# 5. Demographics

Table S1. Demographic description of the sample by country.

	Country	N	Age (SD)	Male %	Higher education %	Collectivism <sup>1</sup>
By country			<u> </u>			
Eastern	China	1677	24.7 (7.6)	42.7%	88.5%	0.075
Eastern	India	502	22.6 (6.1)	33.7%	63.7%	0.069
Eastern	Iran	235	31.0 (9.6)	55.1%	89.5%	0.059
Eastern	Japan	396	44.0 (10.8)	63.6%	68.2%	0.073
Eastern	Lebanon	20	34.1 (16.6)	50.0%	95.0%	0.069
Eastern	Malaysia	171	20.5 (2.4)	17.0%	54.4%	0.133
Eastern	North Macedonia	282	22.1 (3.8)	55.7%	26.6%	0.066
Eastern	Pakistan	423	22.7 (3.7)	36.4%	87.5%	0.078
Eastern	Thailand	91	19.4 (1.0)	22.0%	53.8%	0.079
Eastern	United Arab Emirates	80	24.8 (3.7)	33.8%	71.2%	-
Southern	Argentina	253	34.3 (14.7)	27.4%	79.0%	0.101
Southern	Chile	54	34.4 (13.3)	40.7%	70.4%	0.079
Southern	Colombia	278	27.8 (12.0)	41.0%	87.6%	0.090
Southern	Czechia	411	28.1 (9.6)	69.8%	50.4%	0.050
Southern	Ecuador	45	23.3 (4.5)	31.1%	97.7%	0.130
Southern	France	935	33.8 (13.9)	17.6%	71.9%	0.083
Southern	Hungary	941	21.7 (3.8)	21.0%	22.0%	0.100
Southern	Mexico	64	33.1 (5.6)	64.1%	100.0%	0.082
Southern	Peru	141	24.5 (11.4)	36.9%	47.5%	0.102
Southern	Philippines	282	20.3 (3.0)	33.7%	57.0%	0.102 $0.127$
Southern	Slovakia	560	20.3 (5.0) $22.4 (6.0)$	11.6%	19.7%	0.127
Southern	Turkey	1369	24.6 (8.1)	24.0%	42.8%	0.069
Western	Australia	1164	21.7 (6.9)	28.2%	25.2%	0.009
Western	Austria	346	24.8 (8.5)	35.1%	27.8%	0.032
Western	Brazil	$\frac{340}{267}$	30.1 (12.1)	36.7%	70.4%	0.097
Western	Bulgaria	316	27.7 (11.0)	14.9%	36.4%	0.066
Western	Canada	751	23.0 (7.6)	40.9%	58.9%	0.029
Western	Croatia	$\frac{751}{250}$	21.9 (4.1)	17.2%	19.6%	0.023
Western	Denmark	1299	36.7 (15.9)	46.6%	57.1%	
Western	Germany	$\frac{1233}{2887}$	30.2 (11.6)	29.1%	21.2%	0.047
Western	Greece	515	26.1 (11.0)	20.4%	52.8%	0.047
Western	Italy	500	35.6 (13.9)	44.4%	61.3%	0.045
Western	Kazakhstan	122	33.5 (9.1)	29.5%	100.0%	0.106
Western	Netherlands	479	20.6 (2.8)	34.4%	18.4%	0.049
Western	New Zealand	214	26.2 (10.6)	21.5%	35.0%	0.049
Western	Poland	1416	30.0 (11.0)	32.5%	49.1%	0.052
Western	Portugal	716	28.5 (9.5)	36.6%	70.0%	0.055
Western	Romania	710 755	24.5 (9.5) $24.5 (8.5)$	14.0%	28.2%	0.078
Western	Russia	426	, ,	35.4%	91.5%	0.078
Western	Serbia	485	31.4 (8.2) 27.1 (11.0)	25.6%	52.5%	0.071 $0.028$
Western		102	` /	23.5%	57.8%	0.028
Western	Singapore Spain	$\frac{102}{257}$	22.6 (1.7) 21.5 (6.8)	16.0%	99.2%	0.030
Western	Switzerland	$\frac{257}{549}$	\ /	29.9%	$\frac{99.2\%}{22.1\%}$	0.041
			23.0 (7.2)	29.9% $23.2%$		
Western	United Kingdom United States	$865 \\ 3611$	25.2 (11.2)	23.2% $23.4%$	42.5% $22.9%$	0.075 $0.000$
Western By region	Officed States	3011	20.7 (4.9)	23.4/0	22.970	0.000
		2077	00 1 (0 7)	40.007	TE OM	
Eastern	_	3877	26.1 (9.7)	42.9%	75.2%	_
Southern	_	5333	26.3 (10.5)	27.2%	48.7%	_
Western	_	18292	25.9 (10.4)	28.4%	38.4%	
All						

 $<sup>^{1}\</sup>mathrm{Distance}$  from the US in collectivism. Some countries do not have a collectivism score.

## 6. Additional analysis

### 6.1 Effect of physical contact

In sum, when assassing the effect of physical force, we found inconclusive evidence for the effect of physical contact, regardless of dilemma type (trolley/speedboat). The summary of the results can be found in the tables below.

Table S2. The effect of physical contact on moral dilemma judgements on Trolley dilemmas

Exclusion	Cluster	BF	t	df	p	Cohen's d	Raw effect	89% <b>CI</b>
Exclusion	Eastern	4.11e-01	-0.22	121.63	0.828	0.03	0.07	[-0.37, 0.43]
	Southern	1.94e-01	0.46	388.70	0.643	0.04	-0.09	[-0.36, 0.2]
	Western	1.72e-01	0.18	512.54	0.857	0.01	-0.02	[-0.23, 0.18]
Include familiar	Eastern	1.76e-01	0.61	254.06	0.544	0.06	-0.12	[-0.41, 0.17]
	Southern	9.49 e - 02	1.17	756.54	0.244	0.08	-0.15	[-0.33, 0.08]
	Western	7.91e-02	0.73	1099.31	0.464	0.03	-0.07	[-0.19, 0.08]

#### 6.2 Comparing the standard switch and standard footbridge dilemmas

When comparing the standard switch and standard footbridge dilemmas in all clusters for the trolley and the speedboat tasks we found evidence for a difference between the two dilemmas in moral acceptability ratings. The summary results of each comparison separately can be found in Tables below.

Table S3. Comparing the Standard Switch and Standard Footbridge Dilemmas (all exclusion applied).

Dilemma	Cluster	$\mathbf{t}$	$\mathbf{Bf}$	$\mathbf{df}$	p
Trolley	Eastern	4.81	2.49e+03	154.32	< .001
	Southern	10.38	2.32e+19	229.92	< .001
	Western	16.88	1.99e+54	780.55	< .001
Speedboat	Eastern	6.29	3.61e+05	130.68	< .001
	Southern	9.61	5.50e+15	335.65	< .001
	Western	14.58	4.01e+41	1618.57	< .001

Table S4. Comparing the Standard Switch and Standard Footbridge Dilemmas (familiarity exclusion not applied)

Dilemma	Cluster	t	Bf	df	p
Trolley	Eastern Southern Western	6.79 14.59 27.95	8.73e+07 3.91e+38 1.86e+148	0	< .001 < .001 < .001
Speedboat	Eastern Southern Western	7.30 11.03 24.06	8.06e+08 6.30e+22 4.93e+116	257.05 647.03 4352.64	< .001 < .001 < .001

#### 6.3 Analysing familiar participants

As we registered, we conducted the analysis on familiar participants, the results can be found below.

Table S5. The effect of personal force on moral dilemma judgements (familiar participants).

Dilemma	Cluster	$\mathbf{BF}$	t	$\mathbf{d}\mathbf{f}$	p	Cohen's d	Raw effect	89% <b>CI</b>
Trolley	Eastern Southern Western	1.65e+02 1.76e+05 2.12e+03	-3.65 -5.35 -4.34	437.72 721.33 778.76	<.001 <.001 <.001	$0.35 \\ 0.40 \\ 0.31$	0.73 0.82 0.67	[0.34, 1] [0.54, 1.04] [0.39, 0.89]
Speedboat	Eastern Southern Western	2.06e+00 3.2e+03 5.4e+05	-1.82 -4.32 -5.56	383.27 469.42 707.92	0.07 <.001 <.001	0.18 0.35 0.40	0.37 0.68 0.81	[0.01, 0.62] [0.38, 0.88] [0.53, 1]

Table S6. The interaction of personal force and intention on moral dilemma judgemnts (familiar participants).

Dilemma	Cluster	$\mathbf{BF}$	$\mathbf{F}$	df	p	Partial $\eta^2$	Raw effect
Trolley	Eastern Southern Western	5.57e+01 6.77e+05 5.03e+18	-0.500 -0.463 -0.288	[-0.69, -0.2] [-0.57, -0.31] [-0.33, -0.24]	0.001 <.001 <.001	0.043 $0.047$ $0.019$	-2.00 -1.85 -1.15
Speedboat	Eastern Southern Western	7.16e-01 2.31e+01 2.29e+04	-0.001 -0.355 -0.143	[-0.21, 0.22] [-0.48, -0.09] [-0.18, -0.09]	0.993 0.003 <.001	0.000 0.016 0.005	-0.01 -1.42 -0.57

#### 6.4 Oxford utilitarianism Scale

As we registered, we first plot statistics of the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale in each cultural clusters. We applied no exclusion criteria during this analysis. Note however, that due to a technical mistake, some hungarian participants did not see one of the items in the OUS, hence, they were excluded from this analysis.




Figure S1: Results on the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale by regions. The X axis shows the two subscales, while the Y axis shows the ratings. The center of the boxplots are the median, while the lower bound corresponds to the first quartiles (25th percentile), and the upper bound corresponds to the third quartile (75th percentile). The lower whisker represents the minimum value at no more than 1.5 times the inter quartile range from the lower bound, while the upper whisker respresents the maximum value at no further than 1.5 times the inter quartile range fro the upper bound.

As registered, we also report means and confidence intervals for each cultural cluster and each subscale of the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale.

Table S7. Means and confidence intervals of the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale.)

	Instrume	ental Harm	Impartial	Beneficence
Cluster	Mean	95% <b>CI</b>	Mean	95% <b>CI</b>
Eastern Southern Western	3.404114 3.339469 3.500703	[3.44,3.37] [3.37,3.3] [3.52,3.48]	3.701470 4.219580 4.013701	[3.74,3.67] [4.25,4.19] [4.03,4]

We also reported correlations between each Oxford Utilitarianism Scale subscales and moral acceptability ratings on each moral dilemma. Results suggests a higher correlation between acceptability ratings and the Instrumental Harm scale, and a somewhat lower correlation between Impartial Beneficence and acceptability ratings.

Table S8. Correlational analysis of the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale subscales with moral accaptability ratings on moral dilemmas.)

	Impartial Beneficence		Instrumental			
Dilemma	Cluster	r	p	$\mathbf{r}$	p	$\mathbf{df}$
Trolley	Southern 0.4	45 44 42	<.001 <.001 <.001	0.16 $0.05$ $0.08$	<.001 <.001 <.001	3875 4860 17077
Speedboat		41 40 40	<.001 <.001 <.001	0.20 0.08 0.12	<.001 <.001 <.001	3875 4860 17077

## 7. Exploratory analysis on overall utilitarianism and collectivism

Although not part of the planned analysis, we hypothesized that country-level collectivism would be negatively associated with utilitarian responding (i.e., higher morall acceptibility ratings). We found no evidence for this hypothesis, regardless of familiarity exclusion or dilemma context. Interestingly, however, we found strong evidence for the association between vertical individualism and average moral acceptibility ratings on moral dilemmas, regardless of dilemma context or exclusion criteria. The positive association means that higher levels of vertical individualism is associated with higher acceptance of the utilitarian response option. Although we hypothesized that it would be collectivism that makes people *more* emotional and therefore, less utilitarian, we speculate that individualism made people *less* emotional and therefore, more utilitarian.

In all of the regression models below, we added the random intercept of countries.

Table S9. Is the interaction of personal force and intention affected by individualism/collectivism on Trolley dilemmas?

	With fan	With familiarity exclusion			No familiarity exclusion			
Variable	$\overline{}$ BF	b	p	$\overline{}$ BF	b	p		
Country-level collectivism	2.1e-01	-2.76	0.409	2.8e-01	-3.82	0.216		
H. Collectivism	8.0e-02	-0.02	0.491	4.0e-02	0.00	0.861		
H. Individualism	2.8e + 00	0.06	0.005	2.1e+01	0.05	<.001		
V. Collectivism	1.6e-01	0.03	0.135	4.0e-02	-0.01	0.679		
V. Individualism	$3.6e{+}13$	0.15	<.001	1.8e + 23	0.12	<.001		

Table S10. Is the interaction of personal force and intention affected by individualism/collectivism on Speedboat dilemmas?

	With familiarity exclusion			No familiarity exclusion		
Variable	BF	b	p	BF	b	p
Country-level collectivism	7.9e-01	-6.50	0.048	3.6e-01	-5.25	0.041
H. Collectivism	7.0e-02	-0.01	0.62	4.0e-02	0.00	0.756
H. Individualism	6.0 e-02	0.00	0.876	6.0 e-02	0.01	0.335
V. Collectivism	8.0e-02	0.02	0.423	8.0e-02	-0.01	0.253
V. Individualism	6.2e + 09	0.13	<.001	$1.1e{+17}$	0.10	<.001




Figure S2: Correlation between country-level individualism/collectivism and moral accessibility ratings on the Trolley dilemmas (higher moral acceptibility means higher acceptibility of the utilitarian choice).




Figure S3: Correlation between country-level individualism/collectivism and moral accessibility ratings on the Speedboat dilemmas (higher moral acceptibility means higher acceptibility of the utilitarian choice)




Figure S4: Correlation between country-level individualism/collectivism and moral accessibility ratings on the Trolley dilemmas (higher moral acceptibility means higher acceptibility of the utilitarian choice)




Figure S5: Correlation between country-level individualism/collectivism and moral accessibility ratings on the Speedboat dilemmas (higher moral acceptibility means higher acceptibility of the utilitarian choice)