

Cyber security approaches for Cloud/Edge Environments

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Information

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- ▶ Duration: **20 hours.**
- ▶ Language: **English.**
- ▶ Lesson in site and remote (Teams).

Information

- ▶ Dedicated Teams channel:
 - ▶ **PhD STIET Cyber security approaches for Cloud/Edge Environments**
https://teams.microsoft.com/l/team/19%3a-Dtnw_NHUA1AjZZV4HixlifmU8gywbskeeQwSV--uk1%40thread.tacv2/conversations?groupId=bdafff5c-0ab9-44b2-aef2-5a14e1dd6e15&tenantId=6cd36f83-1a02-442d-972f-2670cb5e9b1a
- ▶ Optional homework.
 - ▶ Available in Teams.
- ▶ Final Exam with two options:
 - ▶ **Theoretical:** short survey with 3 papers.
 - ▶ **Pratical:** 2 exercises.
 - ▶ **Quiz:** multiple choice questions.

Outline

1

Evolving computing paradigms

- Virtualization, cloud computing, software orchestration
- Software-oriented architectures and micro-services
- Beyond the cloud: the Internet of Service and CPS

2

Cloud security aspects

- Limitations of existing approaches
- Evolving threats landscape
- Cloud security approaches


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Protecting the workload



- Monitoring and visibility for cloud-based services: SIEM systems
- Enhancing Elastic Stack
- The ASTRID/GUARD architecture
- Secure development, integration, and deployment pipelines

Cloud computing


- ▶ Virtualization
- ▶ XaaS paradigms: IaaS, PaaS, SaaS, NaaS, ...
- ▶ Sharing of resources (servers, networks, software, data)
 - Multitenancy
- ▶ Private vs Public systems
 - Sharing of responsibility
- ▶ Pay-as-you-go
- ▶ Self-provisioning and software-defined




Cloud computing




Cloud models: IaaS, PaaS, SaaS



Cloud models: management




Cloud models: target users





Beyond plain virtualization

New paradigms for software development, deployment and operation:

- ✓ From "code writing" to "service chaining and configuration"
- ✓ Re-usable components
- ✓ Automated lifecycle management
- ✓ Context-awareness and adaptability
- ✓ Elastic services



Software orchestration



Software orchestration





Software orchestration

Elasticity


*Partially unpredictable
topology and design time!*

Resilience




Service orchestration

- ▶ Service model
 - description
 - capabilities (what the component does)
 - properties (configuration elements),
 - requirements (virtual resources, libraries, other components), and
 - management operations (e.g., install, start, stop, scale, monitor).
- ▶ Orchestration
 - deploy the service in the underlying virtualization infrastructure
 - perform life-cycle management actions.
- ▶ Examples: TOSCA, ETSI NFV, IETF SFC, FIWARE, Kubernetes, Docker Swarm, Apache Mesos.




Orchestration - Examples

Docker Swarm




Apache Mesos




Trends in virtualization...



From VMs...



to lightweight containers




... and software architectures




Monolithic



Multi-tier




Service-oriented




Micro-services

(Micro-)service-oriented architectures


Micro-services



Service meshes




Beyond the cloud: the Internet of Services



Smart services

The Internet of Services




*Service-Oriented
Architectures*


XaaS



Chaining services




Chaining services: example




Digital business chains

- ▶ Dynamic composition of
 - software
 - services
 - data
 - smart devices
- ▶ Elastic topologies
 - model-driven or data-driven
- ▶ Programmable infrastructure
 - cloud, SDN, IoT



... and security?




Security concerns




The “security perimeter” model

- ▶ Shortcomings:
 - ▶ rigidity
 - ▶ network partitioning
 - ▶ HW/SW security appliances
 - ▶ routing/switching policies
 - ▶ market segmentation
 - ▶ network packets bounced across security appliances
 - for analysis, inspection, mitigation, and processing
 - ▶ redundant inspection/analysis
 - ▶ limited scope security service



Security threats in cloud infrastructure

Extra-privileges




Security threats: Network and Infrastructure

Public Internet connection (LTE, WiFi)
 Weak security mechanisms by design
 Poor configuration
 Tampering
 Resource exhaustion

Broader range of attack models
 Increased attack surface
 Multi-tenancy
 Lack of hardware acceleration
 Lack of trusted platform modules

Personal and portable devices, multihoming
 Road warriors
 Removable storage
 Outsourcing



Security challenges

- Slow and ineffective **detection** of attacks
 - low visibility, limited scope of algorithms
- Difficulty in identifying **new threats** and vulnerabilities
 - ineffective correlation of data from multiple sources, lack of big data techniques
- Outdated and inefficient **architectures**
 - sharing the security context, balance granularity with overhead
- Technology and business **lock-in**
 - no common interfaces/architectures


Security challenges

- **Rigidity**
 - network partitioning, security processes, routing and switching policies
- **Slowness to share the knowledge**
 - mostly based on paperwork and manual processes
- **Ineffective awareness to users**
 - dashboards mainly designed for technical operators (no end users, management, legal staff)

Security challenges

- **Growing complexity**
 - human errors in design, implementation, configuration, and management
- **Trustworthiness** and reliability of the overall end-to-end service
 - integrity and dependability of the whole chain beyond identity management and access control
 - tracking the propagation of private data and sensitive information
 - weak links represent a privileged attack vector
- **Dynamic composition**
 - the chain topology and composition are usually unknown
 - difficulty to assess and certify trustworthiness for multi-domain and multi-tenancy services


Emerging trends



- ❖ *From centralized to distributed architectures*
- ❖ *Leveraging the programmability of the infrastructure*
- ❖ *Efficiency vs performance*
- ❖ *Reliability and data protection*
- ❖ *Orchestration and automation*
- ❖ *Data correlation*
- ❖ *Visualization, representation, and sharing*


Emerging trends

- ▶ From centralized to more distributed architectures
 - ▶ Micro-firewalls, distributed firewalls;
 - ▶ Log collectors, integrated security solutions, SIEM.
- ▶ Leverage network programmability
 - ▶ From SNMP, NetFlow, sFlow, IPFIX to OpenFlow and NetConf;
 - ▶ From stateless to stateful inspection and monitoring.




Emerging trends

- ▶ Boost efficiency and performance
 - from simple memory-less string matching to stateful rules;
 - applications are the main targets for attacks;
 - growing number and complexity of protocols;
 - multi-vector attacks.
- ▶ Trustworthiness and data protection
 - certification of origin and integrity
 - data location and propagation




Emerging trends

- ▶ Software orchestration
 - smart devices and applications with programmable reporting capabilities;
 - policy-driven automation;
 - formal verification methods.
- ▶ Data correlation
 - machine learning and AI;
 - information sharing.
- ▶ Situational awareness
 - visualization, representation, sharing.



The cloudification wave



The “cloudification” wave


- ▶ massive virtualization
- ▶ multi-tenancy
- ▶ externalization
- ▶ DevOps
- ▶ software orchestration
- ▶ elastic services
- ▶ cloud-native applications

Security aspects for cloud-based services

- ▶ Service integrity
 - timely detect any attack or threat that may compromise the integrity, confidentiality, or availability of data and processes.
- ▶ Service trustworthiness
 - trust software developers, things, vendors, service providers, infrastructures, data sources, ...
- ▶ Data sovereignty
 - know who, how, and where will process private data and sensitive information.

Challenges


- ▶ Infrastructure vs Virtual Resources
 - many providers and different cloud models
 - different responsibilities
- ▶ heterogeneous interfaces
- ▶ ever-evolving attack patterns
- ▶ broad threat landscape
- ▶ dynamic topologies
- ▶ visibility
 - software, configuration, communications



Technical issues: faster software releases

Faster release cycles of applications

- ▶ new computing paradigms improve the speed at which new software is delivered;
- ▶ this complicates security analysis, which has not improved at the same pace.



Frequency of application changes

Technical trends: evolution of workloads

Physical

- Monolithic applications
- Physical servers as unit of scaling
- Lifespan of years

Virtual Machines

- Hypervisor virtualizes the hardware
- VMs as unit of scaling
- Months to years

Containers

- Virtualizes the OS
- Applications/services as unit of scaling
- Minutes to days

Serverless

- Virtualizes the application runtime
- Resources as unit of scaling
- Seconds to minutes

Increased shift to cloud-native applications



- ▶ Kubernetes being the prevailing cloud technology

Technical trends: containers and Kubernetes

Increased shift to cloud-native applications

- ▶ Kubernetes being the prevailing cloud technology

█ Fall 2018
█ Spring 2019
█ Winter 2020



Technical trends: multi-cloud deployments


No vendor lock-in

Increased availability and resilience


Geographical coverage

- ▶ performance, regulations
- Heterogeneous interfaces and capabilities
 - ▶ deployment, management, security

The cloud threat model



The cloud threat landscape



Top cloud threats

- ▶ Many security tools and features available for cloud applications
 - incorrect usage is a common issue.
- ▶ Typical causes:
 - low understanding;
 - limited visibility;
 - fast software release cycles
 - multi-cloud deployments and heterogeneous security capabilities.






Figure 52. Future security threats to the cloud environment.

Top security features




Cloud protection


- ▶ Multiple layers, multiple scopes.
- ▶ Multiple layers, multiple tools.
- ▶ Multiple layers, multiple responsibilities.
- ▶ Multiple layers, many cross-relationships.





Understanding the sharing of responsibility



Reported vulnerabilities by year



Criticality




Cloud protection hierarchy

Cloud Security Posture Management (CSPM)

- integrates security capabilities offered by cloud providers with the customer's security processes
- Cloud Access Security Brokers (CASB) - translate internal security policies to specific interfaces

Cloud infrastructure:

- cloud providers
- IDS, antivirus, firewalls and similar tools
- as good as or better than most private DCs




Cloud Workload Protection Platforms (CWPP)

- provides "consistent visibility and control for physical machines, virtual machines, containers, and serverless workloads, regardless of location"
- brings end-point protection concepts to the cloud, taking into account specific characteristics: multi-tenancy, elasticity, resource limitations


Cloud Native Application Protection Platform (CNAPP)

- leverages the synergy in combining CWPP and CSPM capabilities
- scan workloads and configurations in development and protect workloads and configurations at runtime


Protecting the workload: the scope




The need for visibility



Protecting the workload



Protecting the workload



Security Information and Event Management

- ▶ **Collection** of events and logs from many sources
 - preferably in raw formats to fulfil legal requirements for forensics.
 - ▶ **Decisions** based on rules
 - look for known patterns in the reported data.
 - ▶ **Incident generation**
 - logs, reports, or alerts.
 - ▶ **Notification** to humans
 - including remediation, if possible.



SIEM – Known limitations

PROBLEM

Cannot use required data

Difficult to maintain and operate

High false negative and positive

Unstable

Inflexible data

Static workflows

Cannot detect modern threats

Make the system *programmable*:
programmatic visibility
+
dynamic security pipelines

→ Cannot adapt to critical cases

→ Limited and restrictive

→ Business risk

SIEM – Evolution

- ▶ Analytics-driven SIEM
 - beyond plain correlation rules for data analysis;
 - sophisticated quantitative methods to gain insight into and prioritize efforts;
 - ML and AI for anomaly detection.
- ▶ Flexibility
 - on premises, in the cloud or hybrid deployment.
- ▶ Beyond logs and security events
 - broader insights from data sources, including cloud workloads.
- ▶ Improved decision-support
 - rapid response, incident investigation and coordination of CSIRT.


SIEM – Evolution

► Scalability



- to follow the organization grow;
- filter out useless information and events.

► Elasticity

- to detect new cloud workloads;
- to process variable amounts of data;
- to balance resource consumption and performance.




SIEM - Challenges



- ▶ Beyond bare metal servers and static service architectures:
 - virtualization, multi-tenancy, cloud-native applications, software repositories, elastic and dynamic topologies
- ▶ Beyond rigid appliances and services for cybersecurity
 - programmable agents, flexible streaming and pipelining

SIEM common architecture




*Log and data collection
File integrity monitoring
Rootkit and malware detection
Security policy monitoring
Configuration assessments
Software inventory*

*Security analytics
Intrusion detection
Log data analysis
File integrity monitoring*


*Vulnerability detection
Configuration assessment
Incident response
Regulatory compliance
Wazuh architecture*

SIEM layers




Towards new architectures


- ▶ Externalization of security processes
- ▶ Multi- and cross- cloud deployments
- ▶ Cloud-native applications
- ▶ Programmatic inspection and monitoring
- ▶ Portability
- ▶ Service orchestration



The ASTRID architecture



The ASTRID model




*Event and log collection
Software tracing
Deep packet inspection*

*Aggregation
Tagging
Enrichment*


*Delivery
Processing
Normalization
Correlation*

*Detection
Attestation
Prediction
Assessment*


Collecting data



Collecting data: the Elastic Stack



Collecting data: the Elastic Stack



Full deployment

Collecting data: alternative frameworks

Name	Use Cases
Elastic Stack	Log collection, metric collection, network packet collection
Prometheus	Metrics collection, monitoring
Zipkin	Trace Collection and Dashboarding
Jaeger	Trace Collection and Dashboarding
OpenCensus	Metrics and Trace Collection
Grafana	Analytics and Dashboarding


Elastic vs Prometheus and Splunk

Name	Elasticsearch	Prometheus	Splunk
Description	A distributed, RESTful modern search and analytics engine based on Apache Lucene	Open-source Time Series DBMS and monitoring system	Analytics Platform for Big Data
Primary database model	Search engine	Time Series DBMS	Search engine
Secondary database models	Document store		
Developer	Elastic		Splunk Inc.
License	Open Source	Open Source	Commercial
Cloud-based only	no	no	no
Implementation language	Java	Go	
Server operating systems	All OS with a Java VM	Linux, Windows	Linux, OS X, Solaris, Windows
Data scheme	schema-free	yes	yes
Typing info	yes	Numeric data only	yes
XML support	no	no	yes
Secondary indexes	yes	no	yes
SQL	SQL-like query language	no	no
APIs and other access methods	Java API; RESTful HTTP/JSON API	RESTful HTTP/JSON API	HTTP REST
Supported programming languages	.NET; Groovy; Community Contributed Clients; Java; JavaScript; Perl; PHP; Python; Ruby	.NET; C++; Go; Haskell; Java; JavaScript (Node.js); Python; Ruby	C#; Java; JavaScript; PHP; Python; Ruby


Elastic vs Prometheus and Splunk

Name	Elasticsearch	Prometheus	Splunk
Server-side scripts	yes	no	yes
Triggers	yes	no	yes
Partitioning methods	Sharding	Sharding	Sharding
Replication methods	yes	yes	Multi-source replication
MapReduce info	ES-Hadoop Connector	no	yes
Consistency concepts	Eventual Consistency	none	Eventual Consistency
Foreign keys	no	no	no
Transaction concepts	no	no	no
Concurrency	yes	yes	yes
Durability	yes	yes	yes
In-memory capabilities	Memcached and Redis integration	no	no
User concepts		no	Access rights for users and roles

Extending the Elastic Stack



Software architecture




Programmable agents

- ▶ Elastic Beats 
- ▶ eBPF-based tools 

- ▶ Polycube cubes: monitoring, inspection, firewalling

- ▶ RunTimeTracer
- ▶ LCP



Security services


Network Analytics

- ▶ Learn periodic and seasonal trends
- ▶ Detect anomalies from the trend
- ▶ Switch between multiple states (BAU, warning)
- ▶ Change the behaviour of programmable agents
- ▶ Leverages eBPF programs for traffic measurements and deep packet inspection


Remote attestation

- ▶ Verify the behaviour of the software at run-time
- ▶ Collect measurements validated by the TPM
- ▶ Attestation by proof/Attestation by quote
- ▶ Leverage eBPF tools for tracing the execution of kernel functions

The ASTRID programming model




Building processing pipelines




Building processing pipelines at run-time


Activation




Mitigation and reaction



Abstracting the context: the Context Broker




The Context Fabric



The model and interfaces

Security considerations




Targets:

- ▶ **T1:** The Business Logic
- ▶ **T2:** The service orchestrator
- ▶ **T3:** Security-related data
- ▶ **T4:** Security processes


Threat vectors:

- ▶ **V1:** APIs exposed by micro-services
- ▶ **V2:** Privilege escalation in the VF
- ▶ **V3:** Micro-services architecture
- ▶ **V4:** Programmable components


Deployments



Centralized standalone




Co-located




Hybrid


Beyond the cloud: digital services




Digital service chains: example




The GUARD architecture




AuthN & AuthZ



GDPR aspects




The GUARD software architecture




The road away: secure CI/CD pipelines

- ▶ Security vs quick code delivery
- ▶ Templates and software orchestration
- ▶ Unknown topologies
- ▶ Lack of visibility into the cloud




CI/CD/CS



- ▶ Source code assessment
- ▶ Container images
- ▶ Kubernetes templates
- ▶ Offline testing
- ▶ Run-time monitoring and analysis

ASTRID factsheet

Project acronym	ASTRID
Project ID	786922
Starting Date	1 st May 2018
Ending Date	30 th April 2021
Call Topic	H2020-DS-2016-2017 H2020-DS-07-2017 - Cybersecurity PPP: Addressing Advanced Cyber Security Threats and Threat Actors
Total Cost	EUR 2,932,297.50
EC Contribution	EUR 2,932,297.50
Funding scheme	RIA



GUARD factsheet

Project acronym	GUARD
Project ID	833456
Starting Date	1 st May 2019
Ending Date	30 th April 2022
Call Topic	SU-ICT-01-2018 - Dynamic countering of cyber-attacks
Total Cost	€ 5,443,250.00
EC Contribution	€ 4,684,700.00
Funding scheme	IA



Thesis/Research grants

- ▶ Deep packet inspection through eBPF programs
- ▶ Kernel tracing through eBPF programs
- ▶ Integration/extension to open-source frameworks
(Cilium)
- ▶ Detection of stegomalware and covert channels

Suggested readings

- ▶ M. Repetto, A. Carrega, R. Rapuzzi. An architecture to manage security operations for digital service chains. *Future Generation Computer Systems*, Volume 115, February 2021, Pages 251-266. DOI: 10.1016/j.future.2020.08.044
- ▶ S. Covaci, R. Rapuzzi, M. Repetto, Fulvio Risso. A New Paradigm to Address Threats for Virtualized Services. In *IEEE 42nd Annual Computer Software and Applications Conference (COMPSAC)*, Tokyo, Japan, July 23rd-27th, 2018, pp. 689-694.
- ▶ R. Rapuzzi, M. Repetto. Building situational awareness for network threats in fog/edge computing: Emerging paradigms beyond the security perimeter model, *Future Generation Computer Systems*, Volume 85, August 2018, pp. 235-249. DOI: 10.1016/j.future.2018.04.007.

Suggested readings

- ▶ Gábor Pék, Levente Buttyán, Boldizsár Bencsáth. A survey of security issues in hardware virtualization, *ACM Computing Surveys*, July 2013, Article No.: 40, <https://doi.org/10.1145/2480741.2480757>.
- ▶ Cloud Security Alliance. Security Guidance v4.0 – CSA Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud Computing v4.0, 07/26/2017.
- ▶ ASTRID website: <https://www.astrid-project.eu/>
- ▶ GUARD website: <https://guard-project.eu/>