsi_np was active processing a login request and more than a single iscsit_reset_np_thread() caller to the same iscsi_np was blocked on iscsi_np->np_restart_comp, iscsi_np kthread process context in __iscsi_target_login_thread() would flush pending signals and only perform a single completion of np->np_restart_comp before going back to sleep within transport specific iscsit_transport->iscsi_accept_np code. To address this bug, add a iscsi_np->np_reset_count and update __iscsi_target_login_thread() to keep completing np->np_restart_comp until ->np_reset_count has reached zero. Reported-by: Gary Guo <ghg@datera.io> Tested-by: Gary Guo <ghg@datera.io> Cc: Mike Christie <mchristi@redhat.com> Cc: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.10+ Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
Dean Jenkins says: ==================== asix: Improve robustness Please consider taking these patches to improve the robustness of the ASIX USB to Ethernet driver. Failures prompting an ASIX driver code review ============================================= On an ARM i.MX6 embedded platform some strange one-off and two-off failures were observed in and around the ASIX USB to Ethernet driver. This was observed on a highly modified kernel 3.14 with the ASIX driver containing back-ported changes from kernel.org up to kernel 4.8 approximately. a) A one-off failure in asix_rx_fixup_internal(): There was an occurrence of an attempt to write off the end of the netdev buffer which was trapped by skb_over_panic() in skb_put(). [20030.846440] skbuff: skb_over_panic: text:7f2271c0 len:120 put:60 head:8366ecc0 data:8366ed02 tail:0x8366ed7a end:0x8366ed40 dev:eth0 [20030.863007] Kernel BUG at 8044ce38 [verbose debug info unavailable] [20031.215345] Backtrace: [20031.217884] [<8044cde0>] (skb_panic) from [<8044d50c>] (skb_put+0x50/0x5c) [20031.227408] [<8044d4bc>] (skb_put) from [<7f2271c0>] (asix_rx_fixup_internal+0x1c4/0x23c [asix]) [20031.242024] [<7f226ffc>] (asix_rx_fixup_internal [asix]) from [<7f22724c>] (asix_rx_fixup_common+0x14/0x18 [asix]) [20031.260309] [<7f227238>] (asix_rx_fixup_common [asix]) from [<7f21f7d4>] (usbnet_bh+0x74/0x224 [usbnet]) [20031.269879] [<7f21f760>] (usbnet_bh [usbnet]) from [<8002f834>] (call_timer_fn+0xa4/0x1f0) [20031.283961] [<8002f790>] (call_timer_fn) from [<80030834>] (run_timer_softirq+0x230/0x2a8) [20031.302782] [<80030604>] (run_timer_softirq) from [<80028780>] (__do_softirq+0x15c/0x37c) [20031.321511] [<80028624>] (__do_softirq) from [<80028c38>] (irq_exit+0x8c/0xe8) [20031.339298] [<80028bac>] (irq_exit) from [<8000e9c8>] (handle_IRQ+0x8c/0xc8) [20031.350038] [<8000e93c>] (handle_IRQ) from [<800085c8>] (gic_handle_irq+0xb8/0xf8) [20031.365528] [<80008510>] (gic_handle_irq) from [<8050de80>] (__irq_svc+0x40/0x70) Analysis of the logic of the ASIX driver (containing backported changes from kernel.org up to kernel 4.8 approximately) suggested that the software could not trigger skb_over_panic(). The analysis of the kernel BUG() crash information suggested that the netdev buffer was written with 2 minimal 60 octet length Ethernet frames (ASIX hardware drops the 4 octet FCS field) and the 2nd Ethernet frame attempted to write off the end of the netdev buffer. Note that the netdev buffer should only contain 1 Ethernet frame so if an attempt to write 2 Ethernet frames into the buffer is made then that is wrong. However, the logic of the asix_rx_fixup_internal() only allows 1 Ethernet frame to be written into the netdev buffer. Potentially this failure was due to memory corruption because it was only seen once. b) Two-off failures in the NAPI layer's backlog queue: There were 2 crashes in the NAPI layer's backlog queue presumably after asix_rx_fixup_internal() called usbnet_skb_return(). [24097.273945] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000004 [24097.398944] PC is at process_backlog+0x80/0x16c [24097.569466] Backtrace: [24097.572007] [<8045ad98>] (process_backlog) from [<8045b64c>] (net_rx_action+0xcc/0x248) [24097.591631] [<8045b580>] (net_rx_action) from [<80028780>] (__do_softirq+0x15c/0x37c) [24097.610022] [<80028624>] (__do_softirq) from [<800289cc>] (run_ksoftirqd+0x2c/0x84) and [ 1059.828452] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000 [ 1059.953715] PC is at process_backlog+0x84/0x16c [ 1060.140896] Backtrace: [ 1060.143434] [<8045ad98>] (process_backlog) from [<8045b64c>] (net_rx_action+0xcc/0x248) [ 1060.163075] [<8045b580>] (net_rx_action) from [<80028780>] (__do_softirq+0x15c/0x37c) [ 1060.181474] [<80028624>] (__do_softirq) from [<80028c38>] (irq_exit+0x8c/0xe8) [ 1060.199256] [<80028bac>] (irq_exit) from [<8000e9c8>] (handle_IRQ+0x8c/0xc8) [ 1060.210006] [<8000e93c>] (handle_IRQ) from [<800085c8>] (gic_handle_irq+0xb8/0xf8) [ 1060.225492] [<80008510>] (gic_handle_irq) from [<8050de80>] (__irq_svc+0x40/0x70) The embedded board was only using an ASIX USB to Ethernet adaptor eth0. Analysis suggested that the doubly-linked list pointers of the backlog queue had been corrupted because one of the link pointers was NULL. Potentially this failure was due to memory corruption because it was only seen twice. Results of the ASIX driver code review ====================================== During the code review some weaknesses were observed in the ASIX driver and the following patches have been created to improve the robustness. Brief overview of the patches ----------------------------- 1. asix: Add rx->ax_skb = NULL after usbnet_skb_return() The current ASIX driver sends the received Ethernet frame to the NAPI layer of the network stack via the call to usbnet_skb_return() in asix_rx_fixup_internal() but retains the rx->ax_skb pointer to the netdev buffer. The driver no longer needs the rx->ax_skb pointer at this point because the NAPI layer now has the Ethernet frame. This means that asix_rx_fixup_internal() must not use rx->ax_skb after the call to usbnet_skb_return() because it could corrupt the handling of the Ethernet frame within the network layer. Therefore, to remove the risk of erroneous usage of rx->ax_skb, set rx->ax_skb to NULL after the call to usbnet_skb_return(). This avoids potential erroneous freeing of rx->ax_skb and erroneous writing to the netdev buffer. If the software now somehow inappropriately reused rx->ax_skb, then a NULL pointer dereference of rx->ax_skb would occur which makes investigation easier. 2. asix: Ensure asix_rx_fixup_info members are all reset This patch creates reset_asix_rx_fixup_info() to allow all the asix_rx_fixup_info structure members to be consistently reset to initial conditions. Call reset_asix_rx_fixup_info() upon each detectable error condition so that the next URB is processed from a known state. Otherwise, there is a risk that some members of the asix_rx_fixup_info structure may be incorrect after an error occurred so potentially leading to a malfunction. 3. asix: Fix small memory leak in ax88772_unbind() This patch creates asix_rx_fixup_common_free() to allow the rx->ax_skb to be freed when necessary. asix_rx_fixup_common_free() is called from ax88772_unbind() before the parent private data structure is freed. Without this patch, there is a risk of a small netdev buffer memory leak each time ax88772_unbind() is called during the reception of an Ethernet frame that spans across 2 URBs. Testing ======= The patches have been sanity tested on a 64-bit Linux laptop running kernel 4.13-rc2 with the 3 patches applied on top. The ASIX USB to Adaptor used for testing was (output of lsusb): ID 0b95:772b ASIX Electronics Corp. AX88772B Test #1 ------- The test ran a flood ping test script which slowly incremented the ICMP Echo Request's payload from 0 to 5000 octets. This eventually causes IPv4 fragmentation to occur which causes Ethernet frames to be sent very close to each other so increases the probability that an Ethernet frame will span 2 URBs. The test showed that all pings were successful. The test took about 15 minutes to complete. Test #2 ------- A script was run on the laptop to periodically run ifdown and ifup every second so that the ASIX USB to Adaptor was up for 1 second and down for 1 second. From a Linux PC connected to the laptop, the following ping command was used ping -f -s 5000 <ip address of laptop> The large ICMP payload causes IPv4 fragmentation resulting in multiple Ethernet frames per original IP packet. Kernel debug within the ASIX driver was enabled to see whether any ASIX errors were generated. The test was run for about 24 hours and no ASIX errors were seen. Patches ======= The 3 patches have been rebased off the net-next repo master branch with HEAD fbbeefd net: fec: Allow reception of frames bigger than 1522 bytes ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
MEI device performs link reset during system suspend sequence. The link reset cannot be performed while device is in runtime suspend state. The resume sequence is bypassed with suspend direct complete optimization,so the optimization should be disabled for mei devices. Fixes: [ 192.940537] Restarting tasks ... [ 192.940610] PGI is not set [ 192.940619] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 192.940623] WARNING: CPU: 0 me.c:653 mei_me_pg_exit_sync+0x351/0x360 [ 192.940624] Modules linked in: [ 192.940627] CPU: 0 PID: 1661 Comm: kworker/0:3 Not tainted 4.13.0-rc2+ #2 [ 192.940628] Hardware name: Dell Inc. XPS 13 9343/0TM99H, BIOS A11 12/08/2016 [ 192.940630] Workqueue: pm pm_runtime_work <snip> [ 192.940642] Call Trace: [ 192.940646] ? pci_pme_active+0x1de/0x1f0 [ 192.940649] ? pci_restore_standard_config+0x50/0x50 [ 192.940651] ? kfree+0x172/0x190 [ 192.940653] ? kfree+0x172/0x190 [ 192.940655] ? pci_restore_standard_config+0x50/0x50 [ 192.940663] mei_me_pm_runtime_resume+0x3f/0xc0 [ 192.940665] pci_pm_runtime_resume+0x7a/0xa0 [ 192.940667] __rpm_callback+0xb9/0x1e0 [ 192.940668] ? preempt_count_add+0x6d/0xc0 [ 192.940670] rpm_callback+0x24/0x90 [ 192.940672] ? pci_restore_standard_config+0x50/0x50 [ 192.940674] rpm_resume+0x4e8/0x800 [ 192.940676] pm_runtime_work+0x55/0xb0 [ 192.940678] process_one_work+0x184/0x3e0 [ 192.940680] worker_thread+0x4d/0x3a0 [ 192.940681] ? preempt_count_sub+0x9b/0x100 [ 192.940683] kthread+0x122/0x140 [ 192.940684] ? process_one_work+0x3e0/0x3e0 [ 192.940685] ? __kthread_create_on_node+0x1a0/0x1a0 [ 192.940688] ret_from_fork+0x27/0x40 [ 192.940690] Code: 96 3a 9e ff 48 8b 7d 98 e8 cd 21 58 00 83 bb bc 01 00 00 04 0f 85 40 fe ff ff e9 41 fe ff ff 48 c7 c7 5f 04 99 96 e8 93 6b 9f ff <0f> ff e9 5d fd ff ff e8 33 fe 99 ff 0f 1f 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 [ 192.940719] ---[ end trace a86955597774ead8 ]--- [ 192.942540] done. Suggested-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Reported-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Signed-off-by: Alexander Usyskin <alexander.usyskin@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tomas Winkler <tomas.winkler@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Now that rxrpc_put_local() may call kthread_stop(), it can't be called under spinlock as it might sleep. This can cause a problem in the peer keepalive code in rxrpc as it tries to avoid dropping the peer_hash_lock from the point it needs to re-add peer->keepalive_link to going round the loop again in rxrpc_peer_keepalive_dispatch(). Fix this by just dropping the lock when we don't need it and accepting that we'll have to take it again. This code is only called about every 20s for each peer, so not very often. This allows rxrpc_put_peer_unlocked() to be removed also. If triggered, this bug produces an oops like the following, as reproduced by a syzbot reproducer for a different oops[1]: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/sched/completion.c:101 ... RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0 3 locks held by kworker/u9:0/50: #0: ffff88810e74a138 ((wq_completion)krxrpcd){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x294/0x636 #1: ffff8881013a7e20 ((work_completion)(&rxnet->peer_keepalive_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x294/0x636 #2: ffff88817d366390 (&rxnet->peer_hash_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: rxrpc_peer_keepalive_dispatch+0x2bd/0x35f ... Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x4c/0x5f __might_resched+0x2cf/0x2f2 __wait_for_common+0x87/0x1e8 kthread_stop+0x14d/0x255 rxrpc_peer_keepalive_dispatch+0x333/0x35f rxrpc_peer_keepalive_worker+0x2e9/0x449 process_one_work+0x3c1/0x636 worker_thread+0x25f/0x359 kthread+0x1a6/0x1b5 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 Fixes: a275da6 ("rxrpc: Create a per-local endpoint receive queue and I/O thread") Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com> cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/0000000000002b4a9f05ef2b616f@google.com/ [1] Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
When doing timestamping in lan966x and having PROVE_LOCKING enabled the following warning is shown. ======================================================== WARNING: possible irq lock inversion dependency detected 6.2.0-rc7-01749-gc54e1f7f7e36 #2786 Tainted: G N -------------------------------------------------------- swapper/0/0 just changed the state of lock: c2609f50 (_xmit_ETHER#2){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: sch_direct_xmit+0x16c/0x2e8 but this lock took another, SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock in the past: (&lan966x->ptp_ts_id_lock){+.+.}-{2:2} and interrupts could create inverse lock ordering between them. other info that might help us debug this: Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&lan966x->ptp_ts_id_lock); local_irq_disable(); lock(_xmit_ETHER#2); lock(&lan966x->ptp_ts_id_lock); <Interrupt> lock(_xmit_ETHER#2); *** DEADLOCK *** 5 locks held by swapper/0/0: #0: c1001e18 ((&ndev->rs_timer)){+.-.}-{0:0}, at: call_timer_fn+0x0/0x33c #1: c105e7c4 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: ndisc_send_skb+0x134/0x81c #2: c105e7d8 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: ip6_finish_output2+0x17c/0xc64 #3: c105e7d8 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x4c/0x1224 #4: c3056174 (dev->qdisc_tx_busylock ?: &qdisc_tx_busylock){+...}-{2:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x354/0x1224 the shortest dependencies between 2nd lock and 1st lock: -> (&lan966x->ptp_ts_id_lock){+.+.}-{2:2} { HARDIRQ-ON-W at: lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248 _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x48 lan966x_ptp_irq_handler+0x164/0x2a8 irq_thread_fn+0x1c/0x78 irq_thread+0x130/0x278 kthread+0xec/0x110 ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28 SOFTIRQ-ON-W at: lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248 _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x48 lan966x_ptp_irq_handler+0x164/0x2a8 irq_thread_fn+0x1c/0x78 irq_thread+0x130/0x278 kthread+0xec/0x110 ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28 INITIAL USE at: lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4c/0x68 lan966x_ptp_txtstamp_request+0x128/0x1cc lan966x_port_xmit+0x224/0x43c dev_hard_start_xmit+0xa8/0x2f0 sch_direct_xmit+0x108/0x2e8 __dev_queue_xmit+0x41c/0x1224 packet_sendmsg+0xdb4/0x134c __sys_sendto+0xd0/0x154 sys_send+0x18/0x20 ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x1c } ... key at: [<c174ba0c>] __key.2+0x0/0x8 ... acquired at: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4c/0x68 lan966x_ptp_txtstamp_request+0x128/0x1cc lan966x_port_xmit+0x224/0x43c dev_hard_start_xmit+0xa8/0x2f0 sch_direct_xmit+0x108/0x2e8 __dev_queue_xmit+0x41c/0x1224 packet_sendmsg+0xdb4/0x134c __sys_sendto+0xd0/0x154 sys_send+0x18/0x20 ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x1c -> (_xmit_ETHER#2){+.-.}-{2:2} { HARDIRQ-ON-W at: lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248 _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x48 netif_freeze_queues+0x38/0x68 dev_deactivate_many+0xac/0x388 dev_deactivate+0x38/0x6c linkwatch_do_dev+0x70/0x8c __linkwatch_run_queue+0xd4/0x1e8 linkwatch_event+0x24/0x34 process_one_work+0x284/0x744 worker_thread+0x28/0x4bc kthread+0xec/0x110 ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28 IN-SOFTIRQ-W at: lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248 _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x48 sch_direct_xmit+0x16c/0x2e8 __dev_queue_xmit+0x41c/0x1224 ip6_finish_output2+0x5f4/0xc64 ndisc_send_skb+0x4cc/0x81c addrconf_rs_timer+0xb0/0x2f8 call_timer_fn+0xb4/0x33c expire_timers+0xb4/0x10c run_timer_softirq+0xf8/0x2a8 __do_softirq+0xd4/0x5fc __irq_exit_rcu+0x138/0x17c irq_exit+0x8/0x28 __irq_svc+0x90/0xbc arch_cpu_idle+0x30/0x3c default_idle_call+0x44/0xac do_idle+0xc8/0x138 cpu_startup_entry+0x18/0x1c rest_init+0xcc/0x168 arch_post_acpi_subsys_init+0x0/0x8 INITIAL USE at: lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248 _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x48 netif_freeze_queues+0x38/0x68 dev_deactivate_many+0xac/0x388 dev_deactivate+0x38/0x6c linkwatch_do_dev+0x70/0x8c __linkwatch_run_queue+0xd4/0x1e8 linkwatch_event+0x24/0x34 process_one_work+0x284/0x744 worker_thread+0x28/0x4bc kthread+0xec/0x110 ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28 } ... key at: [<c175974c>] netdev_xmit_lock_key+0x8/0x1c8 ... acquired at: __lock_acquire+0x978/0x2978 lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248 _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x48 sch_direct_xmit+0x16c/0x2e8 __dev_queue_xmit+0x41c/0x1224 ip6_finish_output2+0x5f4/0xc64 ndisc_send_skb+0x4cc/0x81c addrconf_rs_timer+0xb0/0x2f8 call_timer_fn+0xb4/0x33c expire_timers+0xb4/0x10c run_timer_softirq+0xf8/0x2a8 __do_softirq+0xd4/0x5fc __irq_exit_rcu+0x138/0x17c irq_exit+0x8/0x28 __irq_svc+0x90/0xbc arch_cpu_idle+0x30/0x3c default_idle_call+0x44/0xac do_idle+0xc8/0x138 cpu_startup_entry+0x18/0x1c rest_init+0xcc/0x168 arch_post_acpi_subsys_init+0x0/0x8 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G N 6.2.0-rc7-01749-gc54e1f7f7e36 #2786 Hardware name: Generic DT based system unwind_backtrace from show_stack+0x10/0x14 show_stack from dump_stack_lvl+0x58/0x70 dump_stack_lvl from mark_lock.part.0+0x59c/0x93c mark_lock.part.0 from __lock_acquire+0x978/0x2978 __lock_acquire from lock_acquire.part.0+0xb0/0x248 lock_acquire.part.0 from _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x48 _raw_spin_lock from sch_direct_xmit+0x16c/0x2e8 sch_direct_xmit from __dev_queue_xmit+0x41c/0x1224 __dev_queue_xmit from ip6_finish_output2+0x5f4/0xc64 ip6_finish_output2 from ndisc_send_skb+0x4cc/0x81c ndisc_send_skb from addrconf_rs_timer+0xb0/0x2f8 addrconf_rs_timer from call_timer_fn+0xb4/0x33c call_timer_fn from expire_timers+0xb4/0x10c expire_timers from run_timer_softirq+0xf8/0x2a8 run_timer_softirq from __do_softirq+0xd4/0x5fc __do_softirq from __irq_exit_rcu+0x138/0x17c __irq_exit_rcu from irq_exit+0x8/0x28 irq_exit from __irq_svc+0x90/0xbc Exception stack(0xc1001f20 to 0xc1001f68) 1f20: ffffffff ffffffff 00000001 c011f840 c100e000 c100e000 c1009314 c1009370 1f40: c10f0c1a c0d5e564 c0f5da8c 00000000 00000000 c1001f70 c010f0bc c010f0c0 1f60: 600f0013 ffffffff __irq_svc from arch_cpu_idle+0x30/0x3c arch_cpu_idle from default_idle_call+0x44/0xac default_idle_call from do_idle+0xc8/0x138 do_idle from cpu_startup_entry+0x18/0x1c cpu_startup_entry from rest_init+0xcc/0x168 rest_init from arch_post_acpi_subsys_init+0x0/0x8 Fix this by using spin_lock_irqsave/spin_lock_irqrestore also inside lan966x_ptp_irq_handler. Fixes: e85a96e ("net: lan966x: Add support for ptp interrupts") Signed-off-by: Horatiu Vultur <horatiu.vultur@microchip.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230217210917.2649365-1-horatiu.vultur@microchip.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
The TC architecture allows filters and actions to be created independently. In filters the user can reference action objects using: tc action add action pedit ... index 1 tc filter add ... action pedit index 1 In the current code for act_pedit this is broken as it checks netlink attributes for create/update before actually checking if we are binding to an existing action. tdc results: 1..69 ok 1 319a - Add pedit action that mangles IP TTL ok 2 7e67 - Replace pedit action with invalid goto chain ok 3 377e - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u32 ok 4 a0ca - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u32 (INVALID) ok 5 dd8a - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u16 u16 ok 6 53db - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u16 (INVALID) ok 7 5c7e - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u8 add value ok 8 2893 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u8 quad ok 9 3a07 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u8-u16-u8 ok 10 ab0f - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u16-u8-u8 ok 11 9d12 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u32 set u16 clear u8 invert ok 12 ebfa - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset overflow u32 (INVALID) ok 13 f512 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u16 at offmask shift set ok 14 c2cb - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u32 retain value ok 15 1762 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u8 clear value ok 16 bcee - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u8 retain value ok 17 e89f - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u16 retain value ok 18 c282 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u32 clear value ok 19 c422 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u16 invert value ok 20 d3d3 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u32 invert value ok 21 57e5 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u8 preserve value ok 22 99e0 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u16 preserve value ok 23 1892 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u32 preserve value ok 24 4b60 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP negative offset u16/u32 set value ok 25 a5a7 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth set src ok 26 86d4 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth set src & dst ok 27 f8a9 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth set dst ok 28 c715 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth set src (INVALID) ok 29 8131 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth set dst (INVALID) ok 30 ba22 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth type set/clear sequence ok 31 dec4 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth set type (INVALID) ok 32 ab06 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth add type ok 33 918d - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth invert src ok 34 a8d4 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth invert dst ok 35 ee13 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth invert type ok 36 7588 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set src ok 37 0fa7 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set dst ok 38 5810 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set src & dst ok 39 1092 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set ihl & dsfield ok 40 02d8 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set ttl & protocol ok 41 3e2d - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set ttl (INVALID) ok 42 31ae - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip ttl clear/set ok 43 486f - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set duplicate fields ok 44 e790 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set ce, df, mf, firstfrag, nofrag fields ok 45 cc8a - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set tos ok 46 7a17 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set precedence ok 47 c3b6 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip add tos ok 48 43d3 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip add precedence ok 49 438e - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip clear tos ok 50 6b1b - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip clear precedence ok 51 824a - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip invert tos ok 52 106f - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip invert precedence ok 53 6829 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP beyond ip set dport & sport ok 54 afd8 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP beyond ip set icmp_type & icmp_code ok 55 3143 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP beyond ip set dport (INVALID) ok 56 815c - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip6 set src ok 57 4dae - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip6 set dst ok 58 fc1f - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip6 set src & dst ok 59 6d34 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip6 dst retain value (INVALID) ok 60 94bb - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip6 traffic_class ok 61 6f5e - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip6 flow_lbl ok 62 6795 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip6 set payload_len, nexthdr, hoplimit ok 63 1442 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP tcp set dport & sport ok 64 b7ac - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP tcp sport set (INVALID) ok 65 cfcc - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP tcp flags set ok 66 3bc4 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP tcp set dport, sport & flags fields ok 67 f1c8 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP udp set dport & sport ok 68 d784 - Add pedit action with mixed RAW/LAYERED_OP #1 ok 69 70ca - Add pedit action with mixed RAW/LAYERED_OP #2 Fixes: 71d0ed7 ("net/act_pedit: Support using offset relative to the conventional network headers") Fixes: f67169f ("net/sched: act_pedit: fix WARN() in the traffic path") Reviewed-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> Signed-off-by: Pedro Tammela <pctammela@mojatatu.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
code path: ocfs2_ioctl_move_extents ocfs2_move_extents ocfs2_defrag_extent __ocfs2_move_extent + ocfs2_journal_access_di + ocfs2_split_extent //sub-paths call jbd2_journal_restart + ocfs2_journal_dirty //crash by jbs2 ASSERT crash stacks: PID: 11297 TASK: ffff974a676dcd00 CPU: 67 COMMAND: "defragfs.ocfs2" #0 [ffffb25d8dad3900] machine_kexec at ffffffff8386fe01 #1 [ffffb25d8dad3958] __crash_kexec at ffffffff8395959d #2 [ffffb25d8dad3a20] crash_kexec at ffffffff8395a45d #3 [ffffb25d8dad3a38] oops_end at ffffffff83836d3f #4 [ffffb25d8dad3a58] do_trap at ffffffff83833205 #5 [ffffb25d8dad3aa0] do_invalid_op at ffffffff83833aa6 #6 [ffffb25d8dad3ac0] invalid_op at ffffffff84200d18 [exception RIP: jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata+0x2ba] RIP: ffffffffc09ca54a RSP: ffffb25d8dad3b70 RFLAGS: 00010207 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9706eedc5248 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff97337029ea28 RDI: ffff9706eedc5250 RBP: ffff9703c3520200 R8: 000000000f46b0b2 R9: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 00000001000000fe R12: ffff97337029ea28 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff9703de59bf60 R15: ffff9706eedc5250 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #7 [ffffb25d8dad3ba8] ocfs2_journal_dirty at ffffffffc137fb95 [ocfs2] #8 [ffffb25d8dad3be8] __ocfs2_move_extent at ffffffffc139a950 [ocfs2] #9 [ffffb25d8dad3c80] ocfs2_defrag_extent at ffffffffc139b2d2 [ocfs2] Analysis This bug has the same root cause of 'commit 7f27ec9 ("ocfs2: call ocfs2_journal_access_di() before ocfs2_journal_dirty() in ocfs2_write_end_nolock()")'. For this bug, jbd2_journal_restart() is called by ocfs2_split_extent() during defragmenting. How to fix For ocfs2_split_extent() can handle journal operations totally by itself. Caller doesn't need to call journal access/dirty pair, and caller only needs to call journal start/stop pair. The fix method is to remove journal access/dirty from __ocfs2_move_extent(). The discussion for this patch: https://oss.oracle.com/pipermail/ocfs2-devel/2023-February/000647.html Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230217003717.32469-1-heming.zhao@suse.com Signed-off-by: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn> Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com> Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
…dler Recent test_kprobe_missed kprobes kunit test uncovers the following error (reported when CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP is enabled): BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:580 in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 662, name: kunit_try_catch preempt_count: 0, expected: 0 RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0 no locks held by kunit_try_catch/662. irq event stamp: 280 hardirqs last enabled at (279): [<00000003e60a3d42>] __do_pgm_check+0x17a/0x1c0 hardirqs last disabled at (280): [<00000003e3bd774a>] kprobe_exceptions_notify+0x27a/0x318 softirqs last enabled at (0): [<00000003e3c5c890>] copy_process+0x14a8/0x4c80 softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 CPU: 46 PID: 662 Comm: kunit_try_catch Tainted: G N 6.2.0-173644-g44c18d77f0c0 #2 Hardware name: IBM 3931 A01 704 (LPAR) Call Trace: [<00000003e60a3a00>] dump_stack_lvl+0x120/0x198 [<00000003e3d02e82>] __might_resched+0x60a/0x668 [<00000003e60b9908>] __mutex_lock+0xc0/0x14e0 [<00000003e60bad5a>] mutex_lock_nested+0x32/0x40 [<00000003e3f7b460>] unregister_kprobe+0x30/0xd8 [<00000003e51b2602>] test_kprobe_missed+0xf2/0x268 [<00000003e51b5406>] kunit_try_run_case+0x10e/0x290 [<00000003e51b7dfa>] kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x62/0xb8 [<00000003e3ce30f8>] kthread+0x2d0/0x398 [<00000003e3b96afa>] __ret_from_fork+0x8a/0xe8 [<00000003e60ccada>] ret_from_fork+0xa/0x40 The reason for this error report is that kprobes handling code failed to restore irqs. The problem is that when kprobe is triggered from another kprobe post_handler current sequence of enable_singlestep / disable_singlestep is the following: enable_singlestep <- original kprobe (saves kprobe_saved_imask) enable_singlestep <- kprobe triggered from post_handler (clobbers kprobe_saved_imask) disable_singlestep <- kprobe triggered from post_handler (restores kprobe_saved_imask) disable_singlestep <- original kprobe (restores wrong clobbered kprobe_saved_imask) There is just one kprobe_ctlblk per cpu and both calls saves and loads irq mask to kprobe_saved_imask. To fix the problem simply move resume_execution (which calls disable_singlestep) before calling post_handler. This also fixes the problem that post_handler is called with pt_regs which were not yet adjusted after single-stepping. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 4ba069b ("[S390] add kprobes support.") Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Hayes Wang says: ==================== r8152: fix 2.5G devices v3: For patch #2, modify the comment. v2: For patch #1, Remove inline for fc_pause_on_auto() and fc_pause_off_auto(), and update the commit message. For patch #2, define the magic value for OCP register 0xa424. v1: These patches are used to fix some issues of RTL8156. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Sai Krishna says: ==================== octeontx2: Miscellaneous fixes This patchset includes following fixes. Patch #1 Fix for the race condition while updating APR table Patch #2 Fix end bit position in NPC scan config Patch #3 Fix depth of CAM, MEM table entries Patch #4 Fix in increase the size of DMAC filter flows Patch #5 Fix driver crash resulting from invalid interface type information retrieved from firmware Patch #6 Fix incorrect mask used while installing filters involving fragmented packets Patch #7 Fixes for NPC field hash extract w.r.t IPV6 hash reduction, IPV6 filed hash configuration. Patch #8 Fix for NPC hardware parser configuration destination address hash, IPV6 endianness issues. Patch #9 Fix for skipping mbox initialization for PFs disabled by firmware. Patch #10 Fix disabling packet I/O in case of mailbox timeout. Patch #11 Fix detaching LF resources in case of VF probe fail. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Thread #1: [122554.641906][ T92] f2fs_getxattr+0xd4/0x5fc -> waiting for f2fs_down_read(&F2FS_I(inode)->i_xattr_sem); [122554.641927][ T92] __f2fs_get_acl+0x50/0x284 [122554.641948][ T92] f2fs_init_acl+0x84/0x54c [122554.641969][ T92] f2fs_init_inode_metadata+0x460/0x5f0 [122554.641990][ T92] f2fs_add_inline_entry+0x11c/0x350 -> Locked dir->inode_page by f2fs_get_node_page() [122554.642009][ T92] f2fs_do_add_link+0x100/0x1e4 [122554.642025][ T92] f2fs_create+0xf4/0x22c [122554.642047][ T92] vfs_create+0x130/0x1f4 Thread #2: [123996.386358][ T92] __get_node_page+0x8c/0x504 -> waiting for dir->inode_page lock [123996.386383][ T92] read_all_xattrs+0x11c/0x1f4 [123996.386405][ T92] __f2fs_setxattr+0xcc/0x528 [123996.386424][ T92] f2fs_setxattr+0x158/0x1f4 -> f2fs_down_write(&F2FS_I(inode)->i_xattr_sem); [123996.386443][ T92] __f2fs_set_acl+0x328/0x430 [123996.386618][ T92] f2fs_set_acl+0x38/0x50 [123996.386642][ T92] posix_acl_chmod+0xc8/0x1c8 [123996.386669][ T92] f2fs_setattr+0x5e0/0x6bc [123996.386689][ T92] notify_change+0x4d8/0x580 [123996.386717][ T92] chmod_common+0xd8/0x184 [123996.386748][ T92] do_fchmodat+0x60/0x124 [123996.386766][ T92] __arm64_sys_fchmodat+0x28/0x3c Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Fixes: 27161f1 "f2fs: avoid race in between read xattr & write xattr" Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
…linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull SMP updates from Thomas Gleixner: "A large update for SMP management: - Parallel CPU bringup The reason why people are interested in parallel bringup is to shorten the (kexec) reboot time of cloud servers to reduce the downtime of the VM tenants. The current fully serialized bringup does the following per AP: 1) Prepare callbacks (allocate, intialize, create threads) 2) Kick the AP alive (e.g. INIT/SIPI on x86) 3) Wait for the AP to report alive state 4) Let the AP continue through the atomic bringup 5) Let the AP run the threaded bringup to full online state There are two significant delays: #3 The time for an AP to report alive state in start_secondary() on x86 has been measured in the range between 350us and 3.5ms depending on vendor and CPU type, BIOS microcode size etc. #4 The atomic bringup does the microcode update. This has been measured to take up to ~8ms on the primary threads depending on the microcode patch size to apply. On a two socket SKL server with 56 cores (112 threads) the boot CPU spends on current mainline about 800ms busy waiting for the APs to come up and apply microcode. That's more than 80% of the actual onlining procedure. This can be reduced significantly by splitting the bringup mechanism into two parts: 1) Run the prepare callbacks and kick the AP alive for each AP which needs to be brought up. The APs wake up, do their firmware initialization and run the low level kernel startup code including microcode loading in parallel up to the first synchronization point. (#1 and #2 above) 2) Run the rest of the bringup code strictly serialized per CPU (#3 - #5 above) as it's done today. Parallelizing that stage of the CPU bringup might be possible in theory, but it's questionable whether required surgery would be justified for a pretty small gain. If the system is large enough the first AP is already waiting at the first synchronization point when the boot CPU finished the wake-up of the last AP. That reduces the AP bringup time on that SKL from ~800ms to ~80ms, i.e. by a factor ~10x. The actual gain varies wildly depending on the system, CPU, microcode patch size and other factors. There are some opportunities to reduce the overhead further, but that needs some deep surgery in the x86 CPU bringup code. For now this is only enabled on x86, but the core functionality obviously works for all SMP capable architectures. - Enhancements for SMP function call tracing so it is possible to locate the scheduling and the actual execution points. That allows to measure IPI delivery time precisely" * tag 'smp-core-2023-06-26' of ssh://gitolite.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (45 commits) trace,smp: Add tracepoints for scheduling remotelly called functions trace,smp: Add tracepoints around remotelly called functions MAINTAINERS: Add CPU HOTPLUG entry x86/smpboot: Fix the parallel bringup decision x86/realmode: Make stack lock work in trampoline_compat() x86/smp: Initialize cpu_primary_thread_mask late cpu/hotplug: Fix off by one in cpuhp_bringup_mask() x86/apic: Fix use of X{,2}APIC_ENABLE in asm with older binutils x86/smpboot/64: Implement arch_cpuhp_init_parallel_bringup() and enable it x86/smpboot: Support parallel startup of secondary CPUs x86/smpboot: Implement a bit spinlock to protect the realmode stack x86/apic: Save the APIC virtual base address cpu/hotplug: Allow "parallel" bringup up to CPUHP_BP_KICK_AP_STATE x86/apic: Provide cpu_primary_thread mask x86/smpboot: Enable split CPU startup cpu/hotplug: Provide a split up CPUHP_BRINGUP mechanism cpu/hotplug: Reset task stack state in _cpu_up() cpu/hotplug: Remove unused state functions riscv: Switch to hotplug core state synchronization parisc: Switch to hotplug core state synchronization ...
syzkaller hit a WARN_ON_ONCE(!scm->pid) in scm_pidfd_recv(). In unix_stream_read_generic(), if there is no skb in the queue, we could bail out the do-while loop without calling scm_set_cred(): 1. No skb in the queue 2. sk is non-blocking or shutdown(sk, RCV_SHUTDOWN) is called concurrently or peer calls close() If the socket is configured with SO_PASSPIDFD, scm_pidfd_recv() would populate cmsg with garbage emitting the warning. Let's skip SCM_PIDFD if scm->pid is NULL in scm_pidfd_recv(). Note another way would be skip calling scm_recv() in such cases, but this caused a regression resulting in commit 9d797ee ("Revert "af_unix: Call scm_recv() only after scm_set_cred().""). WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 3245 at include/net/scm.h:138 scm_pidfd_recv include/net/scm.h:138 [inline] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 3245 at include/net/scm.h:138 scm_recv.constprop.0+0x754/0x850 include/net/scm.h:177 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 3245 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 6.4.0-rc5-01219-gfa0e21fa4443 #2 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:scm_pidfd_recv include/net/scm.h:138 [inline] RIP: 0010:scm_recv.constprop.0+0x754/0x850 include/net/scm.h:177 Code: 67 fd e9 55 fd ff ff e8 4a 70 67 fd e9 7f fd ff ff e8 40 70 67 fd e9 3e fb ff ff e8 36 70 67 fd e9 02 fd ff ff e8 8c 3a 20 fd <0f> 0b e9 fe fb ff ff e8 50 70 67 fd e9 2e f9 ff ff e8 46 70 67 fd RSP: 0018:ffffc90009af7660 EFLAGS: 00010216 RAX: 00000000000000a1 RBX: ffff888041e58a80 RCX: ffffc90003852000 RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: ffffffff842675b4 RDI: 0000000000000007 RBP: ffffc90009af7810 R08: 0000000000000007 R09: 0000000000000013 R10: 00000000000000f8 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffc90009af7db0 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff888041e58a88 R15: 1ffff9200135eecc FS: 00007f6b7113f640(0000) GS:ffff88806cf00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f6b7111de38 CR3: 0000000012a6e002 CR4: 0000000000770ee0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> unix_stream_read_generic+0x5fe/0x1f50 net/unix/af_unix.c:2830 unix_stream_recvmsg+0x194/0x1c0 net/unix/af_unix.c:2880 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1019 [inline] sock_recvmsg+0x188/0x1d0 net/socket.c:1040 ____sys_recvmsg+0x210/0x610 net/socket.c:2712 ___sys_recvmsg+0xff/0x190 net/socket.c:2754 do_recvmmsg+0x25d/0x6c0 net/socket.c:2848 __sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2927 [inline] __do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2950 [inline] __se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2943 [inline] __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x224/0x290 net/socket.c:2943 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc RIP: 0033:0x7f6b71da2e5d Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 73 9f 1b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f6b7113ecc8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000012b RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004bc050 RCX: 00007f6b71da2e5d RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: 0000000020006600 RDI: 000000000000000b RBP: 00000000004bc050 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000120 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000000000000006e R14: 00007f6b71e03530 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> Fixes: 5e2ff67 ("scm: add SO_PASSPIDFD and SCM_PIDFD") Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230627174314.67688-2-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Sockmap and sockhash maps are a collection of psocks that are objects representing a socket plus a set of metadata needed to manage the BPF programs associated with the socket. These maps use the stab->lock to protect from concurrent operations on the maps, e.g. trying to insert to objects into the array at the same time in the same slot. Additionally, a sockhash map has a bucket lock to protect iteration and insert/delete into the hash entry. Each psock has a psock->link which is a linked list of all the maps that a psock is attached to. This allows a psock (socket) to be included in multiple sockmap and sockhash maps. This linked list is protected the psock->link_lock. They _must_ be nested correctly to avoid deadlock: lock(stab->lock) : do BPF map operations and psock insert/delete lock(psock->link_lock) : add map to psock linked list of maps unlock(psock->link_lock) unlock(stab->lock) For non PREEMPT_RT kernels both raw_spin_lock_t and spin_lock_t are guaranteed to not sleep. But, with PREEMPT_RT kernels the spin_lock_t variants may sleep. In the current code we have many patterns like this: rcu_critical_section: raw_spin_lock(stab->lock) spin_lock(psock->link_lock) <- may sleep ouch spin_unlock(psock->link_lock) raw_spin_unlock(stab->lock) rcu_critical_section Nesting spin_lock() inside a raw_spin_lock() violates locking rules for PREEMPT_RT kernels. And additionally we do alloc(GFP_ATOMICS) inside the stab->lock, but those might sleep on PREEMPT_RT kernels. The result is splats like this: ./test_progs -t sockmap_basic [ 33.344330] bpf_testmod: loading out-of-tree module taints kernel. [ 33.441933] [ 33.442089] ============================= [ 33.442421] [ BUG: Invalid wait context ] [ 33.442763] 6.5.0-rc5-01731-gec0ded2e0282 #4958 Tainted: G O [ 33.443320] ----------------------------- [ 33.443624] test_progs/2073 is trying to lock: [ 33.443960] ffff888102a1c290 (&psock->link_lock){....}-{3:3}, at: sock_map_update_common+0x2c2/0x3d0 [ 33.444636] other info that might help us debug this: [ 33.444991] context-{5:5} [ 33.445183] 3 locks held by test_progs/2073: [ 33.445498] #0: ffff88811a208d30 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: sock_map_update_elem_sys+0xff/0x330 [ 33.446159] #1: ffffffff842539e0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: sock_map_update_elem_sys+0xf5/0x330 [ 33.446809] #2: ffff88810d687240 (&stab->lock){+...}-{2:2}, at: sock_map_update_common+0x177/0x3d0 [ 33.447445] stack backtrace: [ 33.447655] CPU: 10 PID To fix observe we can't readily remove the allocations (for that we would need to use/create something similar to bpf_map_alloc). So convert raw_spin_lock_t to spin_lock_t. We note that sock_map_update that would trigger the allocate and potential sleep is only allowed through sys_bpf ops and via sock_ops which precludes hw interrupts and low level atomic sections in RT preempt kernel. On non RT preempt kernel there are no changes here and spin locks sections and alloc(GFP_ATOMIC) are still not sleepable. Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230830053517.166611-1-john.fastabend@gmail.com
…es_lock __dma_entry_alloc_check_leak() calls into printk -> serial console output (qcom geni) and grabs port->lock under free_entries_lock spin lock, which is a reverse locking dependency chain as qcom_geni IRQ handler can call into dma-debug code and grab free_entries_lock under port->lock. Move __dma_entry_alloc_check_leak() call out of free_entries_lock scope so that we don't acquire serial console's port->lock under it. Trimmed-down lockdep splat: The existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (free_entries_lock){-.-.}-{2:2}: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x60/0x80 dma_entry_alloc+0x38/0x110 debug_dma_map_page+0x60/0xf8 dma_map_page_attrs+0x1e0/0x230 dma_map_single_attrs.constprop.0+0x6c/0xc8 geni_se_rx_dma_prep+0x40/0xcc qcom_geni_serial_isr+0x310/0x510 __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x110/0x244 handle_irq_event_percpu+0x20/0x54 handle_irq_event+0x50/0x88 handle_fasteoi_irq+0xa4/0xcc handle_irq_desc+0x28/0x40 generic_handle_domain_irq+0x24/0x30 gic_handle_irq+0xc4/0x148 do_interrupt_handler+0xa4/0xb0 el1_interrupt+0x34/0x64 el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x24 el1h_64_irq+0x64/0x68 arch_local_irq_enable+0x4/0x8 ____do_softirq+0x18/0x24 ... -> #1 (&port_lock_key){-.-.}-{2:2}: _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x60/0x80 qcom_geni_serial_console_write+0x184/0x1dc console_flush_all+0x344/0x454 console_unlock+0x94/0xf0 vprintk_emit+0x238/0x24c vprintk_default+0x3c/0x48 vprintk+0xb4/0xbc _printk+0x68/0x90 register_console+0x230/0x38c uart_add_one_port+0x338/0x494 qcom_geni_serial_probe+0x390/0x424 platform_probe+0x70/0xc0 really_probe+0x148/0x280 __driver_probe_device+0xfc/0x114 driver_probe_device+0x44/0x100 __device_attach_driver+0x64/0xdc bus_for_each_drv+0xb0/0xd8 __device_attach+0xe4/0x140 device_initial_probe+0x1c/0x28 bus_probe_device+0x44/0xb0 device_add+0x538/0x668 of_device_add+0x44/0x50 of_platform_device_create_pdata+0x94/0xc8 of_platform_bus_create+0x270/0x304 of_platform_populate+0xac/0xc4 devm_of_platform_populate+0x60/0xac geni_se_probe+0x154/0x160 platform_probe+0x70/0xc0 ... -> #0 (console_owner){-...}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0xdf8/0x109c lock_acquire+0x234/0x284 console_flush_all+0x330/0x454 console_unlock+0x94/0xf0 vprintk_emit+0x238/0x24c vprintk_default+0x3c/0x48 vprintk+0xb4/0xbc _printk+0x68/0x90 dma_entry_alloc+0xb4/0x110 debug_dma_map_sg+0xdc/0x2f8 __dma_map_sg_attrs+0xac/0xe4 dma_map_sgtable+0x30/0x4c get_pages+0x1d4/0x1e4 [msm] msm_gem_pin_pages_locked+0x38/0xac [msm] msm_gem_pin_vma_locked+0x58/0x88 [msm] msm_ioctl_gem_submit+0xde4/0x13ac [msm] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xe0/0x15c drm_ioctl+0x2e8/0x3f4 vfs_ioctl+0x30/0x50 ... Chain exists of: console_owner --> &port_lock_key --> free_entries_lock Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(free_entries_lock); lock(&port_lock_key); lock(free_entries_lock); lock(console_owner); *** DEADLOCK *** Call trace: dump_backtrace+0xb4/0xf0 show_stack+0x20/0x30 dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0x84 dump_stack+0x18/0x24 print_circular_bug+0x1cc/0x234 check_noncircular+0x78/0xac __lock_acquire+0xdf8/0x109c lock_acquire+0x234/0x284 console_flush_all+0x330/0x454 console_unlock+0x94/0xf0 vprintk_emit+0x238/0x24c vprintk_default+0x3c/0x48 vprintk+0xb4/0xbc _printk+0x68/0x90 dma_entry_alloc+0xb4/0x110 debug_dma_map_sg+0xdc/0x2f8 __dma_map_sg_attrs+0xac/0xe4 dma_map_sgtable+0x30/0x4c get_pages+0x1d4/0x1e4 [msm] msm_gem_pin_pages_locked+0x38/0xac [msm] msm_gem_pin_vma_locked+0x58/0x88 [msm] msm_ioctl_gem_submit+0xde4/0x13ac [msm] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xe0/0x15c drm_ioctl+0x2e8/0x3f4 vfs_ioctl+0x30/0x50 ... Reported-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky@chromium.org> Acked-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
…git/vgupta/arc Pull ARC updates from Vineet Gupta: - fixes for -Wmissing-prototype warnings - missing compiler barrier in relaxed atomics - some uaccess simplification, declutter - removal of massive glocal struct cpuinfo_arc from bootlog code - __switch_to consolidation (removal of inline asm variant) - use GP to cache task pointer (vs. r25) - misc rework of entry code * tag 'arc-6.6-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vgupta/arc: (24 commits) ARC: boot log: fix warning arc: Explicitly include correct DT includes ARC: pt_regs: create seperate type for ecr ARCv2: entry: rearrange pt_regs slightly ARC: entry: replace 8 byte ADD.ne with 4 byte ADD2.ne ARC: entry: replace 8 byte OR with 4 byte BSET ARC: entry: Add more common chores to EXCEPTION_PROLOGUE ARC: entry: EV_MachineCheck dont re-read ECR ARC: entry: ARcompact EV_ProtV to use r10 directly ARC: entry: rework (non-functional) ARC: __switch_to: move ksp to thread_info from thread_struct ARC: __switch_to: asm with dwarf ops (vs. inline asm) ARC: kernel stack: INIT_THREAD need not setup @init_stack in @ksp ARC: entry: use gp to cache task pointer (vs. r25) ARC: boot log: eliminate struct cpuinfo_arc #4: boot log per ISA ARC: boot log: eliminate struct cpuinfo_arc #3: don't export ARC: boot log: eliminate struct cpuinfo_arc #2: cache ARC: boot log: eliminate struct cpuinfo_arc #1: mm ARCv2: memset: don't prefetch for len == 0 which happens a alot ARC: uaccess: elide unaliged handling if hardware supports ...
Currently, for double invoke call_rcu(), will dump rcu_head objects memory info, if the objects is not allocated from the slab allocator, the vmalloc_dump_obj() will be invoke and the vmap_area_lock spinlock need to be held, since the call_rcu() can be invoked in interrupt context, therefore, there is a possibility of spinlock deadlock scenarios. And in Preempt-RT kernel, the rcutorture test also trigger the following lockdep warning: BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:48 in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 1, name: swapper/0 preempt_count: 1, expected: 0 RCU nest depth: 1, expected: 1 3 locks held by swapper/0/1: #0: ffffffffb534ee80 (fullstop_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: torture_init_begin+0x24/0xa0 #1: ffffffffb5307940 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_torture_init+0x1ec7/0x2370 #2: ffffffffb536af40 (vmap_area_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: find_vmap_area+0x1f/0x70 irq event stamp: 565512 hardirqs last enabled at (565511): [<ffffffffb379b138>] __call_rcu_common+0x218/0x940 hardirqs last disabled at (565512): [<ffffffffb5804262>] rcu_torture_init+0x20b2/0x2370 softirqs last enabled at (399112): [<ffffffffb36b2586>] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x126/0x170 softirqs last disabled at (399106): [<ffffffffb43fef59>] inet_register_protosw+0x9/0x1d0 Preemption disabled at: [<ffffffffb58040c3>] rcu_torture_init+0x1f13/0x2370 CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W 6.5.0-rc4-rt2-yocto-preempt-rt+ #15 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.2-0-gea1b7a073390-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0xb0 dump_stack+0x14/0x20 __might_resched+0x1aa/0x280 ? __pfx_rcu_torture_err_cb+0x10/0x10 rt_spin_lock+0x53/0x130 ? find_vmap_area+0x1f/0x70 find_vmap_area+0x1f/0x70 vmalloc_dump_obj+0x20/0x60 mem_dump_obj+0x22/0x90 __call_rcu_common+0x5bf/0x940 ? debug_smp_processor_id+0x1b/0x30 call_rcu_hurry+0x14/0x20 rcu_torture_init+0x1f82/0x2370 ? __pfx_rcu_torture_leak_cb+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_rcu_torture_leak_cb+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_rcu_torture_init+0x10/0x10 do_one_initcall+0x6c/0x300 ? debug_smp_processor_id+0x1b/0x30 kernel_init_freeable+0x2b9/0x540 ? __pfx_kernel_init+0x10/0x10 kernel_init+0x1f/0x150 ret_from_fork+0x40/0x50 ? __pfx_kernel_init+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 </TASK> The previous patch fixes this by using the deadlock-safe best-effort version of find_vm_area. However, in case of failure print the fact that the pointer was a vmalloc pointer so that we print at least something. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230904180806.1002832-2-joel@joelfernandes.org Fixes: 98f1808 ("mm: Make mem_dump_obj() handle vmalloc() memory") Signed-off-by: Zqiang <qiang.zhang1211@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org> Reported-by: Zhen Lei <thunder.leizhen@huaweicloud.com> Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Cc: Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) <urezki@gmail.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Chuyi Zhou says: ==================== Relax allowlist for open-coded css_task iter Hi, The patchset aims to relax the allowlist for open-coded css_task iter suggested by Alexei[1]. Please see individual patches for more details. And comments are always welcome. Patch summary: * Patch #1: Relax the allowlist and let css_task iter can be used in bpf iters and any sleepable progs. * Patch #2: Add a test in cgroup_iters.c which demonstrates how css_task iters can be combined with cgroup iter. * Patch #3: Add a test to prove css_task iter can be used in normal * sleepable progs. link[1]:https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAADnVQKafk_junRyE=-FVAik4hjTRDtThymYGEL8hGTuYoOGpA@mail.gmail.com/ --- Changes in v2: * Fix the incorrect logic in check_css_task_iter_allowlist. Use expected_attach_type to check whether we are using bpf_iters. * Link to v1:https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231022154527.229117-1-zhouchuyi@bytedance.com/T/#m946f9cde86b44a13265d9a44c5738a711eb578fd Changes in v3: * Add a testcase to prove css_task can be used in fentry.s * Link to v2:https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231024024240.42790-1-zhouchuyi@bytedance.com/T/#m14a97041ff56c2df21bc0149449abd275b73f6a3 Changes in v4: * Add Yonghong's ack for patch #1 and patch #2. * Solve Yonghong's comments for patch #2 * Move prog 'iter_css_task_for_each_sleep' from iters_task_failure.c to iters_css_task.c. Use RUN_TESTS to prove we can load this prog. * Link to v3:https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231025075914.30979-1-zhouchuyi@bytedance.com/T/#m3200d8ad29af4ffab97588e297361d0a45d7585d --- ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231031050438.93297-1-zhouchuyi@bytedance.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
When LAN9303 is MDIO-connected two callchains exist into mdio->bus->write(): 1. switch ports 1&2 ("physical" PHYs): virtual (switch-internal) MDIO bus (lan9303_switch_ops->phy_{read|write})-> lan9303_mdio_phy_{read|write} -> mdiobus_{read|write}_nested 2. LAN9303 virtual PHY: virtual MDIO bus (lan9303_phy_{read|write}) -> lan9303_virt_phy_reg_{read|write} -> regmap -> lan9303_mdio_{read|write} If the latter functions just take mutex_lock(&sw_dev->device->bus->mdio_lock) it triggers a LOCKDEP false-positive splat. It's false-positive because the first mdio_lock in the second callchain above belongs to virtual MDIO bus, the second mdio_lock belongs to physical MDIO bus. Consequent annotation in lan9303_mdio_{read|write} as nested lock (similar to lan9303_mdio_phy_{read|write}, it's the same physical MDIO bus) prevents the following splat: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.15.71 #1 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ kworker/u4:3/609 is trying to acquire lock: ffff000011531c68 (lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: regmap_lock_mutex but task is already holding lock: ffff0000114c44d8 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mdiobus_read which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: lock_acquire __mutex_lock mutex_lock_nested lan9303_mdio_read _regmap_read regmap_read lan9303_probe lan9303_mdio_probe mdio_probe really_probe __driver_probe_device driver_probe_device __device_attach_driver bus_for_each_drv __device_attach device_initial_probe bus_probe_device deferred_probe_work_func process_one_work worker_thread kthread ret_from_fork -> #0 (lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire lock_acquire.part.0 lock_acquire __mutex_lock mutex_lock_nested regmap_lock_mutex regmap_read lan9303_phy_read dsa_slave_phy_read __mdiobus_read mdiobus_read get_phy_device mdiobus_scan __mdiobus_register dsa_register_switch lan9303_probe lan9303_mdio_probe mdio_probe really_probe __driver_probe_device driver_probe_device __device_attach_driver bus_for_each_drv __device_attach device_initial_probe bus_probe_device deferred_probe_work_func process_one_work worker_thread kthread ret_from_fork other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&bus->mdio_lock); lock(lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock); lock(&bus->mdio_lock); lock(lan9303_mdio:131:(&lan9303_mdio_regmap_config)->lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 5 locks held by kworker/u4:3/609: #0: ffff000002842938 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work #1: ffff80000bacbd60 (deferred_probe_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work #2: ffff000007645178 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: __device_attach #3: ffff8000096e6e78 (dsa2_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dsa_register_switch #4: ffff0000114c44d8 (&bus->mdio_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: mdiobus_read stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 609 Comm: kworker/u4:3 Not tainted 5.15.71 #1 Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func Call trace: dump_backtrace show_stack dump_stack_lvl dump_stack print_circular_bug check_noncircular __lock_acquire lock_acquire.part.0 lock_acquire __mutex_lock mutex_lock_nested regmap_lock_mutex regmap_read lan9303_phy_read dsa_slave_phy_read __mdiobus_read mdiobus_read get_phy_device mdiobus_scan __mdiobus_register dsa_register_switch lan9303_probe lan9303_mdio_probe ... Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: dc70058 ("net: dsa: LAN9303: add MDIO managed mode support") Signed-off-by: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin@siemens.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231027065741.534971-1-alexander.sverdlin@siemens.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
…pf_iter_reg' Chuyi Zhou says: ==================== The patchset aims to let the BPF verivier consider bpf_iter__cgroup->cgroup and bpf_iter__task->task is trusted suggested by Alexei[1]. Please see individual patches for more details. And comments are always welcome. Link[1]:https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231022154527.229117-1-zhouchuyi@bytedance.com/T/#mb57725edc8ccdd50a1b165765c7619b4d65ed1b0 v2->v1: * Patch #1: Add Yonghong's ack and add description of similar case in log. * Patch #2: Add Yonghong's ack ==================== Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
We must check the return value of find_first_bit() before using the return value as an index array since it happens to overflow the array and then panic: [ 107.318430] Kernel BUG [#1] [ 107.319434] CPU: 3 PID: 1238 Comm: kill Tainted: G E 6.6.0-rc6ubuntu-defconfig #2 [ 107.319465] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT) [ 107.319551] epc : pmu_sbi_ovf_handler+0x3a4/0x3ae [ 107.319840] ra : pmu_sbi_ovf_handler+0x52/0x3ae [ 107.319868] epc : ffffffff80a0a77c ra : ffffffff80a0a42a sp : ffffaf83fecda350 [ 107.319884] gp : ffffffff823961a8 tp : ffffaf8083db1dc0 t0 : ffffaf83fecda480 [ 107.319899] t1 : ffffffff80cafe62 t2 : 000000000000ff00 s0 : ffffaf83fecda520 [ 107.319921] s1 : ffffaf83fecda380 a0 : 00000018fca29df0 a1 : ffffffffffffffff [ 107.319936] a2 : 0000000001073734 a3 : 0000000000000004 a4 : 0000000000000000 [ 107.319951] a5 : 0000000000000040 a6 : 000000001d1c8774 a7 : 0000000000504d55 [ 107.319965] s2 : ffffffff82451f10 s3 : ffffffff82724e70 s4 : 000000000000003f [ 107.319980] s5 : 0000000000000011 s6 : ffffaf8083db27c0 s7 : 0000000000000000 [ 107.319995] s8 : 0000000000000001 s9 : 00007fffb45d6558 s10: 00007fffb45d81a0 [ 107.320009] s11: ffffaf7ffff60000 t3 : 0000000000000004 t4 : 0000000000000000 [ 107.320023] t5 : ffffaf7f80000000 t6 : ffffaf8000000000 [ 107.320037] status: 0000000200000100 badaddr: 0000000000000000 cause: 0000000000000003 [ 107.320081] [<ffffffff80a0a77c>] pmu_sbi_ovf_handler+0x3a4/0x3ae [ 107.320112] [<ffffffff800b42d0>] handle_percpu_devid_irq+0x9e/0x1a0 [ 107.320131] [<ffffffff800ad92c>] generic_handle_domain_irq+0x28/0x36 [ 107.320148] [<ffffffff8065f9f8>] riscv_intc_irq+0x36/0x4e [ 107.320166] [<ffffffff80caf4a0>] handle_riscv_irq+0x54/0x86 [ 107.320189] [<ffffffff80cb0036>] do_irq+0x64/0x96 [ 107.320271] Code: 85a6 855e b097 ff7f 80e7 9220 b709 9002 4501 bbd9 (9002) 6097 [ 107.320585] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 107.320704] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt [ 107.320775] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs [ 107.321219] Kernel Offset: 0x0 from 0xffffffff80000000 [ 107.333051] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt ]--- Fixes: 4905ec2 ("RISC-V: Add sscofpmf extension support") Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231109082128.40777-1-alexghiti@rivosinc.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.5.0-kfd-fkuehlin #276 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ kworker/8:2/2676 is trying to acquire lock: ffff9435aae95c88 ((work_completion)(&svm_bo->eviction_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x52/0x550 but task is already holding lock: ffff9435cd8e1720 (&svms->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: svm_range_deferred_list_work+0xe8/0x340 [amdgpu] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (&svms->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x97/0xd30 kfd_ioctl_alloc_memory_of_gpu+0x6d/0x3c0 [amdgpu] kfd_ioctl+0x1b2/0x5d0 [amdgpu] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x86/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x39/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd -> #1 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}: down_read+0x42/0x160 svm_range_evict_svm_bo_worker+0x8b/0x340 [amdgpu] process_one_work+0x27a/0x540 worker_thread+0x53/0x3e0 kthread+0xeb/0x120 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 -> #0 ((work_completion)(&svm_bo->eviction_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x1426/0x2200 lock_acquire+0xc1/0x2b0 __flush_work+0x80/0x550 __cancel_work_timer+0x109/0x190 svm_range_bo_release+0xdc/0x1c0 [amdgpu] svm_range_free+0x175/0x180 [amdgpu] svm_range_deferred_list_work+0x15d/0x340 [amdgpu] process_one_work+0x27a/0x540 worker_thread+0x53/0x3e0 kthread+0xeb/0x120 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: (work_completion)(&svm_bo->eviction_work) --> &mm->mmap_lock --> &svms->lock Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&svms->lock); lock(&mm->mmap_lock); lock(&svms->lock); lock((work_completion)(&svm_bo->eviction_work)); I believe this cannot really lead to a deadlock in practice, because svm_range_evict_svm_bo_worker only takes the mmap_read_lock if the BO refcount is non-0. That means it's impossible that svm_range_bo_release is running concurrently. However, there is no good way to annotate this. To avoid the problem, take a BO reference in svm_range_schedule_evict_svm_bo instead of in the worker. That way it's impossible for a BO to get freed while eviction work is pending and the cancel_work_sync call in svm_range_bo_release can be eliminated. v2: Use svm_bo_ref_unless_zero and explained why that's safe. Also removed redundant checks that are already done in amdkfd_fence_enable_signaling. Signed-off-by: Felix Kuehling <felix.kuehling@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Philip Yang <philip.yang@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.5.0-kfd-yangp #2289 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ kworker/0:2/996 is trying to acquire lock: (srcu){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: __synchronize_srcu+0x5/0x1a0 but task is already holding lock: ((work_completion)(&svms->deferred_list_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x211/0x560 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #3 ((work_completion)(&svms->deferred_list_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: __flush_work+0x88/0x4f0 svm_range_list_lock_and_flush_work+0x3d/0x110 [amdgpu] svm_range_set_attr+0xd6/0x14c0 [amdgpu] kfd_ioctl+0x1d1/0x630 [amdgpu] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x88/0xc0 -> #2 (&info->lock#2){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x99/0xc70 amdgpu_amdkfd_gpuvm_restore_process_bos+0x54/0x740 [amdgpu] restore_process_helper+0x22/0x80 [amdgpu] restore_process_worker+0x2d/0xa0 [amdgpu] process_one_work+0x29b/0x560 worker_thread+0x3d/0x3d0 -> #1 ((work_completion)(&(&process->restore_work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: __flush_work+0x88/0x4f0 __cancel_work_timer+0x12c/0x1c0 kfd_process_notifier_release_internal+0x37/0x1f0 [amdgpu] __mmu_notifier_release+0xad/0x240 exit_mmap+0x6a/0x3a0 mmput+0x6a/0x120 do_exit+0x322/0xb90 do_group_exit+0x37/0xa0 __x64_sys_exit_group+0x18/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x80 -> #0 (srcu){.+.+}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x1521/0x2510 lock_sync+0x5f/0x90 __synchronize_srcu+0x4f/0x1a0 __mmu_notifier_release+0x128/0x240 exit_mmap+0x6a/0x3a0 mmput+0x6a/0x120 svm_range_deferred_list_work+0x19f/0x350 [amdgpu] process_one_work+0x29b/0x560 worker_thread+0x3d/0x3d0 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: srcu --> &info->lock#2 --> (work_completion)(&svms->deferred_list_work) Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock((work_completion)(&svms->deferred_list_work)); lock(&info->lock#2); lock((work_completion)(&svms->deferred_list_work)); sync(srcu); Signed-off-by: Philip Yang <Philip.Yang@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Felix Kuehling <felix.kuehling@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Andrii Nakryiko says: ==================== Tighten up arg:ctx type enforcement Follow up fixes for kernel-side and libbpf-side logic around handling arg:ctx (__arg_ctx) tagged arguments of BPF global subprogs. Patch #1 adds libbpf feature detection of kernel-side __arg_ctx support to avoid unnecessary rewriting BTF types. With stricter kernel-side type enforcement this is now mandatory to avoid problems with using `struct bpf_user_pt_regs_t` instead of actual typedef. For __arg_ctx tagged arguments verifier is now supporting either `bpf_user_pt_regs_t` typedef or resolves it down to the actual struct (pt_regs/user_pt_regs/user_regs_struct), depending on architecture), but for old kernels without __arg_ctx support it's more backwards compatible for libbpf to use `struct bpf_user_pt_regs_t` rewrite which will work on wider range of kernels. So feature detection prevent libbpf accidentally breaking global subprogs on new kernels. We also adjust selftests to do similar feature detection (much simpler, but potentially breaking due to kernel source code refactoring, which is fine for selftests), and skip tests expecting libbpf's BTF type rewrites. Patch #2 is preparatory refactoring for patch #3 which adds type enforcement for arg:ctx tagged global subprog args. See the patch for specifics. Patch #4 adds many new cases to ensure type logic works as expected. Finally, patch #5 adds a relevant subset of kernel-side type checks to __arg_ctx cases that libbpf supports rewrite of. In libbpf's case, type violations are reported as warnings and BTF rewrite is not performed, which will eventually lead to BPF verifier complaining at program verification time. Good care was taken to avoid conflicts between bpf and bpf-next tree (which has few follow up refactorings in the same code area). Once trees converge some of the code will be moved around a bit (and some will be deleted), but with no change to functionality or general shape of the code. v2->v3: - support `bpf_user_pt_regs_t` typedef for KPROBE and PERF_EVENT (CI); v1->v2: - add user_pt_regs and user_regs_struct support for PERF_EVENT (CI); - drop FEAT_ARG_CTX_TAG enum leftover from patch #1; - fix warning about default: without break in the switch (CI). ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240118033143.3384355-1-andrii@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Petr Machata says: ==================== mlxsw: Miscellaneous fixes This patchset is a bric-a-brac of fixes for bugs impacting mlxsw. - Patches #1 and #2 fix issues in ACL handling error paths. - Patch #3 fixes stack corruption in ACL code that a recent FW update has uncovered. - Patch #4 fixes an issue in handling of IPIP next hops. - Patch #5 fixes a typo in a the qos_pfc selftest - Patch #6 fixes the same selftest to work with 8-lane ports. ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/cover.1705502064.git.petrm@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
When I was testing mongodb over bcachefs with compression, there is a lockdep warning when snapshotting mongodb data volume. $ cat test.sh prog=bcachefs $prog subvolume create /mnt/data $prog subvolume create /mnt/data/snapshots while true;do $prog subvolume snapshot /mnt/data /mnt/data/snapshots/$(date +%s) sleep 1s done $ cat /etc/mongodb.conf systemLog: destination: file logAppend: true path: /mnt/data/mongod.log storage: dbPath: /mnt/data/ lockdep reports: [ 3437.452330] ====================================================== [ 3437.452750] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 3437.453168] 6.7.0-rc7-custom+ #85 Tainted: G E [ 3437.453562] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 3437.453981] bcachefs/35533 is trying to acquire lock: [ 3437.454325] ffffa0a02b2b1418 (sb_writers#10){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: filename_create+0x62/0x190 [ 3437.454875] but task is already holding lock: [ 3437.455268] ffffa0a02b2b10e0 (&type->s_umount_key#48){.+.+}-{3:3}, at: bch2_fs_file_ioctl+0x232/0xc90 [bcachefs] [ 3437.456009] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 3437.456553] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 3437.457054] -> #3 (&type->s_umount_key#48){.+.+}-{3:3}: [ 3437.457507] down_read+0x3e/0x170 [ 3437.457772] bch2_fs_file_ioctl+0x232/0xc90 [bcachefs] [ 3437.458206] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x93/0xd0 [ 3437.458498] do_syscall_64+0x42/0xf0 [ 3437.458779] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 [ 3437.459155] -> #2 (&c->snapshot_create_lock){++++}-{3:3}: [ 3437.459615] down_read+0x3e/0x170 [ 3437.459878] bch2_truncate+0x82/0x110 [bcachefs] [ 3437.460276] bchfs_truncate+0x254/0x3c0 [bcachefs] [ 3437.460686] notify_change+0x1f1/0x4a0 [ 3437.461283] do_truncate+0x7f/0xd0 [ 3437.461555] path_openat+0xa57/0xce0 [ 3437.461836] do_filp_open+0xb4/0x160 [ 3437.462116] do_sys_openat2+0x91/0xc0 [ 3437.462402] __x64_sys_openat+0x53/0xa0 [ 3437.462701] do_syscall_64+0x42/0xf0 [ 3437.462982] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 [ 3437.463359] -> #1 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#15){+.+.}-{3:3}: [ 3437.463843] down_write+0x3b/0xc0 [ 3437.464223] bch2_write_iter+0x5b/0xcc0 [bcachefs] [ 3437.464493] vfs_write+0x21b/0x4c0 [ 3437.464653] ksys_write+0x69/0xf0 [ 3437.464839] do_syscall_64+0x42/0xf0 [ 3437.465009] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 [ 3437.465231] -> #0 (sb_writers#10){.+.+}-{0:0}: [ 3437.465471] __lock_acquire+0x1455/0x21b0 [ 3437.465656] lock_acquire+0xc6/0x2b0 [ 3437.465822] mnt_want_write+0x46/0x1a0 [ 3437.465996] filename_create+0x62/0x190 [ 3437.466175] user_path_create+0x2d/0x50 [ 3437.466352] bch2_fs_file_ioctl+0x2ec/0xc90 [bcachefs] [ 3437.466617] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x93/0xd0 [ 3437.466791] do_syscall_64+0x42/0xf0 [ 3437.466957] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 [ 3437.467180] other info that might help us debug this: [ 3437.469670] 2 locks held by bcachefs/35533: other info that might help us debug this: [ 3437.467507] Chain exists of: sb_writers#10 --> &c->snapshot_create_lock --> &type->s_umount_key#48 [ 3437.467979] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 3437.468223] CPU0 CPU1 [ 3437.468405] ---- ---- [ 3437.468585] rlock(&type->s_umount_key#48); [ 3437.468758] lock(&c->snapshot_create_lock); [ 3437.469030] lock(&type->s_umount_key#48); [ 3437.469291] rlock(sb_writers#10); [ 3437.469434] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 3437.469670] 2 locks held by bcachefs/35533: [ 3437.469838] #0: ffffa0a02ce00a88 (&c->snapshot_create_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: bch2_fs_file_ioctl+0x1e3/0xc90 [bcachefs] [ 3437.470294] #1: ffffa0a02b2b10e0 (&type->s_umount_key#48){.+.+}-{3:3}, at: bch2_fs_file_ioctl+0x232/0xc90 [bcachefs] [ 3437.470744] stack backtrace: [ 3437.470922] CPU: 7 PID: 35533 Comm: bcachefs Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 6.7.0-rc7-custom+ #85 [ 3437.471313] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014 [ 3437.471694] Call Trace: [ 3437.471795] <TASK> [ 3437.471884] dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x90 [ 3437.472035] check_noncircular+0x132/0x150 [ 3437.472202] __lock_acquire+0x1455/0x21b0 [ 3437.472369] lock_acquire+0xc6/0x2b0 [ 3437.472518] ? filename_create+0x62/0x190 [ 3437.472683] ? lock_is_held_type+0x97/0x110 [ 3437.472856] mnt_want_write+0x46/0x1a0 [ 3437.473025] ? filename_create+0x62/0x190 [ 3437.473204] filename_create+0x62/0x190 [ 3437.473380] user_path_create+0x2d/0x50 [ 3437.473555] bch2_fs_file_ioctl+0x2ec/0xc90 [bcachefs] [ 3437.473819] ? lock_acquire+0xc6/0x2b0 [ 3437.474002] ? __fget_files+0x2a/0x190 [ 3437.474195] ? __fget_files+0xbc/0x190 [ 3437.474380] ? lock_release+0xc5/0x270 [ 3437.474567] ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0x93/0xd0 [ 3437.474764] ? __pfx_bch2_fs_file_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [bcachefs] [ 3437.475090] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x93/0xd0 [ 3437.475277] do_syscall_64+0x42/0xf0 [ 3437.475454] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 [ 3437.475691] RIP: 0033:0x7f2743c313af ====================================================== In __bch2_ioctl_subvolume_create(), we grab s_umount unconditionally and unlock it at the end of the function. There is a comment "why do we need this lock?" about the lock coming from commit 42d2373 ("bcachefs: Snapshot creation, deletion") The reason is that __bch2_ioctl_subvolume_create() calls sync_inodes_sb() which enforce locked s_umount to writeback all dirty nodes before doing snapshot works. Fix it by read locking s_umount for snapshotting only and unlocking s_umount after sync_inodes_sb(). Signed-off-by: Su Yue <glass.su@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev>
Tests with hot-plugging crytpo cards on KVM guests with debug kernel build revealed an use after free for the load field of the struct zcrypt_card. The reason was an incorrect reference handling of the zcrypt card object which could lead to a free of the zcrypt card object while it was still in use. This is an example of the slab message: kernel: 0x00000000885a7512-0x00000000885a7513 @offset=1298. First byte 0x68 instead of 0x6b kernel: Allocated in zcrypt_card_alloc+0x36/0x70 [zcrypt] age=18046 cpu=3 pid=43 kernel: kmalloc_trace+0x3f2/0x470 kernel: zcrypt_card_alloc+0x36/0x70 [zcrypt] kernel: zcrypt_cex4_card_probe+0x26/0x380 [zcrypt_cex4] kernel: ap_device_probe+0x15c/0x290 kernel: really_probe+0xd2/0x468 kernel: driver_probe_device+0x40/0xf0 kernel: __device_attach_driver+0xc0/0x140 kernel: bus_for_each_drv+0x8c/0xd0 kernel: __device_attach+0x114/0x198 kernel: bus_probe_device+0xb4/0xc8 kernel: device_add+0x4d2/0x6e0 kernel: ap_scan_adapter+0x3d0/0x7c0 kernel: ap_scan_bus+0x5a/0x3b0 kernel: ap_scan_bus_wq_callback+0x40/0x60 kernel: process_one_work+0x26e/0x620 kernel: worker_thread+0x21c/0x440 kernel: Freed in zcrypt_card_put+0x54/0x80 [zcrypt] age=9024 cpu=3 pid=43 kernel: kfree+0x37e/0x418 kernel: zcrypt_card_put+0x54/0x80 [zcrypt] kernel: ap_device_remove+0x4c/0xe0 kernel: device_release_driver_internal+0x1c4/0x270 kernel: bus_remove_device+0x100/0x188 kernel: device_del+0x164/0x3c0 kernel: device_unregister+0x30/0x90 kernel: ap_scan_adapter+0xc8/0x7c0 kernel: ap_scan_bus+0x5a/0x3b0 kernel: ap_scan_bus_wq_callback+0x40/0x60 kernel: process_one_work+0x26e/0x620 kernel: worker_thread+0x21c/0x440 kernel: kthread+0x150/0x168 kernel: __ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x58 kernel: ret_from_fork+0xa/0x30 kernel: Slab 0x00000372022169c0 objects=20 used=18 fp=0x00000000885a7c88 flags=0x3ffff00000000a00(workingset|slab|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1ffff) kernel: Object 0x00000000885a74b8 @offset=1208 fp=0x00000000885a7c88 kernel: Redzone 00000000885a74b0: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb ........ kernel: Object 00000000885a74b8: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk kernel: Object 00000000885a74c8: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk kernel: Object 00000000885a74d8: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk kernel: Object 00000000885a74e8: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk kernel: Object 00000000885a74f8: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk kernel: Object 00000000885a7508: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 68 4b 6b 6b 6b a5 kkkkkkkkkkhKkkk. kernel: Redzone 00000000885a7518: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb ........ kernel: Padding 00000000885a756c: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a ZZZZZZZZZZZZ kernel: CPU: 0 PID: 387 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 6.8.0-HF #2 kernel: Hardware name: IBM 3931 A01 704 (KVM/Linux) kernel: Call Trace: kernel: [<00000000ca5ab5b8>] dump_stack_lvl+0x90/0x120 kernel: [<00000000c99d78bc>] check_bytes_and_report+0x114/0x140 kernel: [<00000000c99d53cc>] check_object+0x334/0x3f8 kernel: [<00000000c99d820c>] alloc_debug_processing+0xc4/0x1f8 kernel: [<00000000c99d852e>] get_partial_node.part.0+0x1ee/0x3e0 kernel: [<00000000c99d94ec>] ___slab_alloc+0xaf4/0x13c8 kernel: [<00000000c99d9e38>] __slab_alloc.constprop.0+0x78/0xb8 kernel: [<00000000c99dc8dc>] __kmalloc+0x434/0x590 kernel: [<00000000c9b4c0ce>] ext4_htree_store_dirent+0x4e/0x1c0 kernel: [<00000000c9b908a2>] htree_dirblock_to_tree+0x17a/0x3f0 kernel: [<00000000c9b919dc>] ext4_htree_fill_tree+0x134/0x400 kernel: [<00000000c9b4b3d0>] ext4_dx_readdir+0x160/0x2f0 kernel: [<00000000c9b4bedc>] ext4_readdir+0x5f4/0x760 kernel: [<00000000c9a7efc4>] iterate_dir+0xb4/0x280 kernel: [<00000000c9a7f1ea>] __do_sys_getdents64+0x5a/0x120 kernel: [<00000000ca5d6946>] __do_syscall+0x256/0x310 kernel: [<00000000ca5eea10>] system_call+0x70/0x98 kernel: INFO: lockdep is turned off. kernel: FIX kmalloc-96: Restoring Poison 0x00000000885a7512-0x00000000885a7513=0x6b kernel: FIX kmalloc-96: Marking all objects used The fix is simple: Before use of the queue not only the queue object but also the card object needs to increase it's reference count with a call to zcrypt_card_get(). Similar after use of the queue not only the queue but also the card object's reference count is decreased with zcrypt_card_put(). Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Holger Dengler <dengler@linux.ibm.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
The boot sequence evaluates CPUID information twice: 1) During early boot 2) When finalizing the early setup right before mitigations are selected and alternatives are patched. In both cases the evaluation is stored in boot_cpu_data, but on UP the copying of boot_cpu_data to the per CPU info of the boot CPU happens between #1 and #2. So any update which happens in #2 is never propagated to the per CPU info instance. Consolidate the whole logic and copy boot_cpu_data right before applying alternatives as that's the point where boot_cpu_data is in it's final state and not supposed to change anymore. This also removes the voodoo mb() from smp_prepare_cpus_common() which had absolutely no purpose. Fixes: 71eb489 ("x86/percpu: Cure per CPU madness on UP") Reported-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240322185305.127642785@linutronix.de
Pull block updates from Jens Axboe: - Add a partscan attribute in sysfs, fixing an issue with systemd relying on an internal interface that went away. - Attempt #2 at making long running discards interruptible. The previous attempt went into 6.9, but we ended up mostly reverting it as it had issues. - Remove old ida_simple API in bcache - Support for zoned write plugging, greatly improving the performance on zoned devices. - Remove the old throttle low interface, which has been experimental since 2017 and never made it beyond that and isn't being used. - Remove page->index debugging checks in brd, as it hasn't caught anything and prepares us for removing in struct page. - MD pull request from Song - Don't schedule block workers on isolated CPUs * tag 'for-6.10/block-20240511' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux: (84 commits) blk-throttle: delay initialization until configuration blk-throttle: remove CONFIG_BLK_DEV_THROTTLING_LOW block: fix that util can be greater than 100% block: support to account io_ticks precisely block: add plug while submitting IO bcache: fix variable length array abuse in btree_iter bcache: Remove usage of the deprecated ida_simple_xx() API md: Revert "md: Fix overflow in is_mddev_idle" blk-lib: check for kill signal in ioctl BLKDISCARD block: add a bio_await_chain helper block: add a blk_alloc_discard_bio helper block: add a bio_chain_and_submit helper block: move discard checks into the ioctl handler block: remove the discard_granularity check in __blkdev_issue_discard block/ioctl: prefer different overflow check null_blk: Fix the WARNING: modpost: missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION() block: fix and simplify blkdevparts= cmdline parsing block: refine the EOF check in blkdev_iomap_begin block: add a partscan sysfs attribute for disks block: add a disk_has_partscan helper ...
…rnel/git/netfilter/nf-next Pablo Neira Ayuso says: ==================== Netfilter updates for net-next The following patchset contains Netfilter updates for net-next: Patch #1 skips transaction if object type provides no .update interface. Patch #2 skips NETDEV_CHANGENAME which is unused. Patch #3 enables conntrack to handle Multicast Router Advertisements and Multicast Router Solicitations from the Multicast Router Discovery protocol (RFC4286) as untracked opposed to invalid packets. From Linus Luessing. Patch #4 updates DCCP conntracker to mark invalid as invalid, instead of dropping them, from Jason Xing. Patch #5 uses NF_DROP instead of -NF_DROP since NF_DROP is 0, also from Jason. Patch #6 removes reference in netfilter's sysctl documentation on pickup entries which were already removed by Florian Westphal. Patch #7 removes check for IPS_OFFLOAD flag to disable early drop which allows to evict entries from the conntrack table, also from Florian. Patches #8 to #16 updates nf_tables pipapo set backend to allocate the datastructure copy on-demand from preparation phase, to better deal with OOM situations where .commit step is too late to fail. Series from Florian Westphal. Patch #17 adds a selftest with packetdrill to cover conntrack TCP state transitions, also from Florian. Patch #18 use GFP_KERNEL to clone elements from control plane to avoid quick atomic reserves exhaustion with large sets, reporter refers to million entries magnitude. * tag 'nf-next-24-05-12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf-next: netfilter: nf_tables: allow clone callbacks to sleep selftests: netfilter: add packetdrill based conntrack tests netfilter: nft_set_pipapo: remove dirty flag netfilter: nft_set_pipapo: move cloning of match info to insert/removal path netfilter: nft_set_pipapo: prepare pipapo_get helper for on-demand clone netfilter: nft_set_pipapo: merge deactivate helper into caller netfilter: nft_set_pipapo: prepare walk function for on-demand clone netfilter: nft_set_pipapo: prepare destroy function for on-demand clone netfilter: nft_set_pipapo: make pipapo_clone helper return NULL netfilter: nft_set_pipapo: move prove_locking helper around netfilter: conntrack: remove flowtable early-drop test netfilter: conntrack: documentation: remove reference to non-existent sysctl netfilter: use NF_DROP instead of -NF_DROP netfilter: conntrack: dccp: try not to drop skb in conntrack netfilter: conntrack: fix ct-state for ICMPv6 Multicast Router Discovery netfilter: nf_tables: remove NETDEV_CHANGENAME from netdev chain event handler netfilter: nf_tables: skip transaction if update object is not implemented ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240512161436.168973-1-pablo@netfilter.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Xuan Zhuo says: ==================== virtio_net: rx enable premapped mode by default Actually, for the virtio drivers, we can enable premapped mode whatever the value of use_dma_api. Because we provide the virtio dma apis. So the driver can enable premapped mode unconditionally. This patch set makes the big mode of virtio-net to support premapped mode. And enable premapped mode for rx by default. Based on the following points, we do not use page pool to manage these pages: 1. virtio-net uses the DMA APIs wrapped by virtio core. Therefore, we can only prevent the page pool from performing DMA operations, and let the driver perform DMA operations on the allocated pages. 2. But when the page pool releases the page, we have no chance to execute dma unmap. 3. A solution to #2 is to execute dma unmap every time before putting the page back to the page pool. (This is actually a waste, we don't execute unmap so frequently.) 4. But there is another problem, we still need to use page.dma_addr to save the dma address. Using page.dma_addr while using page pool is unsafe behavior. 5. And we need space the chain the pages submitted once to virtio core. More: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CACGkMEu=Aok9z2imB_c5qVuujSh=vjj1kx12fy9N7hqyi+M5Ow@mail.gmail.com/ Why we do not use the page space to store the dma? http://lore.kernel.org/all/CACGkMEuyeJ9mMgYnnB42=hw6umNuo=agn7VBqBqYPd7GN=+39Q@mail.gmail.com ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240511031404.30903-1-xuanzhuo@linux.alibaba.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
In dctcp_update_alpha(), we use a module parameter dctcp_shift_g as follows: alpha -= min_not_zero(alpha, alpha >> dctcp_shift_g); ... delivered_ce <<= (10 - dctcp_shift_g); It seems syzkaller started fuzzing module parameters and triggered shift-out-of-bounds [0] by setting 100 to dctcp_shift_g: memcpy((void*)0x20000080, "/sys/module/tcp_dctcp/parameters/dctcp_shift_g\000", 47); res = syscall(__NR_openat, /*fd=*/0xffffffffffffff9cul, /*file=*/0x20000080ul, /*flags=*/2ul, /*mode=*/0ul); memcpy((void*)0x20000000, "100\000", 4); syscall(__NR_write, /*fd=*/r[0], /*val=*/0x20000000ul, /*len=*/4ul); Let's limit the max value of dctcp_shift_g by param_set_uint_minmax(). With this patch: # echo 10 > /sys/module/tcp_dctcp/parameters/dctcp_shift_g # cat /sys/module/tcp_dctcp/parameters/dctcp_shift_g 10 # echo 11 > /sys/module/tcp_dctcp/parameters/dctcp_shift_g -bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument [0]: UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in net/ipv4/tcp_dctcp.c:143:12 shift exponent 100 is too large for 32-bit type 'u32' (aka 'unsigned int') CPU: 0 PID: 8083 Comm: syz-executor345 Not tainted 6.9.0-05151-g1b294a1f3561 #2 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x201/0x300 lib/dump_stack.c:114 ubsan_epilogue lib/ubsan.c:231 [inline] __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x346/0x3a0 lib/ubsan.c:468 dctcp_update_alpha+0x540/0x570 net/ipv4/tcp_dctcp.c:143 tcp_in_ack_event net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:3802 [inline] tcp_ack+0x17b1/0x3bc0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:3948 tcp_rcv_state_process+0x57a/0x2290 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6711 tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x764/0xc40 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1937 sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:1106 [inline] __release_sock+0x20f/0x350 net/core/sock.c:2983 release_sock+0x61/0x1f0 net/core/sock.c:3549 mptcp_subflow_shutdown+0x3d0/0x620 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2907 mptcp_check_send_data_fin+0x225/0x410 net/mptcp/protocol.c:2976 __mptcp_close+0x238/0xad0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:3072 mptcp_close+0x2a/0x1a0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:3127 inet_release+0x190/0x1f0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:437 __sock_release net/socket.c:659 [inline] sock_close+0xc0/0x240 net/socket.c:1421 __fput+0x41b/0x890 fs/file_table.c:422 task_work_run+0x23b/0x300 kernel/task_work.c:180 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:38 [inline] do_exit+0x9c8/0x2540 kernel/exit.c:878 do_group_exit+0x201/0x2b0 kernel/exit.c:1027 __do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1038 [inline] __se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1036 [inline] __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3f/0x40 kernel/exit.c:1036 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xe4/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0x6f RIP: 0033:0x7f6c2b5005b6 Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7f6c2b50058c. RSP: 002b:00007ffe883eb948 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000e7 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f6c2b5862f0 RCX: 00007f6c2b5005b6 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 000000000000003c RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 00000000000000e7 R09: ffffffffffffffc0 R10: 0000000000000006 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f6c2b5862f0 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001 </TASK> Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Reported-by: Yue Sun <samsun1006219@gmail.com> Reported-by: xingwei lee <xrivendell7@gmail.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAEkJfYNJM=cw-8x7_Vmj1J6uYVCWMbbvD=EFmDPVBGpTsqOxEA@mail.gmail.com/ Fixes: e3118e8 ("net: tcp: add DCTCP congestion control algorithm") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240517091626.32772-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Patch series "Introduce mseal", v10. This patchset proposes a new mseal() syscall for the Linux kernel. In a nutshell, mseal() protects the VMAs of a given virtual memory range against modifications, such as changes to their permission bits. Modern CPUs support memory permissions, such as the read/write (RW) and no-execute (NX) bits. Linux has supported NX since the release of kernel version 2.6.8 in August 2004 [1]. The memory permission feature improves the security stance on memory corruption bugs, as an attacker cannot simply write to arbitrary memory and point the code to it. The memory must be marked with the X bit, or else an exception will occur. Internally, the kernel maintains the memory permissions in a data structure called VMA (vm_area_struct). mseal() additionally protects the VMA itself against modifications of the selected seal type. Memory sealing is useful to mitigate memory corruption issues where a corrupted pointer is passed to a memory management system. For example, such an attacker primitive can break control-flow integrity guarantees since read-only memory that is supposed to be trusted can become writable or .text pages can get remapped. Memory sealing can automatically be applied by the runtime loader to seal .text and .rodata pages and applications can additionally seal security critical data at runtime. A similar feature already exists in the XNU kernel with the VM_FLAGS_PERMANENT [3] flag and on OpenBSD with the mimmutable syscall [4]. Also, Chrome wants to adopt this feature for their CFI work [2] and this patchset has been designed to be compatible with the Chrome use case. Two system calls are involved in sealing the map: mmap() and mseal(). The new mseal() is an syscall on 64 bit CPU, and with following signature: int mseal(void addr, size_t len, unsigned long flags) addr/len: memory range. flags: reserved. mseal() blocks following operations for the given memory range. 1> Unmapping, moving to another location, and shrinking the size, via munmap() and mremap(), can leave an empty space, therefore can be replaced with a VMA with a new set of attributes. 2> Moving or expanding a different VMA into the current location, via mremap(). 3> Modifying a VMA via mmap(MAP_FIXED). 4> Size expansion, via mremap(), does not appear to pose any specific risks to sealed VMAs. It is included anyway because the use case is unclear. In any case, users can rely on merging to expand a sealed VMA. 5> mprotect() and pkey_mprotect(). 6> Some destructive madvice() behaviors (e.g. MADV_DONTNEED) for anonymous memory, when users don't have write permission to the memory. Those behaviors can alter region contents by discarding pages, effectively a memset(0) for anonymous memory. The idea that inspired this patch comes from Stephen Röttger’s work in V8 CFI [5]. Chrome browser in ChromeOS will be the first user of this API. Indeed, the Chrome browser has very specific requirements for sealing, which are distinct from those of most applications. For example, in the case of libc, sealing is only applied to read-only (RO) or read-execute (RX) memory segments (such as .text and .RELRO) to prevent them from becoming writable, the lifetime of those mappings are tied to the lifetime of the process. Chrome wants to seal two large address space reservations that are managed by different allocators. The memory is mapped RW- and RWX respectively but write access to it is restricted using pkeys (or in the future ARM permission overlay extensions). The lifetime of those mappings are not tied to the lifetime of the process, therefore, while the memory is sealed, the allocators still need to free or discard the unused memory. For example, with madvise(DONTNEED). However, always allowing madvise(DONTNEED) on this range poses a security risk. For example if a jump instruction crosses a page boundary and the second page gets discarded, it will overwrite the target bytes with zeros and change the control flow. Checking write-permission before the discard operation allows us to control when the operation is valid. In this case, the madvise will only succeed if the executing thread has PKEY write permissions and PKRU changes are protected in software by control-flow integrity. Although the initial version of this patch series is targeting the Chrome browser as its first user, it became evident during upstream discussions that we would also want to ensure that the patch set eventually is a complete solution for memory sealing and compatible with other use cases. The specific scenario currently in mind is glibc's use case of loading and sealing ELF executables. To this end, Stephen is working on a change to glibc to add sealing support to the dynamic linker, which will seal all non-writable segments at startup. Once this work is completed, all applications will be able to automatically benefit from these new protections. In closing, I would like to formally acknowledge the valuable contributions received during the RFC process, which were instrumental in shaping this patch: Jann Horn: raising awareness and providing valuable insights on the destructive madvise operations. Liam R. Howlett: perf optimization. Linus Torvalds: assisting in defining system call signature and scope. Theo de Raadt: sharing the experiences and insight gained from implementing mimmutable() in OpenBSD. MM perf benchmarks ================== This patch adds a loop in the mprotect/munmap/madvise(DONTNEED) to check the VMAs’ sealing flag, so that no partial update can be made, when any segment within the given memory range is sealed. To measure the performance impact of this loop, two tests are developed. [8] The first is measuring the time taken for a particular system call, by using clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC). The second is using PERF_COUNT_HW_REF_CPU_CYCLES (exclude user space). Both tests have similar results. The tests have roughly below sequence: for (i = 0; i < 1000, i++) create 1000 mappings (1 page per VMA) start the sampling for (j = 0; j < 1000, j++) mprotect one mapping stop and save the sample delete 1000 mappings calculates all samples. Below tests are performed on Intel(R) Pentium(R) Gold 7505 @ 2.00GHz, 4G memory, Chromebook. Based on the latest upstream code: The first test (measuring time) syscall__ vmas t t_mseal delta_ns per_vma % munmap__ 1 909 944 35 35 104% munmap__ 2 1398 1502 104 52 107% munmap__ 4 2444 2594 149 37 106% munmap__ 8 4029 4323 293 37 107% munmap__ 16 6647 6935 288 18 104% munmap__ 32 11811 12398 587 18 105% mprotect 1 439 465 26 26 106% mprotect 2 1659 1745 86 43 105% mprotect 4 3747 3889 142 36 104% mprotect 8 6755 6969 215 27 103% mprotect 16 13748 14144 396 25 103% mprotect 32 27827 28969 1142 36 104% madvise_ 1 240 262 22 22 109% madvise_ 2 366 442 76 38 121% madvise_ 4 623 751 128 32 121% madvise_ 8 1110 1324 215 27 119% madvise_ 16 2127 2451 324 20 115% madvise_ 32 4109 4642 534 17 113% The second test (measuring cpu cycle) syscall__ vmas cpu cmseal delta_cpu per_vma % munmap__ 1 1790 1890 100 100 106% munmap__ 2 2819 3033 214 107 108% munmap__ 4 4959 5271 312 78 106% munmap__ 8 8262 8745 483 60 106% munmap__ 16 13099 14116 1017 64 108% munmap__ 32 23221 24785 1565 49 107% mprotect 1 906 967 62 62 107% mprotect 2 3019 3203 184 92 106% mprotect 4 6149 6569 420 105 107% mprotect 8 9978 10524 545 68 105% mprotect 16 20448 21427 979 61 105% mprotect 32 40972 42935 1963 61 105% madvise_ 1 434 497 63 63 115% madvise_ 2 752 899 147 74 120% madvise_ 4 1313 1513 200 50 115% madvise_ 8 2271 2627 356 44 116% madvise_ 16 4312 4883 571 36 113% madvise_ 32 8376 9319 943 29 111% Based on the result, for 6.8 kernel, sealing check adds 20-40 nano seconds, or around 50-100 CPU cycles, per VMA. In addition, I applied the sealing to 5.10 kernel: The first test (measuring time) syscall__ vmas t tmseal delta_ns per_vma % munmap__ 1 357 390 33 33 109% munmap__ 2 442 463 21 11 105% munmap__ 4 614 634 20 5 103% munmap__ 8 1017 1137 120 15 112% munmap__ 16 1889 2153 263 16 114% munmap__ 32 4109 4088 -21 -1 99% mprotect 1 235 227 -7 -7 97% mprotect 2 495 464 -30 -15 94% mprotect 4 741 764 24 6 103% mprotect 8 1434 1437 2 0 100% mprotect 16 2958 2991 33 2 101% mprotect 32 6431 6608 177 6 103% madvise_ 1 191 208 16 16 109% madvise_ 2 300 324 24 12 108% madvise_ 4 450 473 23 6 105% madvise_ 8 753 806 53 7 107% madvise_ 16 1467 1592 125 8 108% madvise_ 32 2795 3405 610 19 122% The second test (measuring cpu cycle) syscall__ nbr_vma cpu cmseal delta_cpu per_vma % munmap__ 1 684 715 31 31 105% munmap__ 2 861 898 38 19 104% munmap__ 4 1183 1235 51 13 104% munmap__ 8 1999 2045 46 6 102% munmap__ 16 3839 3816 -23 -1 99% munmap__ 32 7672 7887 216 7 103% mprotect 1 397 443 46 46 112% mprotect 2 738 788 50 25 107% mprotect 4 1221 1256 35 9 103% mprotect 8 2356 2429 72 9 103% mprotect 16 4961 4935 -26 -2 99% mprotect 32 9882 10172 291 9 103% madvise_ 1 351 380 29 29 108% madvise_ 2 565 615 49 25 109% madvise_ 4 872 933 61 15 107% madvise_ 8 1508 1640 132 16 109% madvise_ 16 3078 3323 245 15 108% madvise_ 32 5893 6704 811 25 114% For 5.10 kernel, sealing check adds 0-15 ns in time, or 10-30 CPU cycles, there is even decrease in some cases. It might be interesting to compare 5.10 and 6.8 kernel The first test (measuring time) syscall__ vmas t_5_10 t_6_8 delta_ns per_vma % munmap__ 1 357 909 552 552 254% munmap__ 2 442 1398 956 478 316% munmap__ 4 614 2444 1830 458 398% munmap__ 8 1017 4029 3012 377 396% munmap__ 16 1889 6647 4758 297 352% munmap__ 32 4109 11811 7702 241 287% mprotect 1 235 439 204 204 187% mprotect 2 495 1659 1164 582 335% mprotect 4 741 3747 3006 752 506% mprotect 8 1434 6755 5320 665 471% mprotect 16 2958 13748 10790 674 465% mprotect 32 6431 27827 21397 669 433% madvise_ 1 191 240 49 49 125% madvise_ 2 300 366 67 33 122% madvise_ 4 450 623 173 43 138% madvise_ 8 753 1110 357 45 147% madvise_ 16 1467 2127 660 41 145% madvise_ 32 2795 4109 1314 41 147% The second test (measuring cpu cycle) syscall__ vmas cpu_5_10 c_6_8 delta_cpu per_vma % munmap__ 1 684 1790 1106 1106 262% munmap__ 2 861 2819 1958 979 327% munmap__ 4 1183 4959 3776 944 419% munmap__ 8 1999 8262 6263 783 413% munmap__ 16 3839 13099 9260 579 341% munmap__ 32 7672 23221 15549 486 303% mprotect 1 397 906 509 509 228% mprotect 2 738 3019 2281 1140 409% mprotect 4 1221 6149 4929 1232 504% mprotect 8 2356 9978 7622 953 423% mprotect 16 4961 20448 15487 968 412% mprotect 32 9882 40972 31091 972 415% madvise_ 1 351 434 82 82 123% madvise_ 2 565 752 186 93 133% madvise_ 4 872 1313 442 110 151% madvise_ 8 1508 2271 763 95 151% madvise_ 16 3078 4312 1234 77 140% madvise_ 32 5893 8376 2483 78 142% From 5.10 to 6.8 munmap: added 250-550 ns in time, or 500-1100 in cpu cycle, per vma. mprotect: added 200-750 ns in time, or 500-1200 in cpu cycle, per vma. madvise: added 33-50 ns in time, or 70-110 in cpu cycle, per vma. In comparison to mseal, which adds 20-40 ns or 50-100 CPU cycles, the increase from 5.10 to 6.8 is significantly larger, approximately ten times greater for munmap and mprotect. When I discuss the mm performance with Brian Makin, an engineer who worked on performance, it was brought to my attention that such performance benchmarks, which measuring millions of mm syscall in a tight loop, may not accurately reflect real-world scenarios, such as that of a database service. Also this is tested using a single HW and ChromeOS, the data from another HW or distribution might be different. It might be best to take this data with a grain of salt. This patch (of 5): Wire up mseal syscall for all architectures. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240415163527.626541-1-jeffxu@chromium.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240415163527.626541-2-jeffxu@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> [Bug #2] Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Jorge Lucangeli Obes <jorgelo@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Muhammad Usama Anjum <usama.anjum@collabora.com> Cc: Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@gmail.com> Cc: Stephen Röttger <sroettger@google.com> Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com> Cc: Amer Al Shanawany <amer.shanawany@gmail.com> Cc: Javier Carrasco <javier.carrasco.cruz@gmail.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
In order to correlate an USER_AUTH event to a LOGIN event, we need to have the tty that's associated with the change in loginuid.
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