

# FROM HARDWARE TO 0-DAY

OR HOW TO BUY A SECURITY CAMERA AND NEVER USE IT FOR ITS  
INTENDED PURPOSE

PIETRO OLIVA



Pietro Oliva – @0xsysenter

# WHOAMI

- NAME: PIETRO OLIVA @0XSYSENTER
- CURRENT ROLE: SECURITY RESEARCHER (R3)
- PREVIOUS ROLES:
  - SECURITY RESEARCHER (SONY)
  - RED TEAM OPERATOR (JP MORGAN)
  - PENETRATION TESTER / SECURITY AUDITOR (NCC GROUP, PWC, GMV)

# AGENDA

- WHY PERFORM SECURITY RESEARCH ON A SECURITY CAMERA
- INFORMATION GATHERING ON PREVIOUS WORK
- THE CHALLENGE
- THE PATH TO SUCCESS
- LESSONS LEARNED
- FUTURE WORK
- CONCLUSIONS
- Q & A

# WHY PERFORM SECURITY RESEARCH ON A SECURITY CAMERA?

- MANY PEOPLE SAY “IOT DEVICES ARE NOT SECURE”
- I WANTED TO VERIFY THESE CLAIMS
- I WAS LOOKING FOR A CHALLENGE AND LEARNING OPPORTUNITY

# PREVIOUS WORK ON TP-LINK NC200/NC220

- THIS WAS ALREADY PATCHED ON LATER FIRMWARE VERSIONS
- IS THERE REALLY ONLY ONE VULNERABILITY AFFECTING THIS CAMERA?

**R2CON**  
~2~0~2~0

## IOActive Security Advisory

Title	Authenticated OS Command Injection on TP-LINK Cloud Cameras
Severity	High – CVSSv2 Score 6.0 (AV:L/AC:H/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C)
Discovered by	Tao Sauvage
Advisory Date	March 9, 2016

### Affected Products

1. TP-LINK Cloud Camera NC200, firmware NC200\_V1\_151125
2. TP-LINK Cloud Camera NC220, firmware NC220\_V1\_151125

### Impact

An attacker with Administrator (admin) access to the administrative web panel of a TP-LINK Cloud Camera can gain root access to the device, fully compromising its confidentiality, integrity, and availability.

### Background

TP-LINK Cloud Cameras offer a quick and easy way to “See there, when you can’t be there,” allowing users to remotely monitor everything going on where the cameras are installed. TP-LINK Cloud Cameras allow video monitoring and recording, which can later be accessed from around the world thanks to the TP-LINK Cloud service.

### Technical Details

The administrative web panel allows the admin to configure PPPoE on the Cloud Camera device. IOActive found that the username and password fields were vulnerable to OS command injection, which would allow an attacker to execute OS commands on the device with root privileges.




# THE CHALLENGE

## HACK THE LATEST AND GREATEST FIRMWARE

- STARTING FROM HARDWARE ANALYSIS AND FIRMWARE DUMPING
- BY PERFORMING FIRMWARE REVERSE ENGINEERING (DELIBERATELY EXCLUDING FUZZING)
- ON AN ARCHITECTURE I WAS UNFAMILIAR WITH (MIPS)
- USING A REVERSE ENGINEERING TOOL THAT:
  - IS FREE AND OPEN SOURCE
  - I CAN USE EVERYWHERE (INCLUDING ON A MOBILE PHONE)
- THAT TOOL EXISTS AND IS CALLED RADARE2!


# HARDWARE ANALYSIS AND FLASH DUMPING

- IDENTIFIED THE BOARD COMPONENTS VIA PICTURES AND FCC ID
- DOWNLOADED DATASHEETS
- PERFORMED FLASH DUMPING



# SPI FLASH DUMPING – TOOLS

- BUS PIRATE AS SPI READER/WRITER
  - FLASHROM TO PERFORM DUMP VIA BUS PIRATE
  - THE 8 MB SPI FLASH CONTAINED THE MAIN FIRMWARE!



# FIRMWARE EXTRACTION AND ANALYSIS

- BINWALK + JEFFERSON FOR FILESYSTEM EXTRACTION
- RADARE2 AS THE MAIN REVERSE ENGINEERING TOOL
- MAIN REVERSE ENGINEERING TARGET: A BINARY CALLED “IPCAMERA”

# VULNERABILITIES

A screenshot from Toy Story showing Woody and Jessie. Woody is on the left, looking worried, while Jessie is behind him, smiling and pointing upwards with her right arm. They are in a room with a wooden floor and a door in the background.

# VULNERABILITIES EVERYWHERE

# BUGS, BUGS, BUGS...

CVE-2020-10231 - TP-LINK CLOUD CAMERAS NCXXX REMOTE NULL POINTER DEREference

```
0x0047dca0    2800c48f    lw a0, (arg_user)
0x0047dca4    2c00c58f    lw a1, (arg_password)
0x0047dca8    208e998f    lw t9, -sym.swUMMatchPassword(gp) ; [0x534130:4]=0x4bdf68 sym.swUMMatchPassword ; "h\xdfK"
0x0047dcac    00000000    nop
0x0047dcba    09f82003    jalr t9
0x0047dcbb    00000000    nop
0x0047dcbb    2000dc8f    lw gp, (arg_20h)
0x0047dcbb    5000c2af    sw v0, (arg_50h)
0x0047dcc0    5000c28f    lw v0, (arg_50h)
0x0047dcc4    00000000    nop
< 0x0047dcc8    5a004014    bnez v0, 0x47de34
0x0047dcc9    00000000    nop
0x0047dcdb    5400c0af    sw zero, (arg_54h)
0x0047dcdb    7800c48f    lw a0, (http_env)
0x0047dcdb    1c80858f    lw a1, -0x7fe4(gp)      ; [0x53332c:4]=0x4f0000 "uldn't find protocol block."
0x0047dcdb    00000000    nop
0x0047dcdb    5083a524    addiu a1, a1, -0x7cb0   ; 0x4e8350 ; "HTTP_USER_AGENT" ; str.HTTP_USER_AGENT
0x0047dcdb    0483998f    lw t9, -sym.httpGetEnv(gp); [0x533614:4]=0x45d0f8 sym.httpGetEnv
0x0047dcdb    00000000    nop
0x0047dcdb    09f82003    jalr t9
0x0047dcdb    00000000    nop
0x0047dcdb    2000dc8f    lw gp, (arg_20h)
0x0047dcdb    5800c2af    sw v0, (arg_58h)
0x0047dcdb    5800c48f    lw a0, (arg_58h)
0x0047dd00    1c80858f    lw a1, -0x7fe4(gp)      ; [0x53332c:4]=0x4f0000 "uldn't find protocol block."
0x0047dd04    00000000    nop
0x0047dd08    6083a524    addiu a1, a1, -0x7ca0   ; 0x4e8360 ; "Firefox" ; str.Firefox
0x0047dd0c    c089998f    lw t9, -sym.imp.strstr(gp); [0x533cd0:4]=0x4dd380 sym.imp.strstr
0x0047dd10    00000000    nop
0x0047dd14    09f82003    jalr t9
```

# THE PAIN OF RESPONSIBLE DISCLOSURE

CVE-2020-10231 - TP-LINK CLOUD CAMERAS NCXXX REMOTE NULL POINTER DEREference

- STAGE 1: THE CAMERA IS “NOT SUPPORTED ANYMORE”
- STAGE 2: LET’S SEE IF OTHER CAMERAS ARE AFFECTED
- STAGE 3: WARN THE VENDOR ALL NC CAMERAS ARE AFFECTED
- STAGE 4: DROP A ZERO DAY
- STAGE 5: VULNERABILITY GETS FIXED
- STAGE 6: NEXT REPORTS AND DEADLINES ARE TAKEN SERIOUSLY
- STAGE 7: PROMISED I WON’T REPORT ANY MORE ISSUES

# BUGS, BUGS, BUGS...


CVE-2020-13224 - TP-LINK CLOUD CAMERAS NCXXX DELMULTIUSER STACK OVERFLOW

```
0x0047ebd0    4404c48f    lw a0, (arg_usernames_copy)
0x0047ebd4    0086998f    lw t9, -sym.swUMDelUser(gp) ; [0x533910:4]=0x4c0708 sym.swUMDelUser
0x0047ebd8    00000000    nop
0x0047ebdc    09f82003    jalr t9
0x0047ebe0    00000000    nop
0x0047ebe4    1000dc8f    lw gp, (arg_10h)
0x0047ebe8    1800c2af    sw v0, (error_code)
0x0047ebec    4804c227    addiu v0, fp, 0x448
0x0047ebf0    21204000    move a0, v0
0x0047ebf4    1c80858f    lw a1, -0x7fe4(gp)      ; [0x53332c:4]=0x4f0000
0x0047ebf8    00000000    nop
0x0047ebfc    6c84a524    addiu a1, a1, -0x7b94      ; esilref: '{"errorCode":&d},'
0x0047ec00    1800c68f    lw a2, (error_code)
0x0047ec04    b485998f    lw t9, -sym.imp.strftime(gp) ; [0x5338c4:4]=0x4dd740 sym.imp.strftime
0x0047ec08    00000000    nop
0x0047ec0c    09f82003    jalr t9
0x0047ec10    00000000    nop
0x0047ec14    1000dc8f    lw gp, (arg_10h)
0x0047ec18    4000c227    addiu v0, fp, 0x40
0x0047ec1c    4804c327    addiu v1, fp, 0x448
0x0047ec20    21204000    move a0, v0
0x0047ec24    21286000    move a1, v1
0x0047ec28    308b998f    lw t9, -sym.imp.strcat(gp) ; [0x533e40:4]=0x4dd270 sym.imp.strcat ; "p\xd2M"
0x0047ec2c    00000000    nop
0x0047ec30    09f82003    jalr t9
0x0047ec34    00000000    nop
0x0047ec38    1000dc8f    lw gp, (arg_10h)
0x0047ec3c    4004c28f    lw v0, (next_comma)
0x0047ec40    00000000    nop
0x0047ec44    01004224    addiu v0, v0, 1
0x0047ec48    1e000010    b 0x47ecc4

; CODE XREF from sym.httpDelMultiUserRpm @ 0x47ec48
-> 0x0047ecc4    4004c28f    lw v0, (next_comma)
0x0047ecc8    00000000    nop
-< 0x0047eccc    03004010    beqz v0, 0x47ecd0
0x0047ecd0    00000000    nop
-< 0x0047ecd4    afff0010    b 0x47eb94
0x0047ecd8    00000000    nop
```

The PoC:  
Usernames=.....

MY LARGE INPUT



WILL CAUSE A MASSIVE  
BUFFER OVERFLOW.

R2CON  
°~2~0~2~0

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# BUGS, BUGS, BUGS...

CVE-2020-12110 - TP-LINK CLOUD CAMERAS NCXXX HARDCODED ENCRYPTION KEY (1)

```
0x004a1c54    1c80848f    lw a0, -0x7fe4(gp)
0x004a1c58    00000000    nop
0x004a1c5c    44b48424    addiu a0, a0, -0x4bbc      ; 0x4eb444 ; "/usr/local/config/ipcamera/pBackup"
0x004a1c60    1c80858f    lw a1, -0x7fe4(gp)
0x004a1c64    00000000    nop
0x004a1c68    d4b3a524    addiu a1, a1, -0x4c2c      ; 0x4eb3d4 ; "tp-link" ; str.tp_link
0x004a1c6c    1c80868f    lw a2, -0x7fe4(gp)
0x004a1c70    00000000    nop
0x004a1c74    7cb4c624    addiu a2, a2, -0x4b84      ; 0x4eb47c ; "/usr/local/config/ipcamera/eBackup"
0x004a1c78    0c88998f    lw t9, -sym.DES_Encrypt(gp) ; [0x533b1c:4]=0x497254 sym.DES_Encrypt
0x004a1c7c    00000000    nop
0x004a1c80    09f82003    jalr t9
```

# BUGS, BUGS, BUGS...

CVE-2020-12110 - TP-LINK CLOUD CAMERAS NCXXX HARDCODED ENCRYPTION KEY (2)

THIS LOOKS STRAIGHTFORWARD, BUT WE HAVE A PROBLEM TO SOLVE:

- WE KNOW THE ALGORITHM IS DES ECB AND THE ENCRYPTION KEY
- FOUND A TOOL THAT WOULD CORRECTLY ENCRYPT/DECRYPT BACKUP FILES
- BUT I WOULD GET RANDOM DATA WITH STANDARD DES IMPLEMENTATIONS
- I THOUGHT I WAS DOING SOMETHING WRONG, UNTIL I REALIZED THAT...

BUGS, BUGS, BUGS...

**ONE DOES NOT SIMPLY**

**USE AN ENCRYPTION KEY**

# BUGS, BUGS, BUGS...

CVE-2020-12110 - TP-LINK CLOUD CAMERAS NCXXX HARDCODED ENCRYPTION KEY (3)

AFTER CHECKING ALL THE CODE, THERE WAS ONLY ONE THING LEFT TO CHECK...

C ⌂ ⌚ [github.com/VicoandMe/3DES/blob/master/des.h](https://github.com/VicoandMe/3DES/blob/master/des.h)

```
static int IP_Table[64] = { 57, 49, 41, 33, 25, 17, 9, 1,
    59, 51, 43, 35, 27, 19, 11, 3,
    61, 53, 45, 37, 29, 21, 13, 5,
    63, 55, 47, 39, 31, 23, 15, 7,
    56, 48, 40, 32, 24, 16, 8, 0,
    58, 50, 42, 34, 26, 18, 10, 2,
    60, 52, 44, 36, 28, 20, 12, 4,
    62, 54, 46, 38, 30, 22, 14, 6,
    64, 56, 48, 40, 32, 24, 16, 8,
    57, 49, 41, 33, 25, 17, 9, 1,
    59, 51, 43, 35, 27, 19, 11, 3,
    61, 53, 45, 37, 29, 21, 13, 5,
    63, 55, 47, 39, 31, 23, 15, 7};
```

[en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DES\\_supplementary\\_material](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DES_supplementary_material)

Initial permutation (IP) [ edit ]

IP

58	50	42	34	26	18	10	2
60	52	44	36	28	20	12	4
62	54	46	38	30	22	14	6
64	56	48	40	32	24	16	8
57	49	41	33	25	17	9	1
59	51	43	35	27	19	11	3
61	53	45	37	29	21	13	5
63	55	47	39	31	23	15	7

A diagram showing the initial permutation (IP) mapping. On the left, there are 64 small blue circles numbered 1 through 64. Lines connect them to 56 larger blue circles numbered 1 through 56, representing the permutation mapping.

RANDOM TOOL ON THE INTERNET THAT SOMEHOW WORKS



STANDARD DES

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# BUGS, BUGS, BUGS...

CVE-2020-12110 - TP-LINK CLOUD CAMERAS NCXXX HARDCODED ENCRYPTION KEY (4)



use strong  
encryption  
algorithm

customize  
weak  
encryption  
algorithm

# BUGS, BUGS, BUGS...

CVE-2020-12110 - TP-LINK CLOUD CAMERAS NCXXX HARDCODED ENCRYPTION KEY (5)

00000000:	7e7d	ee77	0119	0000	a44f	a17f	7408	374b	~}.w.....0..t.7K
00000010:	3354	f9c4	569e	d2f0	6669	6e67	6572	7072	3T..V...fingerpr
00000020:	696e	7400	0000	0000	0000	0000	f40a	0000	int.....
00000030:	3600	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	6.....
00000040:	0000	0000	0000	0000	2f75	7372	2f6c	6f63	...../usr/loc
00000050:	616c	2f63	6f6e	6669	672f	6970	6361	6d65	al/config/pcamera
00000060:	7261	2f77	6f72	6b6d	6f64	2e63	6f6e	6600	ra/workmod.conf.
00000070:	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	.....
00000080:	0000	0000	0000	0000	2a0b	0000	d002	0000	.....*
00000090:	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	.....
000000a0:	0000	0000	2f75	7372	2f6c	6f63	616c	2f63	....../usr/local/c
000000b0:	6f6e	6669	672f	6970	6361	6d65	7261	2f76	onfig/pcamera/v
000000c0:	6964	656f	6374	726c	2e63	6f6e	6600	0000	ideoctrl.conf...
000000d0:	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	.....
000000e0:	0000	0000	fa0d	0000	d301	0000	0000	0000	.....
000000f0:	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	.....
00000100:	2f75	7372	2f6c	6f63	616c	2f63	6f6e	6669	/usr/local/confi
00000110:	672f	6970	6361	6d65	7261	2f64	6174	6574	g/pcamera/datet
00000120:	696d	652e	636f	6e66	0000	0000	0000	0000	ime.conf.....
00000130:	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	.....
00000140:	cd0f	0000	2800	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	....(.....
00000150:	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	2f75	7372	.....	...../usr
00000160:	2f6c	6f63	616c	2f63	6f6e	6669	672f	6970	/local/config/ip
00000170:	6361	6d65	7261	2f75	706e	702e	636f	6e66	camera/upnp.conf
00000180:	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	.....
00000190:	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	f50f	0000	.....
000001a0:	1100	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	.....
000001b0:	0000	0000	0000	0000	2f75	7372	2f6c	6f63	...../usr/loc
000001c0:	616c	2f63	6f6e	6669	672f	6970	6361	6d65	al/config/pcamera
000001d0:	7261	2f53	6573	7369	6f6e	2e63	6f6e	6600	ra/session.conf.

Header:

4 bytes: Magic

4 bytes: File size

16 bytes: File MD5

12 bytes: Null-terminated string "fingerprint"

8 bytes: Zero padding

File entries:

4 bytes: Absolute offset of file content

4 bytes: File size

20 bytes: Zero padding

64 bytes: Null-terminated file name + padding

# BUGS, BUGS, BUGS...

CVE-2020-12110 - TP-LINK CLOUD CAMERAS NCXXX HARDCODED ENCRYPTION KEY (6)

DEMO

# BUGS, BUGS, BUGS...

CVE-2020-12111 - TP-LINK CLOUD CAMERAS NCXXX SETENCRYPTKEY COMMAND INJECTION

## THIS ONLY AFFECTED NC260 AND NC450 CAMERAS

# BUGS, BUGS, BUGS...

CVE-2020-12109 - TP-LINK CLOUD CAMERAS NCXXX BONJOUR COMMAND INJECTION (1)

```
0x00439fc4    000d8424    addiu a0, a0, 0xd00      ; 0x4e0d00 ; "BONJOUR_STATUS" ; arg1 ; str.BONJOUR_STATUS
0x00439fc8    6889998f    lw t9, -sym.sysConfGetLong(gp) ; [0x533c78:4]=0x432858 sym.sysConfGetLong ; "X(C"
0x00439fcc    00000000    nop
0x00439fd0    09f82003    jalr t9
0x00439fd4    00000000    nop
0x00439fd8    1000dc8f    lw gp, (arg_10h)
< 0x00439fdc    1e004010    beqz v0, 0x43a058
0x00439fe0    00000000    nop
0x00439fe4    2000c227    addiu v0, fp, 0x20
0x00439fe8    21204000    move a0, v0
0x00439fec    21280000    move a1, zero
0x00439ff0    88000624    addiu a2, zero, 0x88      ; arg3
0x00439ff4    4887998f    lw t9, -sym.imp.memset(gp) ; [0x533a58:4]=0x4dd5f0 sym.imp.memset
0x00439ff8    00000000    nop
0x00439ffc    09f82003    jalr t9
0x0043a000    00000000    nop
0x0043a004    1000dc8f    lw gp, (arg_10h)
0x0043a008    2000c227    addiu v0, fp, 0x20
0x0043a00c    21204000    move a0, v0
0x0043a010    88000524    addiu a1, zero, 0x88      ; arg2
0x0043a014    cc84998f    lw t9, -sym.swBonjourGetName(gp) ; [0x5337dc:4]=0x43a198 sym.swBonjourGetName
0x0043a018    00000000    nop
0x0043a01c    09f82003    jalr t9
0x0043a020    00000000    nop
0x0043a024    1000dc8f    lw gp, (arg_10h)
0x0043a028    2000c227    addiu v0, fp, 0x20
0x0043a02c    2480848f    lw a0, -0x7fdc(gp)       ; [0x533334:4]=0x4e0000
0x0043a030    00000000    nop
0x0043a034    100d8424    addiu a0, a0, 0xd10     ; 0x4e0d10 ; "mDNSResponderPosix -n \"%s\" -t _http._tcp -p %d -x path=/login.html &
; str.mDNSResponderPosix__n__s__t__http._tcp__p__d__x_path__login.html
0x0043a038    21284000    move a1, v0
0x0043a03c    b000c68f    lw a2, (arg_b0h)
0x0043a040    a08b998f    lw t9, -sym.cmCommand(gp) ; [0x533eb0:4]=0x449364 sym.cmCommand
```

# BUGS, BUGS, BUGS...


CVE-2020-12109 - TP-LINK CLOUD CAMERAS NCXXX BONJOUR COMMAND INJECTION (2)

```
0x0049f1cc    0a001c3c    lui gp, 0xa
0x0049f1d0    44c19c27    addiu gp, gp, -0x3ebc
0x0049f1d4    21e09903    addu gp, gp, t9
0x0049f1d8    d8fbd27    addiu sp, sp, -0x28
0x0049f1dc    2400bfaf    sw ra, (var_4h)
0x0049f1e0    2000beaf    sw fp, (var_8h)
0x0049f1e4    21f0a003    move fp, sp
0x0049f1e8    1000bcdf    sw gp, (var_18h)
0x0049f1ec    2800c4af    sw a0, (alias_string)
0x0049f1f0    2800c28f    lw v0, (alias_string)
0x0049f1f4    00000000    nop
< 0x0049f1f8    07004010    beqz v0, 0x49f218
0x0049f1fc    00000000    nop
0x0049f200    2800c28f    lw v0, (alias_string)
0x0049f204    00000000    nop
0x0049f208    00004280    lb v0, (v0)
0x0049f20c    00000000    nop
< 0x0049f210    04004014    bnez v0, 0x49f224
0x0049f214    00000000    nop
; CODE XREF from sym.swSystemSetProductAliasCheck @ 0x49f1f8
-> 0x0049f218    2f040224    addiu v0, zero, 0x42f
-< 0x0049f21c    0e000010    b 0x49f258
0x0049f220    1800c2af    sw v0, (ret)
; CODE XREF from sym.swSystemSetProductAliasCheck @ 0x49f210
-> 0x0049f224    2800c48f    lw a0, (alias_string)
0x0049f228    1882998f    lw t9, -sym.imp.strlen(gp) ; [0x533528:4]
0x0049f22c    00000000    nop
0x0049f230    09f82003    jalr t9
0x0049f234    00000000    nop
0x0049f238    1000dc8f    lw gp, (arg_10h)
0x0049f23c    8100422c    sltiu v0, v0, 0x81
0x0049f240    04004014    bnez v0, 0x49f254
-< 0x0049f244    00000000    nop
0x0049f248    30040224    addiu v0, zero, 0x430
-< 0x0049f24c    02000010    b 0x49f258
0x0049f250    1800c2af    sw v0, (ret)
; CODE XREF from sym.swSystemSetProductAliasCheck @ 0x49f240
-> 0x0049f254    1800c0af    sw zero, (ret)
; CODE XREFS from sym.swSystemSetProductAliasCheck @ 0x49f21c, 0x49f24c
-> 0x0049f258    1800c28f    lw v0, (ret)
0x0049f25c    21e8c003    move sp, fp
0x0049f260    2400bf8f    lw ra, (var_4h)
0x0049f264    2000be8f    lw fp, (var_8h)
0x0049f268    0800e003    jr ra
0x0049f26c    2800bd27    addiu sp, sp, 0x28
```

SWSYSTEMSETPRODUCTALIASCHECK

# BUGS, BUGS, BUGS...

CVE-2020-12109 - TP-LINK CLOUD CAMERAS NCXXX BONJOUR COMMAND INJECTION (3)



# BUGS, BUGS, BUGS...

CVE-2020-12109 - TP-LINK Cloud Cameras NCXXX Bonjour Command Injection (4)

ONE BUG TO RULE THEM ALL:

- THIS BUG AFFECTED ALL 7 NC CAMERAS
- CAN BE TRIGGERED EASILY
- GIVES US EASY AND RELIABLE ROOT SHELL

# BUGS, BUGS, BUGS...

CVE-2020-12109 - TP-LINK CLOUD CAMERAS NCXXX BONJOUR COMMAND INJECTION (5)

DEMO



# LESSONS LEARNED

- CHECK VENDOR WEBSITE BEFORE DUMPING DEVICE FLASH
- CODE REUSE = SAME VULNERABILITIES ACROSS DIFFERENT DEVICES
- DROPPING A ZERO-DAY AFTER FIX DEADLINE HAS PASSED CAN GET THE VENDOR TO FIX ISSUES AND TAKE YOUR REPORTS SERIOUSLY
- REVERSE ENGINEERING CAN REVEAL BUGS THAT CANNOT BE FOUND VIA FUZZING/BLACK BOX TESTING

# FUTURE WORK

LIST OF THINGS THAT WAS ORIGINALLY IN MY TODO LIST:

- LOOK FOR VULNERABILITIES THAT CAN BE EXPLOITED FROM TP-LINK CLOUD
- LOOK FOR VULNERABILITIES IN THE BROWSER PLUGIN
- LOOK FOR BASEBAND (WI-FI) VULNERABILITIES

# CONCLUSIONS

- THERE WAS MORE THAN JUST ONE VULNERABILITY ON NC CAMERAS
- YOU DON'T NEED EXPENSIVE TOOLS TO FIND THOSE ISSUES
- IT IS POSSIBLE TO FIND ISSUES WITH A MOBILE PHONE ON A PLANE
- REVERSING IS NECESSARY TO COMPLEMENT FUZZING/BLACK BOX TESTING
- IT WAS A GOOD IDEA TO NEVER CONNECT MY CAMERA TO THE CLOUD
- I CAN NOW SAY FROM EXPERIENCE THAT SOME IOT DEVICES ARE INDEED INSECURE
- SECURITY RESEARCHERS AND VENDORS HAVE A SHARED RESPONSIBILITY AT MAKING THINGS MORE SECURE

THANK YOU FOR LISTENING

ANY QUESTIONS?

