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How to taint a memory address and check its propagation in the guest machine #3

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maofeichen opened this issue Apr 30, 2014 · 4 comments

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@maofeichen
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Hi,
I download the Panda and be able to install and run VM successfully. What I'm trying to do is taint a memory address in the guest machine, and check its propagation during the process running. For example, a simple function call of program, and there is a temp array defined in it, if I taint the address of the temp array, how could I check the propagate of this tainted data during the function call executing? I checked the doc and the description in the taint folder, but I can't find related explanations of how to do it. I wonder if someone could help? It would be better if could list detail command. Thanks!

Best,
michael chen

@tleek
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tleek commented May 1, 2014

Hi Michael. There isn't currently much (any) of an API to using taint.
Essentially, you'd have to modify the taint.cpp plug-in code, registering
some new callbacks that would label taint where you want to do so, and also
query taint where you want. Labeling and querying would be a matter of
calling some function in taint_processor.h. That part is easy and well
supported. But there isn't much guest introspection at present, so it
would be up to you to figure out the right time from a whole-system
perspective, to do both those things.

Sorry, that part of PANDA very much still in the works. Hope to have a
better interface soon, though!

Cheers.

Tim

On Wed, Apr 30, 2014 at 2:47 PM, mchen2016 notifications@github.com wrote:

Hi,
I download the Panda and be able to install and run VM successfully. What
I'm trying to do is taint a memory address in the guest machine, and check
its propagation during the process running. For example, a simple function
call of program, and there is a temp array defined in it, if I taint the
address of the temp array, how could I check the propagate of this tainted
data during the function call executing? I checked the doc and the
description in the taint folder, but I can't find related explanations of
how to do it. I wonder if someone could help? It would be better if could
list detail command. Thanks!

Best,
michael chen


Reply to this email directly or view it on GitHubhttps://github.com/moyix/panda/issues/3
.

When I see an adult on a bicycle, I do not despair for the future of the
human race. - H. G.Wells

@maofeichen
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Hi Tim. Thank you for your kindly reply. I'll try to figure out what I need to do. I'll continue to pay attention to your updates. Thanks!

Best,
Michael

@tleek
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tleek commented Jun 14, 2014

Hello. Sorry for the underdeveloped state of affairs with respect to
taint. We are working on it. Hoping to have a much better setup by
summer's end!

Cheers.

Tim

On Fri, Jun 13, 2014 at 7:56 PM, Epeius notifications@github.com wrote:

Hi,
I find PANDA is a great analysis platform since it supports many archs, so
I want to do some Android taint analysis experiments with PANDA's taint
analysis plugin-PIRATE. But I found that in taint.cpp there was a function
called "guest_hypercall_callback()", which invoked the "enable_taint()"
function. But in guest_hypercall_callback(), code seems to not support ARM
as follows:
int guest_hypercall_callback(CPUState *env){
#ifdef TARGET_I386
target_ulong buf_start = env->regs[R_EBX];
target_ulong buf_len = env->regs[R_ECX];

if (env->regs[R_EAX] == 7 || env->regs[R_EAX] == 8){
if (!taintEnabled){
printf("Taint plugin: Label operation detected\n");
printf("Enabling taint processing\n");
taintJustEnabled = true;
taintEnabled = true;
enable_taint();
}

#endif // TARGET_I386
return 1;
}

So, it seems that this taint plugin doesn't support ARM platform, or on
ARM, there is anthor way to start analysis?

Best regards.
B. Zhang

Reply to this email directly or view it on GitHub
moyix/panda#3 (comment).

When I see an adult on a bicycle, I do not despair for the future of the
human race. - H. G.Wells

@moyix
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moyix commented Nov 7, 2014

I think Tim's taint tutorial covers this nicely now, so I'm closing this one.

@moyix moyix closed this as completed Nov 7, 2014
phulin pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 6, 2017
QEMU will crash with the follow backtrace if the new created thread exited before
we call qemu_thread_set_name() for it.

  (gdb) bt
  #0 0x00007f9a68b095d7 in __GI_raise (sig=sig@entry=6) at ../nptl/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/raise.c:56
  #1 0x00007f9a68b0acc8 in __GI_abort () at abort.c:90
  #2 0x00007f9a69cda389 in PAT_abort () from /usr/lib64/libuvpuserhotfix.so
  #3 0x00007f9a69cdda0d in patchIllInsHandler () from /usr/lib64/libuvpuserhotfix.so
  #4 <signal handler called>
  #5 pthread_setname_np (th=140298470549248, name=name@entry=0x8cc74a "io-task-worker") at ../nptl/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/pthread_setname.c:49
  #6 0x00000000007f5f20 in qemu_thread_set_name (thread=thread@entry=0x7ffd2ac09680, name=name@entry=0x8cc74a "io-task-worker") at util/qemu_thread_posix.c:459
  #7 0x00000000007f679e in qemu_thread_create (thread=thread@entry=0x7ffd2ac09680, name=name@entry=0x8cc74a "io-task-worker",start_routine=start_routine@entry=0x7c1300 <qio_task_thread_worker>, arg=arg@entry=0x7f99b8001720, mode=mode@entry=1) at util/qemu_thread_posix.c:498
  #8 0x00000000007c15b6 in qio_task_run_in_thread (task=task@entry=0x7f99b80033d0, worker=worker@entry=0x7bd920 <qio_channel_socket_connect_worker>, opaque=0x7f99b8003370, destroy=0x7c6220 <qapi_free_SocketAddress>) at io/task.c:133
  #9 0x00000000007bda04 in qio_channel_socket_connect_async (ioc=0x7f99b80014c0, addr=0x37235d0, callback=callback@entry=0x54ad00 <qemu_chr_socket_connected>, opaque=opaque@entry=0x38118b0, destroy=destroy@entry=0x0) at io/channel_socket.c:191
  #10 0x00000000005487f6 in socket_reconnect_timeout (opaque=0x38118b0) at qemu_char.c:4402
  #11 0x00007f9a6a1533b3 in g_timeout_dispatch () from /usr/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0
  #12 0x00007f9a6a15299a in g_main_context_dispatch () from /usr/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0
  #13 0x0000000000747386 in glib_pollfds_poll () at main_loop.c:227
  #14 0x0000000000747424 in os_host_main_loop_wait (timeout=404000000) at main_loop.c:272
  #15 0x0000000000747575 in main_loop_wait (nonblocking=nonblocking@entry=0) at main_loop.c:520
  #16 0x0000000000557d31 in main_loop () at vl.c:2170
  #17 0x000000000041c8b7 in main (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>, envp=<optimized out>) at vl.c:5083

Let's detach the new thread after calling qemu_thread_set_name().

Signed-off-by: Caoxinhua <caoxinhua@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: zhanghailiang <zhang.zhanghailiang@huawei.com>
Message-Id: <1483493521-9604-1-git-send-email-zhang.zhanghailiang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
phulin pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 6, 2017
This reverts commit aff8fd1.

Both virtio-net and virtio-crypto do not balance
virtio_queue_set_notification() enable and disable calls.  This makes
the notifications_disabled counter unreliable and Doug Goldstein
reported the following assertion failure:

  #3  0x00007ffff44d1c62 in __GI___assert_fail (
      assertion=assertion@entry=0x555555ae8e8a "vq->notification_disabled > 0",
      file=file@entry=0x555555ae89c0 "/home/doug/work/qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c",
      line=line@entry=215,
      function=function@entry=0x555555ae9630 <__PRETTY_FUNCTION__.43707>
      "virtio_queue_set_notification") at assert.c:101
  #4  0x00005555557f25d6 in virtio_queue_set_notification (vq=0x55555666aa90,
      enable=enable@entry=1) at /home/doug/work/qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:215
  #5  0x00005555557dc311 in virtio_net_has_buffers (q=<optimized out>,
      q=<optimized out>, bufsize=102)
      at /home/doug/work/qemu/hw/net/virtio-net.c:1008
  #6  virtio_net_receive (nc=<optimized out>, buf=0x555557386b88 "", size=102)
      at /home/doug/work/qemu/hw/net/virtio-net.c:1148
  #7  0x00005555559cad33 in nc_sendv_compat (flags=<optimized out>, iovcnt=1,
      iov=0x7fffead746d0, nc=0x55555788b340) at net/net.c:705
  #8  qemu_deliver_packet_iov (sender=<optimized out>, flags=<optimized out>,
      iov=0x7fffead746d0, iovcnt=1, opaque=0x55555788b340) at net/net.c:732
  #9  0x00005555559cd929 in qemu_net_queue_deliver (size=<optimized out>,
      data=<optimized out>, flags=<optimized out>, sender=<optimized out>,
      queue=0x55555788b550) at net/queue.c:164
  #10 qemu_net_queue_flush (queue=0x55555788b550) at net/queue.c:261

This patch is safe to revert since it's just an optimization for
virtqueue polling.  The next patch will improve the situation again
without resorting to nesting.

Reported-by: Doug Goldstein <cardoe@cardoe.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
phulin pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 6, 2017
AioHandlers marked ->is_external must be skipped when aio_node_check()
fails.  bdrv_drained_begin() needs this to prevent dataplane from
submitting new I/O requests while another thread accesses the device and
relies on it being quiesced.

This patch fixes the following segfault:

  Program terminated with signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
  #0  0x00005577f6127dad in bdrv_io_plug (bs=0x5577f7ae52f0) at qemu/block/io.c:2650
  2650            bdrv_io_plug(child->bs);
  [Current thread is 1 (Thread 0x7ff5c4bd1c80 (LWP 10917))]
  (gdb) bt
  #0  0x00005577f6127dad in bdrv_io_plug (bs=0x5577f7ae52f0) at qemu/block/io.c:2650
  #1  0x00005577f6114363 in blk_io_plug (blk=0x5577f7b8ba20) at qemu/block/block-backend.c:1561
  #2  0x00005577f5d4091d in virtio_blk_handle_vq (s=0x5577f9ada030, vq=0x5577f9b3d2a0) at qemu/hw/block/virtio-blk.c:589
  #3  0x00005577f5d4240d in virtio_blk_data_plane_handle_output (vdev=0x5577f9ada030, vq=0x5577f9b3d2a0) at qemu/hw/block/dataplane/virtio-blk.c:158
  #4  0x00005577f5d88acd in virtio_queue_notify_aio_vq (vq=0x5577f9b3d2a0) at qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:1304
  #5  0x00005577f5d8aaaf in virtio_queue_host_notifier_aio_poll (opaque=0x5577f9b3d308) at qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:2134
  #6  0x00005577f60ca077 in run_poll_handlers_once (ctx=0x5577f79ddbb0) at qemu/aio-posix.c:493
  #7  0x00005577f60ca268 in try_poll_mode (ctx=0x5577f79ddbb0, blocking=true) at qemu/aio-posix.c:569
  #8  0x00005577f60ca331 in aio_poll (ctx=0x5577f79ddbb0, blocking=true) at qemu/aio-posix.c:601
  #9  0x00005577f612722a in bdrv_flush (bs=0x5577f7c20970) at qemu/block/io.c:2403
  #10 0x00005577f60c1b2d in bdrv_close (bs=0x5577f7c20970) at qemu/block.c:2322
  #11 0x00005577f60c20e7 in bdrv_delete (bs=0x5577f7c20970) at qemu/block.c:2465
  #12 0x00005577f60c3ecf in bdrv_unref (bs=0x5577f7c20970) at qemu/block.c:3425
  #13 0x00005577f60bf951 in bdrv_root_unref_child (child=0x5577f7a2de70) at qemu/block.c:1361
  #14 0x00005577f6112162 in blk_remove_bs (blk=0x5577f7b8ba20) at qemu/block/block-backend.c:491
  #15 0x00005577f6111b1b in blk_remove_all_bs () at qemu/block/block-backend.c:245
  #16 0x00005577f60c1db6 in bdrv_close_all () at qemu/block.c:2382
  #17 0x00005577f5e60cca in main (argc=20, argv=0x7ffea6eb8398, envp=0x7ffea6eb8440) at qemu/vl.c:4684

The key thing is that bdrv_close() uses bdrv_drained_begin() and
virtio_queue_host_notifier_aio_poll() must not be called.

Thanks to Fam Zheng <famz@redhat.com> for identifying the root cause of
this crash.

Reported-by: Alberto Garcia <berto@igalia.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Fam Zheng <famz@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Alberto Garcia <berto@igalia.com>
Message-id: 20170124095350.16679-1-stefanha@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
nathanjackson pushed a commit to nathanjackson/panda that referenced this issue Jan 21, 2019
ASAN detects an "unknown-crash" when running pxe-test:

/ppc64/pxe/spapr-vlan: =================================================================
==7143==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: unknown-crash on address 0x7f6dcd298d30 at pc 0x55e22218830d bp 0x7f6dcd2989e0 sp 0x7f6dcd2989d0
READ of size 128 at 0x7f6dcd298d30 thread T2
    #0 0x55e22218830c in tftp_session_allocate /home/elmarco/src/qq/slirp/tftp.c:73
    panda-re#1 0x55e22218a1f8 in tftp_handle_rrq /home/elmarco/src/qq/slirp/tftp.c:289
    panda-re#2 0x55e22218b54c in tftp_input /home/elmarco/src/qq/slirp/tftp.c:446
    panda-re#3 0x55e2221833fe in udp6_input /home/elmarco/src/qq/slirp/udp6.c:82
    panda-re#4 0x55e222137b17 in ip6_input /home/elmarco/src/qq/slirp/ip6_input.c:67

Address 0x7f6dcd298d30 is located in stack of thread T2 at offset 96 in frame
    #0 0x55e222182420 in udp6_input /home/elmarco/src/qq/slirp/udp6.c:13

  This frame has 3 object(s):
    [32, 48) '<unknown>'
    [96, 124) 'lhost' <== Memory access at offset 96 partially overflows this variable
    [160, 200) 'save_ip' <== Memory access at offset 96 partially underflows this variable

The sockaddr_storage pointer is the sockaddr_in6 lhost on the
stack. Copy only the source addr size.

Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Signed-off-by: Samuel Thibault <samuel.thibault@ens-lyon.org>
(cherry picked from commit 17eb587)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
moyix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 8, 2019
Running postcopy-test with ASAN produces the following error:

QTEST_QEMU_BINARY=ppc64-softmmu/qemu-system-ppc64  tests/postcopy-test
...
=================================================================
==23641==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7f1556600000 at pc 0x55b8e9d28208 bp 0x7f1555f4d3c0 sp 0x7f1555f4d3b0
READ of size 8 at 0x7f1556600000 thread T6
    #0 0x55b8e9d28207 in htab_save_first_pass /home/elmarco/src/qq/hw/ppc/spapr.c:1528
    #1 0x55b8e9d2939c in htab_save_iterate /home/elmarco/src/qq/hw/ppc/spapr.c:1665
    #2 0x55b8e9beae3a in qemu_savevm_state_iterate /home/elmarco/src/qq/migration/savevm.c:1044
    #3 0x55b8ea677733 in migration_thread /home/elmarco/src/qq/migration/migration.c:1976
    #4 0x7f15845f46c9 in start_thread (/lib64/libpthread.so.0+0x76c9)
    #5 0x7f157d9d0f7e in clone (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x107f7e)

0x7f1556600000 is located 0 bytes to the right of 2097152-byte region [0x7f1556400000,0x7f1556600000)
allocated by thread T0 here:
    #0 0x7f159bb76980 in posix_memalign (/lib64/libasan.so.3+0xc7980)
    #1 0x55b8eab185b2 in qemu_try_memalign /home/elmarco/src/qq/util/oslib-posix.c:106
    #2 0x55b8eab186c8 in qemu_memalign /home/elmarco/src/qq/util/oslib-posix.c:122
    #3 0x55b8e9d268a8 in spapr_reallocate_hpt /home/elmarco/src/qq/hw/ppc/spapr.c:1214
    #4 0x55b8e9d26e04 in ppc_spapr_reset /home/elmarco/src/qq/hw/ppc/spapr.c:1261
    #5 0x55b8ea12e913 in qemu_system_reset /home/elmarco/src/qq/vl.c:1697
    #6 0x55b8ea13fa40 in main /home/elmarco/src/qq/vl.c:4679
    #7 0x7f157d8e9400 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x20400)

Thread T6 created by T0 here:
    #0 0x7f159bae0488 in __interceptor_pthread_create (/lib64/libasan.so.3+0x31488)
    #1 0x55b8eab1d9cb in qemu_thread_create /home/elmarco/src/qq/util/qemu-thread-posix.c:465
    #2 0x55b8ea67874c in migrate_fd_connect /home/elmarco/src/qq/migration/migration.c:2096
    #3 0x55b8ea66cbb0 in migration_channel_connect /home/elmarco/src/qq/migration/migration.c:500
    #4 0x55b8ea678f38 in socket_outgoing_migration /home/elmarco/src/qq/migration/socket.c:87
    #5 0x55b8eaa5a03a in qio_task_complete /home/elmarco/src/qq/io/task.c:142
    #6 0x55b8eaa599cc in gio_task_thread_result /home/elmarco/src/qq/io/task.c:88
    #7 0x7f15823e38e6  (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x468e6)
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /home/elmarco/src/qq/hw/ppc/spapr.c:1528 in htab_save_first_pass

index seems to be wrongly incremented, unless I miss something that
would be worth a comment.

Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
moyix pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 8, 2019
During block job completion, nothing is preventing
block_job_defer_to_main_loop_bh from being called in a nested
aio_poll(), which is a trouble, such as in this code path:

    qmp_block_commit
      commit_active_start
        bdrv_reopen
          bdrv_reopen_multiple
            bdrv_reopen_prepare
              bdrv_flush
                aio_poll
                  aio_bh_poll
                    aio_bh_call
                      block_job_defer_to_main_loop_bh
                        stream_complete
                          bdrv_reopen

block_job_defer_to_main_loop_bh is the last step of the stream job,
which should have been "paused" by the bdrv_drained_begin/end in
bdrv_reopen_multiple, but it is not done because it's in the form of a
main loop BH.

Similar to why block jobs should be paused between drained_begin and
drained_end, BHs they schedule must be excluded as well.  To achieve
this, this patch forces draining the BH in BDRV_POLL_WHILE.

As a side effect this fixes a hang in block_job_detach_aio_context
during system_reset when a block job is ready:

    #0  0x0000555555aa79f3 in bdrv_drain_recurse
    #1  0x0000555555aa825d in bdrv_drained_begin
    #2  0x0000555555aa8449 in bdrv_drain
    #3  0x0000555555a9c356 in blk_drain
    #4  0x0000555555aa3cfd in mirror_drain
    #5  0x0000555555a66e11 in block_job_detach_aio_context
    #6  0x0000555555a62f4d in bdrv_detach_aio_context
    #7  0x0000555555a63116 in bdrv_set_aio_context
    #8  0x0000555555a9d326 in blk_set_aio_context
    #9  0x00005555557e38da in virtio_blk_data_plane_stop
    #10 0x00005555559f9d5f in virtio_bus_stop_ioeventfd
    #11 0x00005555559fa49b in virtio_bus_stop_ioeventfd
    #12 0x00005555559f6a18 in virtio_pci_stop_ioeventfd
    #13 0x00005555559f6a18 in virtio_pci_reset
    #14 0x00005555559139a9 in qdev_reset_one
    #15 0x0000555555916738 in qbus_walk_children
    #16 0x0000555555913318 in qdev_walk_children
    #17 0x0000555555916738 in qbus_walk_children
    #18 0x00005555559168ca in qemu_devices_reset
    #19 0x000055555581fcbb in pc_machine_reset
    #20 0x00005555558a4d96 in qemu_system_reset
    #21 0x000055555577157a in main_loop_should_exit
    #22 0x000055555577157a in main_loop
    #23 0x000055555577157a in main

The rationale is that the loop in block_job_detach_aio_context cannot
make any progress in pausing/completing the job, because bs->in_flight
is 0, so bdrv_drain doesn't process the block_job_defer_to_main_loop
BH. With this patch, it does.

Reported-by: Jeff Cody <jcody@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Fam Zheng <famz@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20170418143044.12187-3-famz@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Cody <jcody@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jeff Cody <jcody@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Fam Zheng <famz@redhat.com>
AndrewFasano pushed a commit that referenced this issue Apr 27, 2020
The following segfault is encountered if the NBD server closes the UNIX
domain socket immediately after negotiation:

  Program terminated with signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
  #0  aio_co_schedule (ctx=0x0, co=0xd3c0ff2ef0) at util/async.c:441
  441       QSLIST_INSERT_HEAD_ATOMIC(&ctx->scheduled_coroutines,
  (gdb) bt
  #0  0x000000d3c01a50f8 in aio_co_schedule (ctx=0x0, co=0xd3c0ff2ef0) at util/async.c:441
  #1  0x000000d3c012fa90 in nbd_coroutine_end (bs=bs@entry=0xd3c0fec650, request=<optimized out>) at block/nbd-client.c:207
  #2  0x000000d3c012fb58 in nbd_client_co_preadv (bs=0xd3c0fec650, offset=0, bytes=<optimized out>, qiov=0x7ffc10a91b20, flags=0) at block/nbd-client.c:237
  #3  0x000000d3c0128e63 in bdrv_driver_preadv (bs=bs@entry=0xd3c0fec650, offset=offset@entry=0, bytes=bytes@entry=512, qiov=qiov@entry=0x7ffc10a91b20, flags=0) at block/io.c:836
  #4  0x000000d3c012c3e0 in bdrv_aligned_preadv (child=child@entry=0xd3c0ff51d0, req=req@entry=0x7f31885d6e90, offset=offset@entry=0, bytes=bytes@entry=512, align=align@entry=1, qiov=qiov@entry=0x7ffc10a91b20, f
+lags=0) at block/io.c:1086
  #5  0x000000d3c012c6b8 in bdrv_co_preadv (child=0xd3c0ff51d0, offset=offset@entry=0, bytes=bytes@entry=512, qiov=qiov@entry=0x7ffc10a91b20, flags=flags@entry=0) at block/io.c:1182
  #6  0x000000d3c011cc17 in blk_co_preadv (blk=0xd3c0ff4f80, offset=0, bytes=512, qiov=0x7ffc10a91b20, flags=0) at block/block-backend.c:1032
  #7  0x000000d3c011ccec in blk_read_entry (opaque=0x7ffc10a91b40) at block/block-backend.c:1079
  #8  0x000000d3c01bbb96 in coroutine_trampoline (i0=<optimized out>, i1=<optimized out>) at util/coroutine-ucontext.c:79
  #9  0x00007f3196cb8600 in __start_context () at /lib64/libc.so.6

The problem is that nbd_client_init() uses
nbd_client_attach_aio_context() -> aio_co_schedule(new_context,
client->read_reply_co).  Execution of read_reply_co is deferred to a BH
which doesn't run until later.

In the mean time blk_co_preadv() can be called and nbd_coroutine_end()
calls aio_wake() on read_reply_co.  At this point in time
read_reply_co's ctx isn't set because it has never been entered yet.

This patch simplifies the nbd_co_send_request() ->
nbd_co_receive_reply() -> nbd_coroutine_end() lifecycle to just
nbd_co_send_request() -> nbd_co_receive_reply().  The request is "ended"
if an error occurs at any point.  Callers no longer have to invoke
nbd_coroutine_end().

This cleanup also eliminates the segfault because we don't call
aio_co_schedule() to wake up s->read_reply_co if sending the request
failed.  It is only necessary to wake up s->read_reply_co if a reply was
received.

Note this only happens with UNIX domain sockets on Linux.  It doesn't
seem possible to reproduce this with TCP sockets.

Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20170829122745.14309-2-stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 3c2d518)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
AndrewFasano pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jul 18, 2022
We can't know the caller read enough data in the memory pointed
by ext_hdr to cast it as a ip6_ext_hdr_routing.
Declare rt_hdr on the stack and fill it again from the iovec.

Since we already checked there is enough data in the iovec buffer,
simply add an assert() call to consume the bytes_read variable.

This fix a 2 bytes buffer overrun in eth_parse_ipv6_hdr() reported
by QEMU fuzzer:

  $ cat << EOF | ./qemu-system-i386 -M pc-q35-5.0 \
    -accel qtest -monitor none \
    -serial none -nographic -qtest stdio
  outl 0xcf8 0x80001010
  outl 0xcfc 0xe1020000
  outl 0xcf8 0x80001004
  outw 0xcfc 0x7
  write 0x25 0x1 0x86
  write 0x26 0x1 0xdd
  write 0x4f 0x1 0x2b
  write 0xe1020030 0x4 0x190002e1
  write 0xe102003a 0x2 0x0807
  write 0xe1020048 0x4 0x12077cdd
  write 0xe1020400 0x4 0xba077cdd
  write 0xe1020420 0x4 0x190002e1
  write 0xe1020428 0x4 0x3509d807
  write 0xe1020438 0x1 0xe2
  EOF
  =================================================================
  ==2859770==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on address 0x7ffdef904902 at pc 0x561ceefa78de bp 0x7ffdef904820 sp 0x7ffdef904818
  READ of size 1 at 0x7ffdef904902 thread T0
      #0 0x561ceefa78dd in _eth_get_rss_ex_dst_addr net/eth.c:410:17
      #1 0x561ceefa41fb in eth_parse_ipv6_hdr net/eth.c:532:17
      #2 0x561cef7de639 in net_tx_pkt_parse_headers hw/net/net_tx_pkt.c:228:14
      #3 0x561cef7dbef4 in net_tx_pkt_parse hw/net/net_tx_pkt.c:273:9
      #4 0x561ceec29f22 in e1000e_process_tx_desc hw/net/e1000e_core.c:730:29
      #5 0x561ceec28eac in e1000e_start_xmit hw/net/e1000e_core.c:927:9
      #6 0x561ceec1baab in e1000e_set_tdt hw/net/e1000e_core.c:2444:9
      #7 0x561ceebf300e in e1000e_core_write hw/net/e1000e_core.c:3256:9
      #8 0x561cef3cd4cd in e1000e_mmio_write hw/net/e1000e.c:110:5

  Address 0x7ffdef904902 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 34 in frame
      #0 0x561ceefa320f in eth_parse_ipv6_hdr net/eth.c:486

    This frame has 1 object(s):
      [32, 34) 'ext_hdr' (line 487) <== Memory access at offset 34 overflows this variable
  HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork
        (longjmp and C++ exceptions *are* supported)
  SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow net/eth.c:410:17 in _eth_get_rss_ex_dst_addr
  Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
    0x10003df188d0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x10003df188e0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x10003df188f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x10003df18900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x10003df18910: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1
  =>0x10003df18920:[02]f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x10003df18930: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x10003df18940: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x10003df18950: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x10003df18960: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x10003df18970: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
    Addressable:           00
    Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
    Stack left redzone:      f1
    Stack right redzone:     f3
  ==2859770==ABORTING

Add the corresponding qtest case with the fuzzer reproducer.

FWIW GCC 11 similarly reported:

  net/eth.c: In function 'eth_parse_ipv6_hdr':
  net/eth.c:410:15: error: array subscript 'struct ip6_ext_hdr_routing[0]' is partly outside array bounds of 'struct ip6_ext_hdr[1]' [-Werror=array-bounds]
    410 |     if ((rthdr->rtype == 2) && (rthdr->segleft == 1)) {
        |          ~~~~~^~~~~~~
  net/eth.c:485:24: note: while referencing 'ext_hdr'
    485 |     struct ip6_ext_hdr ext_hdr;
        |                        ^~~~~~~
  net/eth.c:410:38: error: array subscript 'struct ip6_ext_hdr_routing[0]' is partly outside array bounds of 'struct ip6_ext_hdr[1]' [-Werror=array-bounds]
    410 |     if ((rthdr->rtype == 2) && (rthdr->segleft == 1)) {
        |                                 ~~~~~^~~~~~~~~
  net/eth.c:485:24: note: while referencing 'ext_hdr'
    485 |     struct ip6_ext_hdr ext_hdr;
        |                        ^~~~~~~

Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Buglink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1879531
Reported-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
Reported-by: Miroslav Rezanina <mrezanin@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Miroslav Rezanina <mrezanin@redhat.com>
Fixes: eb70002 ("net_pkt: Extend packet abstraction as required by e1000e functionality")
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
AndrewFasano pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jul 18, 2022
We can't know the caller read enough data in the memory pointed
by ext_hdr to cast it as a ip6_ext_hdr_routing.
Declare rt_hdr on the stack and fill it again from the iovec.

Since we already checked there is enough data in the iovec buffer,
simply add an assert() call to consume the bytes_read variable.

This fix a 2 bytes buffer overrun in eth_parse_ipv6_hdr() reported
by QEMU fuzzer:

  $ cat << EOF | ./qemu-system-i386 -M pc-q35-5.0 \
    -accel qtest -monitor none \
    -serial none -nographic -qtest stdio
  outl 0xcf8 0x80001010
  outl 0xcfc 0xe1020000
  outl 0xcf8 0x80001004
  outw 0xcfc 0x7
  write 0x25 0x1 0x86
  write 0x26 0x1 0xdd
  write 0x4f 0x1 0x2b
  write 0xe1020030 0x4 0x190002e1
  write 0xe102003a 0x2 0x0807
  write 0xe1020048 0x4 0x12077cdd
  write 0xe1020400 0x4 0xba077cdd
  write 0xe1020420 0x4 0x190002e1
  write 0xe1020428 0x4 0x3509d807
  write 0xe1020438 0x1 0xe2
  EOF
  =================================================================
  ==2859770==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on address 0x7ffdef904902 at pc 0x561ceefa78de bp 0x7ffdef904820 sp 0x7ffdef904818
  READ of size 1 at 0x7ffdef904902 thread T0
      #0 0x561ceefa78dd in _eth_get_rss_ex_dst_addr net/eth.c:410:17
      #1 0x561ceefa41fb in eth_parse_ipv6_hdr net/eth.c:532:17
      #2 0x561cef7de639 in net_tx_pkt_parse_headers hw/net/net_tx_pkt.c:228:14
      #3 0x561cef7dbef4 in net_tx_pkt_parse hw/net/net_tx_pkt.c:273:9
      #4 0x561ceec29f22 in e1000e_process_tx_desc hw/net/e1000e_core.c:730:29
      #5 0x561ceec28eac in e1000e_start_xmit hw/net/e1000e_core.c:927:9
      #6 0x561ceec1baab in e1000e_set_tdt hw/net/e1000e_core.c:2444:9
      #7 0x561ceebf300e in e1000e_core_write hw/net/e1000e_core.c:3256:9
      #8 0x561cef3cd4cd in e1000e_mmio_write hw/net/e1000e.c:110:5

  Address 0x7ffdef904902 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 34 in frame
      #0 0x561ceefa320f in eth_parse_ipv6_hdr net/eth.c:486

    This frame has 1 object(s):
      [32, 34) 'ext_hdr' (line 487) <== Memory access at offset 34 overflows this variable
  HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork
        (longjmp and C++ exceptions *are* supported)
  SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow net/eth.c:410:17 in _eth_get_rss_ex_dst_addr
  Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
    0x10003df188d0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x10003df188e0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x10003df188f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x10003df18900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x10003df18910: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1
  =>0x10003df18920:[02]f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x10003df18930: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x10003df18940: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x10003df18950: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x10003df18960: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x10003df18970: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
    Addressable:           00
    Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
    Stack left redzone:      f1
    Stack right redzone:     f3
  ==2859770==ABORTING

Add the corresponding qtest case with the fuzzer reproducer.

FWIW GCC 11 similarly reported:

  net/eth.c: In function 'eth_parse_ipv6_hdr':
  net/eth.c:410:15: error: array subscript 'struct ip6_ext_hdr_routing[0]' is partly outside array bounds of 'struct ip6_ext_hdr[1]' [-Werror=array-bounds]
    410 |     if ((rthdr->rtype == 2) && (rthdr->segleft == 1)) {
        |          ~~~~~^~~~~~~
  net/eth.c:485:24: note: while referencing 'ext_hdr'
    485 |     struct ip6_ext_hdr ext_hdr;
        |                        ^~~~~~~
  net/eth.c:410:38: error: array subscript 'struct ip6_ext_hdr_routing[0]' is partly outside array bounds of 'struct ip6_ext_hdr[1]' [-Werror=array-bounds]
    410 |     if ((rthdr->rtype == 2) && (rthdr->segleft == 1)) {
        |                                 ~~~~~^~~~~~~~~
  net/eth.c:485:24: note: while referencing 'ext_hdr'
    485 |     struct ip6_ext_hdr ext_hdr;
        |                        ^~~~~~~

Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Buglink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1879531
Reported-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
Reported-by: Miroslav Rezanina <mrezanin@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Miroslav Rezanina <mrezanin@redhat.com>
Fixes: eb70002 ("net_pkt: Extend packet abstraction as required by e1000e functionality")
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
AndrewFasano pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jul 18, 2022
We can't know the caller read enough data in the memory pointed
by ext_hdr to cast it as a ip6_ext_hdr_routing.
Declare rt_hdr on the stack and fill it again from the iovec.

Since we already checked there is enough data in the iovec buffer,
simply add an assert() call to consume the bytes_read variable.

This fix a 2 bytes buffer overrun in eth_parse_ipv6_hdr() reported
by QEMU fuzzer:

  $ cat << EOF | ./qemu-system-i386 -M pc-q35-5.0 \
    -accel qtest -monitor none \
    -serial none -nographic -qtest stdio
  outl 0xcf8 0x80001010
  outl 0xcfc 0xe1020000
  outl 0xcf8 0x80001004
  outw 0xcfc 0x7
  write 0x25 0x1 0x86
  write 0x26 0x1 0xdd
  write 0x4f 0x1 0x2b
  write 0xe1020030 0x4 0x190002e1
  write 0xe102003a 0x2 0x0807
  write 0xe1020048 0x4 0x12077cdd
  write 0xe1020400 0x4 0xba077cdd
  write 0xe1020420 0x4 0x190002e1
  write 0xe1020428 0x4 0x3509d807
  write 0xe1020438 0x1 0xe2
  EOF
  =================================================================
  ==2859770==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on address 0x7ffdef904902 at pc 0x561ceefa78de bp 0x7ffdef904820 sp 0x7ffdef904818
  READ of size 1 at 0x7ffdef904902 thread T0
      #0 0x561ceefa78dd in _eth_get_rss_ex_dst_addr net/eth.c:410:17
      #1 0x561ceefa41fb in eth_parse_ipv6_hdr net/eth.c:532:17
      #2 0x561cef7de639 in net_tx_pkt_parse_headers hw/net/net_tx_pkt.c:228:14
      #3 0x561cef7dbef4 in net_tx_pkt_parse hw/net/net_tx_pkt.c:273:9
      #4 0x561ceec29f22 in e1000e_process_tx_desc hw/net/e1000e_core.c:730:29
      #5 0x561ceec28eac in e1000e_start_xmit hw/net/e1000e_core.c:927:9
      #6 0x561ceec1baab in e1000e_set_tdt hw/net/e1000e_core.c:2444:9
      #7 0x561ceebf300e in e1000e_core_write hw/net/e1000e_core.c:3256:9
      #8 0x561cef3cd4cd in e1000e_mmio_write hw/net/e1000e.c:110:5

  Address 0x7ffdef904902 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 34 in frame
      #0 0x561ceefa320f in eth_parse_ipv6_hdr net/eth.c:486

    This frame has 1 object(s):
      [32, 34) 'ext_hdr' (line 487) <== Memory access at offset 34 overflows this variable
  HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork
        (longjmp and C++ exceptions *are* supported)
  SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow net/eth.c:410:17 in _eth_get_rss_ex_dst_addr
  Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
    0x10003df188d0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x10003df188e0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x10003df188f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x10003df18900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x10003df18910: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1
  =>0x10003df18920:[02]f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x10003df18930: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x10003df18940: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x10003df18950: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x10003df18960: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x10003df18970: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
    Addressable:           00
    Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
    Stack left redzone:      f1
    Stack right redzone:     f3
  ==2859770==ABORTING

Add the corresponding qtest case with the fuzzer reproducer.

FWIW GCC 11 similarly reported:

  net/eth.c: In function 'eth_parse_ipv6_hdr':
  net/eth.c:410:15: error: array subscript 'struct ip6_ext_hdr_routing[0]' is partly outside array bounds of 'struct ip6_ext_hdr[1]' [-Werror=array-bounds]
    410 |     if ((rthdr->rtype == 2) && (rthdr->segleft == 1)) {
        |          ~~~~~^~~~~~~
  net/eth.c:485:24: note: while referencing 'ext_hdr'
    485 |     struct ip6_ext_hdr ext_hdr;
        |                        ^~~~~~~
  net/eth.c:410:38: error: array subscript 'struct ip6_ext_hdr_routing[0]' is partly outside array bounds of 'struct ip6_ext_hdr[1]' [-Werror=array-bounds]
    410 |     if ((rthdr->rtype == 2) && (rthdr->segleft == 1)) {
        |                                 ~~~~~^~~~~~~~~
  net/eth.c:485:24: note: while referencing 'ext_hdr'
    485 |     struct ip6_ext_hdr ext_hdr;
        |                        ^~~~~~~

Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Buglink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1879531
Reported-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
Reported-by: Miroslav Rezanina <mrezanin@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Miroslav Rezanina <mrezanin@redhat.com>
Fixes: eb70002 ("net_pkt: Extend packet abstraction as required by e1000e functionality")
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
AndrewFasano pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jul 19, 2022
We can't know the caller read enough data in the memory pointed
by ext_hdr to cast it as a ip6_ext_hdr_routing.
Declare rt_hdr on the stack and fill it again from the iovec.

Since we already checked there is enough data in the iovec buffer,
simply add an assert() call to consume the bytes_read variable.

This fix a 2 bytes buffer overrun in eth_parse_ipv6_hdr() reported
by QEMU fuzzer:

  $ cat << EOF | ./qemu-system-i386 -M pc-q35-5.0 \
    -accel qtest -monitor none \
    -serial none -nographic -qtest stdio
  outl 0xcf8 0x80001010
  outl 0xcfc 0xe1020000
  outl 0xcf8 0x80001004
  outw 0xcfc 0x7
  write 0x25 0x1 0x86
  write 0x26 0x1 0xdd
  write 0x4f 0x1 0x2b
  write 0xe1020030 0x4 0x190002e1
  write 0xe102003a 0x2 0x0807
  write 0xe1020048 0x4 0x12077cdd
  write 0xe1020400 0x4 0xba077cdd
  write 0xe1020420 0x4 0x190002e1
  write 0xe1020428 0x4 0x3509d807
  write 0xe1020438 0x1 0xe2
  EOF
  =================================================================
  ==2859770==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on address 0x7ffdef904902 at pc 0x561ceefa78de bp 0x7ffdef904820 sp 0x7ffdef904818
  READ of size 1 at 0x7ffdef904902 thread T0
      #0 0x561ceefa78dd in _eth_get_rss_ex_dst_addr net/eth.c:410:17
      #1 0x561ceefa41fb in eth_parse_ipv6_hdr net/eth.c:532:17
      #2 0x561cef7de639 in net_tx_pkt_parse_headers hw/net/net_tx_pkt.c:228:14
      #3 0x561cef7dbef4 in net_tx_pkt_parse hw/net/net_tx_pkt.c:273:9
      #4 0x561ceec29f22 in e1000e_process_tx_desc hw/net/e1000e_core.c:730:29
      #5 0x561ceec28eac in e1000e_start_xmit hw/net/e1000e_core.c:927:9
      #6 0x561ceec1baab in e1000e_set_tdt hw/net/e1000e_core.c:2444:9
      #7 0x561ceebf300e in e1000e_core_write hw/net/e1000e_core.c:3256:9
      #8 0x561cef3cd4cd in e1000e_mmio_write hw/net/e1000e.c:110:5

  Address 0x7ffdef904902 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 34 in frame
      #0 0x561ceefa320f in eth_parse_ipv6_hdr net/eth.c:486

    This frame has 1 object(s):
      [32, 34) 'ext_hdr' (line 487) <== Memory access at offset 34 overflows this variable
  HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork
        (longjmp and C++ exceptions *are* supported)
  SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow net/eth.c:410:17 in _eth_get_rss_ex_dst_addr
  Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
    0x10003df188d0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x10003df188e0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x10003df188f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x10003df18900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x10003df18910: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1
  =>0x10003df18920:[02]f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x10003df18930: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x10003df18940: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x10003df18950: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x10003df18960: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    0x10003df18970: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
    Addressable:           00
    Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
    Stack left redzone:      f1
    Stack right redzone:     f3
  ==2859770==ABORTING

Add the corresponding qtest case with the fuzzer reproducer.

FWIW GCC 11 similarly reported:

  net/eth.c: In function 'eth_parse_ipv6_hdr':
  net/eth.c:410:15: error: array subscript 'struct ip6_ext_hdr_routing[0]' is partly outside array bounds of 'struct ip6_ext_hdr[1]' [-Werror=array-bounds]
    410 |     if ((rthdr->rtype == 2) && (rthdr->segleft == 1)) {
        |          ~~~~~^~~~~~~
  net/eth.c:485:24: note: while referencing 'ext_hdr'
    485 |     struct ip6_ext_hdr ext_hdr;
        |                        ^~~~~~~
  net/eth.c:410:38: error: array subscript 'struct ip6_ext_hdr_routing[0]' is partly outside array bounds of 'struct ip6_ext_hdr[1]' [-Werror=array-bounds]
    410 |     if ((rthdr->rtype == 2) && (rthdr->segleft == 1)) {
        |                                 ~~~~~^~~~~~~~~
  net/eth.c:485:24: note: while referencing 'ext_hdr'
    485 |     struct ip6_ext_hdr ext_hdr;
        |                        ^~~~~~~

Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Buglink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1879531
Reported-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
Reported-by: Miroslav Rezanina <mrezanin@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Miroslav Rezanina <mrezanin@redhat.com>
Fixes: eb70002 ("net_pkt: Extend packet abstraction as required by e1000e functionality")
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
AndrewFasano pushed a commit that referenced this issue Oct 14, 2023
Receive/transmit/event vqs forgot to cleanup in vhost_vsock_unrealize. This
patch save receive/transmit vq pointer in realize() and cleanup vqs
through those vq pointers in unrealize(). The leak stack is as follow:

Direct leak of 21504 byte(s) in 3 object(s) allocated from:
  #0 0x7f86a1356970 (/lib64/libasan.so.5+0xef970)  ??:?
  #1 0x7f86a09aa49d (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x5249d)  ??:?
  #2 0x5604852f85ca (./x86_64-softmmu/qemu-system-x86_64+0x2c3e5ca)  /mnt/sdb/qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:2333
  #3 0x560485356208 (./x86_64-softmmu/qemu-system-x86_64+0x2c9c208)  /mnt/sdb/qemu/hw/virtio/vhost-vsock.c:339
  #4 0x560485305a17 (./x86_64-softmmu/qemu-system-x86_64+0x2c4ba17)  /mnt/sdb/qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:3531
  #5 0x5604858e6b65 (./x86_64-softmmu/qemu-system-x86_64+0x322cb65)  /mnt/sdb/qemu/hw/core/qdev.c:865
  #6 0x5604861e6c41 (./x86_64-softmmu/qemu-system-x86_64+0x3b2cc41)  /mnt/sdb/qemu/qom/object.c:2102

Reported-by: Euler Robot <euler.robot@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Pan Nengyuan <pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Message-Id: <20200115062535.50644-1-pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
AndrewFasano pushed a commit that referenced this issue Oct 16, 2023
Receive/transmit/event vqs forgot to cleanup in vhost_vsock_unrealize. This
patch save receive/transmit vq pointer in realize() and cleanup vqs
through those vq pointers in unrealize(). The leak stack is as follow:

Direct leak of 21504 byte(s) in 3 object(s) allocated from:
  #0 0x7f86a1356970 (/lib64/libasan.so.5+0xef970)  ??:?
  #1 0x7f86a09aa49d (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x5249d)  ??:?
  #2 0x5604852f85ca (./x86_64-softmmu/qemu-system-x86_64+0x2c3e5ca)  /mnt/sdb/qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:2333
  #3 0x560485356208 (./x86_64-softmmu/qemu-system-x86_64+0x2c9c208)  /mnt/sdb/qemu/hw/virtio/vhost-vsock.c:339
  #4 0x560485305a17 (./x86_64-softmmu/qemu-system-x86_64+0x2c4ba17)  /mnt/sdb/qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:3531
  #5 0x5604858e6b65 (./x86_64-softmmu/qemu-system-x86_64+0x322cb65)  /mnt/sdb/qemu/hw/core/qdev.c:865
  #6 0x5604861e6c41 (./x86_64-softmmu/qemu-system-x86_64+0x3b2cc41)  /mnt/sdb/qemu/qom/object.c:2102

Reported-by: Euler Robot <euler.robot@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Pan Nengyuan <pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Message-Id: <20200115062535.50644-1-pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
AndrewFasano pushed a commit that referenced this issue Oct 16, 2023
Currently offloads disabled by guest via the VIRTIO_NET_CTRL_GUEST_OFFLOADS_SET
command are not preserved on VM migration.
Instead all offloads reported by guest features (via VIRTIO_PCI_GUEST_FEATURES)
get enabled.
What happens is: first the VirtIONet::curr_guest_offloads gets restored and offloads
are getting set correctly:

 #0  qemu_set_offload (nc=0x555556a11400, csum=1, tso4=0, tso6=0, ecn=0, ufo=0) at net/net.c:474
 #1  virtio_net_apply_guest_offloads (n=0x555557701ca0) at hw/net/virtio-net.c:720
 #2  virtio_net_post_load_device (opaque=0x555557701ca0, version_id=11) at hw/net/virtio-net.c:2334
 #3  vmstate_load_state (f=0x5555569dc010, vmsd=0x555556577c80 <vmstate_virtio_net_device>, opaque=0x555557701ca0, version_id=11)
     at migration/vmstate.c:168
 #4  virtio_load (vdev=0x555557701ca0, f=0x5555569dc010, version_id=11) at hw/virtio/virtio.c:2197
 #5  virtio_device_get (f=0x5555569dc010, opaque=0x555557701ca0, size=0, field=0x55555668cd00 <__compound_literal.5>) at hw/virtio/virtio.c:2036
 #6  vmstate_load_state (f=0x5555569dc010, vmsd=0x555556577ce0 <vmstate_virtio_net>, opaque=0x555557701ca0, version_id=11) at migration/vmstate.c:143
 #7  vmstate_load (f=0x5555569dc010, se=0x5555578189e0) at migration/savevm.c:829
 #8  qemu_loadvm_section_start_full (f=0x5555569dc010, mis=0x5555569eee20) at migration/savevm.c:2211
 #9  qemu_loadvm_state_main (f=0x5555569dc010, mis=0x5555569eee20) at migration/savevm.c:2395
 #10 qemu_loadvm_state (f=0x5555569dc010) at migration/savevm.c:2467
 #11 process_incoming_migration_co (opaque=0x0) at migration/migration.c:449

However later on the features are getting restored, and offloads get reset to
everything supported by features:

 #0  qemu_set_offload (nc=0x555556a11400, csum=1, tso4=1, tso6=1, ecn=0, ufo=0) at net/net.c:474
 #1  virtio_net_apply_guest_offloads (n=0x555557701ca0) at hw/net/virtio-net.c:720
 #2  virtio_net_set_features (vdev=0x555557701ca0, features=5104441767) at hw/net/virtio-net.c:773
 #3  virtio_set_features_nocheck (vdev=0x555557701ca0, val=5104441767) at hw/virtio/virtio.c:2052
 #4  virtio_load (vdev=0x555557701ca0, f=0x5555569dc010, version_id=11) at hw/virtio/virtio.c:2220
 #5  virtio_device_get (f=0x5555569dc010, opaque=0x555557701ca0, size=0, field=0x55555668cd00 <__compound_literal.5>) at hw/virtio/virtio.c:2036
 #6  vmstate_load_state (f=0x5555569dc010, vmsd=0x555556577ce0 <vmstate_virtio_net>, opaque=0x555557701ca0, version_id=11) at migration/vmstate.c:143
 #7  vmstate_load (f=0x5555569dc010, se=0x5555578189e0) at migration/savevm.c:829
 #8  qemu_loadvm_section_start_full (f=0x5555569dc010, mis=0x5555569eee20) at migration/savevm.c:2211
 #9  qemu_loadvm_state_main (f=0x5555569dc010, mis=0x5555569eee20) at migration/savevm.c:2395
 #10 qemu_loadvm_state (f=0x5555569dc010) at migration/savevm.c:2467
 #11 process_incoming_migration_co (opaque=0x0) at migration/migration.c:449

Fix this by preserving the state in saved_guest_offloads field and
pushing out offload initialization to the new post load hook.

Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Mikhail Sennikovsky <mikhail.sennikovskii@cloud.ionos.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
AndrewFasano pushed a commit that referenced this issue Oct 16, 2023
ivq/dvq/svq/free_page_vq is forgot to cleanup in
virtio_balloon_device_unrealize, the memory leak stack is as follow:

Direct leak of 14336 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7f99fd9d8560 in calloc (/usr/lib64/libasan.so.3+0xc7560)
    #1 0x7f99fcb20015 in g_malloc0 (/usr/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x50015)
    #2 0x557d90638437 in virtio_add_queue hw/virtio/virtio.c:2327
    #3 0x557d9064401d in virtio_balloon_device_realize hw/virtio/virtio-balloon.c:793
    #4 0x557d906356f7 in virtio_device_realize hw/virtio/virtio.c:3504
    #5 0x557d9073f081 in device_set_realized hw/core/qdev.c:876
    #6 0x557d908b1f4d in property_set_bool qom/object.c:2080
    #7 0x557d908b655e in object_property_set_qobject qom/qom-qobject.c:26

Reported-by: Euler Robot <euler.robot@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Pan Nengyuan <pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Message-Id: <1575444716-17632-2-git-send-email-pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
AndrewFasano pushed a commit that referenced this issue Oct 16, 2023
Currently the SLOF firmware for pseries guests will disable/re-enable
a PCI device multiple times via IO/MEM/MASTER bits of PCI_COMMAND
register after the initial probe/feature negotiation, as it tends to
work with a single device at a time at various stages like probing
and running block/network bootloaders without doing a full reset
in-between.

In QEMU, when PCI_COMMAND_MASTER is disabled we disable the
corresponding IOMMU memory region, so DMA accesses (including to vring
fields like idx/flags) will no longer undergo the necessary
translation. Normally we wouldn't expect this to happen since it would
be misbehavior on the driver side to continue driving DMA requests.

However, in the case of pseries, with iommu_platform=on, we trigger the
following sequence when tearing down the virtio-blk dataplane ioeventfd
in response to the guest unsetting PCI_COMMAND_MASTER:

  #2  0x0000555555922651 in virtqueue_map_desc (vdev=vdev@entry=0x555556dbcfb0, p_num_sg=p_num_sg@entry=0x7fffe657e1a8, addr=addr@entry=0x7fffe657e240, iov=iov@entry=0x7fffe6580240, max_num_sg=max_num_sg@entry=1024, is_write=is_write@entry=false, pa=0, sz=0)
      at /home/mdroth/w/qemu.git/hw/virtio/virtio.c:757
  #3  0x0000555555922a89 in virtqueue_pop (vq=vq@entry=0x555556dc8660, sz=sz@entry=184)
      at /home/mdroth/w/qemu.git/hw/virtio/virtio.c:950
  #4  0x00005555558d3eca in virtio_blk_get_request (vq=0x555556dc8660, s=0x555556dbcfb0)
      at /home/mdroth/w/qemu.git/hw/block/virtio-blk.c:255
  #5  0x00005555558d3eca in virtio_blk_handle_vq (s=0x555556dbcfb0, vq=0x555556dc8660)
      at /home/mdroth/w/qemu.git/hw/block/virtio-blk.c:776
  #6  0x000055555591dd66 in virtio_queue_notify_aio_vq (vq=vq@entry=0x555556dc8660)
      at /home/mdroth/w/qemu.git/hw/virtio/virtio.c:1550
  #7  0x000055555591ecef in virtio_queue_notify_aio_vq (vq=0x555556dc8660)
      at /home/mdroth/w/qemu.git/hw/virtio/virtio.c:1546
  #8  0x000055555591ecef in virtio_queue_host_notifier_aio_poll (opaque=0x555556dc86c8)
      at /home/mdroth/w/qemu.git/hw/virtio/virtio.c:2527
  #9  0x0000555555d02164 in run_poll_handlers_once (ctx=ctx@entry=0x55555688bfc0, timeout=timeout@entry=0x7fffe65844a8)
      at /home/mdroth/w/qemu.git/util/aio-posix.c:520
  #10 0x0000555555d02d1b in try_poll_mode (timeout=0x7fffe65844a8, ctx=0x55555688bfc0)
      at /home/mdroth/w/qemu.git/util/aio-posix.c:607
  #11 0x0000555555d02d1b in aio_poll (ctx=ctx@entry=0x55555688bfc0, blocking=blocking@entry=true)
      at /home/mdroth/w/qemu.git/util/aio-posix.c:639
  #12 0x0000555555d0004d in aio_wait_bh_oneshot (ctx=0x55555688bfc0, cb=cb@entry=0x5555558d5130 <virtio_blk_data_plane_stop_bh>, opaque=opaque@entry=0x555556de86f0)
      at /home/mdroth/w/qemu.git/util/aio-wait.c:71
  #13 0x00005555558d59bf in virtio_blk_data_plane_stop (vdev=<optimized out>)
      at /home/mdroth/w/qemu.git/hw/block/dataplane/virtio-blk.c:288
  #14 0x0000555555b906a1 in virtio_bus_stop_ioeventfd (bus=bus@entry=0x555556dbcf38)
      at /home/mdroth/w/qemu.git/hw/virtio/virtio-bus.c:245
  #15 0x0000555555b90dbb in virtio_bus_stop_ioeventfd (bus=bus@entry=0x555556dbcf38)
      at /home/mdroth/w/qemu.git/hw/virtio/virtio-bus.c:237
  #16 0x0000555555b92a8e in virtio_pci_stop_ioeventfd (proxy=0x555556db4e40)
      at /home/mdroth/w/qemu.git/hw/virtio/virtio-pci.c:292
  #17 0x0000555555b92a8e in virtio_write_config (pci_dev=0x555556db4e40, address=<optimized out>, val=1048832, len=<optimized out>)
      at /home/mdroth/w/qemu.git/hw/virtio/virtio-pci.c:613

I.e. the calling code is only scheduling a one-shot BH for
virtio_blk_data_plane_stop_bh, but somehow we end up trying to process
an additional virtqueue entry before we get there. This is likely due
to the following check in virtio_queue_host_notifier_aio_poll:

  static bool virtio_queue_host_notifier_aio_poll(void *opaque)
  {
      EventNotifier *n = opaque;
      VirtQueue *vq = container_of(n, VirtQueue, host_notifier);
      bool progress;

      if (!vq->vring.desc || virtio_queue_empty(vq)) {
          return false;
      }

      progress = virtio_queue_notify_aio_vq(vq);

namely the call to virtio_queue_empty(). In this case, since no new
requests have actually been issued, shadow_avail_idx == last_avail_idx,
so we actually try to access the vring via vring_avail_idx() to get
the latest non-shadowed idx:

  int virtio_queue_empty(VirtQueue *vq)
  {
      bool empty;
      ...

      if (vq->shadow_avail_idx != vq->last_avail_idx) {
          return 0;
      }

      rcu_read_lock();
      empty = vring_avail_idx(vq) == vq->last_avail_idx;
      rcu_read_unlock();
      return empty;

but since the IOMMU region has been disabled we get a bogus value (0
usually), which causes virtio_queue_empty() to falsely report that
there are entries to be processed, which causes errors such as:

  "virtio: zero sized buffers are not allowed"

or

  "virtio-blk missing headers"

and puts the device in an error state.

This patch works around the issue by introducing virtio_set_disabled(),
which sets a 'disabled' flag to bypass checks like virtio_queue_empty()
when bus-mastering is disabled. Since we'd check this flag at all the
same sites as vdev->broken, we replace those checks with an inline
function which checks for either vdev->broken or vdev->disabled.

The 'disabled' flag is only migrated when set, which should be fairly
rare, but to maintain migration compatibility we disable it's use for
older machine types. Users requiring the use of the flag in conjunction
with older machine types can set it explicitly as a virtio-device
option.

NOTES:

 - This leaves some other oddities in play, like the fact that
   DRIVER_OK also gets unset in response to bus-mastering being
   disabled, but not restored (however the device seems to continue
   working)
 - Similarly, we disable the host notifier via
   virtio_bus_stop_ioeventfd(), which seems to move the handling out
   of virtio-blk dataplane and back into the main IO thread, and it
   ends up staying there till a reset (but otherwise continues working
   normally)

Cc: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>,
Cc: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Message-Id: <20191120005003.27035-1-mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
AndrewFasano pushed a commit that referenced this issue Oct 16, 2023
Receive/transmit/event vqs forgot to cleanup in vhost_vsock_unrealize. This
patch save receive/transmit vq pointer in realize() and cleanup vqs
through those vq pointers in unrealize(). The leak stack is as follow:

Direct leak of 21504 byte(s) in 3 object(s) allocated from:
  #0 0x7f86a1356970 (/lib64/libasan.so.5+0xef970)  ??:?
  #1 0x7f86a09aa49d (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x5249d)  ??:?
  #2 0x5604852f85ca (./x86_64-softmmu/qemu-system-x86_64+0x2c3e5ca)  /mnt/sdb/qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:2333
  #3 0x560485356208 (./x86_64-softmmu/qemu-system-x86_64+0x2c9c208)  /mnt/sdb/qemu/hw/virtio/vhost-vsock.c:339
  #4 0x560485305a17 (./x86_64-softmmu/qemu-system-x86_64+0x2c4ba17)  /mnt/sdb/qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:3531
  #5 0x5604858e6b65 (./x86_64-softmmu/qemu-system-x86_64+0x322cb65)  /mnt/sdb/qemu/hw/core/qdev.c:865
  #6 0x5604861e6c41 (./x86_64-softmmu/qemu-system-x86_64+0x3b2cc41)  /mnt/sdb/qemu/qom/object.c:2102

Reported-by: Euler Robot <euler.robot@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Pan Nengyuan <pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Message-Id: <20200115062535.50644-1-pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
AndrewFasano pushed a commit that referenced this issue Oct 16, 2023
Similar to other virtio device(https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11399237/), virtio queues forgot to delete in unrealize, and aslo error path in realize, this patch fix these memleaks, the leak stack is as follow:
Direct leak of 57344 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7f15784fb970 in __interceptor_calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.5+0xef970)
    #1 0x7f157790849d in g_malloc0 (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x5249d)
    #2 0x55587a1bf859 in virtio_add_queue /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:2333
    #3 0x55587a2071d5 in vuf_device_realize /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/hw/virtio/vhost-user-fs.c:212
    #4 0x55587a1ae360 in virtio_device_realize /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:3531
    #5 0x55587a63fb7b in device_set_realized /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/hw/core/qdev.c:891
    #6 0x55587acf03f5 in property_set_bool /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/qom/object.c:2238
    #7 0x55587acfce0d in object_property_set_qobject /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/qom/qom-qobject.c:26
    #8 0x55587acf5c8c in object_property_set_bool /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/qom/object.c:1390
    #9 0x55587a8e22a2 in pci_qdev_realize /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/hw/pci/pci.c:2095
    #10 0x55587a63fb7b in device_set_realized /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/hw/core/qdev.c:891
    #11 0x55587acf03f5 in property_set_bool /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/qom/object.c:2238
    #12 0x55587acfce0d in object_property_set_qobject /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/qom/qom-qobject.c:26
    #13 0x55587acf5c8c in object_property_set_bool /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/qom/object.c:1390
    #14 0x55587a496d65 in qdev_device_add /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/qdev-monitor.c:679

Reported-by: Euler Robot <euler.robot@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Pan Nengyuan <pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200225075554.10835-2-pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
AndrewFasano pushed a commit that referenced this issue Oct 16, 2023
Similar to other virtio-deivces, ctrl_vq forgot to delete in virtio_crypto_device_unrealize, this patch fix it.
This device has aleardy maintained vq pointers. Thus, we use the new virtio_delete_queue function directly to do the cleanup.

The leak stack:
Direct leak of 10752 byte(s) in 3 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7f4c024b1970 in __interceptor_calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.5+0xef970)
    #1 0x7f4c018be49d in g_malloc0 (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x5249d)
    #2 0x55a2f8017279 in virtio_add_queue /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:2333
    #3 0x55a2f8057035 in virtio_crypto_device_realize /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c:814
    #4 0x55a2f8005d80 in virtio_device_realize /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:3531
    #5 0x55a2f8497d1b in device_set_realized /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/hw/core/qdev.c:891
    #6 0x55a2f8b48595 in property_set_bool /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/qom/object.c:2238
    #7 0x55a2f8b54fad in object_property_set_qobject /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/qom/qom-qobject.c:26
    #8 0x55a2f8b4de2c in object_property_set_bool /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/qom/object.c:1390
    #9 0x55a2f80609c9 in virtio_crypto_pci_realize /mnt/sdb/qemu-new/qemu_test/qemu/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto-pci.c:58

Reported-by: Euler Robot <euler.robot@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Pan Nengyuan <pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Cc: "Gonglei (Arei)" <arei.gonglei@huawei.com>
Message-Id: <20200225075554.10835-5-pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
AndrewFasano pushed a commit that referenced this issue Oct 16, 2023
The virtqueue code sets up MemoryRegionCaches to access the virtqueue
guest RAM data structures.  The code currently assumes that
VRingMemoryRegionCaches is initialized before device emulation code
accesses the virtqueue.  An assertion will fail in
vring_get_region_caches() when this is not true.  Device fuzzing found a
case where this assumption is false (see below).

Virtqueue guest RAM addresses can also be changed from a vCPU thread
while an IOThread is accessing the virtqueue.  This breaks the same
assumption but this time the caches could become invalid partway through
the virtqueue code.  The code fetches the caches RCU pointer multiple
times so we will need to validate the pointer every time it is fetched.

Add checks each time we call vring_get_region_caches() and treat invalid
caches as a nop: memory stores are ignored and memory reads return 0.

The fuzz test failure is as follows:

  $ qemu -M pc -device virtio-blk-pci,id=drv0,drive=drive0,addr=4.0 \
         -drive if=none,id=drive0,file=null-co://,format=raw,auto-read-only=off \
         -drive if=none,id=drive1,file=null-co://,file.read-zeroes=on,format=raw \
         -display none \
         -qtest stdio
  endianness
  outl 0xcf8 0x80002020
  outl 0xcfc 0xe0000000
  outl 0xcf8 0x80002004
  outw 0xcfc 0x7
  write 0xe0000000 0x24 0x00ffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffab5cffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffabffffffab0000000001
  inb 0x4
  writew 0xe000001c 0x1
  write 0xe0000014 0x1 0x0d

The following error message is produced:

  qemu-system-x86_64: /home/stefanha/qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:286: vring_get_region_caches: Assertion `caches != NULL' failed.

The backtrace looks like this:

  #0  0x00007ffff5520625 in raise () at /lib64/libc.so.6
  #1  0x00007ffff55098d9 in abort () at /lib64/libc.so.6
  #2  0x00007ffff55097a9 in _nl_load_domain.cold () at /lib64/libc.so.6
  #3  0x00007ffff5518a66 in annobin_assert.c_end () at /lib64/libc.so.6
  #4  0x00005555559073da in vring_get_region_caches (vq=<optimized out>) at qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:286
  #5  vring_get_region_caches (vq=<optimized out>) at qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:283
  #6  0x000055555590818d in vring_used_flags_set_bit (mask=1, vq=0x5555575ceea0) at qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:398
  #7  virtio_queue_split_set_notification (enable=0, vq=0x5555575ceea0) at qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:398
  #8  virtio_queue_set_notification (vq=vq@entry=0x5555575ceea0, enable=enable@entry=0) at qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:451
  #9  0x0000555555908512 in virtio_queue_set_notification (vq=vq@entry=0x5555575ceea0, enable=enable@entry=0) at qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:444
  #10 0x00005555558c697a in virtio_blk_handle_vq (s=0x5555575c57e0, vq=0x5555575ceea0) at qemu/hw/block/virtio-blk.c:775
  #11 0x0000555555907836 in virtio_queue_notify_aio_vq (vq=0x5555575ceea0) at qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:2244
  #12 0x0000555555cb5dd7 in aio_dispatch_handlers (ctx=ctx@entry=0x55555671a420) at util/aio-posix.c:429
  #13 0x0000555555cb67a8 in aio_dispatch (ctx=0x55555671a420) at util/aio-posix.c:460
  #14 0x0000555555cb307e in aio_ctx_dispatch (source=<optimized out>, callback=<optimized out>, user_data=<optimized out>) at util/async.c:260
  #15 0x00007ffff7bbc510 in g_main_context_dispatch () at /lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0
  #16 0x0000555555cb5848 in glib_pollfds_poll () at util/main-loop.c:219
  #17 os_host_main_loop_wait (timeout=<optimized out>) at util/main-loop.c:242
  #18 main_loop_wait (nonblocking=<optimized out>) at util/main-loop.c:518
  #19 0x00005555559b20c9 in main_loop () at vl.c:1683
  #20 0x0000555555838115 in main (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>, envp=<optimized out>) at vl.c:4441

Reported-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
Cc: Michael Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200207104619.164892-1-stefanha@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
AndrewFasano pushed a commit that referenced this issue Oct 16, 2023
when s->inflight is freed, vhost_dev_free_inflight may try to access
s->inflight->addr, it will retrigger the following issue.

==7309==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x604001020d18 at pc 0x555555ce948a bp 0x7fffffffb170 sp 0x7fffffffb160
READ of size 8 at 0x604001020d18 thread T0
    #0 0x555555ce9489 in vhost_dev_free_inflight /root/smartx/qemu-el7/qemu-test/hw/virtio/vhost.c:1473
    #1 0x555555cd86eb in virtio_reset /root/smartx/qemu-el7/qemu-test/hw/virtio/virtio.c:1214
    #2 0x5555560d3eff in virtio_pci_reset hw/virtio/virtio-pci.c:1859
    #3 0x555555f2ac53 in device_set_realized hw/core/qdev.c:893
    #4 0x5555561d572c in property_set_bool qom/object.c:1925
    #5 0x5555561de8de in object_property_set_qobject qom/qom-qobject.c:27
    #6 0x5555561d99f4 in object_property_set_bool qom/object.c:1188
    #7 0x555555e50ae7 in qdev_device_add /root/smartx/qemu-el7/qemu-test/qdev-monitor.c:626
    #8 0x555555e51213 in qmp_device_add /root/smartx/qemu-el7/qemu-test/qdev-monitor.c:806
    #9 0x555555e8ff40 in hmp_device_add /root/smartx/qemu-el7/qemu-test/hmp.c:1951
    #10 0x555555be889a in handle_hmp_command /root/smartx/qemu-el7/qemu-test/monitor.c:3404
    #11 0x555555beac8b in monitor_command_cb /root/smartx/qemu-el7/qemu-test/monitor.c:4296
    #12 0x555556433eb7 in readline_handle_byte util/readline.c:393
    #13 0x555555be89ec in monitor_read /root/smartx/qemu-el7/qemu-test/monitor.c:4279
    #14 0x5555563285cc in tcp_chr_read chardev/char-socket.c:470
    #15 0x7ffff670b968 in g_main_context_dispatch (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x4a968)
    #16 0x55555640727c in glib_pollfds_poll util/main-loop.c:215
    #17 0x55555640727c in os_host_main_loop_wait util/main-loop.c:238
    #18 0x55555640727c in main_loop_wait util/main-loop.c:497
    #19 0x555555b2d0bf in main_loop /root/smartx/qemu-el7/qemu-test/vl.c:2013
    #20 0x555555b2d0bf in main /root/smartx/qemu-el7/qemu-test/vl.c:4776
    #21 0x7fffdd2eb444 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x22444)
    #22 0x555555b3767a  (/root/smartx/qemu-el7/qemu-test/x86_64-softmmu/qemu-system-x86_64+0x5e367a)

0x604001020d18 is located 8 bytes inside of 40-byte region [0x604001020d10,0x604001020d38)
freed by thread T0 here:
    #0 0x7ffff6f00508 in __interceptor_free (/lib64/libasan.so.4+0xde508)
    #1 0x7ffff671107d in g_free (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x5007d)

previously allocated by thread T0 here:
    #0 0x7ffff6f00a88 in __interceptor_calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.4+0xdea88)
    #1 0x7ffff6710fc5 in g_malloc0 (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x4ffc5)

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free /root/smartx/qemu-el7/qemu-test/hw/virtio/vhost.c:1473 in vhost_dev_free_inflight
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
  0x0c08801fc150: fa fa 00 00 00 00 04 fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa
  0x0c08801fc160: fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa 00 00 00 00 04 fa
  0x0c08801fc170: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 01 fa fa 00 00 00 00 04 fa
  0x0c08801fc180: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 01 fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 01
  0x0c08801fc190: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 04 fa
=>0x0c08801fc1a0: fa fa fd[fd]fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa
  0x0c08801fc1b0: fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa
  0x0c08801fc1c0: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd
  0x0c08801fc1d0: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 01 fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa
  0x0c08801fc1e0: fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd
  0x0c08801fc1f0: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 01 fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
  Addressable:           00
  Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
  Heap left redzone:       fa
  Freed heap region:       fd
  Stack left redzone:      f1
  Stack mid redzone:       f2
  Stack right redzone:     f3
  Stack after return:      f5
  Stack use after scope:   f8
  Global redzone:          f9
  Global init order:       f6
  Poisoned by user:        f7
  Container overflow:      fc
  Array cookie:            ac
  Intra object redzone:    bb
  ASan internal:           fe
  Left alloca redzone:     ca
  Right alloca redzone:    cb
==7309==ABORTING

Signed-off-by: Li Feng <fengli@smartx.com>
Message-Id: <20200417101707.14467-1-fengli@smartx.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Raphael Norwitz <raphael.norwitz@nutanix.com>
lacraig2 pushed a commit that referenced this issue Nov 20, 2023
Receive/transmit/event vqs forgot to cleanup in vhost_vsock_unrealize. This
patch save receive/transmit vq pointer in realize() and cleanup vqs
through those vq pointers in unrealize(). The leak stack is as follow:

Direct leak of 21504 byte(s) in 3 object(s) allocated from:
  #0 0x7f86a1356970 (/lib64/libasan.so.5+0xef970)  ??:?
  #1 0x7f86a09aa49d (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x5249d)  ??:?
  #2 0x5604852f85ca (./x86_64-softmmu/qemu-system-x86_64+0x2c3e5ca)  /mnt/sdb/qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:2333
  #3 0x560485356208 (./x86_64-softmmu/qemu-system-x86_64+0x2c9c208)  /mnt/sdb/qemu/hw/virtio/vhost-vsock.c:339
  #4 0x560485305a17 (./x86_64-softmmu/qemu-system-x86_64+0x2c4ba17)  /mnt/sdb/qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:3531
  #5 0x5604858e6b65 (./x86_64-softmmu/qemu-system-x86_64+0x322cb65)  /mnt/sdb/qemu/hw/core/qdev.c:865
  #6 0x5604861e6c41 (./x86_64-softmmu/qemu-system-x86_64+0x3b2cc41)  /mnt/sdb/qemu/qom/object.c:2102

Reported-by: Euler Robot <euler.robot@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Pan Nengyuan <pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Message-Id: <20200115062535.50644-1-pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
lacraig2 pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jan 22, 2024
Receive/transmit/event vqs forgot to cleanup in vhost_vsock_unrealize. This
patch save receive/transmit vq pointer in realize() and cleanup vqs
through those vq pointers in unrealize(). The leak stack is as follow:

Direct leak of 21504 byte(s) in 3 object(s) allocated from:
  #0 0x7f86a1356970 (/lib64/libasan.so.5+0xef970)  ??:?
  #1 0x7f86a09aa49d (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x5249d)  ??:?
  #2 0x5604852f85ca (./x86_64-softmmu/qemu-system-x86_64+0x2c3e5ca)  /mnt/sdb/qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:2333
  #3 0x560485356208 (./x86_64-softmmu/qemu-system-x86_64+0x2c9c208)  /mnt/sdb/qemu/hw/virtio/vhost-vsock.c:339
  #4 0x560485305a17 (./x86_64-softmmu/qemu-system-x86_64+0x2c4ba17)  /mnt/sdb/qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:3531
  #5 0x5604858e6b65 (./x86_64-softmmu/qemu-system-x86_64+0x322cb65)  /mnt/sdb/qemu/hw/core/qdev.c:865
  #6 0x5604861e6c41 (./x86_64-softmmu/qemu-system-x86_64+0x3b2cc41)  /mnt/sdb/qemu/qom/object.c:2102

Reported-by: Euler Robot <euler.robot@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Pan Nengyuan <pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Message-Id: <20200115062535.50644-1-pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
lacraig2 pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 6, 2024
Receive/transmit/event vqs forgot to cleanup in vhost_vsock_unrealize. This
patch save receive/transmit vq pointer in realize() and cleanup vqs
through those vq pointers in unrealize(). The leak stack is as follow:

Direct leak of 21504 byte(s) in 3 object(s) allocated from:
  #0 0x7f86a1356970 (/lib64/libasan.so.5+0xef970)  ??:?
  #1 0x7f86a09aa49d (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x5249d)  ??:?
  #2 0x5604852f85ca (./x86_64-softmmu/qemu-system-x86_64+0x2c3e5ca)  /mnt/sdb/qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:2333
  #3 0x560485356208 (./x86_64-softmmu/qemu-system-x86_64+0x2c9c208)  /mnt/sdb/qemu/hw/virtio/vhost-vsock.c:339
  #4 0x560485305a17 (./x86_64-softmmu/qemu-system-x86_64+0x2c4ba17)  /mnt/sdb/qemu/hw/virtio/virtio.c:3531
  #5 0x5604858e6b65 (./x86_64-softmmu/qemu-system-x86_64+0x322cb65)  /mnt/sdb/qemu/hw/core/qdev.c:865
  #6 0x5604861e6c41 (./x86_64-softmmu/qemu-system-x86_64+0x3b2cc41)  /mnt/sdb/qemu/qom/object.c:2102

Reported-by: Euler Robot <euler.robot@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Pan Nengyuan <pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Message-Id: <20200115062535.50644-1-pannengyuan@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
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