

Cybersecurity for National Security: Roadmaps, Policy, Partnerships, and Acquisitions (DRAFT)

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Abstract

Cyber risk has become a persistent strategic threat with material impacts to national security, public safety, and economic stability. The United States is shifting from voluntary, outcome-light models to outcome-based regulation, software liability pressure, and memory-safe, post-quantum, zero trust architectures. This paper proposes a 2025–2035 roadmap that integrates policy, engineering, and acquisitions: (i) national milestones for zero trust, post-quantum cryptography, memory-safe software, and incident reporting harmonization; (ii) an Intelligence Community (IC) plan for data fabrics, continuous monitoring, and hunt-forward operations; (iii) governance using the NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0; (iv) partnerships via CISA’s JCDC and sector risk management agencies; and (v) rapid, modular contracting patterns that tie incentives to measurable security outcomes.

1 Strategic Imperative and Current Posture

Cyber operations by state and criminal actors routinely disrupt hospitals, pipelines, and municipal services, while supply-chain compromises and cloud identity abuse challenge legacy perimeters. Federal direction now orients around: (1) *Zero Trust* adoption across agencies; (2) *software supply chain security* using SSDF and SBOM practices; (3) *operational collaboration* through the Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative (JCDC); (4) *timely incident disclosures* (e.g., SEC Form 8-K Item 1.05) and sectoral reporting; and (5) *post-quantum cryptography* and *memory safety* to reduce classes of defects.

2 Threat Landscape

- **Ransomware and data extortion:** Criminal ecosystems exploit weak identity hygiene, flat networks, and unpatched edge services; double-extortion tactics increase business impact.
- **State-aligned APT activity:** Long-dwell intrusions targeting defense industrial base (DIB), critical infrastructure, and cloud identity providers.
- **Operational Technology (OT) risk:** Pipelines, rail, and water utilities require outcome-based controls and timely incident reporting; segmentation and continuous monitoring remain uneven.
- **Software supply chain:** Vulnerable dependencies and build systems demand SSDF practices, reproducible builds, and verifiable attestations.

- **Regulatory fragmentation:** Multiple overlapping rules drive compliance cost; harmonization and reciprocity are essential to reduce burden while improving outcomes.

3 State of Practice and Standards

3.1 Zero trust

NIST SP 800-207 defines the conceptual architecture; OMB M-22-09 and DoD's Zero Trust Strategy establish federal implementation objectives. [1, 2, 3] Priorities include identity-centric access, continuous authorization, strong device posture, encrypted traffic, and centralized policy decision points.

3.2 Software supply chain security

NIST SP800-218 (SSDF) codifies secure development practices. Executive Order14028 accelerated SBOM, provenance, and high-assurance build requirements, while FedRAMP Rev.5 baselines align cloud security with NIST SP800-53 Rev. 5. [4, 5, 6, 7]

3.3 Memory safety

CISA and partners urge vendors to publish *memory-safe roadmaps* and increase the share of code in memory-safe languages, complemented by mitigations (control-flow integrity, hardened allocators) where rewriting is infeasible.[8]

3.4 Post-quantum cryptography

NIST finalized FIPS203 (ML-KEM), FIPS204 (ML-DSA), and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA) with effective date August 14, 2024; agencies and critical infrastructure should plan phased migration with crypto-agility and risk scoring for long-lived data. [9, 10, 11]

3.5 Incident reporting and disclosures

The National Cybersecurity Strategy (NCS) and its 2024 Implementation Plan advance harmonized reporting. CIRCIA's rulemaking proposes 72-hour incident and 24-hour ransom-report timelines for covered critical infrastructure, while SEC rules require public companies to report material cyber incidents within four business days. [12, 13, 14, 15]

4 National Cyber Roadmap (2025–2035)

4.1 Phase I—*Harden and Harmonize* (2025–2026)

- **Zero Trust baselines:** Achieve agency ZT target states for identity, device, network, application, and data; adopt continuous authorization and phishing-resistant MFA. [1, 2, 3]
- **PQC pilots:** Deploy ML-KEM/ML-DSA gateways; complete crypto inventories; protect high-value data against harvest-now/decrypt-later. [9, 10, 11]
- **SSDF + SBOM:** Require SSDF-aligned attestations for major acquisitions; mandate SBOMs and vulnerability/exploitability (VEX) metadata. [4, 5]
- **Memory safety:** Each major vendor publishes a roadmap with measurable language migration targets and mitigations. [8]
- **Reporting harmonization:** Align sectoral rules to CIRCIA data elements; enable machine-readable submissions and reciprocity across regulators. [16, 13]

4.2 Phase II—*Operate and Automate* (2027–2029)

- **Continuous monitoring fabric:** Unified telemetry (cloud, endpoint, network, identity) with automated containment, canarying, and kill-switches. [17]
- **Threat-informed defense:** ATT&CK-driven detections; purple-teaming at scale; large-model assistants for triage and hunt.
- **Cross-sector exercises:** JCDC-led exercises with shared playbooks; sector cyber ranges for OT with vendor-in-the-loop testing. [18, 19]
- **PQC at scale:** Transition major protocols (TLS, QUIC, IPsec, PQC-enabled PKI); dual-stack deployments with agility. [9, 10, 11]

4.3 Phase III—*Resilience and Recovery* (2030–2035)

- **Self-healing architectures:** Partitioned blast radii, automated re-provisioning, signed golden images, and continuous dependency risk scoring.
- **Regulatory convergence:** Mature reciprocity across SEC, CIRCIA, TSA, HHS, and sector regulators; outcome metrics emphasize dwell time, lateral-movement prevention, and recovery SLAs. [14, 16, 20, 21]
- **PQC completion:** Full migration for federal high-value assets and critical infrastructure PKI; legacy risk isolated behind PQC gateways. [9, 10, 11]

Table 1: Milestones and Metrics

Year	Domain	Target	Example Metric
2026	ZT	Phishing-resistant MFA	> 98% protected logins
2026	PQC	Crypto inventory complete	> 95% coverage
2026	SSDF	SBOM/VEX in new awards	> 90% by value
2027	Reporting	Machine-readable CIRCIA	> 90% of covered entities
2028	Telemetry	Unified telemetry fabric	Mean time to contain < 1 h
2029	PQC	PQC-enabled TLS/PKI	> 80% external services
2031	Resilience	Blast-radius partitioning	> 95% critical apps segmented
2033	PQC	Full migration HVAs	> 99% HVA coverage

5 IC Roadmap

5.1 Mission use cases

Counterintelligence and DIB protection; threat emulation and hunt-forward; crypto-agile enclaves; supply-chain verification (SBOM attestation, reproducible builds); PQC transition for classified and controlled networks. [12]

5.2 Infrastructure

Tier-1 Cyber Fusion Campus: petabyte/day telemetry ingest; AI-assisted SOC; red/blue/purple ranges; malware foundry; classified enclaves with cross-domain solutions.

Tier-2 Regional Pods: deployable hunt teams; OT testbeds; data-lake shards with local analytics.

Tier-3 Kits: forward sensors, deception, and PQC gateways.

6 Policy and Governance

- **Framework alignment:** Adopt NIST CSF2.0 with the new *Govern* function as the organizing backbone for agencies and critical infrastructure. [22, 23]
- **Zero Trust mandates:** Maintain OMB M-22-09 targets; extend to grants and regulated sectors via outcome metrics. [2]
- **Software liability and incentives:** Tie procurement preferences and safe harbors to SSDF conformance, memory-safe roadmaps, and vulnerability response SLAs. [4, 8]
- **Reporting harmonization:** ONCD leads interagency harmonization; publish a common data schema and reciprocity matrix. [12]
- **PQC policy:** Set dated milestones aligned to FIPS203/204/205; require crypto-agility in all new systems. [9, 10, 11]

7 Partnerships

7.1 Operational collaboration

Deepen JCDC constructs with cloud/telecom/CDN/identity providers; expand international collaboration (Five Eyes, EU) and cross-sector exercises. [18, 19] Sector risk management agencies align outcome metrics and reciprocity. Additionally, TSA directives for pipeline and rail operators exemplify outcome-based OT cybersecurity requirements. [20, 21, 24, 25]

7.2 Vendors and integrators

Prime integrators for federal and critical-infrastructure deployments; cloud service providers aligned to FedRAMP Rev. 5; security vendors committed to memory-safe roadmaps and verifiable SBOMs.

8 Acquisitions: Rapid, Modular, Accountable

8.1 Outcome-based contracts

Tie incentives to measurable outcomes: phishing-resistant MFA adoption, privileged access reductions, lateral movement prevention, mean time to contain, and recovery SLAs. Require SSDF attestations, SBOM/VEX, and PQC agility. [4, 14]

8.2 Modular CLINs

Separate identity, telemetry, analytics, response orchestration, PQC gateways, and OT security segments to enable independent competition and upgrades. Use OTA and down-select phases for rapid fielding.

9 Facility Blueprint

Security operations leverage a unified data fabric (cloud-native lakehouse), AI-assisted triage, deception, and kill-switch automation. OT cyber ranges validate playbooks against vendor equipment. Classified enclaves maintain cross-domain guards and PQC front-doors. [6]

10 Risk Register

- **Identity compromise:** Enforce phishing-resistant MFA, privileged access management, and continuous authorization.
- **Supply-chain opacity:** Mandate SBOM/VEX, attestations, and reproducible builds; red-team vendor updates.

- **Telemetry gaps:** Require unified collection across cloud, endpoint, network, and identity with strict retention.
- **Regulatory uncertainty:** Plan for litigation risk; prioritize harmonization and standards-based reciprocity.
- **PQC lag:** Fund migration tooling, gateways, and crypto-inventory automation; protect long-lived data now.

11 Conclusion

A defensible national posture requires outcome-driven zero trust, secure-by-design software, rapid incident visibility, and crypto-agility. By aligning policy, partnerships, and rapid acquisitions with measurable engineering milestones, the United States can reduce systemic risk, speed recovery, and sustain technological advantage.

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