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-___ _  _ __ _ __ ________ ____                      ___ _
 
 
+Censure of being Partial, and to the suspicion of having some 
+hidden designs to be carried on by these unusual methods. 
 
-6o              Tl_e CJi_rncter
+When all is said, there is a Natural Reason of State, an 
+undefinable thing, grounded upon the Common Good of 
+Mankind, which is immortal, and in all Changes and Revo- 
+lutions, still preserveth its Original Right of saving a Nation, 
+when the Letter of the Law perhaps would destroy it; and by 
+whatsoever means it moveth, carrieth a Power with it, that 
+admitteth of no opposition, being supported by Nature, which 
+inspireth an immediate consent at some Critical times into 
+every individual Member, to that which visibly tendeth to 
+preservation of the whole; and this being so, a Wise Prince 
+instead of Controverting the right of this Reason of State, will 
+by all means endeavour it may be of his side, and then he will 
+be secure. 
 
-Ce1_su1'e of being ___1'tial, and to the suspicion of having some
-_id__ desi__ns to be carI'ied on by these unusual _nethuds.
-__'_eI1 _ll is said, _ere is a Natul'al ReasoI_ o_f State, an
-u_de__able  thing, eI'ounded  upon  the  Commo_  G_od  of
-ML_nhin' d, _Thich is in_nJortal, and in all Changes and _evo-
-lutions, still _reservet_ its Q.rigin. a_ l _gI_t of savine a Mation,
-_vI_en the Letter of the L__-  _erh_ps __uuld destroy it; and by
-_vhatsoever _eans it nJoveth, carriet_ a Po_Ter __th it, thnt
-admitteth of no op_osition, being supported by Nature, which
-i__s_ireth an i__1mediate consent at some  C?.'i_tical tin_es into
-eve1'y iI_dividual Me?__ber,_ to th_t which visibly teI_deth  to
-_1'ese?'vation of the _vhole; and this bei__g so, a Wise IJrince
-instead of Controverting the 1'ight of this Reasun of State, _vill
-by all means endeavour it may be of his side, and then __e_ will
-_e secure.                                   - _-
-Our Tr21n1ner cannot conceive that tl_e Po__er of any P1'ince
-can be lasting, but where 'tis built ___un the fo__ndation of his
-own unborl'owed vert_e, he must not only be the 61'st Mover
-J__d  the  Fountai__, from  _hence  tI1e  great  Acts  of  State
-originally Ao_, but he n_u_t be tho_ght so to his Peo_le that
-tl_ey ma' y _1'eserve their veneration fo_. him; he must be Jealous
-of lis Po_er, and not impart so much of it to any _bout him,
-as that he may su_er an _clipse by it.
-He c__n__ot tahe too I_uch ca1'e to hee_ hin_self up, for _Then
-a Pri__ce is thought to be led by those, __itl_ _hom he should
-onely advise, and that the Con1_ands he giveth are transmitte_
-through hi___, and are not of his own gro_th; the World _vill
-looh __on him as a Bird ado_ed _Tith Feathers that are _ot his
-o_n,  or  consider  him  rather  as  an  Engine than  a livin6
-Creature ; besides, 't_ould _e a Cunt1.adiction fo1' a Prince to
-fear a Con_1non-__ealth, and at the sanJe time create one himself,
-by delegati1_g such a Po_er to any Nun1ber of Men near hin1,
-as is inconsistent with the _igure of a Mona1'ch: it is the _orst
-kind of Co-ordination the Cro_Fn can submit to; fol' it is tI_e
-exercise of Po_er th_t dra_eth the respect along with it, an_
-_vhen that is parted with, the bare _C.h. _a_r.,&cte_,_fva_ King is not
-_u_cient to heep it up; but tho' it is a diminutio_ to a Pri_1ce,
-to
+Our Trimmer cannot conceive that the Power of any Prince 
+can be lasting, but where 'tis built upon the foundation of his 
+own unborrowed vertue, he must not only be the first Mover 
+and the Fountain, from whence the great Acts of State 
+originally flow, but he must be thought so to his People that 
+they may preserve their veneration for him; he must be jealous 
+of his Power, and not impart so much of it to any about him, 
+as that he may suffer an Eclipse by it. 
+
+He cannot take too much care to keep himself up, for when 
+a Prince is thought to be led by those, with whom he should 
+onely advise, and that the Commands he giveth are transmitted 
+through him, and are not of his own growth; the World will 
+look upon him as a Bird adorned with Feathers that are not his 
+own, or consider him rather as an Engine than a living 
+Creature; besides, 'twould be a Contradiction for a Prince to 
+fear a Common-wealth, and at the same time create one himself, 
+by delegating such a Power to any Number of Men near him, 
+as is inconsistent with the Figure of a Monarch: it is the worst 
+kind of Co-ordination the Crown can submit to; for it is the 
+exercise of Power that draweth the respect along with it, and 
+when that is parted with, the bare Character of a King is not 
+sufficient to keep it up; but tho' it is a diminution to a Prince,