checkm8 exploit & checkra1n jailbreak

Student seminar: security protocols and applications

03/2020

Louis Merlin (247565)



Plan

- 1. What is a jailbreak?
- 2. History
- 3. Deep Dive
- 4. Conclusion





- Privilege escalation on Apple's iOS



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- Mobile carrier unlocking and device customization
- First jailbreak came out a few days after the first iPhone (2007)
- Can be tethered, semi-tethered, untethered or semiuntethered



2. History


- Late 2019, by axi0mX
- Targets SecureROM (immutable code), so unpatchable
- Leads to



3. Deep Dive



SecureROM





3.1 - Normal use of DFU

- Start USB DFU protocol:
 - Input output buffer is allocated by the device in the ram
 - Address is given to usb stack via global variable
 - Image is transfered to the device
 - Image is copied to the memory location from where the boot will happen
 - Image is verified
- On DFU exit:
 - i/o buffer is freed
 - If parsing the image fails, the USB stack is activated again



3.2 - checkm8

- Start USB DFU protocol:
 - Input output buffer is allocated by the device in the ram
 - Address is given to usb stack via global variable
 - Image is transferred to the device INTERRUPT
 - Image is copied to the memory location from where the boot will happen
 - Image is verified
- On DFU exit:
 - i/o buffer is freed => use-after-free
 - If parsing the image fails, the USB stack is activated again



3.3 - A8 and A9 processors

- iPhone 6, 6+, 6s and 6s+
- Use-after-free overwrites USB stack
- USB tasks are a linked list of tasks
- Overwrite the current task's **next** value, and create that next task
- -



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- Heap Feng Shui to the rescue!




Heap Feng Shui

Requests that are not a multiple of 64 bytes do not trigger the leak!



heap layout





1st DFU iteration

	string descriptors	task					
:	Nonce Manufacturer Product Serial Number Conf String	task task structure stack	io buffer	hs fs conf	dlz	dlz	




2nd DFU iteration

•	Conf String	task structure	task stack	io buffer	Serial Number ZIp	
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We want this





Payload



Final steps of exploit

- Restore USB configuration
- USB Serial Number = "PWND:[checkm8]"
- Replace USB request handler pointer



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- But iBoot will reset all registers and wipe memory ("trampoline")
- We can hook bzero to avoid that
- Embed tiny ramdisk in kernel with hijack code
- We now have a fork(2) during system boot



4. Conclusion

- latest full jailbreak was on iOS 8 (2014)
- enables researchers to do security research
- dual booting
- Linux on iPhone?

Illustrations and content

- https://habr.com/en/company/dsec/blog/472762
- https://media.ccc.de/v/36c3-11238-the-one-weird-trick-securerom-hates

