Support (maybe?) simultaneous open #5

cpaasch · 2013-08-13T14:47:14Z

In tcp_rcv_synsent_state_process(), a second if-branch checks for th->syn. We
should (if possible?) correctly support this.

commit e8d0527 upstream. commit 2f7021a "cpufreq: protect 'policy->cpus' from offlining during __gov_queue_work()" caused a regression in CPU hotplug, because it lead to a deadlock between cpufreq governor worker thread and the CPU hotplug writer task. Lockdep splat corresponding to this deadlock is shown below: [ 60.277396] ====================================================== [ 60.277400] [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ] [ 60.277407] 3.10.0-rc7-dbg-01385-g241fd04-dirty #1744 Not tainted [ 60.277411] ------------------------------------------------------- [ 60.277417] bash/2225 is trying to acquire lock: [ 60.277422] ((&(&j_cdbs->work)->work)){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff810621b5>] flush_work+0x5/0x280 [ 60.277444] but task is already holding lock: [ 60.277449] (cpu_hotplug.lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81042d8b>] cpu_hotplug_begin+0x2b/0x60 [ 60.277465] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 60.277472] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 60.277477] -> #2 (cpu_hotplug.lock){+.+.+.}: [ 60.277490] [<ffffffff810ac6d4>] lock_acquire+0xa4/0x200 [ 60.277503] [<ffffffff815b6157>] mutex_lock_nested+0x67/0x410 [ 60.277514] [<ffffffff81042cbc>] get_online_cpus+0x3c/0x60 [ 60.277522] [<ffffffff814b842a>] gov_queue_work+0x2a/0xb0 [ 60.277532] [<ffffffff814b7891>] cs_dbs_timer+0xc1/0xe0 [ 60.277543] [<ffffffff8106302d>] process_one_work+0x1cd/0x6a0 [ 60.277552] [<ffffffff81063d31>] worker_thread+0x121/0x3a0 [ 60.277560] [<ffffffff8106ae2b>] kthread+0xdb/0xe0 [ 60.277569] [<ffffffff815bb96c>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0 [ 60.277580] -> #1 (&j_cdbs->timer_mutex){+.+...}: [ 60.277592] [<ffffffff810ac6d4>] lock_acquire+0xa4/0x200 [ 60.277600] [<ffffffff815b6157>] mutex_lock_nested+0x67/0x410 [ 60.277608] [<ffffffff814b785d>] cs_dbs_timer+0x8d/0xe0 [ 60.277616] [<ffffffff8106302d>] process_one_work+0x1cd/0x6a0 [ 60.277624] [<ffffffff81063d31>] worker_thread+0x121/0x3a0 [ 60.277633] [<ffffffff8106ae2b>] kthread+0xdb/0xe0 [ 60.277640] [<ffffffff815bb96c>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0 [ 60.277649] -> #0 ((&(&j_cdbs->work)->work)){+.+...}: [ 60.277661] [<ffffffff810ab826>] __lock_acquire+0x1766/0x1d30 [ 60.277669] [<ffffffff810ac6d4>] lock_acquire+0xa4/0x200 [ 60.277677] [<ffffffff810621ed>] flush_work+0x3d/0x280 [ 60.277685] [<ffffffff81062d8a>] __cancel_work_timer+0x8a/0x120 [ 60.277693] [<ffffffff81062e53>] cancel_delayed_work_sync+0x13/0x20 [ 60.277701] [<ffffffff814b89d9>] cpufreq_governor_dbs+0x529/0x6f0 [ 60.277709] [<ffffffff814b76a7>] cs_cpufreq_governor_dbs+0x17/0x20 [ 60.277719] [<ffffffff814b5df8>] __cpufreq_governor+0x48/0x100 [ 60.277728] [<ffffffff814b6b80>] __cpufreq_remove_dev.isra.14+0x80/0x3c0 [ 60.277737] [<ffffffff815adc0d>] cpufreq_cpu_callback+0x38/0x4c [ 60.277747] [<ffffffff81071a4d>] notifier_call_chain+0x5d/0x110 [ 60.277759] [<ffffffff81071b0e>] __raw_notifier_call_chain+0xe/0x10 [ 60.277768] [<ffffffff815a0a68>] _cpu_down+0x88/0x330 [ 60.277779] [<ffffffff815a0d46>] cpu_down+0x36/0x50 [ 60.277788] [<ffffffff815a2748>] store_online+0x98/0xd0 [ 60.277796] [<ffffffff81452a28>] dev_attr_store+0x18/0x30 [ 60.277806] [<ffffffff811d9edb>] sysfs_write_file+0xdb/0x150 [ 60.277818] [<ffffffff8116806d>] vfs_write+0xbd/0x1f0 [ 60.277826] [<ffffffff811686fc>] SyS_write+0x4c/0xa0 [ 60.277834] [<ffffffff815bbbbe>] tracesys+0xd0/0xd5 [ 60.277842] other info that might help us debug this: [ 60.277848] Chain exists of: (&(&j_cdbs->work)->work) --> &j_cdbs->timer_mutex --> cpu_hotplug.lock [ 60.277864] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 60.277869] CPU0 CPU1 [ 60.277873] ---- ---- [ 60.277877] lock(cpu_hotplug.lock); [ 60.277885] lock(&j_cdbs->timer_mutex); [ 60.277892] lock(cpu_hotplug.lock); [ 60.277900] lock((&(&j_cdbs->work)->work)); [ 60.277907] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 60.277915] 6 locks held by bash/2225: [ 60.277919] #0: (sb_writers#6){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff81168173>] vfs_write+0x1c3/0x1f0 [ 60.277937] #1: (&buffer->mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff811d9e3c>] sysfs_write_file+0x3c/0x150 [ 60.277954] #2: (s_active#61){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff811d9ec3>] sysfs_write_file+0xc3/0x150 [ 60.277972] #3: (x86_cpu_hotplug_driver_mutex){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff81024cf7>] cpu_hotplug_driver_lock+0x17/0x20 [ 60.277990] #4: (cpu_add_remove_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff815a0d32>] cpu_down+0x22/0x50 [ 60.278007] #5: (cpu_hotplug.lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81042d8b>] cpu_hotplug_begin+0x2b/0x60 [ 60.278023] stack backtrace: [ 60.278031] CPU: 3 PID: 2225 Comm: bash Not tainted 3.10.0-rc7-dbg-01385-g241fd04-dirty #1744 [ 60.278037] Hardware name: Acer Aspire 5741G /Aspire 5741G , BIOS V1.20 02/08/2011 [ 60.278042] ffffffff8204e110 ffff88014df6b9f8 ffffffff815b3d90 ffff88014df6ba38 [ 60.278055] ffffffff815b0a8d ffff880150ed3f60 ffff880150ed4770 3871c4002c8980b2 [ 60.278068] ffff880150ed4748 ffff880150ed4770 ffff880150ed3f60 ffff88014df6bb00 [ 60.278081] Call Trace: [ 60.278091] [<ffffffff815b3d90>] dump_stack+0x19/0x1b [ 60.278101] [<ffffffff815b0a8d>] print_circular_bug+0x2b6/0x2c5 [ 60.278111] [<ffffffff810ab826>] __lock_acquire+0x1766/0x1d30 [ 60.278123] [<ffffffff81067e08>] ? __kernel_text_address+0x58/0x80 [ 60.278134] [<ffffffff810ac6d4>] lock_acquire+0xa4/0x200 [ 60.278142] [<ffffffff810621b5>] ? flush_work+0x5/0x280 [ 60.278151] [<ffffffff810621ed>] flush_work+0x3d/0x280 [ 60.278159] [<ffffffff810621b5>] ? flush_work+0x5/0x280 [ 60.278169] [<ffffffff810a9b14>] ? mark_held_locks+0x94/0x140 [ 60.278178] [<ffffffff81062d77>] ? __cancel_work_timer+0x77/0x120 [ 60.278188] [<ffffffff810a9cbd>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0xfd/0x1c0 [ 60.278196] [<ffffffff81062d8a>] __cancel_work_timer+0x8a/0x120 [ 60.278206] [<ffffffff81062e53>] cancel_delayed_work_sync+0x13/0x20 [ 60.278214] [<ffffffff814b89d9>] cpufreq_governor_dbs+0x529/0x6f0 [ 60.278225] [<ffffffff814b76a7>] cs_cpufreq_governor_dbs+0x17/0x20 [ 60.278234] [<ffffffff814b5df8>] __cpufreq_governor+0x48/0x100 [ 60.278244] [<ffffffff814b6b80>] __cpufreq_remove_dev.isra.14+0x80/0x3c0 [ 60.278255] [<ffffffff815adc0d>] cpufreq_cpu_callback+0x38/0x4c [ 60.278265] [<ffffffff81071a4d>] notifier_call_chain+0x5d/0x110 [ 60.278275] [<ffffffff81071b0e>] __raw_notifier_call_chain+0xe/0x10 [ 60.278284] [<ffffffff815a0a68>] _cpu_down+0x88/0x330 [ 60.278292] [<ffffffff81024cf7>] ? cpu_hotplug_driver_lock+0x17/0x20 [ 60.278302] [<ffffffff815a0d46>] cpu_down+0x36/0x50 [ 60.278311] [<ffffffff815a2748>] store_online+0x98/0xd0 [ 60.278320] [<ffffffff81452a28>] dev_attr_store+0x18/0x30 [ 60.278329] [<ffffffff811d9edb>] sysfs_write_file+0xdb/0x150 [ 60.278337] [<ffffffff8116806d>] vfs_write+0xbd/0x1f0 [ 60.278347] [<ffffffff81185950>] ? fget_light+0x320/0x4b0 [ 60.278355] [<ffffffff811686fc>] SyS_write+0x4c/0xa0 [ 60.278364] [<ffffffff815bbbbe>] tracesys+0xd0/0xd5 [ 60.280582] smpboot: CPU 1 is now offline The intention of that commit was to avoid warnings during CPU hotplug, which indicated that offline CPUs were getting IPIs from the cpufreq governor's work items. But the real root-cause of that problem was commit a66b2e5 (cpufreq: Preserve sysfs files across suspend/resume) because it totally skipped all the cpufreq callbacks during CPU hotplug in the suspend/resume path, and hence it never actually shut down the cpufreq governor's worker threads during CPU offline in the suspend/resume path. Reflecting back, the reason why we never suspected that commit as the root-cause earlier, was that the original issue was reported with just the halt command and nobody had brought in suspend/resume to the equation. The reason for _that_ in turn, as it turns out, is that earlier halt/shutdown was being done by disabling non-boot CPUs while tasks were frozen, just like suspend/resume.... but commit cf7df37 (reboot: migrate shutdown/reboot to boot cpu) which came somewhere along that very same time changed that logic: shutdown/halt no longer takes CPUs offline. Thus, the test-cases for reproducing the bug were vastly different and thus we went totally off the trail. Overall, it was one hell of a confusion with so many commits affecting each other and also affecting the symptoms of the problems in subtle ways. Finally, now since the original problematic commit (a66b2e5) has been completely reverted, revert this intermediate fix too (2f7021a), to fix the CPU hotplug deadlock. Phew! Reported-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Reported-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <b.zolnierkie@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa.bhat@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Tested-by: Peter Wu <lekensteyn@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit ea3768b upstream. We used to keep the port's char device structs and the /sys entries around till the last reference to the port was dropped. This is actually unnecessary, and resulted in buggy behaviour: 1. Open port in guest 2. Hot-unplug port 3. Hot-plug a port with the same 'name' property as the unplugged one This resulted in hot-plug being unsuccessful, as a port with the same name already exists (even though it was unplugged). This behaviour resulted in a warning message like this one: -------------------8<--------------------------------------- WARNING: at fs/sysfs/dir.c:512 sysfs_add_one+0xc9/0x130() (Not tainted) Hardware name: KVM sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:04.0/virtio0/virtio-ports/vport0p1' Call Trace: [<ffffffff8106b607>] ? warn_slowpath_common+0x87/0xc0 [<ffffffff8106b6f6>] ? warn_slowpath_fmt+0x46/0x50 [<ffffffff811f2319>] ? sysfs_add_one+0xc9/0x130 [<ffffffff811f23e8>] ? create_dir+0x68/0xb0 [<ffffffff811f2469>] ? sysfs_create_dir+0x39/0x50 [<ffffffff81273129>] ? kobject_add_internal+0xb9/0x260 [<ffffffff812733d8>] ? kobject_add_varg+0x38/0x60 [<ffffffff812734b4>] ? kobject_add+0x44/0x70 [<ffffffff81349de4>] ? get_device_parent+0xf4/0x1d0 [<ffffffff8134b389>] ? device_add+0xc9/0x650 -------------------8<--------------------------------------- Instead of relying on guest applications to release all references to the ports, we should go ahead and unregister the port from all the core layers. Any open/read calls on the port will then just return errors, and an unplug/plug operation on the host will succeed as expected. This also caused buggy behaviour in case of the device removal (not just a port): when the device was removed (which means all ports on that device are removed automatically as well), the ports with active users would clean up only when the last references were dropped -- and it would be too late then to be referencing char device pointers, resulting in oopses: -------------------8<--------------------------------------- PID: 6162 TASK: ffff8801147ad500 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "cat" #0 [ffff88011b9d5a90] machine_kexec at ffffffff8103232b #1 [ffff88011b9d5af0] crash_kexec at ffffffff810b9322 #2 [ffff88011b9d5bc0] oops_end at ffffffff814f4a50 #3 [ffff88011b9d5bf0] die at ffffffff8100f26b #4 [ffff88011b9d5c20] do_general_protection at ffffffff814f45e2 #5 [ffff88011b9d5c50] general_protection at ffffffff814f3db5 [exception RIP: strlen+2] RIP: ffffffff81272ae2 RSP: ffff88011b9d5d00 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff880118901c18 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff88011799982c RSI: 00000000000000d0 RDI: 3a303030302f3030 RBP: ffff88011b9d5d38 R8: 0000000000000006 R9: ffffffffa0134500 R10: 0000000000001000 R11: 0000000000001000 R12: ffff880117a1cc10 R13: 00000000000000d0 R14: 0000000000000017 R15: ffffffff81aff700 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #6 [ffff88011b9d5d00] kobject_get_path at ffffffff8126dc5d #7 [ffff88011b9d5d40] kobject_uevent_env at ffffffff8126e551 #8 [ffff88011b9d5dd0] kobject_uevent at ffffffff8126e9eb #9 [ffff88011b9d5de0] device_del at ffffffff813440c7 -------------------8<--------------------------------------- So clean up when we have all the context, and all that's left to do when the references to the port have dropped is to free up the port struct itself. Reported-by: chayang <chayang@redhat.com> Reported-by: YOGANANTH SUBRAMANIAN <anantyog@in.ibm.com> Reported-by: FuXiangChun <xfu@redhat.com> Reported-by: Qunfang Zhang <qzhang@redhat.com> Reported-by: Sibiao Luo <sluo@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Amit Shah <amit.shah@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

On architectures where cputime_t is 64 bit type, is possible to trigger divide by zero on do_div(temp, (__force u32) total) line, if total is a non zero number but has lower 32 bit's zeroed. Removing casting is not a good solution since some do_div() implementations do cast to u32 internally. This problem can be triggered in practice on very long lived processes: PID: 2331 TASK: ffff880472814b00 CPU: 2 COMMAND: "oraagent.bin" #0 [ffff880472a51b70] machine_kexec at ffffffff8103214b multipath-tcp#1 [ffff880472a51bd0] crash_kexec at ffffffff810b91c2 multipath-tcp#2 [ffff880472a51ca0] oops_end at ffffffff814f0b00 multipath-tcp#3 [ffff880472a51cd0] die at ffffffff8100f26b multipath-tcp#4 [ffff880472a51d00] do_trap at ffffffff814f03f4 multipath-tcp#5 [ffff880472a51d60] do_divide_error at ffffffff8100cfff multipath-tcp#6 [ffff880472a51e00] divide_error at ffffffff8100be7b [exception RIP: thread_group_times+0x56] RIP: ffffffff81056a16 RSP: ffff880472a51eb8 RFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: bc3572c9fe12d194 RBX: ffff880874150800 RCX: 0000000110266fad RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff880472a51eb8 RDI: 001038ae7d9633dc RBP: ffff880472a51ef8 R8: 00000000b10a3a64 R9: ffff880874150800 R10: 00007fcba27ab680 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: ffff880472a51f08 R13: ffff880472a51f10 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000007 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 multipath-tcp#7 [ffff880472a51f00] do_sys_times at ffffffff8108845d multipath-tcp#8 [ffff880472a51f40] sys_times at ffffffff81088524 multipath-tcp#9 [ffff880472a51f80] system_call_fastpath at ffffffff8100b0f2 RIP: 0000003808caac3a RSP: 00007fcba27ab6d8 RFLAGS: 00000202 RAX: 0000000000000064 RBX: ffffffff8100b0f2 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 00007fcba27ab6e0 RSI: 000000000076d58e RDI: 00007fcba27ab6e0 RBP: 00007fcba27ab700 R8: 0000000000000020 R9: 000000000000091b R10: 00007fcba27ab680 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007fff9ca41940 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fcba27ac9c0 R15: 00007fff9ca41940 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000064 CS: 0033 SS: 002b Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120808092714.GA3580@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

This moves ARM over to the asm-generic/unaligned.h header. This has the benefit of better code generated especially for ARMv7 on gcc 4.7+ compilers. As Arnd Bergmann, points out: The asm-generic version uses the "struct" version for native-endian unaligned access and the "byteshift" version for the opposite endianess. The current ARM version however uses the "byteshift" implementation for both. Thanks to Nicolas Pitre for the excellent analysis: Test case: int foo (int *x) { return get_unaligned(x); } long long bar (long long *x) { return get_unaligned(x); } With the current ARM version: foo: ldrb r3, [r0, multipath-tcp#2] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 2B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 2B] ldrb r1, [r0, multipath-tcp#1] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 1B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 1B] ldrb r2, [r0, #0] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D)], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D)] mov r3, r3, asl multipath-tcp#16 @ tmp154, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 2B], ldrb r0, [r0, multipath-tcp#3] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 3B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 3B] orr r3, r3, r1, asl multipath-tcp#8 @, tmp155, tmp154, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 1B], orr r3, r3, r2 @ tmp157, tmp155, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D)] orr r0, r3, r0, asl multipath-tcp#24 @,, tmp157, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 3B], bx lr @ bar: stmfd sp!, {r4, r5, r6, r7} @, mov r2, #0 @ tmp184, ldrb r5, [r0, multipath-tcp#6] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 6B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 6B] ldrb r4, [r0, multipath-tcp#5] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 5B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 5B] ldrb ip, [r0, multipath-tcp#2] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 2B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 2B] ldrb r1, [r0, multipath-tcp#4] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 4B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 4B] mov r5, r5, asl multipath-tcp#16 @ tmp175, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 6B], ldrb r7, [r0, multipath-tcp#1] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 1B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 1B] orr r5, r5, r4, asl multipath-tcp#8 @, tmp176, tmp175, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 5B], ldrb r6, [r0, multipath-tcp#7] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 7B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 7B] orr r5, r5, r1 @ tmp178, tmp176, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 4B] ldrb r4, [r0, #0] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D)], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D)] mov ip, ip, asl multipath-tcp#16 @ tmp188, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 2B], ldrb r1, [r0, multipath-tcp#3] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 3B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 3B] orr ip, ip, r7, asl multipath-tcp#8 @, tmp189, tmp188, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 1B], orr r3, r5, r6, asl multipath-tcp#24 @,, tmp178, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 7B], orr ip, ip, r4 @ tmp191, tmp189, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D)] orr ip, ip, r1, asl multipath-tcp#24 @, tmp194, tmp191, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 3B], mov r1, r3 @, orr r0, r2, ip @ tmp171, tmp184, tmp194 ldmfd sp!, {r4, r5, r6, r7} bx lr In both cases the code is slightly suboptimal. One may wonder why wasting r2 with the constant 0 in the second case for example. And all the mov's could be folded in subsequent orr's, etc. Now with the asm-generic version: foo: ldr r0, [r0, #0] @ unaligned @,* x bx lr @ bar: mov r3, r0 @ x, x ldr r0, [r0, #0] @ unaligned @,* x ldr r1, [r3, multipath-tcp#4] @ unaligned @, bx lr @ This is way better of course, but only because this was compiled for ARMv7. In this case the compiler knows that the hardware can do unaligned word access. This isn't that obvious for foo(), but if we remove the get_unaligned() from bar as follows: long long bar (long long *x) {return *x; } then the resulting code is: bar: ldmia r0, {r0, r1} @ x,, bx lr @ So this proves that the presumed aligned vs unaligned cases does have influence on the instructions the compiler may use and that the above unaligned code results are not just an accident. Still... this isn't fully conclusive without at least looking at the resulting assembly fron a pre ARMv6 compilation. Let's see with an ARMv5 target: foo: ldrb r3, [r0, #0] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp139,* x ldrb r1, [r0, multipath-tcp#1] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp140, ldrb r2, [r0, multipath-tcp#2] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp143, ldrb r0, [r0, multipath-tcp#3] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp146, orr r3, r3, r1, asl multipath-tcp#8 @, tmp142, tmp139, tmp140, orr r3, r3, r2, asl multipath-tcp#16 @, tmp145, tmp142, tmp143, orr r0, r3, r0, asl multipath-tcp#24 @,, tmp145, tmp146, bx lr @ bar: stmfd sp!, {r4, r5, r6, r7} @, ldrb r2, [r0, #0] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp139,* x ldrb r7, [r0, multipath-tcp#1] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp140, ldrb r3, [r0, multipath-tcp#4] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp149, ldrb r6, [r0, multipath-tcp#5] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp150, ldrb r5, [r0, multipath-tcp#2] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp143, ldrb r4, [r0, multipath-tcp#6] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp153, ldrb r1, [r0, multipath-tcp#7] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp156, ldrb ip, [r0, multipath-tcp#3] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp146, orr r2, r2, r7, asl multipath-tcp#8 @, tmp142, tmp139, tmp140, orr r3, r3, r6, asl multipath-tcp#8 @, tmp152, tmp149, tmp150, orr r2, r2, r5, asl multipath-tcp#16 @, tmp145, tmp142, tmp143, orr r3, r3, r4, asl multipath-tcp#16 @, tmp155, tmp152, tmp153, orr r0, r2, ip, asl multipath-tcp#24 @,, tmp145, tmp146, orr r1, r3, r1, asl multipath-tcp#24 @,, tmp155, tmp156, ldmfd sp!, {r4, r5, r6, r7} bx lr Compared to the initial results, this is really nicely optimized and I couldn't do much better if I were to hand code it myself. Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <rob.herring@calxeda.com> Reviewed-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org> Tested-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com> Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>

Fixes following lockdep splat : [ 1614.734896] ============================================= [ 1614.734898] [ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ] [ 1614.734901] 3.6.0-rc3+ #782 Not tainted [ 1614.734903] --------------------------------------------- [ 1614.734905] swapper/11/0 is trying to acquire lock: [ 1614.734907] (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffffa0209d72>] l2tp_xmit_skb+0x172/0xa50 [l2tp_core] [ 1614.734920] [ 1614.734920] but task is already holding lock: [ 1614.734922] (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff815fce23>] tcp_v4_err+0x163/0x6b0 [ 1614.734932] [ 1614.734932] other info that might help us debug this: [ 1614.734935] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 1614.734935] [ 1614.734937] CPU0 [ 1614.734938] ---- [ 1614.734940] lock(slock-AF_INET); [ 1614.734943] lock(slock-AF_INET); [ 1614.734946] [ 1614.734946] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 1614.734946] [ 1614.734949] May be due to missing lock nesting notation [ 1614.734949] [ 1614.734952] 7 locks held by swapper/11/0: [ 1614.734954] #0: (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff81592801>] __netif_receive_skb+0x251/0xd00 [ 1614.734964] multipath-tcp#1: (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff815d319c>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x4c/0x4e0 [ 1614.734972] multipath-tcp#2: (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff8160d116>] icmp_socket_deliver+0x46/0x230 [ 1614.734982] multipath-tcp#3: (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff815fce23>] tcp_v4_err+0x163/0x6b0 [ 1614.734989] multipath-tcp#4: (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff815da240>] ip_queue_xmit+0x0/0x680 [ 1614.734997] multipath-tcp#5: (rcu_read_lock_bh){.+....}, at: [<ffffffff815d9925>] ip_finish_output+0x135/0x890 [ 1614.735004] multipath-tcp#6: (rcu_read_lock_bh){.+....}, at: [<ffffffff81595680>] dev_queue_xmit+0x0/0xe00 [ 1614.735012] [ 1614.735012] stack backtrace: [ 1614.735016] Pid: 0, comm: swapper/11 Not tainted 3.6.0-rc3+ #782 [ 1614.735018] Call Trace: [ 1614.735020] <IRQ> [<ffffffff810a50ac>] __lock_acquire+0x144c/0x1b10 [ 1614.735033] [<ffffffff810a334b>] ? check_usage+0x9b/0x4d0 [ 1614.735037] [<ffffffff810a6762>] ? mark_held_locks+0x82/0x130 [ 1614.735042] [<ffffffff810a5df0>] lock_acquire+0x90/0x200 [ 1614.735047] [<ffffffffa0209d72>] ? l2tp_xmit_skb+0x172/0xa50 [l2tp_core] [ 1614.735051] [<ffffffff810a69ad>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10 [ 1614.735060] [<ffffffff81749b31>] _raw_spin_lock+0x41/0x50 [ 1614.735065] [<ffffffffa0209d72>] ? l2tp_xmit_skb+0x172/0xa50 [l2tp_core] [ 1614.735069] [<ffffffffa0209d72>] l2tp_xmit_skb+0x172/0xa50 [l2tp_core] [ 1614.735075] [<ffffffffa014f7f2>] l2tp_eth_dev_xmit+0x32/0x60 [l2tp_eth] [ 1614.735079] [<ffffffff81595112>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x502/0xa70 [ 1614.735083] [<ffffffff81594c6e>] ? dev_hard_start_xmit+0x5e/0xa70 [ 1614.735087] [<ffffffff815957c1>] ? dev_queue_xmit+0x141/0xe00 [ 1614.735093] [<ffffffff815b622e>] sch_direct_xmit+0xfe/0x290 [ 1614.735098] [<ffffffff81595865>] dev_queue_xmit+0x1e5/0xe00 [ 1614.735102] [<ffffffff81595680>] ? dev_hard_start_xmit+0xa70/0xa70 [ 1614.735106] [<ffffffff815b4daa>] ? eth_header+0x3a/0xf0 [ 1614.735111] [<ffffffff8161d33e>] ? fib_get_table+0x2e/0x280 [ 1614.735117] [<ffffffff8160a7e2>] arp_xmit+0x22/0x60 [ 1614.735121] [<ffffffff8160a863>] arp_send+0x43/0x50 [ 1614.735125] [<ffffffff8160b82f>] arp_solicit+0x18f/0x450 [ 1614.735132] [<ffffffff8159d9da>] neigh_probe+0x4a/0x70 [ 1614.735137] [<ffffffff815a191a>] __neigh_event_send+0xea/0x300 [ 1614.735141] [<ffffffff815a1c93>] neigh_resolve_output+0x163/0x260 [ 1614.735146] [<ffffffff815d9cf5>] ip_finish_output+0x505/0x890 [ 1614.735150] [<ffffffff815d9925>] ? ip_finish_output+0x135/0x890 [ 1614.735154] [<ffffffff815dae79>] ip_output+0x59/0xf0 [ 1614.735158] [<ffffffff815da1cd>] ip_local_out+0x2d/0xa0 [ 1614.735162] [<ffffffff815da403>] ip_queue_xmit+0x1c3/0x680 [ 1614.735165] [<ffffffff815da240>] ? ip_local_out+0xa0/0xa0 [ 1614.735172] [<ffffffff815f4402>] tcp_transmit_skb+0x402/0xa60 [ 1614.735177] [<ffffffff815f5a11>] tcp_retransmit_skb+0x1a1/0x620 [ 1614.735181] [<ffffffff815f7e93>] tcp_retransmit_timer+0x393/0x960 [ 1614.735185] [<ffffffff815fce23>] ? tcp_v4_err+0x163/0x6b0 [ 1614.735189] [<ffffffff815fd317>] tcp_v4_err+0x657/0x6b0 [ 1614.735194] [<ffffffff8160d116>] ? icmp_socket_deliver+0x46/0x230 [ 1614.735199] [<ffffffff8160d19e>] icmp_socket_deliver+0xce/0x230 [ 1614.735203] [<ffffffff8160d116>] ? icmp_socket_deliver+0x46/0x230 [ 1614.735208] [<ffffffff8160d464>] icmp_unreach+0xe4/0x2c0 [ 1614.735213] [<ffffffff8160e520>] icmp_rcv+0x350/0x4a0 [ 1614.735217] [<ffffffff815d3285>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x135/0x4e0 [ 1614.735221] [<ffffffff815d319c>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x4c/0x4e0 [ 1614.735225] [<ffffffff815d3ffa>] ip_local_deliver+0x4a/0x90 [ 1614.735229] [<ffffffff815d37b7>] ip_rcv_finish+0x187/0x730 [ 1614.735233] [<ffffffff815d425d>] ip_rcv+0x21d/0x300 [ 1614.735237] [<ffffffff81592a1b>] __netif_receive_skb+0x46b/0xd00 [ 1614.735241] [<ffffffff81592801>] ? __netif_receive_skb+0x251/0xd00 [ 1614.735245] [<ffffffff81593368>] process_backlog+0xb8/0x180 [ 1614.735249] [<ffffffff81593cf9>] net_rx_action+0x159/0x330 [ 1614.735257] [<ffffffff810491f0>] __do_softirq+0xd0/0x3e0 [ 1614.735264] [<ffffffff8109ed24>] ? tick_program_event+0x24/0x30 [ 1614.735270] [<ffffffff8175419c>] call_softirq+0x1c/0x30 [ 1614.735278] [<ffffffff8100425d>] do_softirq+0x8d/0xc0 [ 1614.735282] [<ffffffff8104983e>] irq_exit+0xae/0xe0 [ 1614.735287] [<ffffffff8175494e>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6e/0x99 [ 1614.735291] [<ffffffff81753a1c>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x6c/0x80 [ 1614.735293] <EOI> [<ffffffff810a14ad>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xd/0x10 [ 1614.735306] [<ffffffff81336f85>] ? intel_idle+0xf5/0x150 [ 1614.735310] [<ffffffff81336f7e>] ? intel_idle+0xee/0x150 [ 1614.735317] [<ffffffff814e6ea9>] cpuidle_enter+0x19/0x20 [ 1614.735321] [<ffffffff814e7538>] cpuidle_idle_call+0xa8/0x630 [ 1614.735327] [<ffffffff8100c1ba>] cpu_idle+0x8a/0xe0 [ 1614.735333] [<ffffffff8173762e>] start_secondary+0x220/0x222 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Use spin_lock_irq() to quiet warning: [ 8.232324] BUG: spinlock trylock failure on UP on CPU#0, reboot/85 [ 8.234138] lock: c161c760, .magic: dead4ead, .owner: reboot/85, .owner_cpu: 0 [ 8.236132] Pid: 85, comm: reboot Not tainted 3.4.0-rc7-00656-g82163ed multipath-tcp#5 [ 8.237965] Call Trace: [ 8.238648] [<c13dfd20>] ? printk+0x18/0x1a [ 8.239827] [<c122a5e0>] spin_dump+0x80/0xd0 [ 8.241016] [<c122a652>] spin_bug+0x22/0x30 [ 8.242181] [<c122a93b>] do_raw_spin_trylock+0x5b/0x70 [ 8.243611] [<c13e8bae>] _raw_spin_trylock+0xe/0x60 [ 8.244975] [<c1392230>] ? keypad_send_key.constprop.9+0xe0/0xe0 ==> [ 8.246638] [<c13922ea>] panel_scan_timer+0xba/0x570 [ 8.248019] [<c1392230>] ? keypad_send_key.constprop.9+0xe0/0xe0 [ 8.249689] [<c102f6f5>] run_timer_softirq+0x1e5/0x370 [ 8.251191] [<c102f645>] ? run_timer_softirq+0x135/0x370 [ 8.252718] [<c1392230>] ? keypad_send_key.constprop.9+0xe0/0xe0 [ 8.254462] [<c102a592>] __do_softirq+0xc2/0x1c0 [ 8.255758] [<c102a4d0>] ? local_bh_enable_ip+0x130/0x130 [ 8.257228] <IRQ> [<c102a855>] ? irq_exit+0x65/0x70 [ 8.258647] [<c1013ff9>] ? smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x49/0x80 [ 8.260226] [<c13e96c1>] ? apic_timer_interrupt+0x31/0x38 [ 8.261737] [<c12700e0>] ? drm_vm_open_locked+0x70/0xb0 [ 8.263166] [<c122489a>] ? delay_tsc+0x1a/0x30 [ 8.264452] [<c12248c9>] ? __delay+0x9/0x10 [ 8.265621] [<c12248ec>] ? __const_udelay+0x1c/0x20 ==> [ 8.266967] [<c139136c>] ? lcd_clear_fast_p8+0x9c/0xe0 [ 8.268386] [<c1391a66>] ? lcd_write+0x226/0x810 [ 8.269653] [<c1367900>] ? md_set_readonly+0xc0/0xc0 [ 8.271013] [<c122a9ed>] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x9d/0xe0 [ 8.272470] [<c1392a98>] ? panel_lcd_print+0x38/0x40 [ 8.273837] [<c1392ace>] ? panel_notify_sys+0x2e/0x60 [ 8.275224] [<c1046634>] ? notifier_call_chain+0x84/0xb0 [ 8.276754] [<c10469ce>] ? __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x3e/0x60 [ 8.278576] [<c1046a0a>] ? blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x1a/0x20 [ 8.280267] [<c1036a14>] ? kernel_restart_prepare+0x14/0x40 [ 8.281901] [<c1036a8e>] ? kernel_restart+0xe/0x50 [ 8.283216] [<c1036ce9>] ? sys_reboot+0x149/0x1e0 [ 8.284532] [<c10b3fb3>] ? handle_pte_fault+0x93/0xd70 [ 8.285956] [<c1019e35>] ? do_page_fault+0x215/0x5e0 [ 8.287330] [<c101a113>] ? do_page_fault+0x4f3/0x5e0 [ 8.288704] [<c1045ac6>] ? up_read+0x16/0x30 [ 8.289890] [<c101a113>] ? do_page_fault+0x4f3/0x5e0 [ 8.291252] [<c10d4486>] ? iterate_supers+0x86/0xd0 [ 8.292615] [<c122a9ed>] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x9d/0xe0 [ 8.294049] [<c13e8dcd>] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x1d/0x20 [ 8.295449] [<c10d44ab>] ? iterate_supers+0xab/0xd0 [ 8.296795] [<c10fb620>] ? __sync_filesystem+0xa0/0xa0 [ 8.298199] [<c13e9b03>] ? sysenter_do_call+0x12/0x37 [ 8.306899] Restarting system. [ 8.307747] machine restart Signed-off-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

Cancel work of the xfs_sync_worker before teardown of the log in xfs_unmountfs. This prevents occasional crashes on unmount like so: PID: 21602 TASK: ee9df060 CPU: 0 COMMAND: "kworker/0:3" #0 [c5377d28] crash_kexec at c0292c94 multipath-tcp#1 [c5377d80] oops_end at c07090c2 multipath-tcp#2 [c5377d98] no_context at c06f614e multipath-tcp#3 [c5377dbc] __bad_area_nosemaphore at c06f6281 multipath-tcp#4 [c5377df4] bad_area_nosemaphore at c06f629b multipath-tcp#5 [c5377e00] do_page_fault at c070b0cb multipath-tcp#6 [c5377e7c] error_code (via page_fault) at c070892c EAX: f300c6a8 EBX: f300c6a8 ECX: 000000c0 EDX: 000000c0 EBP: c5377ed0 DS: 007b ESI: 00000000 ES: 007b EDI: 00000001 GS: ffffad20 CS: 0060 EIP: c0481ad0 ERR: ffffffff EFLAGS: 00010246 multipath-tcp#7 [c5377eb0] atomic64_read_cx8 at c0481ad0 multipath-tcp#8 [c5377ebc] xlog_assign_tail_lsn_locked at f7cc7c6e [xfs] multipath-tcp#9 [c5377ed4] xfs_trans_ail_delete_bulk at f7ccd520 [xfs] multipath-tcp#10 [c5377f0c] xfs_buf_iodone at f7ccb602 [xfs] multipath-tcp#11 [c5377f24] xfs_buf_do_callbacks at f7cca524 [xfs] multipath-tcp#12 [c5377f30] xfs_buf_iodone_callbacks at f7cca5da [xfs] multipath-tcp#13 [c5377f4c] xfs_buf_iodone_work at f7c718d0 [xfs] multipath-tcp#14 [c5377f58] process_one_work at c024ee4c multipath-tcp#15 [c5377f98] worker_thread at c024f43d multipath-tcp#16 [c5377fbc] kthread at c025326b multipath-tcp#17 [c5377fe8] kernel_thread_helper at c070e834 PID: 26653 TASK: e79143b0 CPU: 3 COMMAND: "umount" #0 [cde0fda0] __schedule at c0706595 multipath-tcp#1 [cde0fe28] schedule at c0706b89 multipath-tcp#2 [cde0fe30] schedule_timeout at c0705600 multipath-tcp#3 [cde0fe94] __down_common at c0706098 multipath-tcp#4 [cde0fec8] __down at c0706122 multipath-tcp#5 [cde0fed0] down at c025936f multipath-tcp#6 [cde0fee0] xfs_buf_lock at f7c7131d [xfs] multipath-tcp#7 [cde0ff00] xfs_freesb at f7cc2236 [xfs] multipath-tcp#8 [cde0ff10] xfs_fs_put_super at f7c80f21 [xfs] multipath-tcp#9 [cde0ff1c] generic_shutdown_super at c0333d7a multipath-tcp#10 [cde0ff38] kill_block_super at c0333e0f multipath-tcp#11 [cde0ff48] deactivate_locked_super at c0334218 multipath-tcp#12 [cde0ff58] deactivate_super at c033495d multipath-tcp#13 [cde0ff68] mntput_no_expire at c034bc13 multipath-tcp#14 [cde0ff7c] sys_umount at c034cc69 multipath-tcp#15 [cde0ffa0] sys_oldumount at c034ccd4 multipath-tcp#16 [cde0ffb0] system_call at c0707e66 commit 11159a0 added this to xfs_log_unmount and needs to be cleaned up at a later date. Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com> Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Mark Tinguely <tinguely@sgi.com>

One of the modes of Huawei E367 has this QMI/wwan interface: I:* If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=01 Prot=07 Driver=(none) E: Ad=83(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 64 Ivl=2ms E: Ad=84(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=02(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=4ms Huawei use subclass and protocol to identify vendor specific functions, so adding a new vendor rule for this combination. The Pantech devices UML290 (106c:3718) and P4200 (106c:3721) use the same subclass to identify the QMI/wwan function. Replace the existing device specific UML290 entries with generic vendor matching, adding support for the Pantech P4200. The ZTE MF683 has 6 vendor specific interfaces, all using ff/ff/ff for cls/sub/prot. Adding a match on interface multipath-tcp#5 which is a QMI/wwan interface. Cc: Fangxiaozhi (Franko) <fangxiaozhi@huawei.com> Cc: Thomas Schäfer <tschaefer@t-online.de> Cc: Dan Williams <dcbw@redhat.com> Cc: Shawn J. Goff <shawn7400@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Interface multipath-tcp#5 on ZTE MF683 is a QMI/wwan interface. Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Shawn J. Goff <shawn7400@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

One of the modes of Huawei E367 has this QMI/wwan interface: I:* If#= 1 Alt= 0 #EPs= 3 Cls=ff(vend.) Sub=01 Prot=07 Driver=(none) E: Ad=83(I) Atr=03(Int.) MxPS= 64 Ivl=2ms E: Ad=84(I) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=0ms E: Ad=02(O) Atr=02(Bulk) MxPS= 512 Ivl=4ms Huawei use subclass and protocol to identify vendor specific functions, so adding a new vendor rule for this combination. The Pantech devices UML290 (106c:3718) and P4200 (106c:3721) use the same subclass to identify the QMI/wwan function. Replace the existing device specific UML290 entries with generic vendor matching, adding support for the Pantech P4200. The ZTE MF683 has 6 vendor specific interfaces, all using ff/ff/ff for cls/sub/prot. Adding a match on interface multipath-tcp#5 which is a QMI/wwan interface. Cc: Fangxiaozhi (Franko) <fangxiaozhi@huawei.com> Cc: Thomas Schäfer <tschaefer@t-online.de> Cc: Dan Williams <dcbw@redhat.com> Cc: Shawn J. Goff <shawn7400@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

netlink_register_notifier requires notify functions to not sleep. nfc_stop_poll locks device mutex and must not be called from notifier. Create workqueue that will handle this for all devices. BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/mutex.c:269 in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 4497, name: neard 1 lock held by neard/4497: Pid: 4497, comm: neard Not tainted 3.5.0-999-nfc+ multipath-tcp#5 Call Trace: [<ffffffff810952c5>] __might_sleep+0x145/0x200 [<ffffffff81743dde>] mutex_lock_nested+0x2e/0x50 [<ffffffff816ffd19>] nfc_stop_poll+0x39/0xb0 [<ffffffff81700a17>] nfc_genl_rcv_nl_event+0x77/0xc0 [<ffffffff8174aa8c>] notifier_call_chain+0x5c/0x120 [<ffffffff8174abd6>] __atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x86/0x140 [<ffffffff8174ab50>] ? notifier_call_chain+0x120/0x120 [<ffffffff815e1347>] ? skb_dequeue+0x67/0x90 [<ffffffff8174aca6>] atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x16/0x20 [<ffffffff8162119a>] netlink_release+0x24a/0x280 [<ffffffff815d7aa8>] sock_release+0x28/0xa0 [<ffffffff815d7be7>] sock_close+0x17/0x30 [<ffffffff811b2a7c>] __fput+0xcc/0x250 [<ffffffff811b2c0e>] ____fput+0xe/0x10 [<ffffffff81085009>] task_work_run+0x69/0x90 [<ffffffff8101b951>] do_notify_resume+0x81/0xd0 [<ffffffff8174ef22>] int_signal+0x12/0x17 Signed-off-by: Szymon Janc <szymon.janc@tieto.com> Signed-off-by: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com>

…aves P_Key change and guid change events are not of interest to all slaves, but only to those slaves which "see" the table slots whose contents have change. For example, if the guid at port 1, index 5 has changed in the PPF, we wish to propagate the gid-change event only to the function which has that guid index mapped to its port/guid table (in this case it is slave multipath-tcp#5). Other functions should not get the event, since the event does not affect them. Similarly with P_Keys -- P_Key change events are forwarded only to slaves which have that P_Key index mapped to their virtual P_Key table. Signed-off-by: Jack Morgenstein <jackm@dev.mellanox.co.il> Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>

If a qdisc is installed on a bonding device, its possible to get following lockdep splat under stress : ============================================= [ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ] 3.6.0+ multipath-tcp#211 Not tainted --------------------------------------------- ping/4876 is trying to acquire lock: (dev->qdisc_tx_busylock ?: &qdisc_tx_busylock){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8157a191>] dev_queue_xmit+0xe1/0x830 but task is already holding lock: (dev->qdisc_tx_busylock ?: &qdisc_tx_busylock){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8157a191>] dev_queue_xmit+0xe1/0x830 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(dev->qdisc_tx_busylock ?: &qdisc_tx_busylock); lock(dev->qdisc_tx_busylock ?: &qdisc_tx_busylock); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 6 locks held by ping/4876: #0: (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff815e5030>] raw_sendmsg+0x600/0xc30 multipath-tcp#1: (rcu_read_lock_bh){.+....}, at: [<ffffffff815ba4bd>] ip_finish_output+0x12d/0x870 multipath-tcp#2: (rcu_read_lock_bh){.+....}, at: [<ffffffff8157a0b0>] dev_queue_xmit+0x0/0x830 multipath-tcp#3: (dev->qdisc_tx_busylock ?: &qdisc_tx_busylock){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8157a191>] dev_queue_xmit+0xe1/0x830 multipath-tcp#4: (&bond->lock){++.?..}, at: [<ffffffffa02128c1>] bond_start_xmit+0x31/0x4b0 [bonding] multipath-tcp#5: (rcu_read_lock_bh){.+....}, at: [<ffffffff8157a0b0>] dev_queue_xmit+0x0/0x830 stack backtrace: Pid: 4876, comm: ping Not tainted 3.6.0+ multipath-tcp#211 Call Trace: [<ffffffff810a0145>] __lock_acquire+0x715/0x1b80 [<ffffffff810a256b>] ? mark_held_locks+0x9b/0x100 [<ffffffff810a1bf2>] lock_acquire+0x92/0x1d0 [<ffffffff8157a191>] ? dev_queue_xmit+0xe1/0x830 [<ffffffff81726b7c>] _raw_spin_lock+0x3c/0x50 [<ffffffff8157a191>] ? dev_queue_xmit+0xe1/0x830 [<ffffffff8106264d>] ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0x5d/0x90 [<ffffffff8157a191>] dev_queue_xmit+0xe1/0x830 [<ffffffff8157a0b0>] ? netdev_pick_tx+0x570/0x570 [<ffffffffa0212a6a>] bond_start_xmit+0x1da/0x4b0 [bonding] [<ffffffff815796d0>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x240/0x6b0 [<ffffffff81597c6e>] sch_direct_xmit+0xfe/0x2a0 [<ffffffff8157a249>] dev_queue_xmit+0x199/0x830 [<ffffffff8157a0b0>] ? netdev_pick_tx+0x570/0x570 [<ffffffff815ba96f>] ip_finish_output+0x5df/0x870 [<ffffffff815ba4bd>] ? ip_finish_output+0x12d/0x870 [<ffffffff815bb964>] ip_output+0x54/0xf0 [<ffffffff815bad48>] ip_local_out+0x28/0x90 [<ffffffff815bc444>] ip_send_skb+0x14/0x50 [<ffffffff815bc4b2>] ip_push_pending_frames+0x32/0x40 [<ffffffff815e536a>] raw_sendmsg+0x93a/0xc30 [<ffffffff8128d570>] ? selinux_file_send_sigiotask+0x1f0/0x1f0 [<ffffffff8109ddb4>] ? __lock_is_held+0x54/0x80 [<ffffffff815f6730>] ? inet_recvmsg+0x220/0x220 [<ffffffff8109ddb4>] ? __lock_is_held+0x54/0x80 [<ffffffff815f6855>] inet_sendmsg+0x125/0x240 [<ffffffff815f6730>] ? inet_recvmsg+0x220/0x220 [<ffffffff8155cddb>] sock_sendmsg+0xab/0xe0 [<ffffffff810a1650>] ? lock_release_non_nested+0xa0/0x2e0 [<ffffffff810a1650>] ? lock_release_non_nested+0xa0/0x2e0 [<ffffffff8155d18c>] __sys_sendmsg+0x37c/0x390 [<ffffffff81195b2a>] ? fsnotify+0x2ca/0x7e0 [<ffffffff811958e8>] ? fsnotify+0x88/0x7e0 [<ffffffff81361f36>] ? put_ldisc+0x56/0xd0 [<ffffffff8116f98a>] ? fget_light+0x3da/0x510 [<ffffffff8155f6c4>] sys_sendmsg+0x44/0x80 [<ffffffff8172fc22>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Avoid this problem using a distinct lock_class_key for bonding devices. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com> Cc: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

A rescue thread exiting TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE can lead to a task scheduling off, never to be seen again. In the case where this occurred, an exiting thread hit reiserfs homebrew conditional resched while holding a mutex, bringing the box to its knees. PID: 18105 TASK: ffff8807fd412180 CPU: 5 COMMAND: "kdmflush" #0 [ffff8808157e7670] schedule at ffffffff8143f489 multipath-tcp#1 [ffff8808157e77b8] reiserfs_get_block at ffffffffa038ab2d [reiserfs] multipath-tcp#2 [ffff8808157e79a8] __block_write_begin at ffffffff8117fb14 multipath-tcp#3 [ffff8808157e7a98] reiserfs_write_begin at ffffffffa0388695 [reiserfs] multipath-tcp#4 [ffff8808157e7ad8] generic_perform_write at ffffffff810ee9e2 multipath-tcp#5 [ffff8808157e7b58] generic_file_buffered_write at ffffffff810eeb41 multipath-tcp#6 [ffff8808157e7ba8] __generic_file_aio_write at ffffffff810f1a3a multipath-tcp#7 [ffff8808157e7c58] generic_file_aio_write at ffffffff810f1c88 multipath-tcp#8 [ffff8808157e7cc8] do_sync_write at ffffffff8114f850 multipath-tcp#9 [ffff8808157e7dd8] do_acct_process at ffffffff810a268f [exception RIP: kernel_thread_helper] RIP: ffffffff8144a5c0 RSP: ffff8808157e7f58 RFLAGS: 00000202 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8107af60 RDI: ffff8803ee491d18 RBP: 0000000000000000 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <mgalbraith@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

All boards, except Amstrad E3, mark USB config with __initdata. As a result, when you compile USB into modules, they will try to refer already released platform data and the behaviour is undefined. For example on Nokia 770, I get the following kernel panic when modprobing ohci-hcd: [ 3.462158] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address e7fddef0 [ 3.477050] pgd = c3434000 [ 3.487365] [e7fddef0] *pgd=00000000 [ 3.498535] Internal error: Oops: 80000005 [multipath-tcp#1] ARM [ 3.510955] Modules linked in: ohci_hcd(+) [ 3.522705] CPU: 0 Not tainted (3.7.0-770_tiny+ multipath-tcp#5) [ 3.535552] PC is at 0xe7fddef0 [ 3.546508] LR is at ohci_omap_init+0x5c/0x144 [ohci_hcd] [ 3.560272] pc : [<e7fddef0>] lr : [<bf003140>] psr: a0000013 [ 3.560272] sp : c344bdb0 ip : c344bce0 fp : c344bdcc [ 3.589782] r10: 00000001 r9 : 00000000 r8 : 00000000 [ 3.604553] r7 : 00000026 r6 : 000000de r5 : c0227300 r4 : c342d620 [ 3.621032] r3 : e7fddef0 r2 : c048b880 r1 : 00000000 r0 : 0000000a [ 3.637786] Flags: NzCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment user [ 3.655822] Control: 0005317f Table: 13434000 DAC: 00000015 [ 3.672790] Process modprobe (pid: 425, stack limit = 0xc344a1b8) [ 3.690643] Stack: (0xc344bdb0 to 0xc344c000) [ 3.707031] bda0: bf0030e4 c342d620 00000000 c049e62c [ 3.727905] bdc0: c344be04 c344bdd0 c0150ff0 bf0030f4 bf001b88 00000000 c048a4ac c345b020 [ 3.748870] bde0: c342d620 00000000 c048a468 bf003968 00000001 bf006000 c344be34 c344be08 [ 3.769836] be00: bf001bf0 c0150e48 00000000 c344be18 c00b9bfc c048a478 c048a4ac bf0037f8 [ 3.790985] be20: c012ca04 c000e024 c344be44 c344be38 c012d968 bf001a84 c344be64 c344be48 [ 3.812164] be40: c012c8ac c012d95c 00000000 c048a478 c048a4ac bf0037f8 c344be84 c344be68 [ 3.833740] be60: c012ca74 c012c80c 20000013 00000000 c344be88 bf0037f8 c344beac c344be88 [ 3.855468] be80: c012b038 c012ca14 c38093cc c383ee10 bf0037f8 c35be5a0 c049d5e8 00000000 [ 3.877166] bea0: c344bebc c344beb0 c012c40c c012aff4 c344beec c344bec0 c012bfc0 c012c3fc [ 3.898834] bec0: bf00378c 00000000 c344beec bf0037f8 00067f39 00000000 00005c44 c000e024 [ 3.920837] bee0: c344bf14 c344bef0 c012cd54 c012befc c04ce080 00067f39 00000000 00005c44 [ 3.943023] bf00: c000e024 bf006000 c344bf24 c344bf18 c012db14 c012ccc0 c344bf3c c344bf28 [ 3.965423] bf20: bf00604c c012dad8 c344a000 bf003834 c344bf7c c344bf40 c00087ac bf006010 [ 3.987976] bf40: 0000000f bf003834 00067f39 00000000 00005c44 bf003834 00067f39 00000000 [ 4.010711] bf60: 00005c44 c000e024 c344a000 00000000 c344bfa4 c344bf80 c004c35c c0008720 [ 4.033569] bf80: c344bfac c344bf90 01422192 01427ea0 00000000 00000080 00000000 c344bfa8 [ 4.056518] bfa0: c000dec0 c004c2f0 01422192 01427ea0 01427ea0 00005c44 00067f39 00000000 [ 4.079406] bfc0: 01422192 01427ea0 00000000 00000080 b6e11008 014221aa be941fcc b6e1e008 [ 4.102569] bfe0: b6ef6300 be941758 0000e93c b6ef6310 60000010 01427ea0 00000000 00000000 [ 4.125946] Backtrace: [ 4.143463] [<bf0030e4>] (ohci_omap_init+0x0/0x144 [ohci_hcd]) from [<c0150ff0>] (usb_add_hcd+0x1b8/0x61c) [ 4.183898] r6:c049e62c r5:00000000 r4:c342d620 r3:bf0030e4 [ 4.205596] [<c0150e38>] (usb_add_hcd+0x0/0x61c) from [<bf001bf0>] (ohci_hcd_omap_drv_probe+0x17c/0x224 [ohci_hcd]) [ 4.248138] [<bf001a74>] (ohci_hcd_omap_drv_probe+0x0/0x224 [ohci_hcd]) from [<c012d968>] (platform_drv_probe+0x1c/0x20) [ 4.292144] r8:c000e024 r7:c012ca04 r6:bf0037f8 r5:c048a4ac r4:c048a478 [ 4.316192] [<c012d94c>] (platform_drv_probe+0x0/0x20) from [<c012c8ac>] (driver_probe_device+0xb0/0x208) [ 4.360168] [<c012c7fc>] (driver_probe_device+0x0/0x208) from [<c012ca74>] (__driver_attach+0x70/0x94) [ 4.405548] r6:bf0037f8 r5:c048a4ac r4:c048a478 r3:00000000 [ 4.429809] [<c012ca04>] (__driver_attach+0x0/0x94) from [<c012b038>] (bus_for_each_dev+0x54/0x90) [ 4.475708] r6:bf0037f8 r5:c344be88 r4:00000000 r3:20000013 [ 4.500366] [<c012afe4>] (bus_for_each_dev+0x0/0x90) from [<c012c40c>] (driver_attach+0x20/0x28) [ 4.528442] r7:00000000 r6:c049d5e8 r5:c35be5a0 r4:bf0037f8 [ 4.553466] [<c012c3ec>] (driver_attach+0x0/0x28) from [<c012bfc0>] (bus_add_driver+0xd4/0x228) [ 4.581878] [<c012beec>] (bus_add_driver+0x0/0x228) from [<c012cd54>] (driver_register+0xa4/0x134) [ 4.629730] r8:c000e024 r7:00005c44 r6:00000000 r5:00067f39 r4:bf0037f8 [ 4.656738] [<c012ccb0>] (driver_register+0x0/0x134) from [<c012db14>] (platform_driver_register+0x4c/0x60) [ 4.706542] [<c012dac8>] (platform_driver_register+0x0/0x60) from [<bf00604c>] (ohci_hcd_mod_init+0x4c/0x8c [ohci_hcd]) [ 4.757843] [<bf006000>] (ohci_hcd_mod_init+0x0/0x8c [ohci_hcd]) from [<c00087ac>] (do_one_initcall+0x9c/0x174) [ 4.808990] r4:bf003834 r3:c344a000 [ 4.832641] [<c0008710>] (do_one_initcall+0x0/0x174) from [<c004c35c>] (sys_init_module+0x7c/0x194) [ 4.881530] [<c004c2e0>] (sys_init_module+0x0/0x194) from [<c000dec0>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x2c) [ 4.930664] r7:00000080 r6:00000000 r5:01427ea0 r4:01422192 [ 4.956481] Code: bad PC value [ 4.978729] ---[ end trace 58280240f08342c4 ]--- [ 5.002258] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Fix this by taking a copy of the data. Also mark Amstrad E3's data with __initdata to save some memory with multi-board kernels. Signed-off-by: Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@iki.fi> Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>

Pursuant to this review https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/11/12/500 by Stefan Richter, update the TODO file. - Clarify purpose of TODO file - Remove firewire item multipath-tcp#4. As discussed in this conversation https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/11/13/564 knowing the AR buffer size is not a hard requirement. The required rx buffer size can be determined experimentally. - Remove firewire item multipath-tcp#5. This was a private note for further experimentation. - Change firewire item multipath-tcp#1. Change suggested header from uapi header to kernel-only header. Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com> Acked-by: Stefan Richter <stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

The following lines of code produce a kernel oops. fd = socket(PF_FILE, SOCK_STREAM|SOCK_CLOEXEC|SOCK_NONBLOCK, 0); fchmod(fd, 0666); [ 139.922364] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) [ 139.924982] IP: [< (null)>] (null) [ 139.924982] *pde = 00000000 [ 139.924982] Oops: 0000 [multipath-tcp#5] SMP [ 139.924982] Modules linked in: fuse dm_crypt dm_mod i2c_piix4 serio_raw evdev binfmt_misc button [ 139.924982] Pid: 3070, comm: acpid Tainted: G D 3.8.0-rc2-kds+ multipath-tcp#465 Bochs Bochs [ 139.924982] EIP: 0060:[<00000000>] EFLAGS: 00010246 CPU: 0 [ 139.924982] EIP is at 0x0 [ 139.924982] EAX: cf5ef000 EBX: cf5ef000 ECX: c143d600 EDX: c15225f2 [ 139.924982] ESI: cf4d2a1c EDI: cf4d2a1c EBP: cc02df10 ESP: cc02dee4 [ 139.924982] DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0033 SS: 0068 [ 139.924982] CR0: 80050033 CR2: 00000000 CR3: 0c059000 CR4: 000006d0 [ 139.924982] DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000 [ 139.924982] DR6: ffff0ff0 DR7: 00000400 [ 139.924982] Process acpid (pid: 3070, ti=cc02c000 task=d7705340 task.ti=cc02c000) [ 139.924982] Stack: [ 139.924982] c1203c88 00000000 cc02def4 cf4d2a1c ae21eefa 471b60d5 1083c1ba c26a5940 [ 139.924982] e891fb5e 00000041 00000004 cc02df1c c1203964 00000000 cc02df4c c10e20c3 [ 139.924982] 00000002 00000000 00000000 22222222 c1ff2222 cf5ef000 00000000 d76efb08 [ 139.924982] Call Trace: [ 139.924982] [<c1203c88>] ? evm_update_evmxattr+0x5b/0x62 [ 139.924982] [<c1203964>] evm_inode_post_setattr+0x22/0x26 [ 139.924982] [<c10e20c3>] notify_change+0x25f/0x281 [ 139.924982] [<c10cbf56>] chmod_common+0x59/0x76 [ 139.924982] [<c10e27a1>] ? put_unused_fd+0x33/0x33 [ 139.924982] [<c10cca09>] sys_fchmod+0x39/0x5c [ 139.924982] [<c13f4f30>] syscall_call+0x7/0xb [ 139.924982] Code: Bad EIP value. This happens because sockets do not define the removexattr operation. Before removing the xattr, verify the removexattr function pointer is not NULL. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>

1. Background Previously, if f2fs tries to move data blocks of an *evicting* inode during the cleaning process, it stops the process incompletely and then restarts the whole process, since it needs a locked inode to grab victim data pages in its address space. In order to get a locked inode, iget_locked() by f2fs_iget() is normally used, but, it waits if the inode is on freeing. So, here is a deadlock scenario. 1. f2fs_evict_inode() <- inode "A" 2. f2fs_balance_fs() 3. f2fs_gc() 4. gc_data_segment() 5. f2fs_iget() <- inode "A" too! If step multipath-tcp#1 and multipath-tcp#5 treat a same inode "A", step multipath-tcp#5 would fall into deadlock since the inode "A" is on freeing. In order to resolve this, f2fs_iget_nowait() which skips __wait_on_freeing_inode() was introduced in step multipath-tcp#5, and stops f2fs_gc() to complete f2fs_evict_inode(). 1. f2fs_evict_inode() <- inode "A" 2. f2fs_balance_fs() 3. f2fs_gc() 4. gc_data_segment() 5. f2fs_iget_nowait() <- inode "A", then stop f2fs_gc() w/ -ENOENT 2. Problem and Solution In the above scenario, however, f2fs cannot finish f2fs_evict_inode() only if: o there are not enough free sections, and o f2fs_gc() tries to move data blocks of the *evicting* inode repeatedly. So, the final solution is to use f2fs_iget() and remove f2fs_balance_fs() in f2fs_evict_inode(). The f2fs_evict_inode() actually truncates all the data and node blocks, which means that it doesn't produce any dirty node pages accordingly. So, we don't need to do f2fs_balance_fs() in practical. Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk.kim@samsung.com>

…y ARC core For now this will suffice for all platforms, later exotic ones needs to get this from DeviceTree Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

…ernel/git/vgupta/arc Pull new ARC architecture from Vineet Gupta: "Initial ARC Linux port with some fixes on top for 3.9-rc1: I would like to introduce the Linux port to ARC Processors (from Synopsys) for 3.9-rc1. The patch-set has been discussed on the public lists since Nov and has received a fair bit of review, specially from Arnd, tglx, Al and other subsystem maintainers for DeviceTree, kgdb... The arch bits are in arch/arc, some asm-generic changes (acked by Arnd), a minor change to PARISC (acked by Helge). The series is a touch bigger for a new port for 2 main reasons: 1. It enables a basic kernel in first sub-series and adds ptrace/kgdb/.. later 2. Some of the fallout of review (DeviceTree support, multi-platform- image support) were added on top of orig series, primarily to record the revision history. This updated pull request additionally contains - fixes due to our GNU tools catching up with the new syscall/ptrace ABI - some (minor) cross-arch Kconfig updates." * tag 'arc-v3.9-rc1-late' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vgupta/arc: (82 commits) ARC: split elf.h into uapi and export it for userspace ARC: Fixup the current ABI version ARC: gdbserver using regset interface possibly broken ARC: Kconfig cleanup tracking cross-arch Kconfig pruning in merge window ARC: make a copy of flat DT ARC: [plat-arcfpga] DT arc-uart bindings change: "baud" => "current-speed" ARC: Ensure CONFIG_VIRT_TO_BUS is not enabled ARC: Fix pt_orig_r8 access ARC: [3.9] Fallout of hlist iterator update ARC: 64bit RTSC timestamp hardware issue ARC: Don't fiddle with non-existent caches ARC: Add self to MAINTAINERS ARC: Provide a default serial.h for uart drivers needing BASE_BAUD ARC: [plat-arcfpga] defconfig for fully loaded ARC Linux ARC: [Review] Multi-platform image multipath-tcp#8: platform registers SMP callbacks ARC: [Review] Multi-platform image multipath-tcp#7: SMP common code to use callbacks ARC: [Review] Multi-platform image multipath-tcp#6: cpu-to-dma-addr optional ARC: [Review] Multi-platform image multipath-tcp#5: NR_IRQS defined by ARC core ARC: [Review] Multi-platform image multipath-tcp#4: Isolate platform headers ARC: [Review] Multi-platform image multipath-tcp#3: switch to board callback ...

The following script will produce a kernel oops: sudo ip netns add v sudo ip netns exec v ip ad add 127.0.0.1/8 dev lo sudo ip netns exec v ip link set lo up sudo ip netns exec v ip ro add 224.0.0.0/4 dev lo sudo ip netns exec v ip li add vxlan0 type vxlan id 42 group 239.1.1.1 dev lo sudo ip netns exec v ip link set vxlan0 up sudo ip netns del v where inspect by gdb: Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. [Switching to Thread 107] 0xffffffffa0289e33 in ?? () (gdb) bt #0 vxlan_leave_group (dev=0xffff88001bafa000) at drivers/net/vxlan.c:533 multipath-tcp#1 vxlan_stop (dev=0xffff88001bafa000) at drivers/net/vxlan.c:1087 multipath-tcp#2 0xffffffff812cc498 in __dev_close_many (head=head@entry=0xffff88001f2e7dc8) at net/core/dev.c:1299 multipath-tcp#3 0xffffffff812cd920 in dev_close_many (head=head@entry=0xffff88001f2e7dc8) at net/core/dev.c:1335 multipath-tcp#4 0xffffffff812cef31 in rollback_registered_many (head=head@entry=0xffff88001f2e7dc8) at net/core/dev.c:4851 multipath-tcp#5 0xffffffff812cf040 in unregister_netdevice_many (head=head@entry=0xffff88001f2e7dc8) at net/core/dev.c:5752 multipath-tcp#6 0xffffffff812cf1ba in default_device_exit_batch (net_list=0xffff88001f2e7e18) at net/core/dev.c:6170 multipath-tcp#7 0xffffffff812cab27 in cleanup_net (work=<optimized out>) at net/core/net_namespace.c:302 multipath-tcp#8 0xffffffff810540ef in process_one_work (worker=0xffff88001ba9ed40, work=0xffffffff8167d020) at kernel/workqueue.c:2157 multipath-tcp#9 0xffffffff810549d0 in worker_thread (__worker=__worker@entry=0xffff88001ba9ed40) at kernel/workqueue.c:2276 multipath-tcp#10 0xffffffff8105870c in kthread (_create=0xffff88001f2e5d68) at kernel/kthread.c:168 multipath-tcp#11 <signal handler called> multipath-tcp#12 0x0000000000000000 in ?? () multipath-tcp#13 0x0000000000000000 in ?? () (gdb) fr 0 #0 vxlan_leave_group (dev=0xffff88001bafa000) at drivers/net/vxlan.c:533 533 struct sock *sk = vn->sock->sk; (gdb) l 528 static int vxlan_leave_group(struct net_device *dev) 529 { 530 struct vxlan_dev *vxlan = netdev_priv(dev); 531 struct vxlan_net *vn = net_generic(dev_net(dev), vxlan_net_id); 532 int err = 0; 533 struct sock *sk = vn->sock->sk; 534 struct ip_mreqn mreq = { 535 .imr_multiaddr.s_addr = vxlan->gaddr, 536 .imr_ifindex = vxlan->link, 537 }; (gdb) p vn->sock $4 = (struct socket *) 0x0 The kernel calls `vxlan_exit_net` when deleting the netns before shutting down vxlan interfaces. Later the removal of all vxlan interfaces, where `vn->sock` is already gone causes the oops. so we should manually shutdown all interfaces before deleting `vn->sock` as the patch does. Signed-off-by: Zang MingJie <zealot0630@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

mnt_drop_write() must be called only if mnt_want_write() succeeded, otherwise the mnt_writers counter will diverge. mnt_writers counters are used to check if remounting FS as read-only is OK, so after an extra mnt_drop_write() call, it would be impossible to remount mqueue FS as read-only. Besides, on umount a warning would be printed like this one: ===================================== [ BUG: bad unlock balance detected! ] 3.9.0-rc3 multipath-tcp#5 Not tainted ------------------------------------- a.out/12486 is trying to release lock (sb_writers) at: mnt_drop_write+0x1f/0x30 but there are no more locks to release! Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@parallels.com> Cc: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Add a new ioctl, EXT4_IOC_SWAP_BOOT which swaps i_blocks and associated attributes (like i_blocks, i_size, i_flags, ...) from the specified inode with inode EXT4_BOOT_LOADER_INO (multipath-tcp#5). This is typically used to store a boot loader in a secure part of the filesystem, where it can't be changed by a normal user by accident. The data blocks of the previous boot loader will be associated with the given inode. This usercode program is a simple example of the usage: int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int fd; int err; if ( argc != 2 ) { printf("usage: ext4-swap-boot-inode FILE-TO-SWAP\n"); exit(1); } fd = open(argv[1], O_WRONLY); if ( fd < 0 ) { perror("open"); exit(1); } err = ioctl(fd, EXT4_IOC_SWAP_BOOT); if ( err < 0 ) { perror("ioctl"); exit(1); } close(fd); exit(0); } [ Modified by Theodore Ts'o to fix a number of bugs in the original code.] Signed-off-by: Dr. Tilmann Bubeck <t.bubeck@reinform.de> Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>

Otherwise we get a race between unload and reload of the same module: the new module doesn't see the old one in the list, but then fails because it can't register over the still-extant entries in sysfs: [ 103.981925] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 103.986902] WARNING: at fs/sysfs/dir.c:536 sysfs_add_one+0xab/0xd0() [ 103.993606] Hardware name: CrownBay Platform [ 103.998075] sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/module/pch_gbe' [ 104.004784] Modules linked in: pch_gbe(+) [last unloaded: pch_gbe] [ 104.011362] Pid: 3021, comm: modprobe Tainted: G W 3.9.0-rc5+ multipath-tcp#5 [ 104.018662] Call Trace: [ 104.021286] [<c103599d>] warn_slowpath_common+0x6d/0xa0 [ 104.026933] [<c1168c8b>] ? sysfs_add_one+0xab/0xd0 [ 104.031986] [<c1168c8b>] ? sysfs_add_one+0xab/0xd0 [ 104.037000] [<c1035a4e>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x2e/0x30 [ 104.042188] [<c1168c8b>] sysfs_add_one+0xab/0xd0 [ 104.046982] [<c1168dbe>] create_dir+0x5e/0xa0 [ 104.051633] [<c1168e78>] sysfs_create_dir+0x78/0xd0 [ 104.056774] [<c1262bc3>] kobject_add_internal+0x83/0x1f0 [ 104.062351] [<c126daf6>] ? kvasprintf+0x46/0x60 [ 104.067231] [<c1262ebd>] kobject_add_varg+0x2d/0x50 [ 104.072450] [<c1262f07>] kobject_init_and_add+0x27/0x30 [ 104.078075] [<c1089240>] mod_sysfs_setup+0x80/0x540 [ 104.083207] [<c1260851>] ? module_bug_finalize+0x51/0xc0 [ 104.088720] [<c108ab29>] load_module+0x1429/0x18b0 We can teardown sysfs first, then to be sure, put the state in MODULE_STATE_UNFORMED so it's ignored while we deconstruct it. Reported-by: Veaceslav Falico <vfalico@redhat.com> Tested-by: Veaceslav Falico <vfalico@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>

The reason for this patch is crash in kmemdup caused by returning from get_callid with uniialized matchoff and matchlen. Removing Zero check of matchlen since it's done by ct_sip_get_header() BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffff880457b5763f IP: [<ffffffff810df7fc>] kmemdup+0x2e/0x35 PGD 27f6067 PUD 0 Oops: 0000 [multipath-tcp#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: xt_state xt_helper nf_conntrack_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 ip6table_mangle xt_connmark xt_conntrack ip6_tables nf_conntrack_ftp ip_vs_ftp nf_nat xt_tcpudp iptable_mangle xt_mark ip_tables x_tables ip_vs_rr ip_vs_lblcr ip_vs_pe_sip ip_vs nf_conntrack_sip nf_conntrack bonding igb i2c_algo_bit i2c_core CPU 5 Pid: 0, comm: swapper/5 Not tainted 3.9.0-rc5+ multipath-tcp#5 /S1200KP RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810df7fc>] [<ffffffff810df7fc>] kmemdup+0x2e/0x35 RSP: 0018:ffff8803fea03648 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: ffff8803d61063e0 RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000000003 RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: ffff880457b5763f RDI: ffff8803d61063e0 RBP: ffff8803fea03658 R08: 0000000000000008 R09: 0000000000000011 R10: 0000000000000011 R11: 00ffffffff81a8a3 R12: ffff880457b5763f R13: ffff8803d67f786a R14: ffff8803fea03730 R15: ffffffffa0098e90 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8803fea00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffff880457b5763f CR3: 0000000001a0c000 CR4: 00000000001407e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Process swapper/5 (pid: 0, threadinfo ffff8803ee18c000, task ffff8803ee18a480) Stack: ffff8803d822a080 000000000000001c ffff8803fea036c8 ffffffffa000937a ffffffff81f0d8a0 000000038135fdd5 ffff880300000014 ffff880300110000 ffffffff150118ac ffff8803d7e8a000 ffff88031e0118ac 0000000000000000 Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffffa000937a>] ip_vs_sip_fill_param+0x13a/0x187 [ip_vs_pe_sip] [<ffffffffa007b209>] ip_vs_sched_persist+0x2c6/0x9c3 [ip_vs] [<ffffffff8107dc53>] ? __lock_acquire+0x677/0x1697 [<ffffffff8100972e>] ? native_sched_clock+0x3c/0x7d [<ffffffff8100972e>] ? native_sched_clock+0x3c/0x7d [<ffffffff810649bc>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x43/0xcf [<ffffffffa007bb1e>] ip_vs_schedule+0x181/0x4ba [ip_vs] ... Signed-off-by: Hans Schillstrom <hans@schillstrom.com> Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This can easily be triggered if a new CPU is added (via ACPI hotplug mechanism) and from user-space you do: echo 1 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu3/online (or wait for UDEV to do it) on a newly appeared physical CPU. The deadlock is that the "store_online" in drivers/base/cpu.c takes the cpu_hotplug_driver_lock() lock, then calls "cpu_up". "cpu_up" eventually ends up calling "save_mc_for_early" which also takes the cpu_hotplug_driver_lock() lock. And here is that lockdep thinks of it: smpboot: Stack at about ffff880075c39f44 smpboot: CPU3: has booted. microcode: CPU3 sig=0x206a7, pf=0x2, revision=0x25 ============================================= [ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ] 3.9.0upstream-10129-g167af0e multipath-tcp#1 Not tainted --------------------------------------------- sh/2487 is trying to acquire lock: (x86_cpu_hotplug_driver_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81075512>] cpu_hotplug_driver_lock+0x12/0x20 but task is already holding lock: (x86_cpu_hotplug_driver_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81075512>] cpu_hotplug_driver_lock+0x12/0x20 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(x86_cpu_hotplug_driver_mutex); lock(x86_cpu_hotplug_driver_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 6 locks held by sh/2487: #0: (sb_writers#5){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff811ca48d>] vfs_write+0x17d/0x190 multipath-tcp#1: (&buffer->mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff812464ef>] sysfs_write_file+0x3f/0x160 multipath-tcp#2: (s_active#20){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff81246578>] sysfs_write_file+0xc8/0x160 multipath-tcp#3: (x86_cpu_hotplug_driver_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81075512>] cpu_hotplug_driver_lock+0x12/0x20 multipath-tcp#4: (cpu_add_remove_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff810961c2>] cpu_maps_update_begin+0x12/0x20 multipath-tcp#5: (cpu_hotplug.lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff810962a7>] cpu_hotplug_begin+0x27/0x60 Suggested-and-Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com Cc: xen-devel@lists.xensource.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # for v3.9 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1368029583-23337-1-git-send-email-konrad.wilk@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Make sure that any open relayfs files are closed before unregistering with mac80211, otherwise this crash is seen: [ 1331.097846] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 6b6b6b8b [ 1331.098170] IP: [<c063d0d6>] debugfs_remove+0x26/0x80 [ 1331.098170] *pdpt = 000000002f9aa001 *pde = 0000000000000000 [ 1331.098170] Oops: 0000 [multipath-tcp#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 1331.098170] Modules linked in: iptable_raw xt_CT nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag] [ 1331.098170] Pid: 4794, comm: rmmod Tainted: G WC 3.9.1+ multipath-tcp#5 To Be Fi. [ 1331.098170] EIP: 0060:[<c063d0d6>] EFLAGS: 00010202 CPU: 0 [ 1331.098170] EIP is at debugfs_remove+0x26/0x80 [ 1331.098170] EAX: f2f3acd0 EBX: f2f3acd0 ECX: 00000006 EDX: f8622348 [ 1331.098170] ESI: 6b6b6b6b EDI: 00000001 EBP: ee251e14 ESP: ee251e0c [ 1331.098170] DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068 [ 1331.098170] CR0: 8005003b CR2: 6b6b6b8b CR3: 2e7b7000 CR4: 000007e0 [ 1331.098170] DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000 [ 1331.098170] DR6: ffff0ff0 DR7: 00000400 [ 1331.098170] Process rmmod (pid: 4794, ti=ee250000 task=efaa2560 task.ti=ee25) [ 1331.098170] Stack: [ 1331.098170] f241e170 0000000a ee251e1c f861394d ee251e28 c04e3088 f241e170 4 [ 1331.098170] c04e30fe f45482b0 ee251e54 c04e3187 f25e86b0 ee251e54 f8618748 0 [ 1331.098170] 0000000a 00000001 ee251e68 f860065b f2509e20 f25085a0 f5b6e8a4 8 [ 1331.098170] Call Trace: [ 1331.098170] [<f861394d>] remove_buf_file_handler+0xd/0x20 [ath9k] [ 1331.098170] [<c04e3088>] relay_remove_buf+0x18/0x30 [ 1331.098170] [<c04e30fe>] relay_close_buf+0x2e/0x40 [ 1331.098170] [<c04e3187>] relay_close+0x77/0xf0 [ 1331.098170] [<f8618748>] ? dpd_exit+0x38/0x40 [ath9k] [ 1331.098170] [<f860065b>] ath9k_deinit_softc+0x8b/0xa0 [ath9k] [ 1331.098170] [<f86006b8>] ath9k_deinit_device+0x48/0x60 [ath9k] [ 1331.098170] [<f86107f1>] ath_pci_remove+0x31/0x50 [ath9k] [ 1331.098170] [<c06dbff8>] pci_device_remove+0x38/0xc0 [ 1331.098170] [<c079daa4>] __device_release_driver+0x64/0xc0 [ 1331.098170] [<c079db97>] driver_detach+0x97/0xa0 [ 1331.098170] [<c079cacc>] bus_remove_driver+0x6c/0xe0 [ 1331.098170] [<c079c197>] ? bus_put+0x17/0x20 [ 1331.098170] [<c079cae3>] ? bus_remove_driver+0x83/0xe0 [ 1331.098170] [<c079e709>] driver_unregister+0x49/0x80 [ 1331.098170] [<c06dc138>] pci_unregister_driver+0x18/0x80 [ 1331.098170] [<f8610602>] ath_pci_exit+0x12/0x20 [ath9k] [ 1331.098170] [<f8619ce0>] ath9k_exit+0x17/0x337 [ath9k] [ 1331.098170] [<c09e537d>] ? mutex_unlock+0xd/0x10 [ 1331.098170] [<c04bd36c>] sys_delete_module+0x17c/0x250 [ 1331.098170] [<c0540dc4>] ? do_munmap+0x244/0x2d0 [ 1331.098170] [<c0540e96>] ? vm_munmap+0x46/0x60 [ 1331.098170] [<c09e8dc4>] ? restore_all+0xf/0xf [ 1331.098170] [<c09ebf50>] ? __do_page_fault+0x4c0/0x4c0 [ 1331.098170] [<c04b18e4>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0xf4/0x180 [ 1331.098170] [<c09ef28d>] sysenter_do_call+0x12/0x38 [ 1331.098170] Code: 90 8d 74 26 00 55 89 e5 83 ec 08 89 1c 24 89 74 24 04 3e 82 [ 1331.098170] EIP: [<c063d0d6>] debugfs_remove+0x26/0x80 SS:ESP 0068:ee251e0c [ 1331.098170] CR2: 000000006b6b6b8b [ 1331.727971] ---[ end trace b5bb9f2066cef7f9 ]--- Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Acked-by: Simon Wunderlich <siwu@hrz.tu-chemnitz.de> Tested-by: Ben Greear <greearb@candelatech.com> Signed-off-by: Sujith Manoharan <c_manoha@qca.qualcomm.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>

Daniel Petre reported crashes in icmp_dst_unreach() with following call graph: multipath-tcp#3 [ffff88003fc03938] __stack_chk_fail at ffffffff81037f77 multipath-tcp#4 [ffff88003fc03948] icmp_send at ffffffff814d5fec multipath-tcp#5 [ffff88003fc03ae8] ipv4_link_failure at ffffffff814a1795 multipath-tcp#6 [ffff88003fc03af8] ipgre_tunnel_xmit at ffffffff814e7965 multipath-tcp#7 [ffff88003fc03b78] dev_hard_start_xmit at ffffffff8146e032 multipath-tcp#8 [ffff88003fc03bc8] sch_direct_xmit at ffffffff81487d66 multipath-tcp#9 [ffff88003fc03c08] __qdisc_run at ffffffff81487efd multipath-tcp#10 [ffff88003fc03c48] dev_queue_xmit at ffffffff8146e5a7 multipath-tcp#11 [ffff88003fc03c88] ip_finish_output at ffffffff814ab596 Daniel found a similar problem mentioned in http://lkml.indiana.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/1007.0/00961.html And indeed this is the root cause : skb->cb[] contains data fooling IP stack. We must clear IPCB in ip_tunnel_xmit() sooner in case dst_link_failure() is called. Or else skb->cb[] might contain garbage from GSO segmentation layer. A similar fix was tested on linux-3.9, but gre code was refactored in linux-3.10. I'll send patches for stable kernels as well. Many thanks to Daniel for providing reports, patches and testing ! Reported-by: Daniel Petre <daniel.petre@rcs-rds.ro> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

In Steven Rostedt's words: > I've been debugging the last couple of days why my tests have been > locking up. One of my tracing tests, runs all available tracers. The > lockup always happened with the mmiotrace, which is used to trace > interactions between priority drivers and the kernel. But to do this > easily, when the tracer gets registered, it disables all but the boot > CPUs. The lockup always happened after it got done disabling the CPUs. > > Then I decided to try this: > > while :; do > for i in 1 2 3; do > echo 0 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu$i/online > done > for i in 1 2 3; do > echo 1 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu$i/online > done > done > > Well, sure enough, that locked up too, with the same users. Doing a > sysrq-w (showing all blocked tasks): > > [ 2991.344562] task PC stack pid father > [ 2991.344562] rcu_preempt D ffff88007986fdf8 0 10 2 0x00000000 > [ 2991.344562] ffff88007986fc98 0000000000000002 ffff88007986fc48 0000000000000908 > [ 2991.344562] ffff88007986c280 ffff88007986ffd8 ffff88007986ffd8 00000000001d3c80 > [ 2991.344562] ffff880079248a40 ffff88007986c280 0000000000000000 00000000fffd4295 > [ 2991.344562] Call Trace: > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff815437ba>] schedule+0x64/0x66 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff81541750>] schedule_timeout+0xbc/0xf9 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff8154bec0>] ? ftrace_call+0x5/0x2f > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff81049513>] ? cascade+0xa8/0xa8 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff815417ab>] schedule_timeout_uninterruptible+0x1e/0x20 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff810c980c>] rcu_gp_kthread+0x502/0x94b > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff81062791>] ? __init_waitqueue_head+0x50/0x50 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff810c930a>] ? rcu_gp_fqs+0x64/0x64 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff81061cdb>] kthread+0xb1/0xb9 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff81091e31>] ? lock_release_holdtime.part.23+0x4e/0x55 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff81061c2a>] ? __init_kthread_worker+0x58/0x58 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff8154c1dc>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff81061c2a>] ? __init_kthread_worker+0x58/0x58 > [ 2991.344562] kworker/0:1 D ffffffff81a30680 0 47 2 0x00000000 > [ 2991.344562] Workqueue: events cpuset_hotplug_workfn > [ 2991.344562] ffff880078dbbb58 0000000000000002 0000000000000006 00000000000000d8 > [ 2991.344562] ffff880078db8100 ffff880078dbbfd8 ffff880078dbbfd8 00000000001d3c80 > [ 2991.344562] ffff8800779ca5c0 ffff880078db8100 ffffffff81541fcf 0000000000000000 > [ 2991.344562] Call Trace: > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff81541fcf>] ? __mutex_lock_common+0x3d4/0x609 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff815437ba>] schedule+0x64/0x66 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff81543a39>] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x18/0x24 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff81541fcf>] __mutex_lock_common+0x3d4/0x609 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff8103d11b>] ? get_online_cpus+0x3c/0x50 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff8103d11b>] ? get_online_cpus+0x3c/0x50 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff815422ff>] mutex_lock_nested+0x3b/0x40 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff8103d11b>] get_online_cpus+0x3c/0x50 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff810af7e6>] rebuild_sched_domains_locked+0x6e/0x3a8 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff810b0ec6>] rebuild_sched_domains+0x1c/0x2a > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff810b109b>] cpuset_hotplug_workfn+0x1c7/0x1d3 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff810b0ed9>] ? cpuset_hotplug_workfn+0x5/0x1d3 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff81058e07>] process_one_work+0x2d4/0x4d1 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff81058d3a>] ? process_one_work+0x207/0x4d1 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff8105964c>] worker_thread+0x2e7/0x3b5 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff81059365>] ? rescuer_thread+0x332/0x332 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff81061cdb>] kthread+0xb1/0xb9 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff81061c2a>] ? __init_kthread_worker+0x58/0x58 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff8154c1dc>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff81061c2a>] ? __init_kthread_worker+0x58/0x58 > [ 2991.344562] bash D ffffffff81a4aa80 0 2618 2612 0x10000000 > [ 2991.344562] ffff8800379abb58 0000000000000002 0000000000000006 0000000000000c2c > [ 2991.344562] ffff880077fea140 ffff8800379abfd8 ffff8800379abfd8 00000000001d3c80 > [ 2991.344562] ffff8800779ca5c0 ffff880077fea140 ffffffff81541fcf 0000000000000000 > [ 2991.344562] Call Trace: > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff81541fcf>] ? __mutex_lock_common+0x3d4/0x609 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff815437ba>] schedule+0x64/0x66 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff81543a39>] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x18/0x24 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff81541fcf>] __mutex_lock_common+0x3d4/0x609 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff81530078>] ? rcu_cpu_notify+0x2f5/0x86e > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff81530078>] ? rcu_cpu_notify+0x2f5/0x86e > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff815422ff>] mutex_lock_nested+0x3b/0x40 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff81530078>] rcu_cpu_notify+0x2f5/0x86e > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff81091c99>] ? __lock_is_held+0x32/0x53 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff81548912>] notifier_call_chain+0x6b/0x98 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff810671fd>] __raw_notifier_call_chain+0xe/0x10 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff8103cf64>] __cpu_notify+0x20/0x32 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff8103cf8d>] cpu_notify_nofail+0x17/0x36 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff815225de>] _cpu_down+0x154/0x259 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff81522710>] cpu_down+0x2d/0x3a > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff81526351>] store_online+0x4e/0xe7 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff8134d764>] dev_attr_store+0x20/0x22 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff811b3c5f>] sysfs_write_file+0x108/0x144 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff8114c5ef>] vfs_write+0xfd/0x158 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff8114c928>] SyS_write+0x5c/0x83 > [ 2991.344562] [<ffffffff8154c494>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2 > > As well as held locks: > > [ 3034.728033] Showing all locks held in the system: > [ 3034.728033] 1 lock held by rcu_preempt/10: > [ 3034.728033] #0: (rcu_preempt_state.onoff_mutex){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff810c9471>] rcu_gp_kthread+0x167/0x94b > [ 3034.728033] 4 locks held by kworker/0:1/47: > [ 3034.728033] #0: (events){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff81058d3a>] process_one_work+0x207/0x4d1 > [ 3034.728033] multipath-tcp#1: (cpuset_hotplug_work){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81058d3a>] process_one_work+0x207/0x4d1 > [ 3034.728033] multipath-tcp#2: (cpuset_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff810b0ec1>] rebuild_sched_domains+0x17/0x2a > [ 3034.728033] multipath-tcp#3: (cpu_hotplug.lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff8103d11b>] get_online_cpus+0x3c/0x50 > [ 3034.728033] 1 lock held by mingetty/2563: > [ 3034.728033] #0: (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff8131e28a>] n_tty_read+0x252/0x7e8 > [ 3034.728033] 1 lock held by mingetty/2565: > [ 3034.728033] #0: (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff8131e28a>] n_tty_read+0x252/0x7e8 > [ 3034.728033] 1 lock held by mingetty/2569: > [ 3034.728033] #0: (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff8131e28a>] n_tty_read+0x252/0x7e8 > [ 3034.728033] 1 lock held by mingetty/2572: > [ 3034.728033] #0: (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff8131e28a>] n_tty_read+0x252/0x7e8 > [ 3034.728033] 1 lock held by mingetty/2575: > [ 3034.728033] #0: (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff8131e28a>] n_tty_read+0x252/0x7e8 > [ 3034.728033] 7 locks held by bash/2618: > [ 3034.728033] #0: (sb_writers#5){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff8114bc3f>] file_start_write+0x2a/0x2c > [ 3034.728033] multipath-tcp#1: (&buffer->mutex#2){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff811b3b93>] sysfs_write_file+0x3c/0x144 > [ 3034.728033] multipath-tcp#2: (s_active#54){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff811b3c3e>] sysfs_write_file+0xe7/0x144 > [ 3034.728033] multipath-tcp#3: (x86_cpu_hotplug_driver_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff810217c2>] cpu_hotplug_driver_lock+0x17/0x19 > [ 3034.728033] multipath-tcp#4: (cpu_add_remove_lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff8103d196>] cpu_maps_update_begin+0x17/0x19 > [ 3034.728033] multipath-tcp#5: (cpu_hotplug.lock){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff8103cfd8>] cpu_hotplug_begin+0x2c/0x6d > [ 3034.728033] multipath-tcp#6: (rcu_preempt_state.onoff_mutex){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff81530078>] rcu_cpu_notify+0x2f5/0x86e > [ 3034.728033] 1 lock held by bash/2980: > [ 3034.728033] #0: (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffff8131e28a>] n_tty_read+0x252/0x7e8 > > Things looked a little weird. Also, this is a deadlock that lockdep did > not catch. But what we have here does not look like a circular lock > issue: > > Bash is blocked in rcu_cpu_notify(): > > 1961 /* Exclude any attempts to start a new grace period. */ > 1962 mutex_lock(&rsp->onoff_mutex); > > > kworker is blocked in get_online_cpus(), which makes sense as we are > currently taking down a CPU. > > But rcu_preempt is not blocked on anything. It is simply sleeping in > rcu_gp_kthread (really rcu_gp_init) here: > > 1453 #ifdef CONFIG_PROVE_RCU_DELAY > 1454 if ((prandom_u32() % (rcu_num_nodes * 8)) == 0 && > 1455 system_state == SYSTEM_RUNNING) > 1456 schedule_timeout_uninterruptible(2); > 1457 #endif /* #ifdef CONFIG_PROVE_RCU_DELAY */ > > And it does this while holding the onoff_mutex that bash is waiting for. > > Doing a function trace, it showed me where it happened: > > [ 125.940066] rcu_pree-10 3.... 28384115273: schedule_timeout_uninterruptible <-rcu_gp_kthread > [...] > [ 125.940066] rcu_pree-10 3d..3 28384202439: sched_switch: prev_comm=rcu_preempt prev_pid=10 prev_prio=120 prev_state=D ==> next_comm=watchdog/3 next_pid=38 next_prio=120 > > The watchdog ran, and then: > > [ 125.940066] watchdog-38 3d..3 28384692863: sched_switch: prev_comm=watchdog/3 prev_pid=38 prev_prio=120 prev_state=P ==> next_comm=modprobe next_pid=2848 next_prio=118 > > Not sure what modprobe was doing, but shortly after that: > > [ 125.940066] modprobe-2848 3d..3 28385041749: sched_switch: prev_comm=modprobe prev_pid=2848 prev_prio=118 prev_state=R+ ==> next_comm=migration/3 next_pid=40 next_prio=0 > > Where the migration thread took down the CPU: > > [ 125.940066] migratio-40 3d..3 28389148276: sched_switch: prev_comm=migration/3 prev_pid=40 prev_prio=0 prev_state=P ==> next_comm=swapper/3 next_pid=0 next_prio=120 > > which finally did: > > [ 125.940066] <idle>-0 3...1 28389282142: arch_cpu_idle_dead <-cpu_startup_entry > [ 125.940066] <idle>-0 3...1 28389282548: native_play_dead <-arch_cpu_idle_dead > [ 125.940066] <idle>-0 3...1 28389282924: play_dead_common <-native_play_dead > [ 125.940066] <idle>-0 3...1 28389283468: idle_task_exit <-play_dead_common > [ 125.940066] <idle>-0 3...1 28389284644: amd_e400_remove_cpu <-play_dead_common > > > CPU 3 is now offline, the rcu_preempt thread that ran on CPU 3 is still > doing a schedule_timeout_uninterruptible() and it registered it's > timeout to the timer base for CPU 3. You would think that it would get > migrated right? The issue here is that the timer migration happens at > the CPU notifier for CPU_DEAD. The problem is that the rcu notifier for > CPU_DOWN is blocked waiting for the onoff_mutex to be released, which is > held by the thread that just put itself into a uninterruptible sleep, > that wont wake up until the CPU_DEAD notifier of the timer > infrastructure is called, which wont happen until the rcu notifier > finishes. Here's our deadlock! This commit breaks this deadlock cycle by substituting a shorter udelay() for the previous schedule_timeout_uninterruptible(), while at the same time increasing the probability of the delay. This maintains the intensity of the testing. Reported-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Tested-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>

------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 16 at net/mptcp/mptcp_ctrl.c:3604 mptcp_check_lock net/mptcp/mptcp_ctrl.c:3604 [inline] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 16 at net/mptcp/mptcp_ctrl.c:3604 mptcp_check_lock+0x97/0xa0 net/mptcp/mptcp_ctrl.c:3599 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 16 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Not tainted 5.4.211 #5 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:mptcp_check_lock net/mptcp/mptcp_ctrl.c:3604 [inline] RIP: 0010:mptcp_check_lock+0x97/0xa0 net/mptcp/mptcp_ctrl.c:3599 Code: 31 ff 89 de e8 7a 10 6b ff 85 db 75 9a e8 01 0f 6b ff 8b 9d 8c 00 00 00 31 ff 89 de e8 62 10 6b ff 85 db 75 82 e8 e9 0e 6b ff <0f> 0b e9 76 ff ff ff 66 90 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 55 48 89 fd 53 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000008bb20 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: ffff88813b115e80 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff81aafbae RDX: 0000000000000100 RSI: ffffffff81aafbb7 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: ffff88813984bf00 R08: ffff88813b115e80 R09: ffffc9000008bb18 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88813984bf00 R13: ffff888116e27680 R14: ffff888138845a00 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88813bb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000001b33523000 CR3: 0000000118624003 CR4: 0000000000160ee0 Call Trace: lock_sock_check_mptcp include/net/sock.h:1553 [inline] inet_csk_complete_hashdance+0x156/0x180 net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:1010 tcp_check_req+0x4e7/0xcd0 net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c:857 tcp_v4_rcv+0xeaa/0x15a0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1958 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x1d/0x140 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:204 ip_local_deliver_finish net/ipv4/ip_input.c:231 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:400 [inline] ip_local_deliver+0xd1/0xf0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:252 dst_input include/net/dst.h:450 [inline] ip_rcv_finish net/ipv4/ip_input.c:413 [inline] ip_rcv_finish net/ipv4/ip_input.c:399 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:400 [inline] ip_rcv+0x6e/0xa0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:523 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0xd4/0x100 net/core/dev.c:4952 __netif_receive_skb+0x27/0xa0 net/core/dev.c:5066 process_backlog+0xc4/0x180 net/core/dev.c:5901 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6347 [inline] net_rx_action+0x190/0x510 net/core/dev.c:6415 __do_softirq+0xdb/0x2d8 kernel/softirq.c:292 run_ksoftirqd kernel/softirq.c:603 [inline] run_ksoftirqd+0x15/0x20 kernel/softirq.c:595 smpboot_thread_fn+0x16a/0x250 kernel/smpboot.c:165 kthread+0x122/0x170 kernel/kthread.c:288 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352 ---[ end trace a4701875b5df21d2 ]--- The problem is that we set tp->mpc to 1 by inheriting from the meta-socket. What is wrong with that approach is that at that point we haven't yet confirmed that this socket will really be fully attached to the meta. Setting mpc to 1 should be left to mptcp_add_sock() where all the pointers,.. are initialized. Fixes: Zero-day bug Signed-off-by: Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@apple.com> Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net> (cherry picked from commit 7863d8c) Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net> (cherry picked from commit 7664e52) Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net> (cherry picked from commit df83322) Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net> (cherry picked from commit 1c6edd5) Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net>

------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 16 at net/mptcp/mptcp_ctrl.c:3604 mptcp_check_lock net/mptcp/mptcp_ctrl.c:3604 [inline] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 16 at net/mptcp/mptcp_ctrl.c:3604 mptcp_check_lock+0x97/0xa0 net/mptcp/mptcp_ctrl.c:3599 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 16 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Not tainted 5.4.211 #5 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:mptcp_check_lock net/mptcp/mptcp_ctrl.c:3604 [inline] RIP: 0010:mptcp_check_lock+0x97/0xa0 net/mptcp/mptcp_ctrl.c:3599 Code: 31 ff 89 de e8 7a 10 6b ff 85 db 75 9a e8 01 0f 6b ff 8b 9d 8c 00 00 00 31 ff 89 de e8 62 10 6b ff 85 db 75 82 e8 e9 0e 6b ff <0f> 0b e9 76 ff ff ff 66 90 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 55 48 89 fd 53 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000008bb20 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: ffff88813b115e80 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff81aafbae RDX: 0000000000000100 RSI: ffffffff81aafbb7 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: ffff88813984bf00 R08: ffff88813b115e80 R09: ffffc9000008bb18 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88813984bf00 R13: ffff888116e27680 R14: ffff888138845a00 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88813bb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000001b33523000 CR3: 0000000118624003 CR4: 0000000000160ee0 Call Trace: lock_sock_check_mptcp include/net/sock.h:1553 [inline] inet_csk_complete_hashdance+0x156/0x180 net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:1010 tcp_check_req+0x4e7/0xcd0 net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c:857 tcp_v4_rcv+0xeaa/0x15a0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1958 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x1d/0x140 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:204 ip_local_deliver_finish net/ipv4/ip_input.c:231 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:400 [inline] ip_local_deliver+0xd1/0xf0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:252 dst_input include/net/dst.h:450 [inline] ip_rcv_finish net/ipv4/ip_input.c:413 [inline] ip_rcv_finish net/ipv4/ip_input.c:399 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:400 [inline] ip_rcv+0x6e/0xa0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:523 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0xd4/0x100 net/core/dev.c:4952 __netif_receive_skb+0x27/0xa0 net/core/dev.c:5066 process_backlog+0xc4/0x180 net/core/dev.c:5901 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6347 [inline] net_rx_action+0x190/0x510 net/core/dev.c:6415 __do_softirq+0xdb/0x2d8 kernel/softirq.c:292 run_ksoftirqd kernel/softirq.c:603 [inline] run_ksoftirqd+0x15/0x20 kernel/softirq.c:595 smpboot_thread_fn+0x16a/0x250 kernel/smpboot.c:165 kthread+0x122/0x170 kernel/kthread.c:288 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352 ---[ end trace a4701875b5df21d2 ]--- The problem is that we set tp->mpc to 1 by inheriting from the meta-socket. What is wrong with that approach is that at that point we haven't yet confirmed that this socket will really be fully attached to the meta. Setting mpc to 1 should be left to mptcp_add_sock() where all the pointers,.. are initialized. Fixes: Zero-day bug Signed-off-by: Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@apple.com> Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net> (cherry picked from commit 7863d8c) Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net> (cherry picked from commit 7664e52) Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net> (cherry picked from commit df83322) Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net> (cherry picked from commit 1c6edd5) Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net> (cherry picked from commit 5cc9733) Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net>

------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 16 at net/mptcp/mptcp_ctrl.c:3604 mptcp_check_lock net/mptcp/mptcp_ctrl.c:3604 [inline] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 16 at net/mptcp/mptcp_ctrl.c:3604 mptcp_check_lock+0x97/0xa0 net/mptcp/mptcp_ctrl.c:3599 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 16 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Not tainted 5.4.211 #5 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:mptcp_check_lock net/mptcp/mptcp_ctrl.c:3604 [inline] RIP: 0010:mptcp_check_lock+0x97/0xa0 net/mptcp/mptcp_ctrl.c:3599 Code: 31 ff 89 de e8 7a 10 6b ff 85 db 75 9a e8 01 0f 6b ff 8b 9d 8c 00 00 00 31 ff 89 de e8 62 10 6b ff 85 db 75 82 e8 e9 0e 6b ff <0f> 0b e9 76 ff ff ff 66 90 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 55 48 89 fd 53 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000008bb20 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: ffff88813b115e80 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff81aafbae RDX: 0000000000000100 RSI: ffffffff81aafbb7 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: ffff88813984bf00 R08: ffff88813b115e80 R09: ffffc9000008bb18 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88813984bf00 R13: ffff888116e27680 R14: ffff888138845a00 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88813bb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000001b33523000 CR3: 0000000118624003 CR4: 0000000000160ee0 Call Trace: lock_sock_check_mptcp include/net/sock.h:1553 [inline] inet_csk_complete_hashdance+0x156/0x180 net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:1010 tcp_check_req+0x4e7/0xcd0 net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c:857 tcp_v4_rcv+0xeaa/0x15a0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1958 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x1d/0x140 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:204 ip_local_deliver_finish net/ipv4/ip_input.c:231 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:400 [inline] ip_local_deliver+0xd1/0xf0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:252 dst_input include/net/dst.h:450 [inline] ip_rcv_finish net/ipv4/ip_input.c:413 [inline] ip_rcv_finish net/ipv4/ip_input.c:399 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:400 [inline] ip_rcv+0x6e/0xa0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:523 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0xd4/0x100 net/core/dev.c:4952 __netif_receive_skb+0x27/0xa0 net/core/dev.c:5066 process_backlog+0xc4/0x180 net/core/dev.c:5901 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6347 [inline] net_rx_action+0x190/0x510 net/core/dev.c:6415 __do_softirq+0xdb/0x2d8 kernel/softirq.c:292 run_ksoftirqd kernel/softirq.c:603 [inline] run_ksoftirqd+0x15/0x20 kernel/softirq.c:595 smpboot_thread_fn+0x16a/0x250 kernel/smpboot.c:165 kthread+0x122/0x170 kernel/kthread.c:288 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352 ---[ end trace a4701875b5df21d2 ]--- The problem is that we set tp->mpc to 1 by inheriting from the meta-socket. What is wrong with that approach is that at that point we haven't yet confirmed that this socket will really be fully attached to the meta. Setting mpc to 1 should be left to mptcp_add_sock() where all the pointers,.. are initialized. Fixes: Zero-day bug Signed-off-by: Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@apple.com> Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net> (cherry picked from commit 7863d8c) Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net> (cherry picked from commit 7664e52) Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net> (cherry picked from commit df83322) Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net> (cherry picked from commit 1c6edd5) Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net> (cherry picked from commit 5cc9733) Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net> (cherry picked from commit 2b53483) Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net>

@Loose

commit 4abc99652812a2ddf932f137515d5c5a04723538 upstream. Syzkaller managed to trigger concurrent calls to kernfs_remove_by_name_ns() for the same file resulting in a KASAN detected use-after-free. The race occurs when the root node is freed during kernfs_drain(). To prevent this acquire an additional reference for the root of the tree that is removed before calling __kernfs_remove(). Found by syzkaller with the following reproducer (slab_nomerge is required): syz_mount_image$ext4(0x0, &(0x7f0000000100)='./file0\x00', 0x100000, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0) r0 = openat(0xffffffffffffff9c, &(0x7f0000000080)='/proc/self/exe\x00', 0x0, 0x0) close(r0) pipe2(&(0x7f0000000140)={0xffffffffffffffff, <r1=>0xffffffffffffffff}, 0x800) mount$9p_fd(0x0, &(0x7f0000000040)='./file0\x00', &(0x7f00000000c0), 0x408, &(0x7f0000000280)={'trans=fd,', {'rfdno', 0x3d, r0}, 0x2c, {'wfdno', 0x3d, r1}, 0x2c, {[{@cache_loose}, {@MMAP}, {@Loose}, {@Loose}, {@MMAP}], [{@Mask={'mask', 0x3d, '^MAY_EXEC'}}, {@FSMagic={'fsmagic', 0x3d, 0x10001}}, {@dont_hash}]}}) Sample report: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in kernfs_type include/linux/kernfs.h:335 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in kernfs_leftmost_descendant fs/kernfs/dir.c:1261 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __kernfs_remove.part.0+0x843/0x960 fs/kernfs/dir.c:1369 Read of size 2 at addr ffff8880088807f0 by task syz-executor.2/857 CPU: 0 PID: 857 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.0.0-rc3-00363-g7726d4c3e60b #5 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x6e/0x91 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:317 [inline] print_report.cold+0x5e/0x5e5 mm/kasan/report.c:433 kasan_report+0xa3/0x130 mm/kasan/report.c:495 kernfs_type include/linux/kernfs.h:335 [inline] kernfs_leftmost_descendant fs/kernfs/dir.c:1261 [inline] __kernfs_remove.part.0+0x843/0x960 fs/kernfs/dir.c:1369 __kernfs_remove fs/kernfs/dir.c:1356 [inline] kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x108/0x190 fs/kernfs/dir.c:1589 sysfs_slab_add+0x133/0x1e0 mm/slub.c:5943 __kmem_cache_create+0x3e0/0x550 mm/slub.c:4899 create_cache mm/slab_common.c:229 [inline] kmem_cache_create_usercopy+0x167/0x2a0 mm/slab_common.c:335 p9_client_create+0xd4d/0x1190 net/9p/client.c:993 v9fs_session_init+0x1e6/0x13c0 fs/9p/v9fs.c:408 v9fs_mount+0xb9/0xbd0 fs/9p/vfs_super.c:126 legacy_get_tree+0xf1/0x200 fs/fs_context.c:610 vfs_get_tree+0x85/0x2e0 fs/super.c:1530 do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:3040 [inline] path_mount+0x675/0x1d00 fs/namespace.c:3370 do_mount fs/namespace.c:3383 [inline] __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3591 [inline] __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3568 [inline] __x64_sys_mount+0x282/0x300 fs/namespace.c:3568 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7f725f983aed Code: 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f725f0f7028 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f725faa3f80 RCX: 00007f725f983aed RDX: 00000000200000c0 RSI: 0000000020000040 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 00007f725f9f419c R08: 0000000020000280 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000408 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000006 R14: 00007f725faa3f80 R15: 00007f725f0d7000 </TASK> Allocated by task 855: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:38 kasan_set_track mm/kasan/common.c:45 [inline] set_alloc_info mm/kasan/common.c:437 [inline] __kasan_slab_alloc+0x66/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:470 kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:224 [inline] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:727 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3243 [inline] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3251 [inline] __kmem_cache_alloc_lru mm/slub.c:3258 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc+0xbf/0x200 mm/slub.c:3268 kmem_cache_zalloc include/linux/slab.h:723 [inline] __kernfs_new_node+0xd4/0x680 fs/kernfs/dir.c:593 kernfs_new_node fs/kernfs/dir.c:655 [inline] kernfs_create_dir_ns+0x9c/0x220 fs/kernfs/dir.c:1010 sysfs_create_dir_ns+0x127/0x290 fs/sysfs/dir.c:59 create_dir lib/kobject.c:63 [inline] kobject_add_internal+0x24a/0x8d0 lib/kobject.c:223 kobject_add_varg lib/kobject.c:358 [inline] kobject_init_and_add+0x101/0x160 lib/kobject.c:441 sysfs_slab_add+0x156/0x1e0 mm/slub.c:5954 __kmem_cache_create+0x3e0/0x550 mm/slub.c:4899 create_cache mm/slab_common.c:229 [inline] kmem_cache_create_usercopy+0x167/0x2a0 mm/slab_common.c:335 p9_client_create+0xd4d/0x1190 net/9p/client.c:993 v9fs_session_init+0x1e6/0x13c0 fs/9p/v9fs.c:408 v9fs_mount+0xb9/0xbd0 fs/9p/vfs_super.c:126 legacy_get_tree+0xf1/0x200 fs/fs_context.c:610 vfs_get_tree+0x85/0x2e0 fs/super.c:1530 do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:3040 [inline] path_mount+0x675/0x1d00 fs/namespace.c:3370 do_mount fs/namespace.c:3383 [inline] __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3591 [inline] __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3568 [inline] __x64_sys_mount+0x282/0x300 fs/namespace.c:3568 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd Freed by task 857: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:38 kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:45 kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x40 mm/kasan/generic.c:370 ____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:367 [inline] ____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:329 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x108/0x190 mm/kasan/common.c:375 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:200 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1754 [inline] slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1780 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:3534 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0x9c/0x340 mm/slub.c:3551 kernfs_put.part.0+0x2b2/0x520 fs/kernfs/dir.c:547 kernfs_put+0x42/0x50 fs/kernfs/dir.c:521 __kernfs_remove.part.0+0x72d/0x960 fs/kernfs/dir.c:1407 __kernfs_remove fs/kernfs/dir.c:1356 [inline] kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x108/0x190 fs/kernfs/dir.c:1589 sysfs_slab_add+0x133/0x1e0 mm/slub.c:5943 __kmem_cache_create+0x3e0/0x550 mm/slub.c:4899 create_cache mm/slab_common.c:229 [inline] kmem_cache_create_usercopy+0x167/0x2a0 mm/slab_common.c:335 p9_client_create+0xd4d/0x1190 net/9p/client.c:993 v9fs_session_init+0x1e6/0x13c0 fs/9p/v9fs.c:408 v9fs_mount+0xb9/0xbd0 fs/9p/vfs_super.c:126 legacy_get_tree+0xf1/0x200 fs/fs_context.c:610 vfs_get_tree+0x85/0x2e0 fs/super.c:1530 do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:3040 [inline] path_mount+0x675/0x1d00 fs/namespace.c:3370 do_mount fs/namespace.c:3383 [inline] __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3591 [inline] __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3568 [inline] __x64_sys_mount+0x282/0x300 fs/namespace.c:3568 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888008880780 which belongs to the cache kernfs_node_cache of size 128 The buggy address is located 112 bytes inside of 128-byte region [ffff888008880780, ffff888008880800) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:00000000732833f8 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x8880 flags: 0x100000000000200(slab|node=0|zone=1) raw: 0100000000000200 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 ffff888001147280 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000150015 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888008880680: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff888008880700: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc >ffff888008880780: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff888008880800: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff888008880880: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ================================================================== Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org> # -rc3 Signed-off-by: Christian A. Ehrhardt <lk@c--e.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220913121723.691454-1-lk@c--e.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

@Loose

commit 4abc99652812a2ddf932f137515d5c5a04723538 upstream. Syzkaller managed to trigger concurrent calls to kernfs_remove_by_name_ns() for the same file resulting in a KASAN detected use-after-free. The race occurs when the root node is freed during kernfs_drain(). To prevent this acquire an additional reference for the root of the tree that is removed before calling __kernfs_remove(). Found by syzkaller with the following reproducer (slab_nomerge is required): syz_mount_image$ext4(0x0, &(0x7f0000000100)='./file0\x00', 0x100000, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0) r0 = openat(0xffffffffffffff9c, &(0x7f0000000080)='/proc/self/exe\x00', 0x0, 0x0) close(r0) pipe2(&(0x7f0000000140)={0xffffffffffffffff, <r1=>0xffffffffffffffff}, 0x800) mount$9p_fd(0x0, &(0x7f0000000040)='./file0\x00', &(0x7f00000000c0), 0x408, &(0x7f0000000280)={'trans=fd,', {'rfdno', 0x3d, r0}, 0x2c, {'wfdno', 0x3d, r1}, 0x2c, {[{@cache_loose}, {@MMAP}, {@Loose}, {@Loose}, {@MMAP}], [{@Mask={'mask', 0x3d, '^MAY_EXEC'}}, {@FSMagic={'fsmagic', 0x3d, 0x10001}}, {@dont_hash}]}}) Sample report: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in kernfs_type include/linux/kernfs.h:335 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in kernfs_leftmost_descendant fs/kernfs/dir.c:1261 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __kernfs_remove.part.0+0x843/0x960 fs/kernfs/dir.c:1369 Read of size 2 at addr ffff8880088807f0 by task syz-executor.2/857 CPU: 0 PID: 857 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.0.0-rc3-00363-g7726d4c3e60b #5 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x6e/0x91 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:317 [inline] print_report.cold+0x5e/0x5e5 mm/kasan/report.c:433 kasan_report+0xa3/0x130 mm/kasan/report.c:495 kernfs_type include/linux/kernfs.h:335 [inline] kernfs_leftmost_descendant fs/kernfs/dir.c:1261 [inline] __kernfs_remove.part.0+0x843/0x960 fs/kernfs/dir.c:1369 __kernfs_remove fs/kernfs/dir.c:1356 [inline] kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x108/0x190 fs/kernfs/dir.c:1589 sysfs_slab_add+0x133/0x1e0 mm/slub.c:5943 __kmem_cache_create+0x3e0/0x550 mm/slub.c:4899 create_cache mm/slab_common.c:229 [inline] kmem_cache_create_usercopy+0x167/0x2a0 mm/slab_common.c:335 p9_client_create+0xd4d/0x1190 net/9p/client.c:993 v9fs_session_init+0x1e6/0x13c0 fs/9p/v9fs.c:408 v9fs_mount+0xb9/0xbd0 fs/9p/vfs_super.c:126 legacy_get_tree+0xf1/0x200 fs/fs_context.c:610 vfs_get_tree+0x85/0x2e0 fs/super.c:1530 do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:3040 [inline] path_mount+0x675/0x1d00 fs/namespace.c:3370 do_mount fs/namespace.c:3383 [inline] __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3591 [inline] __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3568 [inline] __x64_sys_mount+0x282/0x300 fs/namespace.c:3568 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7f725f983aed Code: 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f725f0f7028 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f725faa3f80 RCX: 00007f725f983aed RDX: 00000000200000c0 RSI: 0000000020000040 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 00007f725f9f419c R08: 0000000020000280 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000408 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000006 R14: 00007f725faa3f80 R15: 00007f725f0d7000 </TASK> Allocated by task 855: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:38 kasan_set_track mm/kasan/common.c:45 [inline] set_alloc_info mm/kasan/common.c:437 [inline] __kasan_slab_alloc+0x66/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:470 kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:224 [inline] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:727 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3243 [inline] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3251 [inline] __kmem_cache_alloc_lru mm/slub.c:3258 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc+0xbf/0x200 mm/slub.c:3268 kmem_cache_zalloc include/linux/slab.h:723 [inline] __kernfs_new_node+0xd4/0x680 fs/kernfs/dir.c:593 kernfs_new_node fs/kernfs/dir.c:655 [inline] kernfs_create_dir_ns+0x9c/0x220 fs/kernfs/dir.c:1010 sysfs_create_dir_ns+0x127/0x290 fs/sysfs/dir.c:59 create_dir lib/kobject.c:63 [inline] kobject_add_internal+0x24a/0x8d0 lib/kobject.c:223 kobject_add_varg lib/kobject.c:358 [inline] kobject_init_and_add+0x101/0x160 lib/kobject.c:441 sysfs_slab_add+0x156/0x1e0 mm/slub.c:5954 __kmem_cache_create+0x3e0/0x550 mm/slub.c:4899 create_cache mm/slab_common.c:229 [inline] kmem_cache_create_usercopy+0x167/0x2a0 mm/slab_common.c:335 p9_client_create+0xd4d/0x1190 net/9p/client.c:993 v9fs_session_init+0x1e6/0x13c0 fs/9p/v9fs.c:408 v9fs_mount+0xb9/0xbd0 fs/9p/vfs_super.c:126 legacy_get_tree+0xf1/0x200 fs/fs_context.c:610 vfs_get_tree+0x85/0x2e0 fs/super.c:1530 do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:3040 [inline] path_mount+0x675/0x1d00 fs/namespace.c:3370 do_mount fs/namespace.c:3383 [inline] __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3591 [inline] __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3568 [inline] __x64_sys_mount+0x282/0x300 fs/namespace.c:3568 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd Freed by task 857: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:38 kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:45 kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x40 mm/kasan/generic.c:370 ____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:367 [inline] ____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:329 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x108/0x190 mm/kasan/common.c:375 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:200 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1754 [inline] slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1780 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:3534 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0x9c/0x340 mm/slub.c:3551 kernfs_put.part.0+0x2b2/0x520 fs/kernfs/dir.c:547 kernfs_put+0x42/0x50 fs/kernfs/dir.c:521 __kernfs_remove.part.0+0x72d/0x960 fs/kernfs/dir.c:1407 __kernfs_remove fs/kernfs/dir.c:1356 [inline] kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x108/0x190 fs/kernfs/dir.c:1589 sysfs_slab_add+0x133/0x1e0 mm/slub.c:5943 __kmem_cache_create+0x3e0/0x550 mm/slub.c:4899 create_cache mm/slab_common.c:229 [inline] kmem_cache_create_usercopy+0x167/0x2a0 mm/slab_common.c:335 p9_client_create+0xd4d/0x1190 net/9p/client.c:993 v9fs_session_init+0x1e6/0x13c0 fs/9p/v9fs.c:408 v9fs_mount+0xb9/0xbd0 fs/9p/vfs_super.c:126 legacy_get_tree+0xf1/0x200 fs/fs_context.c:610 vfs_get_tree+0x85/0x2e0 fs/super.c:1530 do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:3040 [inline] path_mount+0x675/0x1d00 fs/namespace.c:3370 do_mount fs/namespace.c:3383 [inline] __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3591 [inline] __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3568 [inline] __x64_sys_mount+0x282/0x300 fs/namespace.c:3568 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888008880780 which belongs to the cache kernfs_node_cache of size 128 The buggy address is located 112 bytes inside of 128-byte region [ffff888008880780, ffff888008880800) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:00000000732833f8 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x8880 flags: 0x100000000000200(slab|node=0|zone=1) raw: 0100000000000200 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 ffff888001147280 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000150015 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888008880680: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff888008880700: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc >ffff888008880780: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff888008880800: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff888008880880: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ================================================================== Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org> # -rc3 Signed-off-by: Christian A. Ehrhardt <lk@c--e.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220913121723.691454-1-lk@c--e.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 1b513f613731e2afc05550e8070d79fac80c661e upstream. Syzkaller reported BUG_ON as follows: ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/ntfs/dir.c:86! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI CPU: 3 PID: 758 Comm: a.out Not tainted 5.19.0-next-20220808 #5 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:ntfs_lookup_inode_by_name+0xd11/0x2d10 Code: ff e9 b9 01 00 00 e8 1e fe d6 fe 48 8b 7d 98 49 8d 5d 07 e8 91 85 29 ff 48 c7 45 98 00 00 00 00 e9 5a fb ff ff e8 ff fd d6 fe <0f> 0b e8 f8 fd d6 fe 0f 0b e8 f1 fd d6 fe 48 8b b5 50 ff ff ff 4c RSP: 0018:ffff888079607978 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000008000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff88807cf10000 RSI: ffffffff82a4a081 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: ffff888079607a70 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff88807a6d01d7 R10: ffffed100f4da03a R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88800f0fb110 R13: ffff88800f0ee000 R14: ffff88800f0fb000 R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 00007f33b63c7540(0000) GS:ffff888108580000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f33b635c090 CR3: 000000000f39e005 CR4: 0000000000770ee0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> load_system_files+0x1f7f/0x3620 ntfs_fill_super+0xa01/0x1be0 mount_bdev+0x36a/0x440 ntfs_mount+0x3a/0x50 legacy_get_tree+0xfb/0x210 vfs_get_tree+0x8f/0x2f0 do_new_mount+0x30a/0x760 path_mount+0x4de/0x1880 __x64_sys_mount+0x2b3/0x340 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7f33b62ff9ea Code: 48 8b 0d a9 f4 0b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 76 f4 0b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffd0c471aa8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f33b62ff9ea RDX: 0000000020000000 RSI: 0000000020000100 RDI: 00007ffd0c471be0 RBP: 00007ffd0c471c60 R08: 00007ffd0c471ae0 R09: 00007ffd0c471c24 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 000055bac5afc160 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> Modules linked in: ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Fix this by adding sanity check on extended system files' directory inode to ensure that it is directory, just like ntfs_extend_init() when mounting ntfs3. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220809064730.2316892-1-chenxiaosong2@huawei.com Signed-off-by: ChenXiaoSong <chenxiaosong2@huawei.com> Cc: Anton Altaparmakov <anton@tuxera.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 2b1299322016731d56807aa49254a5ea3080b6b3 upstream. tl;dr: The Enhanced IBRS mitigation for Spectre v2 does not work as documented for RET instructions after VM exits. Mitigate it with a new one-entry RSB stuffing mechanism and a new LFENCE. == Background == Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS) was designed to help mitigate Branch Target Injection and Speculative Store Bypass, i.e. Spectre, attacks. IBRS prevents software run in less privileged modes from affecting branch prediction in more privileged modes. IBRS requires the MSR to be written on every privilege level change. To overcome some of the performance issues of IBRS, Enhanced IBRS was introduced. eIBRS is an "always on" IBRS, in other words, just turn it on once instead of writing the MSR on every privilege level change. When eIBRS is enabled, more privileged modes should be protected from less privileged modes, including protecting VMMs from guests. == Problem == Here's a simplification of how guests are run on Linux' KVM: void run_kvm_guest(void) { // Prepare to run guest VMRESUME(); // Clean up after guest runs } The execution flow for that would look something like this to the processor: 1. Host-side: call run_kvm_guest() 2. Host-side: VMRESUME 3. Guest runs, does "CALL guest_function" 4. VM exit, host runs again 5. Host might make some "cleanup" function calls 6. Host-side: RET from run_kvm_guest() Now, when back on the host, there are a couple of possible scenarios of post-guest activity the host needs to do before executing host code: * on pre-eIBRS hardware (legacy IBRS, or nothing at all), the RSB is not touched and Linux has to do a 32-entry stuffing. * on eIBRS hardware, VM exit with IBRS enabled, or restoring the host IBRS=1 shortly after VM exit, has a documented side effect of flushing the RSB except in this PBRSB situation where the software needs to stuff the last RSB entry "by hand". IOW, with eIBRS supported, host RET instructions should no longer be influenced by guest behavior after the host retires a single CALL instruction. However, if the RET instructions are "unbalanced" with CALLs after a VM exit as is the RET in #6, it might speculatively use the address for the instruction after the CALL in #3 as an RSB prediction. This is a problem since the (untrusted) guest controls this address. Balanced CALL/RET instruction pairs such as in step #5 are not affected. == Solution == The PBRSB issue affects a wide variety of Intel processors which support eIBRS. But not all of them need mitigation. Today, X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT triggers an RSB filling sequence that mitigates PBRSB. Systems setting RSB_VMEXIT need no further mitigation - i.e., eIBRS systems which enable legacy IBRS explicitly. However, such systems (X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED) do not set RSB_VMEXIT and most of them need a new mitigation. Therefore, introduce a new feature flag X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE which triggers a lighter-weight PBRSB mitigation versus RSB_VMEXIT. The lighter-weight mitigation performs a CALL instruction which is immediately followed by a speculative execution barrier (INT3). This steers speculative execution to the barrier -- just like a retpoline -- which ensures that speculation can never reach an unbalanced RET. Then, ensure this CALL is retired before continuing execution with an LFENCE. In other words, the window of exposure is opened at VM exit where RET behavior is troublesome. While the window is open, force RSB predictions sampling for RET targets to a dead end at the INT3. Close the window with the LFENCE. There is a subset of eIBRS systems which are not vulnerable to PBRSB. Add these systems to the cpu_vuln_whitelist[] as NO_EIBRS_PBRSB. Future systems that aren't vulnerable will set ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO. [ bp: Massage, incorporate review comments from Andy Cooper. ] Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> Co-developed-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> [ bp: Adjust patch to account for kvm entry being in c ] Signed-off-by: Suraj Jitindar Singh <surajjs@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

@Loose

commit 4abc99652812a2ddf932f137515d5c5a04723538 upstream. Syzkaller managed to trigger concurrent calls to kernfs_remove_by_name_ns() for the same file resulting in a KASAN detected use-after-free. The race occurs when the root node is freed during kernfs_drain(). To prevent this acquire an additional reference for the root of the tree that is removed before calling __kernfs_remove(). Found by syzkaller with the following reproducer (slab_nomerge is required): syz_mount_image$ext4(0x0, &(0x7f0000000100)='./file0\x00', 0x100000, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0) r0 = openat(0xffffffffffffff9c, &(0x7f0000000080)='/proc/self/exe\x00', 0x0, 0x0) close(r0) pipe2(&(0x7f0000000140)={0xffffffffffffffff, <r1=>0xffffffffffffffff}, 0x800) mount$9p_fd(0x0, &(0x7f0000000040)='./file0\x00', &(0x7f00000000c0), 0x408, &(0x7f0000000280)={'trans=fd,', {'rfdno', 0x3d, r0}, 0x2c, {'wfdno', 0x3d, r1}, 0x2c, {[{@cache_loose}, {@MMAP}, {@Loose}, {@Loose}, {@MMAP}], [{@Mask={'mask', 0x3d, '^MAY_EXEC'}}, {@FSMagic={'fsmagic', 0x3d, 0x10001}}, {@dont_hash}]}}) Sample report: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in kernfs_type include/linux/kernfs.h:335 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in kernfs_leftmost_descendant fs/kernfs/dir.c:1261 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __kernfs_remove.part.0+0x843/0x960 fs/kernfs/dir.c:1369 Read of size 2 at addr ffff8880088807f0 by task syz-executor.2/857 CPU: 0 PID: 857 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.0.0-rc3-00363-g7726d4c3e60b #5 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x6e/0x91 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:317 [inline] print_report.cold+0x5e/0x5e5 mm/kasan/report.c:433 kasan_report+0xa3/0x130 mm/kasan/report.c:495 kernfs_type include/linux/kernfs.h:335 [inline] kernfs_leftmost_descendant fs/kernfs/dir.c:1261 [inline] __kernfs_remove.part.0+0x843/0x960 fs/kernfs/dir.c:1369 __kernfs_remove fs/kernfs/dir.c:1356 [inline] kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x108/0x190 fs/kernfs/dir.c:1589 sysfs_slab_add+0x133/0x1e0 mm/slub.c:5943 __kmem_cache_create+0x3e0/0x550 mm/slub.c:4899 create_cache mm/slab_common.c:229 [inline] kmem_cache_create_usercopy+0x167/0x2a0 mm/slab_common.c:335 p9_client_create+0xd4d/0x1190 net/9p/client.c:993 v9fs_session_init+0x1e6/0x13c0 fs/9p/v9fs.c:408 v9fs_mount+0xb9/0xbd0 fs/9p/vfs_super.c:126 legacy_get_tree+0xf1/0x200 fs/fs_context.c:610 vfs_get_tree+0x85/0x2e0 fs/super.c:1530 do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:3040 [inline] path_mount+0x675/0x1d00 fs/namespace.c:3370 do_mount fs/namespace.c:3383 [inline] __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3591 [inline] __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3568 [inline] __x64_sys_mount+0x282/0x300 fs/namespace.c:3568 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7f725f983aed Code: 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f725f0f7028 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f725faa3f80 RCX: 00007f725f983aed RDX: 00000000200000c0 RSI: 0000000020000040 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 00007f725f9f419c R08: 0000000020000280 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000408 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000006 R14: 00007f725faa3f80 R15: 00007f725f0d7000 </TASK> Allocated by task 855: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:38 kasan_set_track mm/kasan/common.c:45 [inline] set_alloc_info mm/kasan/common.c:437 [inline] __kasan_slab_alloc+0x66/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:470 kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:224 [inline] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:727 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3243 [inline] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3251 [inline] __kmem_cache_alloc_lru mm/slub.c:3258 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc+0xbf/0x200 mm/slub.c:3268 kmem_cache_zalloc include/linux/slab.h:723 [inline] __kernfs_new_node+0xd4/0x680 fs/kernfs/dir.c:593 kernfs_new_node fs/kernfs/dir.c:655 [inline] kernfs_create_dir_ns+0x9c/0x220 fs/kernfs/dir.c:1010 sysfs_create_dir_ns+0x127/0x290 fs/sysfs/dir.c:59 create_dir lib/kobject.c:63 [inline] kobject_add_internal+0x24a/0x8d0 lib/kobject.c:223 kobject_add_varg lib/kobject.c:358 [inline] kobject_init_and_add+0x101/0x160 lib/kobject.c:441 sysfs_slab_add+0x156/0x1e0 mm/slub.c:5954 __kmem_cache_create+0x3e0/0x550 mm/slub.c:4899 create_cache mm/slab_common.c:229 [inline] kmem_cache_create_usercopy+0x167/0x2a0 mm/slab_common.c:335 p9_client_create+0xd4d/0x1190 net/9p/client.c:993 v9fs_session_init+0x1e6/0x13c0 fs/9p/v9fs.c:408 v9fs_mount+0xb9/0xbd0 fs/9p/vfs_super.c:126 legacy_get_tree+0xf1/0x200 fs/fs_context.c:610 vfs_get_tree+0x85/0x2e0 fs/super.c:1530 do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:3040 [inline] path_mount+0x675/0x1d00 fs/namespace.c:3370 do_mount fs/namespace.c:3383 [inline] __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3591 [inline] __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3568 [inline] __x64_sys_mount+0x282/0x300 fs/namespace.c:3568 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd Freed by task 857: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:38 kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:45 kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x40 mm/kasan/generic.c:370 ____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:367 [inline] ____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:329 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x108/0x190 mm/kasan/common.c:375 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:200 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1754 [inline] slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1780 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:3534 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0x9c/0x340 mm/slub.c:3551 kernfs_put.part.0+0x2b2/0x520 fs/kernfs/dir.c:547 kernfs_put+0x42/0x50 fs/kernfs/dir.c:521 __kernfs_remove.part.0+0x72d/0x960 fs/kernfs/dir.c:1407 __kernfs_remove fs/kernfs/dir.c:1356 [inline] kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x108/0x190 fs/kernfs/dir.c:1589 sysfs_slab_add+0x133/0x1e0 mm/slub.c:5943 __kmem_cache_create+0x3e0/0x550 mm/slub.c:4899 create_cache mm/slab_common.c:229 [inline] kmem_cache_create_usercopy+0x167/0x2a0 mm/slab_common.c:335 p9_client_create+0xd4d/0x1190 net/9p/client.c:993 v9fs_session_init+0x1e6/0x13c0 fs/9p/v9fs.c:408 v9fs_mount+0xb9/0xbd0 fs/9p/vfs_super.c:126 legacy_get_tree+0xf1/0x200 fs/fs_context.c:610 vfs_get_tree+0x85/0x2e0 fs/super.c:1530 do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:3040 [inline] path_mount+0x675/0x1d00 fs/namespace.c:3370 do_mount fs/namespace.c:3383 [inline] __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3591 [inline] __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3568 [inline] __x64_sys_mount+0x282/0x300 fs/namespace.c:3568 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888008880780 which belongs to the cache kernfs_node_cache of size 128 The buggy address is located 112 bytes inside of 128-byte region [ffff888008880780, ffff888008880800) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:00000000732833f8 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x8880 flags: 0x100000000000200(slab|node=0|zone=1) raw: 0100000000000200 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 ffff888001147280 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000150015 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888008880680: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff888008880700: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc >ffff888008880780: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff888008880800: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff888008880880: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ================================================================== Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org> # -rc3 Signed-off-by: Christian A. Ehrhardt <lk@c--e.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220913121723.691454-1-lk@c--e.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 9b2f20344d450137d015b380ff0c2e2a6a170135 upstream. The btrfs_alloc_dummy_root() uses ERR_PTR as the error return value rather than NULL, if error happened, there will be a NULL pointer dereference: BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in btrfs_free_dummy_root+0x21/0x50 [btrfs] Read of size 8 at addr 000000000000002c by task insmod/258926 CPU: 2 PID: 258926 Comm: insmod Tainted: G W 6.1.0-rc2+ #5 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-1.fc33 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x44 kasan_report+0xb7/0x140 kasan_check_range+0x145/0x1a0 btrfs_free_dummy_root+0x21/0x50 [btrfs] btrfs_test_free_space_cache+0x1a8c/0x1add [btrfs] btrfs_run_sanity_tests+0x65/0x80 [btrfs] init_btrfs_fs+0xec/0x154 [btrfs] do_one_initcall+0x87/0x2a0 do_init_module+0xdf/0x320 load_module+0x3006/0x3390 __do_sys_finit_module+0x113/0x1b0 do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 Fixes: aaedb55 ("Btrfs: add tests for btrfs_get_extent") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9+ Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 2b1299322016731d56807aa49254a5ea3080b6b3 upstream. tl;dr: The Enhanced IBRS mitigation for Spectre v2 does not work as documented for RET instructions after VM exits. Mitigate it with a new one-entry RSB stuffing mechanism and a new LFENCE. == Background == Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS) was designed to help mitigate Branch Target Injection and Speculative Store Bypass, i.e. Spectre, attacks. IBRS prevents software run in less privileged modes from affecting branch prediction in more privileged modes. IBRS requires the MSR to be written on every privilege level change. To overcome some of the performance issues of IBRS, Enhanced IBRS was introduced. eIBRS is an "always on" IBRS, in other words, just turn it on once instead of writing the MSR on every privilege level change. When eIBRS is enabled, more privileged modes should be protected from less privileged modes, including protecting VMMs from guests. == Problem == Here's a simplification of how guests are run on Linux' KVM: void run_kvm_guest(void) { // Prepare to run guest VMRESUME(); // Clean up after guest runs } The execution flow for that would look something like this to the processor: 1. Host-side: call run_kvm_guest() 2. Host-side: VMRESUME 3. Guest runs, does "CALL guest_function" 4. VM exit, host runs again 5. Host might make some "cleanup" function calls 6. Host-side: RET from run_kvm_guest() Now, when back on the host, there are a couple of possible scenarios of post-guest activity the host needs to do before executing host code: * on pre-eIBRS hardware (legacy IBRS, or nothing at all), the RSB is not touched and Linux has to do a 32-entry stuffing. * on eIBRS hardware, VM exit with IBRS enabled, or restoring the host IBRS=1 shortly after VM exit, has a documented side effect of flushing the RSB except in this PBRSB situation where the software needs to stuff the last RSB entry "by hand". IOW, with eIBRS supported, host RET instructions should no longer be influenced by guest behavior after the host retires a single CALL instruction. However, if the RET instructions are "unbalanced" with CALLs after a VM exit as is the RET in #6, it might speculatively use the address for the instruction after the CALL in #3 as an RSB prediction. This is a problem since the (untrusted) guest controls this address. Balanced CALL/RET instruction pairs such as in step #5 are not affected. == Solution == The PBRSB issue affects a wide variety of Intel processors which support eIBRS. But not all of them need mitigation. Today, X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT triggers an RSB filling sequence that mitigates PBRSB. Systems setting RSB_VMEXIT need no further mitigation - i.e., eIBRS systems which enable legacy IBRS explicitly. However, such systems (X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED) do not set RSB_VMEXIT and most of them need a new mitigation. Therefore, introduce a new feature flag X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE which triggers a lighter-weight PBRSB mitigation versus RSB_VMEXIT. The lighter-weight mitigation performs a CALL instruction which is immediately followed by a speculative execution barrier (INT3). This steers speculative execution to the barrier -- just like a retpoline -- which ensures that speculation can never reach an unbalanced RET. Then, ensure this CALL is retired before continuing execution with an LFENCE. In other words, the window of exposure is opened at VM exit where RET behavior is troublesome. While the window is open, force RSB predictions sampling for RET targets to a dead end at the INT3. Close the window with the LFENCE. There is a subset of eIBRS systems which are not vulnerable to PBRSB. Add these systems to the cpu_vuln_whitelist[] as NO_EIBRS_PBRSB. Future systems that aren't vulnerable will set ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO. [ bp: Massage, incorporate review comments from Andy Cooper. ] Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> Co-developed-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> [ bp: Adjust patch to account for kvm entry being in c ] Signed-off-by: Suraj Jitindar Singh <surajjs@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: Suleiman Souhlal <suleiman@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 9b2f20344d450137d015b380ff0c2e2a6a170135 upstream. The btrfs_alloc_dummy_root() uses ERR_PTR as the error return value rather than NULL, if error happened, there will be a NULL pointer dereference: BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in btrfs_free_dummy_root+0x21/0x50 [btrfs] Read of size 8 at addr 000000000000002c by task insmod/258926 CPU: 2 PID: 258926 Comm: insmod Tainted: G W 6.1.0-rc2+ #5 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-1.fc33 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x44 kasan_report+0xb7/0x140 kasan_check_range+0x145/0x1a0 btrfs_free_dummy_root+0x21/0x50 [btrfs] btrfs_test_free_space_cache+0x1a8c/0x1add [btrfs] btrfs_run_sanity_tests+0x65/0x80 [btrfs] init_btrfs_fs+0xec/0x154 [btrfs] do_one_initcall+0x87/0x2a0 do_init_module+0xdf/0x320 load_module+0x3006/0x3390 __do_sys_finit_module+0x113/0x1b0 do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 Fixes: aaedb55 ("Btrfs: add tests for btrfs_get_extent") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9+ Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 0473cbae2137b963bd0eaa74336131cb1d3bc6c3 ] We see kernel crashes and lockups and KASAN errors related to ax210 firmware crashes. One of the KASAN dumps pointed at the tx path, and it appears there is indeed a way to double-free an skb. If iwl_mvm_tx_skb_sta returns non-zero, then the 'skb' sent into the method will be freed. But, in case where we build TSO skb buffer, the skb may also be freed in error case. So, return 0 in that particular error case and do cleanup manually. BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __list_del_entry_valid+0x12/0x90 iwlwifi 0000:06:00.0: 0x00000000 | tsf hi Read of size 8 at addr ffff88813cfa4ba0 by task btserver/9650 CPU: 4 PID: 9650 Comm: btserver Tainted: G W 5.19.8+ #5 iwlwifi 0000:06:00.0: 0x00000000 | time gp1 Hardware name: Default string Default string/SKYBAY, BIOS 5.12 02/19/2019 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x55/0x6d print_report.cold.12+0xf2/0x684 iwlwifi 0000:06:00.0: 0x1D0915A8 | time gp2 ? __list_del_entry_valid+0x12/0x90 kasan_report+0x8b/0x180 iwlwifi 0000:06:00.0: 0x00000001 | uCode revision type ? __list_del_entry_valid+0x12/0x90 __list_del_entry_valid+0x12/0x90 iwlwifi 0000:06:00.0: 0x00000048 | uCode version major tcp_update_skb_after_send+0x5d/0x170 __tcp_transmit_skb+0xb61/0x15c0 iwlwifi 0000:06:00.0: 0xDAA05125 | uCode version minor ? __tcp_select_window+0x490/0x490 iwlwifi 0000:06:00.0: 0x00000420 | hw version ? trace_kmalloc_node+0x29/0xd0 ? __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x12a/0x260 ? memset+0x1f/0x40 ? __build_skb_around+0x125/0x150 ? __alloc_skb+0x1d4/0x220 ? skb_zerocopy_clone+0x55/0x230 iwlwifi 0000:06:00.0: 0x00489002 | board version ? kmalloc_reserve+0x80/0x80 ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0x60/0xb0 tcp_write_xmit+0x3f1/0x24d0 iwlwifi 0000:06:00.0: 0x034E001C | hcmd ? __check_object_size+0x180/0x350 iwlwifi 0000:06:00.0: 0x24020000 | isr0 tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x8a9/0x1520 iwlwifi 0000:06:00.0: 0x01400000 | isr1 ? tcp_sendpage+0x50/0x50 iwlwifi 0000:06:00.0: 0x48F0000A | isr2 ? lock_release+0xb9/0x400 ? tcp_sendmsg+0x14/0x40 iwlwifi 0000:06:00.0: 0x00C3080C | isr3 ? lock_downgrade+0x390/0x390 ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x114/0x1d0 iwlwifi 0000:06:00.0: 0x00200000 | isr4 ? rwlock_bug.part.2+0x50/0x50 iwlwifi 0000:06:00.0: 0x034A001C | last cmd Id ? rwlock_bug.part.2+0x50/0x50 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xe/0x200 iwlwifi 0000:06:00.0: 0x0000C2F0 | wait_event ? __local_bh_enable_ip+0x87/0xe0 ? inet_send_prepare+0x220/0x220 iwlwifi 0000:06:00.0: 0x000000C4 | l2p_control tcp_sendmsg+0x22/0x40 sock_sendmsg+0x5f/0x70 iwlwifi 0000:06:00.0: 0x00010034 | l2p_duration __sys_sendto+0x19d/0x250 iwlwifi 0000:06:00.0: 0x00000007 | l2p_mhvalid ? __ia32_sys_getpeername+0x40/0x40 iwlwifi 0000:06:00.0: 0x00000000 | l2p_addr_match ? rcu_read_lock_held_common+0x12/0x50 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x5a/0xd0 ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0xb0/0xb0 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x5a/0xd0 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x5a/0xd0 ? lock_release+0xb9/0x400 ? lock_downgrade+0x390/0x390 ? ktime_get+0x64/0x130 ? ktime_get+0x8d/0x130 ? rcu_read_lock_held_common+0x12/0x50 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x5a/0xd0 ? rcu_read_lock_held_common+0x12/0x50 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x5a/0xd0 ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0xb0/0xb0 ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0xb0/0xb0 __x64_sys_sendto+0x6f/0x80 do_syscall_64+0x34/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 RIP: 0033:0x7f1d126e4531 Code: 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 8d 05 35 80 0c 00 41 89 ca 8b 00 85 c0 75 1c 45 31 c9 45 31 c0 b8 2c 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 67 c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 83 ec 20 48 89 RSP: 002b:00007ffe21a679d8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000ffdc RCX: 00007f1d126e4531 RDX: 0000000000010000 RSI: 000000000374acf0 RDI: 0000000000000014 RBP: 00007ffe21a67ac0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000010 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> Allocated by task 9650: kasan_save_stack+0x1c/0x40 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x6d/0x90 kmem_cache_alloc_node+0xf3/0x2b0 __alloc_skb+0x191/0x220 tcp_stream_alloc_skb+0x3f/0x330 tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x67c/0x1520 tcp_sendmsg+0x22/0x40 sock_sendmsg+0x5f/0x70 __sys_sendto+0x19d/0x250 __x64_sys_sendto+0x6f/0x80 do_syscall_64+0x34/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 Freed by task 9650: kasan_save_stack+0x1c/0x40 kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30 __kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x170 kmem_cache_free+0xc8/0x3e0 iwl_mvm_mac_itxq_xmit+0x124/0x270 [iwlmvm] ieee80211_queue_skb+0x874/0xd10 [mac80211] ieee80211_xmit_fast+0xf80/0x1180 [mac80211] __ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0x287/0x680 [mac80211] ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0xcd/0x730 [mac80211] dev_hard_start_xmit+0xf6/0x420 __dev_queue_xmit+0x165b/0x1b50 ip_finish_output2+0x66e/0xfb0 __ip_finish_output+0x487/0x6d0 ip_output+0x11c/0x350 __ip_queue_xmit+0x36b/0x9d0 __tcp_transmit_skb+0xb35/0x15c0 tcp_write_xmit+0x3f1/0x24d0 tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x8a9/0x1520 tcp_sendmsg+0x22/0x40 sock_sendmsg+0x5f/0x70 __sys_sendto+0x19d/0x250 __x64_sys_sendto+0x6f/0x80 do_syscall_64+0x34/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88813cfa4b40 which belongs to the cache skbuff_fclone_cache of size 472 The buggy address is located 96 bytes inside of 472-byte region [ffff88813cfa4b40, ffff88813cfa4d18) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:ffffea0004f3e900 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff88813cfa6c40 pfn:0x13cfa4 head:ffffea0004f3e900 order:2 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 flags: 0x5fff8000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x3fff) raw: 005fff8000010200 ffffea0004656b08 ffffea0008e8cf08 ffff8881081a5240 raw: ffff88813cfa6c40 0000000000170015 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88813cfa4a80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff88813cfa4b00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb >ffff88813cfa4b80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff88813cfa4c00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff88813cfa4c80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== Fixes: 08f7d8b ("iwlwifi: mvm: bring back mvm GSO code") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-wireless/20220928193057.16132-1-greearb@candelatech.com/ Tested-by: Amol Jawale <amol.jawale@candelatech.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Greear <greearb@candelatech.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221123225313.21b1ee31d666.I3b3ba184433dd2a544d91eeeda29b467021824ae@changeid Signed-off-by: Gregory Greenman <gregory.greenman@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

…g the sock [ Upstream commit 3cf7203ca620682165706f70a1b12b5194607dce ] There is a race condition in vxlan that when deleting a vxlan device during receiving packets, there is a possibility that the sock is released after getting vxlan_sock vs from sk_user_data. Then in later vxlan_ecn_decapsulate(), vxlan_get_sk_family() we will got NULL pointer dereference. e.g. #0 [ffffa25ec6978a38] machine_kexec at ffffffff8c669757 #1 [ffffa25ec6978a90] __crash_kexec at ffffffff8c7c0a4d #2 [ffffa25ec6978b58] crash_kexec at ffffffff8c7c1c48 #3 [ffffa25ec6978b60] oops_end at ffffffff8c627f2b #4 [ffffa25ec6978b80] page_fault_oops at ffffffff8c678fcb #5 [ffffa25ec6978bd8] exc_page_fault at ffffffff8d109542 #6 [ffffa25ec6978c00] asm_exc_page_fault at ffffffff8d200b62 [exception RIP: vxlan_ecn_decapsulate+0x3b] RIP: ffffffffc1014e7b RSP: ffffa25ec6978cb0 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000008 RBX: ffff8aa000888000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 000000000000000e RSI: ffff8a9fc7ab803e RDI: ffff8a9fd1168700 RBP: ffff8a9fc7ab803e R8: 0000000000700000 R9: 00000000000010ae R10: ffff8a9fcb748980 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8a9fd1168700 R13: ffff8aa000888000 R14: 00000000002a0000 R15: 00000000000010ae ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #7 [ffffa25ec6978ce8] vxlan_rcv at ffffffffc10189cd [vxlan] #8 [ffffa25ec6978d90] udp_queue_rcv_one_skb at ffffffff8cfb6507 #9 [ffffa25ec6978dc0] udp_unicast_rcv_skb at ffffffff8cfb6e45 #10 [ffffa25ec6978dc8] __udp4_lib_rcv at ffffffff8cfb8807 #11 [ffffa25ec6978e20] ip_protocol_deliver_rcu at ffffffff8cf76951 #12 [ffffa25ec6978e48] ip_local_deliver at ffffffff8cf76bde #13 [ffffa25ec6978ea0] __netif_receive_skb_one_core at ffffffff8cecde9b #14 [ffffa25ec6978ec8] process_backlog at ffffffff8cece139 #15 [ffffa25ec6978f00] __napi_poll at ffffffff8ceced1a #16 [ffffa25ec6978f28] net_rx_action at ffffffff8cecf1f3 #17 [ffffa25ec6978fa0] __softirqentry_text_start at ffffffff8d4000ca #18 [ffffa25ec6978ff0] do_softirq at ffffffff8c6fbdc3 Reproducer: https://github.com/Mellanox/ovs-tests/blob/master/test-ovs-vxlan-remove-tunnel-during-traffic.sh Fix this by waiting for all sk_user_data reader to finish before releasing the sock. Reported-by: Jianlin Shi <jishi@redhat.com> Suggested-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com> Fixes: 6a93cc9 ("udp-tunnel: Add a few more UDP tunnel APIs") Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit 341097ee53573e06ab9fc675d96a052385b851fa upstream. There's a crash in mempool_free when running the lvm test shell/lvchange-rebuild-raid.sh. The reason for the crash is this: * super_written calls atomic_dec_and_test(&mddev->pending_writes) and wake_up(&mddev->sb_wait). Then it calls rdev_dec_pending(rdev, mddev) and bio_put(bio). * so, the process that waited on sb_wait and that is woken up is racing with bio_put(bio). * if the process wins the race, it calls bioset_exit before bio_put(bio) is executed. * bio_put(bio) attempts to free a bio into a destroyed bio set - causing a crash in mempool_free. We fix this bug by moving bio_put before atomic_dec_and_test. We also move rdev_dec_pending before atomic_dec_and_test as suggested by Neil Brown. The function md_end_flush has a similar bug - we must call bio_put before we decrement the number of in-progress bios. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD 11557f0067 P4D 11557f0067 PUD 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 0 PID: 73 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc3 #5 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014 Workqueue: kdelayd flush_expired_bios [dm_delay] RIP: 0010:mempool_free+0x47/0x80 Code: 48 89 ef 5b 5d ff e0 f3 c3 48 89 f7 e8 32 45 3f 00 48 63 53 08 48 89 c6 3b 53 04 7d 2d 48 8b 43 10 8d 4a 01 48 89 df 89 4b 08 <48> 89 2c d0 e8 b0 45 3f 00 48 8d 7b 30 5b 5d 31 c9 ba 01 00 00 00 RSP: 0018:ffff88910036bda8 EFLAGS: 00010093 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8891037b65d8 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000202 RDI: ffff8891037b65d8 RBP: ffff8891447ba240 R08: 0000000000012908 R09: 00000000003d0900 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000173544 R12: ffff889101a14000 R13: ffff8891562ac300 R14: ffff889102b41440 R15: ffffe8ffffa00d05 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88942fa00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000001102e99000 CR4: 00000000000006b0 Call Trace: <TASK> clone_endio+0xf4/0x1c0 [dm_mod] clone_endio+0xf4/0x1c0 [dm_mod] __submit_bio+0x76/0x120 submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0xb6/0x2a0 flush_expired_bios+0x28/0x2f [dm_delay] process_one_work+0x1b4/0x300 worker_thread+0x45/0x3e0 ? rescuer_thread+0x380/0x380 kthread+0xc2/0x100 ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 </TASK> Modules linked in: brd dm_delay dm_raid dm_mod af_packet uvesafb cfbfillrect cfbimgblt cn cfbcopyarea fb font fbdev tun autofs4 binfmt_misc configfs ipv6 virtio_rng virtio_balloon rng_core virtio_net pcspkr net_failover failover qemu_fw_cfg button mousedev raid10 raid456 libcrc32c async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq raid6_pq async_xor xor async_tx raid1 raid0 md_mod sd_mod t10_pi crc64_rocksoft crc64 virtio_scsi scsi_mod evdev psmouse bsg scsi_common [last unloaded: brd] CR2: 0000000000000000 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit b18cba09e374637a0a3759d856a6bca94c133952 ] Commit 9130b8d ("SUNRPC: allow for upcalls for the same uid but different gss service") introduced `auth` argument to __gss_find_upcall(), but in gss_pipe_downcall() it was left as NULL since it (and auth->service) was not (yet) determined. When multiple upcalls with the same uid and different service are ongoing, it could happen that __gss_find_upcall(), which returns the first match found in the pipe->in_downcall list, could not find the correct gss_msg corresponding to the downcall we are looking for. Moreover, it might return a msg which is not sent to rpc.gssd yet. We could see mount.nfs process hung in D state with multiple mount.nfs are executed in parallel. The call trace below is of CentOS 7.9 kernel-3.10.0-1160.24.1.el7.x86_64 but we observed the same hang w/ elrepo kernel-ml-6.0.7-1.el7. PID: 71258 TASK: ffff91ebd4be0000 CPU: 36 COMMAND: "mount.nfs" #0 [ffff9203ca3234f8] __schedule at ffffffffa3b8899f #1 [ffff9203ca323580] schedule at ffffffffa3b88eb9 #2 [ffff9203ca323590] gss_cred_init at ffffffffc0355818 [auth_rpcgss] #3 [ffff9203ca323658] rpcauth_lookup_credcache at ffffffffc0421ebc [sunrpc] #4 [ffff9203ca3236d8] gss_lookup_cred at ffffffffc0353633 [auth_rpcgss] #5 [ffff9203ca3236e8] rpcauth_lookupcred at ffffffffc0421581 [sunrpc] #6 [ffff9203ca323740] rpcauth_refreshcred at ffffffffc04223d3 [sunrpc] #7 [ffff9203ca3237a0] call_refresh at ffffffffc04103dc [sunrpc] #8 [ffff9203ca3237b8] __rpc_execute at ffffffffc041e1c9 [sunrpc] #9 [ffff9203ca323820] rpc_execute at ffffffffc0420a48 [sunrpc] The scenario is like this. Let's say there are two upcalls for services A and B, A -> B in pipe->in_downcall, B -> A in pipe->pipe. When rpc.gssd reads pipe to get the upcall msg corresponding to service B from pipe->pipe and then writes the response, in gss_pipe_downcall the msg corresponding to service A will be picked because only uid is used to find the msg and it is before the one for B in pipe->in_downcall. And the process waiting for the msg corresponding to service A will be woken up. Actual scheduing of that process might be after rpc.gssd processes the next msg. In rpc_pipe_generic_upcall it clears msg->errno (for A). The process is scheduled to see gss_msg->ctx == NULL and gss_msg->msg.errno == 0, therefore it cannot break the loop in gss_create_upcall and is never woken up after that. This patch adds a simple check to ensure that a msg which is not sent to rpc.gssd yet is not chosen as the matching upcall upon receiving a downcall. Signed-off-by: minoura makoto <minoura@valinux.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Hiroshi Shimamoto <h-shimamoto@nec.com> Tested-by: Hiroshi Shimamoto <h-shimamoto@nec.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trondmy@hammerspace.com> Fixes: 9130b8d ("SUNRPC: allow for upcalls for same uid but different gss service") Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

…g the sock [ Upstream commit 3cf7203ca620682165706f70a1b12b5194607dce ] There is a race condition in vxlan that when deleting a vxlan device during receiving packets, there is a possibility that the sock is released after getting vxlan_sock vs from sk_user_data. Then in later vxlan_ecn_decapsulate(), vxlan_get_sk_family() we will got NULL pointer dereference. e.g. #0 [ffffa25ec6978a38] machine_kexec at ffffffff8c669757 #1 [ffffa25ec6978a90] __crash_kexec at ffffffff8c7c0a4d #2 [ffffa25ec6978b58] crash_kexec at ffffffff8c7c1c48 #3 [ffffa25ec6978b60] oops_end at ffffffff8c627f2b #4 [ffffa25ec6978b80] page_fault_oops at ffffffff8c678fcb #5 [ffffa25ec6978bd8] exc_page_fault at ffffffff8d109542 #6 [ffffa25ec6978c00] asm_exc_page_fault at ffffffff8d200b62 [exception RIP: vxlan_ecn_decapsulate+0x3b] RIP: ffffffffc1014e7b RSP: ffffa25ec6978cb0 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000008 RBX: ffff8aa000888000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 000000000000000e RSI: ffff8a9fc7ab803e RDI: ffff8a9fd1168700 RBP: ffff8a9fc7ab803e R8: 0000000000700000 R9: 00000000000010ae R10: ffff8a9fcb748980 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8a9fd1168700 R13: ffff8aa000888000 R14: 00000000002a0000 R15: 00000000000010ae ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #7 [ffffa25ec6978ce8] vxlan_rcv at ffffffffc10189cd [vxlan] #8 [ffffa25ec6978d90] udp_queue_rcv_one_skb at ffffffff8cfb6507 #9 [ffffa25ec6978dc0] udp_unicast_rcv_skb at ffffffff8cfb6e45 #10 [ffffa25ec6978dc8] __udp4_lib_rcv at ffffffff8cfb8807 #11 [ffffa25ec6978e20] ip_protocol_deliver_rcu at ffffffff8cf76951 #12 [ffffa25ec6978e48] ip_local_deliver at ffffffff8cf76bde #13 [ffffa25ec6978ea0] __netif_receive_skb_one_core at ffffffff8cecde9b #14 [ffffa25ec6978ec8] process_backlog at ffffffff8cece139 #15 [ffffa25ec6978f00] __napi_poll at ffffffff8ceced1a #16 [ffffa25ec6978f28] net_rx_action at ffffffff8cecf1f3 #17 [ffffa25ec6978fa0] __softirqentry_text_start at ffffffff8d4000ca #18 [ffffa25ec6978ff0] do_softirq at ffffffff8c6fbdc3 Reproducer: https://github.com/Mellanox/ovs-tests/blob/master/test-ovs-vxlan-remove-tunnel-during-traffic.sh Fix this by waiting for all sk_user_data reader to finish before releasing the sock. Reported-by: Jianlin Shi <jishi@redhat.com> Suggested-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com> Fixes: 6a93cc9 ("udp-tunnel: Add a few more UDP tunnel APIs") Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit 341097ee53573e06ab9fc675d96a052385b851fa upstream. There's a crash in mempool_free when running the lvm test shell/lvchange-rebuild-raid.sh. The reason for the crash is this: * super_written calls atomic_dec_and_test(&mddev->pending_writes) and wake_up(&mddev->sb_wait). Then it calls rdev_dec_pending(rdev, mddev) and bio_put(bio). * so, the process that waited on sb_wait and that is woken up is racing with bio_put(bio). * if the process wins the race, it calls bioset_exit before bio_put(bio) is executed. * bio_put(bio) attempts to free a bio into a destroyed bio set - causing a crash in mempool_free. We fix this bug by moving bio_put before atomic_dec_and_test. We also move rdev_dec_pending before atomic_dec_and_test as suggested by Neil Brown. The function md_end_flush has a similar bug - we must call bio_put before we decrement the number of in-progress bios. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD 11557f0067 P4D 11557f0067 PUD 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 0 PID: 73 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc3 #5 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014 Workqueue: kdelayd flush_expired_bios [dm_delay] RIP: 0010:mempool_free+0x47/0x80 Code: 48 89 ef 5b 5d ff e0 f3 c3 48 89 f7 e8 32 45 3f 00 48 63 53 08 48 89 c6 3b 53 04 7d 2d 48 8b 43 10 8d 4a 01 48 89 df 89 4b 08 <48> 89 2c d0 e8 b0 45 3f 00 48 8d 7b 30 5b 5d 31 c9 ba 01 00 00 00 RSP: 0018:ffff88910036bda8 EFLAGS: 00010093 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8891037b65d8 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000202 RDI: ffff8891037b65d8 RBP: ffff8891447ba240 R08: 0000000000012908 R09: 00000000003d0900 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000173544 R12: ffff889101a14000 R13: ffff8891562ac300 R14: ffff889102b41440 R15: ffffe8ffffa00d05 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88942fa00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000001102e99000 CR4: 00000000000006b0 Call Trace: <TASK> clone_endio+0xf4/0x1c0 [dm_mod] clone_endio+0xf4/0x1c0 [dm_mod] __submit_bio+0x76/0x120 submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0xb6/0x2a0 flush_expired_bios+0x28/0x2f [dm_delay] process_one_work+0x1b4/0x300 worker_thread+0x45/0x3e0 ? rescuer_thread+0x380/0x380 kthread+0xc2/0x100 ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 </TASK> Modules linked in: brd dm_delay dm_raid dm_mod af_packet uvesafb cfbfillrect cfbimgblt cn cfbcopyarea fb font fbdev tun autofs4 binfmt_misc configfs ipv6 virtio_rng virtio_balloon rng_core virtio_net pcspkr net_failover failover qemu_fw_cfg button mousedev raid10 raid456 libcrc32c async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq raid6_pq async_xor xor async_tx raid1 raid0 md_mod sd_mod t10_pi crc64_rocksoft crc64 virtio_scsi scsi_mod evdev psmouse bsg scsi_common [last unloaded: brd] CR2: 0000000000000000 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit b18cba09e374637a0a3759d856a6bca94c133952 ] Commit 9130b8d ("SUNRPC: allow for upcalls for the same uid but different gss service") introduced `auth` argument to __gss_find_upcall(), but in gss_pipe_downcall() it was left as NULL since it (and auth->service) was not (yet) determined. When multiple upcalls with the same uid and different service are ongoing, it could happen that __gss_find_upcall(), which returns the first match found in the pipe->in_downcall list, could not find the correct gss_msg corresponding to the downcall we are looking for. Moreover, it might return a msg which is not sent to rpc.gssd yet. We could see mount.nfs process hung in D state with multiple mount.nfs are executed in parallel. The call trace below is of CentOS 7.9 kernel-3.10.0-1160.24.1.el7.x86_64 but we observed the same hang w/ elrepo kernel-ml-6.0.7-1.el7. PID: 71258 TASK: ffff91ebd4be0000 CPU: 36 COMMAND: "mount.nfs" #0 [ffff9203ca3234f8] __schedule at ffffffffa3b8899f #1 [ffff9203ca323580] schedule at ffffffffa3b88eb9 #2 [ffff9203ca323590] gss_cred_init at ffffffffc0355818 [auth_rpcgss] #3 [ffff9203ca323658] rpcauth_lookup_credcache at ffffffffc0421ebc [sunrpc] #4 [ffff9203ca3236d8] gss_lookup_cred at ffffffffc0353633 [auth_rpcgss] #5 [ffff9203ca3236e8] rpcauth_lookupcred at ffffffffc0421581 [sunrpc] #6 [ffff9203ca323740] rpcauth_refreshcred at ffffffffc04223d3 [sunrpc] #7 [ffff9203ca3237a0] call_refresh at ffffffffc04103dc [sunrpc] #8 [ffff9203ca3237b8] __rpc_execute at ffffffffc041e1c9 [sunrpc] #9 [ffff9203ca323820] rpc_execute at ffffffffc0420a48 [sunrpc] The scenario is like this. Let's say there are two upcalls for services A and B, A -> B in pipe->in_downcall, B -> A in pipe->pipe. When rpc.gssd reads pipe to get the upcall msg corresponding to service B from pipe->pipe and then writes the response, in gss_pipe_downcall the msg corresponding to service A will be picked because only uid is used to find the msg and it is before the one for B in pipe->in_downcall. And the process waiting for the msg corresponding to service A will be woken up. Actual scheduing of that process might be after rpc.gssd processes the next msg. In rpc_pipe_generic_upcall it clears msg->errno (for A). The process is scheduled to see gss_msg->ctx == NULL and gss_msg->msg.errno == 0, therefore it cannot break the loop in gss_create_upcall and is never woken up after that. This patch adds a simple check to ensure that a msg which is not sent to rpc.gssd yet is not chosen as the matching upcall upon receiving a downcall. Signed-off-by: minoura makoto <minoura@valinux.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Hiroshi Shimamoto <h-shimamoto@nec.com> Tested-by: Hiroshi Shimamoto <h-shimamoto@nec.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trondmy@hammerspace.com> Fixes: 9130b8d ("SUNRPC: allow for upcalls for same uid but different gss service") Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

…g the sock [ Upstream commit 3cf7203ca620682165706f70a1b12b5194607dce ] There is a race condition in vxlan that when deleting a vxlan device during receiving packets, there is a possibility that the sock is released after getting vxlan_sock vs from sk_user_data. Then in later vxlan_ecn_decapsulate(), vxlan_get_sk_family() we will got NULL pointer dereference. e.g. #0 [ffffa25ec6978a38] machine_kexec at ffffffff8c669757 #1 [ffffa25ec6978a90] __crash_kexec at ffffffff8c7c0a4d #2 [ffffa25ec6978b58] crash_kexec at ffffffff8c7c1c48 #3 [ffffa25ec6978b60] oops_end at ffffffff8c627f2b #4 [ffffa25ec6978b80] page_fault_oops at ffffffff8c678fcb #5 [ffffa25ec6978bd8] exc_page_fault at ffffffff8d109542 #6 [ffffa25ec6978c00] asm_exc_page_fault at ffffffff8d200b62 [exception RIP: vxlan_ecn_decapsulate+0x3b] RIP: ffffffffc1014e7b RSP: ffffa25ec6978cb0 RFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000008 RBX: ffff8aa000888000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 000000000000000e RSI: ffff8a9fc7ab803e RDI: ffff8a9fd1168700 RBP: ffff8a9fc7ab803e R8: 0000000000700000 R9: 00000000000010ae R10: ffff8a9fcb748980 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8a9fd1168700 R13: ffff8aa000888000 R14: 00000000002a0000 R15: 00000000000010ae ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #7 [ffffa25ec6978ce8] vxlan_rcv at ffffffffc10189cd [vxlan] #8 [ffffa25ec6978d90] udp_queue_rcv_one_skb at ffffffff8cfb6507 #9 [ffffa25ec6978dc0] udp_unicast_rcv_skb at ffffffff8cfb6e45 #10 [ffffa25ec6978dc8] __udp4_lib_rcv at ffffffff8cfb8807 #11 [ffffa25ec6978e20] ip_protocol_deliver_rcu at ffffffff8cf76951 #12 [ffffa25ec6978e48] ip_local_deliver at ffffffff8cf76bde #13 [ffffa25ec6978ea0] __netif_receive_skb_one_core at ffffffff8cecde9b #14 [ffffa25ec6978ec8] process_backlog at ffffffff8cece139 #15 [ffffa25ec6978f00] __napi_poll at ffffffff8ceced1a #16 [ffffa25ec6978f28] net_rx_action at ffffffff8cecf1f3 #17 [ffffa25ec6978fa0] __softirqentry_text_start at ffffffff8d4000ca #18 [ffffa25ec6978ff0] do_softirq at ffffffff8c6fbdc3 Reproducer: https://github.com/Mellanox/ovs-tests/blob/master/test-ovs-vxlan-remove-tunnel-during-traffic.sh Fix this by waiting for all sk_user_data reader to finish before releasing the sock. Reported-by: Jianlin Shi <jishi@redhat.com> Suggested-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com> Fixes: 6a93cc9 ("udp-tunnel: Add a few more UDP tunnel APIs") Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit 341097ee53573e06ab9fc675d96a052385b851fa upstream. There's a crash in mempool_free when running the lvm test shell/lvchange-rebuild-raid.sh. The reason for the crash is this: * super_written calls atomic_dec_and_test(&mddev->pending_writes) and wake_up(&mddev->sb_wait). Then it calls rdev_dec_pending(rdev, mddev) and bio_put(bio). * so, the process that waited on sb_wait and that is woken up is racing with bio_put(bio). * if the process wins the race, it calls bioset_exit before bio_put(bio) is executed. * bio_put(bio) attempts to free a bio into a destroyed bio set - causing a crash in mempool_free. We fix this bug by moving bio_put before atomic_dec_and_test. We also move rdev_dec_pending before atomic_dec_and_test as suggested by Neil Brown. The function md_end_flush has a similar bug - we must call bio_put before we decrement the number of in-progress bios. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD 11557f0067 P4D 11557f0067 PUD 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 0 PID: 73 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc3 #5 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014 Workqueue: kdelayd flush_expired_bios [dm_delay] RIP: 0010:mempool_free+0x47/0x80 Code: 48 89 ef 5b 5d ff e0 f3 c3 48 89 f7 e8 32 45 3f 00 48 63 53 08 48 89 c6 3b 53 04 7d 2d 48 8b 43 10 8d 4a 01 48 89 df 89 4b 08 <48> 89 2c d0 e8 b0 45 3f 00 48 8d 7b 30 5b 5d 31 c9 ba 01 00 00 00 RSP: 0018:ffff88910036bda8 EFLAGS: 00010093 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8891037b65d8 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000202 RDI: ffff8891037b65d8 RBP: ffff8891447ba240 R08: 0000000000012908 R09: 00000000003d0900 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000173544 R12: ffff889101a14000 R13: ffff8891562ac300 R14: ffff889102b41440 R15: ffffe8ffffa00d05 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88942fa00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000001102e99000 CR4: 00000000000006b0 Call Trace: <TASK> clone_endio+0xf4/0x1c0 [dm_mod] clone_endio+0xf4/0x1c0 [dm_mod] __submit_bio+0x76/0x120 submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0xb6/0x2a0 flush_expired_bios+0x28/0x2f [dm_delay] process_one_work+0x1b4/0x300 worker_thread+0x45/0x3e0 ? rescuer_thread+0x380/0x380 kthread+0xc2/0x100 ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 </TASK> Modules linked in: brd dm_delay dm_raid dm_mod af_packet uvesafb cfbfillrect cfbimgblt cn cfbcopyarea fb font fbdev tun autofs4 binfmt_misc configfs ipv6 virtio_rng virtio_balloon rng_core virtio_net pcspkr net_failover failover qemu_fw_cfg button mousedev raid10 raid456 libcrc32c async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq raid6_pq async_xor xor async_tx raid1 raid0 md_mod sd_mod t10_pi crc64_rocksoft crc64 virtio_scsi scsi_mod evdev psmouse bsg scsi_common [last unloaded: brd] CR2: 0000000000000000 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit b18cba09e374637a0a3759d856a6bca94c133952 ] Commit 9130b8d ("SUNRPC: allow for upcalls for the same uid but different gss service") introduced `auth` argument to __gss_find_upcall(), but in gss_pipe_downcall() it was left as NULL since it (and auth->service) was not (yet) determined. When multiple upcalls with the same uid and different service are ongoing, it could happen that __gss_find_upcall(), which returns the first match found in the pipe->in_downcall list, could not find the correct gss_msg corresponding to the downcall we are looking for. Moreover, it might return a msg which is not sent to rpc.gssd yet. We could see mount.nfs process hung in D state with multiple mount.nfs are executed in parallel. The call trace below is of CentOS 7.9 kernel-3.10.0-1160.24.1.el7.x86_64 but we observed the same hang w/ elrepo kernel-ml-6.0.7-1.el7. PID: 71258 TASK: ffff91ebd4be0000 CPU: 36 COMMAND: "mount.nfs" #0 [ffff9203ca3234f8] __schedule at ffffffffa3b8899f #1 [ffff9203ca323580] schedule at ffffffffa3b88eb9 #2 [ffff9203ca323590] gss_cred_init at ffffffffc0355818 [auth_rpcgss] #3 [ffff9203ca323658] rpcauth_lookup_credcache at ffffffffc0421ebc [sunrpc] #4 [ffff9203ca3236d8] gss_lookup_cred at ffffffffc0353633 [auth_rpcgss] #5 [ffff9203ca3236e8] rpcauth_lookupcred at ffffffffc0421581 [sunrpc] #6 [ffff9203ca323740] rpcauth_refreshcred at ffffffffc04223d3 [sunrpc] #7 [ffff9203ca3237a0] call_refresh at ffffffffc04103dc [sunrpc] #8 [ffff9203ca3237b8] __rpc_execute at ffffffffc041e1c9 [sunrpc] #9 [ffff9203ca323820] rpc_execute at ffffffffc0420a48 [sunrpc] The scenario is like this. Let's say there are two upcalls for services A and B, A -> B in pipe->in_downcall, B -> A in pipe->pipe. When rpc.gssd reads pipe to get the upcall msg corresponding to service B from pipe->pipe and then writes the response, in gss_pipe_downcall the msg corresponding to service A will be picked because only uid is used to find the msg and it is before the one for B in pipe->in_downcall. And the process waiting for the msg corresponding to service A will be woken up. Actual scheduing of that process might be after rpc.gssd processes the next msg. In rpc_pipe_generic_upcall it clears msg->errno (for A). The process is scheduled to see gss_msg->ctx == NULL and gss_msg->msg.errno == 0, therefore it cannot break the loop in gss_create_upcall and is never woken up after that. This patch adds a simple check to ensure that a msg which is not sent to rpc.gssd yet is not chosen as the matching upcall upon receiving a downcall. Signed-off-by: minoura makoto <minoura@valinux.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Hiroshi Shimamoto <h-shimamoto@nec.com> Tested-by: Hiroshi Shimamoto <h-shimamoto@nec.com> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trondmy@hammerspace.com> Fixes: 9130b8d ("SUNRPC: allow for upcalls for same uid but different gss service") Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 6c4ca03bd890566d873e3593b32d034bf2f5a087 ] During EEH error injection testing, a deadlock was encountered in the tg3 driver when tg3_io_error_detected() was attempting to cancel outstanding reset tasks: crash> foreach UN bt ... PID: 159 TASK: c0000000067c6000 CPU: 8 COMMAND: "eehd" ... #5 [c00000000681f990] __cancel_work_timer at c00000000019fd18 #6 [c00000000681fa30] tg3_io_error_detected at c00800000295f098 [tg3] #7 [c00000000681faf0] eeh_report_error at c00000000004e25c ... PID: 290 TASK: c000000036e5f800 CPU: 6 COMMAND: "kworker/6:1" ... #4 [c00000003721fbc0] rtnl_lock at c000000000c940d8 #5 [c00000003721fbe0] tg3_reset_task at c008000002969358 [tg3] #6 [c00000003721fc60] process_one_work at c00000000019e5c4 ... PID: 296 TASK: c000000037a65800 CPU: 21 COMMAND: "kworker/21:1" ... #4 [c000000037247bc0] rtnl_lock at c000000000c940d8 #5 [c000000037247be0] tg3_reset_task at c008000002969358 [tg3] #6 [c000000037247c60] process_one_work at c00000000019e5c4 ... PID: 655 TASK: c000000036f49000 CPU: 16 COMMAND: "kworker/16:2" ...:1 #4 [c0000000373ebbc0] rtnl_lock at c000000000c940d8 #5 [c0000000373ebbe0] tg3_reset_task at c008000002969358 [tg3] #6 [c0000000373ebc60] process_one_work at c00000000019e5c4 ... Code inspection shows that both tg3_io_error_detected() and tg3_reset_task() attempt to acquire the RTNL lock at the beginning of their code blocks. If tg3_reset_task() should happen to execute between the times when tg3_io_error_deteced() acquires the RTNL lock and tg3_reset_task_cancel() is called, a deadlock will occur. Moving tg3_reset_task_cancel() call earlier within the code block, prior to acquiring RTNL, prevents this from happening, but also exposes another deadlock issue where tg3_reset_task() may execute AFTER tg3_io_error_detected() has executed: crash> foreach UN bt PID: 159 TASK: c0000000067d2000 CPU: 9 COMMAND: "eehd" ... #4 [c000000006867a60] rtnl_lock at c000000000c940d8 #5 [c000000006867a80] tg3_io_slot_reset at c0080000026c2ea8 [tg3] #6 [c000000006867b00] eeh_report_reset at c00000000004de88 ... PID: 363 TASK: c000000037564000 CPU: 6 COMMAND: "kworker/6:1" ... #3 [c000000036c1bb70] msleep at c000000000259e6c #4 [c000000036c1bba0] napi_disable at c000000000c6b848 #5 [c000000036c1bbe0] tg3_reset_task at c0080000026d942c [tg3] #6 [c000000036c1bc60] process_one_work at c00000000019e5c4 ... This issue can be avoided by aborting tg3_reset_task() if EEH error recovery is already in progress. Fixes: db84bf4 ("tg3: tg3_reset_task() needs to use rtnl_lock to synchronize") Signed-off-by: David Christensen <drc@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Pavan Chebbi <pavan.chebbi@broadcom.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230124185339.225806-1-drc@linux.vnet.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit 60eed1e3d45045623e46944ebc7c42c30a4350f0 upstream. code path: ocfs2_ioctl_move_extents ocfs2_move_extents ocfs2_defrag_extent __ocfs2_move_extent + ocfs2_journal_access_di + ocfs2_split_extent //sub-paths call jbd2_journal_restart + ocfs2_journal_dirty //crash by jbs2 ASSERT crash stacks: PID: 11297 TASK: ffff974a676dcd00 CPU: 67 COMMAND: "defragfs.ocfs2" #0 [ffffb25d8dad3900] machine_kexec at ffffffff8386fe01 #1 [ffffb25d8dad3958] __crash_kexec at ffffffff8395959d #2 [ffffb25d8dad3a20] crash_kexec at ffffffff8395a45d #3 [ffffb25d8dad3a38] oops_end at ffffffff83836d3f #4 [ffffb25d8dad3a58] do_trap at ffffffff83833205 #5 [ffffb25d8dad3aa0] do_invalid_op at ffffffff83833aa6 #6 [ffffb25d8dad3ac0] invalid_op at ffffffff84200d18 [exception RIP: jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata+0x2ba] RIP: ffffffffc09ca54a RSP: ffffb25d8dad3b70 RFLAGS: 00010207 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9706eedc5248 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff97337029ea28 RDI: ffff9706eedc5250 RBP: ffff9703c3520200 R8: 000000000f46b0b2 R9: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 00000001000000fe R12: ffff97337029ea28 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff9703de59bf60 R15: ffff9706eedc5250 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #7 [ffffb25d8dad3ba8] ocfs2_journal_dirty at ffffffffc137fb95 [ocfs2] #8 [ffffb25d8dad3be8] __ocfs2_move_extent at ffffffffc139a950 [ocfs2] #9 [ffffb25d8dad3c80] ocfs2_defrag_extent at ffffffffc139b2d2 [ocfs2] Analysis This bug has the same root cause of 'commit 7f27ec9 ("ocfs2: call ocfs2_journal_access_di() before ocfs2_journal_dirty() in ocfs2_write_end_nolock()")'. For this bug, jbd2_journal_restart() is called by ocfs2_split_extent() during defragmenting. How to fix For ocfs2_split_extent() can handle journal operations totally by itself. Caller doesn't need to call journal access/dirty pair, and caller only needs to call journal start/stop pair. The fix method is to remove journal access/dirty from __ocfs2_move_extent(). The discussion for this patch: https://oss.oracle.com/pipermail/ocfs2-devel/2023-February/000647.html Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230217003717.32469-1-heming.zhao@suse.com Signed-off-by: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn> Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com> Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit c0c8a83 upstream. Fix crash with illegal operation exception in dasd_device_tasklet. Commit b729493 ("s390/dasd: Prepare for additional path event handling") renamed the verify_path function for ECKD but not for FBA and DIAG. This leads to a panic when the path verification function is called for a FBA or DIAG device. Fix by defining a wrapper function for dasd_generic_verify_path(). Fixes: b729493 ("s390/dasd: Prepare for additional path event handling") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> #5.11 Reviewed-by: Jan Hoeppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Haberland <sth@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210525125006.157531-2-sth@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

commit 60eed1e3d45045623e46944ebc7c42c30a4350f0 upstream. code path: ocfs2_ioctl_move_extents ocfs2_move_extents ocfs2_defrag_extent __ocfs2_move_extent + ocfs2_journal_access_di + ocfs2_split_extent //sub-paths call jbd2_journal_restart + ocfs2_journal_dirty //crash by jbs2 ASSERT crash stacks: PID: 11297 TASK: ffff974a676dcd00 CPU: 67 COMMAND: "defragfs.ocfs2" #0 [ffffb25d8dad3900] machine_kexec at ffffffff8386fe01 #1 [ffffb25d8dad3958] __crash_kexec at ffffffff8395959d #2 [ffffb25d8dad3a20] crash_kexec at ffffffff8395a45d #3 [ffffb25d8dad3a38] oops_end at ffffffff83836d3f #4 [ffffb25d8dad3a58] do_trap at ffffffff83833205 #5 [ffffb25d8dad3aa0] do_invalid_op at ffffffff83833aa6 #6 [ffffb25d8dad3ac0] invalid_op at ffffffff84200d18 [exception RIP: jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata+0x2ba] RIP: ffffffffc09ca54a RSP: ffffb25d8dad3b70 RFLAGS: 00010207 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9706eedc5248 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff97337029ea28 RDI: ffff9706eedc5250 RBP: ffff9703c3520200 R8: 000000000f46b0b2 R9: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 00000001000000fe R12: ffff97337029ea28 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff9703de59bf60 R15: ffff9706eedc5250 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #7 [ffffb25d8dad3ba8] ocfs2_journal_dirty at ffffffffc137fb95 [ocfs2] #8 [ffffb25d8dad3be8] __ocfs2_move_extent at ffffffffc139a950 [ocfs2] #9 [ffffb25d8dad3c80] ocfs2_defrag_extent at ffffffffc139b2d2 [ocfs2] Analysis This bug has the same root cause of 'commit 7f27ec9 ("ocfs2: call ocfs2_journal_access_di() before ocfs2_journal_dirty() in ocfs2_write_end_nolock()")'. For this bug, jbd2_journal_restart() is called by ocfs2_split_extent() during defragmenting. How to fix For ocfs2_split_extent() can handle journal operations totally by itself. Caller doesn't need to call journal access/dirty pair, and caller only needs to call journal start/stop pair. The fix method is to remove journal access/dirty from __ocfs2_move_extent(). The discussion for this patch: https://oss.oracle.com/pipermail/ocfs2-devel/2023-February/000647.html Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230217003717.32469-1-heming.zhao@suse.com Signed-off-by: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn> Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com> Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 05bb0167c80b8f93c6a4e0451b7da9b96db990c2 ] ACPICA commit 770653e3ba67c30a629ca7d12e352d83c2541b1e Before this change we see the following UBSAN stack trace in Fuchsia: #0 0x000021e4213b3302 in acpi_ds_init_aml_walk(struct acpi_walk_state*, union acpi_parse_object*, struct acpi_namespace_node*, u8*, u32, struct acpi_evaluate_info*, u8) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/dispatcher/dswstate.c:682 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x233302 #1.2 0x000020d0f660777f in ubsan_get_stack_trace() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:41 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x3d77f #1.1 0x000020d0f660777f in maybe_print_stack_trace() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:51 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x3d77f #1 0x000020d0f660777f in ~scoped_report() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_diag.cpp:387 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x3d77f multipath-tcp#2 0x000020d0f660b96d in handlepointer_overflow_impl() compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_handlers.cpp:809 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x4196d multipath-tcp#3 0x000020d0f660b50d in compiler-rt/lib/ubsan/ubsan_handlers.cpp:815 <libclang_rt.asan.so>+0x4150d multipath-tcp#4 0x000021e4213b3302 in acpi_ds_init_aml_walk(struct acpi_walk_state*, union acpi_parse_object*, struct acpi_namespace_node*, u8*, u32, struct acpi_evaluate_info*, u8) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/dispatcher/dswstate.c:682 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x233302 multipath-tcp#5 0x000021e4213e2369 in acpi_ds_call_control_method(struct acpi_thread_state*, struct acpi_walk_state*, union acpi_parse_object*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/dispatcher/dsmethod.c:605 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x262369 multipath-tcp#6 0x000021e421437fac in acpi_ps_parse_aml(struct acpi_walk_state*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/parser/psparse.c:550 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2b7fac multipath-tcp#7 0x000021e4214464d2 in acpi_ps_execute_method(struct acpi_evaluate_info*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/parser/psxface.c:244 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2c64d2 multipath-tcp#8 0x000021e4213aa052 in acpi_ns_evaluate(struct acpi_evaluate_info*) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/namespace/nseval.c:250 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x22a052 multipath-tcp#9 0x000021e421413dd8 in acpi_ns_init_one_device(acpi_handle, u32, void*, void**) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/namespace/nsinit.c:735 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x293dd8 multipath-tcp#10 0x000021e421429e98 in acpi_ns_walk_namespace(acpi_object_type, acpi_handle, u32, u32, acpi_walk_callback, acpi_walk_callback, void*, void**) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/namespace/nswalk.c:298 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2a9e98 multipath-tcp#11 0x000021e4214131ac in acpi_ns_initialize_devices(u32) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/namespace/nsinit.c:268 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2931ac multipath-tcp#12 0x000021e42147c40d in acpi_initialize_objects(u32) ../../third_party/acpica/source/components/utilities/utxfinit.c:304 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0x2fc40d multipath-tcp#13 0x000021e42126d603 in acpi::acpi_impl::initialize_acpi(acpi::acpi_impl*) ../../src/devices/board/lib/acpi/acpi-impl.cc:224 <platform-bus-x86.so>+0xed603 Add a simple check that avoids incrementing a pointer by zero, but otherwise behaves as before. Note that our findings are against ACPICA 20221020, but the same code exists on master. Link: acpica/acpica@770653e3 Signed-off-by: Bob Moore <robert.moore@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

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Support (maybe?) simultaneous open #5

Support (maybe?) simultaneous open #5

cpaasch commented Aug 13, 2013

Support (maybe?) simultaneous open #5

Support (maybe?) simultaneous open #5

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cpaasch commented Aug 13, 2013