Fix filename for new WiFi firmware #1
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galaxyfreak
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sachinthomaspj
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Sep 30, 2014
This moves ARM over to the asm-generic/unaligned.h header. This has the
benefit of better code generated especially for ARMv7 on gcc 4.7+
compilers.
As Arnd Bergmann, points out: The asm-generic version uses the "struct"
version for native-endian unaligned access and the "byteshift" version
for the opposite endianess. The current ARM version however uses the
"byteshift" implementation for both.
Thanks to Nicolas Pitre for the excellent analysis:
Test case:
int foo (int *x) { return get_unaligned(x); }
long long bar (long long *x) { return get_unaligned(x); }
With the current ARM version:
foo:
ldrb r3, [r0, #2] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 2B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 2B]
ldrb r1, [r0, #1] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 1B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 1B]
ldrb r2, [r0, #0] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D)], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D)]
mov r3, r3, asl sakindia123#16 @ tmp154, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 2B],
ldrb r0, [r0, #3] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 3B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 3B]
orr r3, r3, r1, asl sakindia123#8 @, tmp155, tmp154, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 1B],
orr r3, r3, r2 @ tmp157, tmp155, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D)]
orr r0, r3, r0, asl #24 @,, tmp157, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 3B],
bx lr @
bar:
stmfd sp!, {r4, r5, r6, r7} @,
mov r2, #0 @ tmp184,
ldrb r5, [r0, #6] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 6B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 6B]
ldrb r4, [r0, #5] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 5B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 5B]
ldrb ip, [r0, #2] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 2B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 2B]
ldrb r1, [r0, #4] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 4B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 4B]
mov r5, r5, asl sakindia123#16 @ tmp175, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 6B],
ldrb r7, [r0, #1] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 1B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 1B]
orr r5, r5, r4, asl sakindia123#8 @, tmp176, tmp175, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 5B],
ldrb r6, [r0, sakindia123#7] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 7B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 7B]
orr r5, r5, r1 @ tmp178, tmp176, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 4B]
ldrb r4, [r0, #0] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D)], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D)]
mov ip, ip, asl sakindia123#16 @ tmp188, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 2B],
ldrb r1, [r0, #3] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 3B], MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 3B]
orr ip, ip, r7, asl sakindia123#8 @, tmp189, tmp188, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 1B],
orr r3, r5, r6, asl #24 @,, tmp178, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 7B],
orr ip, ip, r4 @ tmp191, tmp189, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D)]
orr ip, ip, r1, asl #24 @, tmp194, tmp191, MEM[(const u8 *)x_1(D) + 3B],
mov r1, r3 @,
orr r0, r2, ip @ tmp171, tmp184, tmp194
ldmfd sp!, {r4, r5, r6, r7}
bx lr
In both cases the code is slightly suboptimal. One may wonder why
wasting r2 with the constant 0 in the second case for example. And all
the mov's could be folded in subsequent orr's, etc.
Now with the asm-generic version:
foo:
ldr r0, [r0, #0] @ unaligned @,* x
bx lr @
bar:
mov r3, r0 @ x, x
ldr r0, [r0, #0] @ unaligned @,* x
ldr r1, [r3, #4] @ unaligned @,
bx lr @
This is way better of course, but only because this was compiled for
ARMv7. In this case the compiler knows that the hardware can do
unaligned word access. This isn't that obvious for foo(), but if we
remove the get_unaligned() from bar as follows:
long long bar (long long *x) {return *x; }
then the resulting code is:
bar:
ldmia r0, {r0, r1} @ x,,
bx lr @
So this proves that the presumed aligned vs unaligned cases does have
influence on the instructions the compiler may use and that the above
unaligned code results are not just an accident.
Still... this isn't fully conclusive without at least looking at the
resulting assembly fron a pre ARMv6 compilation. Let's see with an
ARMv5 target:
foo:
ldrb r3, [r0, #0] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp139,* x
ldrb r1, [r0, #1] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp140,
ldrb r2, [r0, #2] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp143,
ldrb r0, [r0, #3] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp146,
orr r3, r3, r1, asl sakindia123#8 @, tmp142, tmp139, tmp140,
orr r3, r3, r2, asl sakindia123#16 @, tmp145, tmp142, tmp143,
orr r0, r3, r0, asl #24 @,, tmp145, tmp146,
bx lr @
bar:
stmfd sp!, {r4, r5, r6, r7} @,
ldrb r2, [r0, #0] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp139,* x
ldrb r7, [r0, #1] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp140,
ldrb r3, [r0, #4] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp149,
ldrb r6, [r0, #5] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp150,
ldrb r5, [r0, #2] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp143,
ldrb r4, [r0, #6] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp153,
ldrb r1, [r0, sakindia123#7] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp156,
ldrb ip, [r0, #3] @ zero_extendqisi2 @ tmp146,
orr r2, r2, r7, asl sakindia123#8 @, tmp142, tmp139, tmp140,
orr r3, r3, r6, asl sakindia123#8 @, tmp152, tmp149, tmp150,
orr r2, r2, r5, asl sakindia123#16 @, tmp145, tmp142, tmp143,
orr r3, r3, r4, asl sakindia123#16 @, tmp155, tmp152, tmp153,
orr r0, r2, ip, asl #24 @,, tmp145, tmp146,
orr r1, r3, r1, asl #24 @,, tmp155, tmp156,
ldmfd sp!, {r4, r5, r6, r7}
bx lr
Compared to the initial results, this is really nicely optimized and I
couldn't do much better if I were to hand code it myself.
Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <rob.herring@calxeda.com>
Reviewed-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
[steven@steven676.net: backport to 3.0: don't depend on asm-generic
wrapper support in Kbuild]
Change-Id: I37f8db38bfa2cd8680a8bec0cb4da8ec39c04861
sachinthomaspj
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that referenced
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Nov 2, 2014
Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG. As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject all such security contexts whether coming from userspace via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr request by SELinux. Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process (CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted to the domain by policy. In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts that are not defined in the build host policy. [On Android, this can only be set by root/CAP_MAC_ADMIN processes, and if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only if mac_admin permission is granted in policy. In Android 4.4, this would only be allowed for root/CAP_MAC_ADMIN processes that are also in unconfined domains. In current AOSP master, mac_admin is not allowed for any domains except the recovery console which has a legitimate need for it. The other potential vector is mounting a maliciously crafted filesystem for which SELinux fetches xattrs (e.g. an ext4 filesystem on a SDcard). However, the end result is only a local denial-of-service (DOS) due to kernel BUG. This fix is queued for 3.14.] Reproducer: su setenforce 0 touch foo setfattr -n security.selinux foo Caveat: Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible without booting with SELinux disabled. Any subsequent access to foo after doing the above will also trigger the BUG. BUG output from Matthew Thode: [ 473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654! [ 473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP [ 474.027196] Modules linked in: [ 474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G D I 3.13.0-grsec #1 [ 474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0 07/29/10 [ 474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti: ffff8805f50cd488 [ 474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>] [<ffffffff814681c7>] context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308 [ 474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX: 0000000000000100 [ 474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI: ffff8805e8aaa000 [ 474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09: 0000000000000006 [ 474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12: 0000000000000006 [ 474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15: 0000000000000000 [ 474.453816] FS: 00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 474.489254] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4: 00000000000207f0 [ 474.556058] Stack: [ 474.584325] ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffff8805f1190a40 [ 474.618913] ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990 ffff8805e8aac860 [ 474.653955] ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060 ffff8805c0ac3d94 [ 474.690461] Call Trace: [ 474.723779] [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a [ 474.778049] [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b [ 474.811398] [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179 [ 474.843813] [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4 [ 474.875694] [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31 [ 474.907370] [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e [ 474.938726] [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22 [ 474.970036] [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d [ 475.000618] [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91 [ 475.030402] [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b [ 475.061097] [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30 [ 475.094595] [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3 [ 475.148405] [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b [ 475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48 8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7 75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8 [ 475.255884] RIP [<ffffffff814681c7>] context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308 [ 475.296120] RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38> [ 475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]--- [sds: commit message edited to note Android implications and to generate a unique Change-Id for gerrit] Change-Id: I4d5389f0cfa72b5f59dada45081fa47e03805413 Reported-by: Matthew Thode <mthode@mthode.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
sachinthomaspj
pushed a commit
that referenced
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Nov 2, 2014
Below Kernel panic is observed due to race condition, where
sock_has_perm called in a thread and is trying to access sksec->sid
without checking sksec. Just before that, sk->sk_security was set
to NULL by selinux_sk_free_security through sk_free in other thread.
31704.949269: <3> IPv4: Attempt to release alive inet socket dd81b200
31704.959049: <1> Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at \
virtual address 00000000
31704.983562: <1> pgd = c6b74000
31704.985248: <1> [00000000] *pgd=00000000
31704.996591: <0> Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM
31705.001016: <6> Modules linked in: adsprpc [last unloaded: wlan]
31705.006659: <6> CPU: 1 Tainted: G O \
(3.4.0-g837ab9b-00003-g6bcd9c6 #1)
31705.014042: <6> PC is at sock_has_perm+0x58/0xd4
31705.018292: <6> LR is at sock_has_perm+0x58/0xd4
31705.022546: <6> pc : [<c0341e8c>] lr : [<c0341e8c>] \
psr: 60000013
31705.022549: <6> sp : dda27f00 ip : 00000000 fp : 5f36fc84
31705.034002: <6> r10: 00004000 r9 : 0000009d r8 : e8c2b700
31705.039211: <6> r7 : dda27f24 r6 : dd81b200 r5 : 00000000 \
r4 : 00000000
31705.045721: <6> r3 : 00000000 r2 : dda27ef8 r1 : 00000000 \
r0 : dda27f54
31705.052232: <6> Flags: nZCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM \
Segment user
31705.059349: <6> Control: 10c5787d Table: 10d7406a DAC: 00000015
.
.
.
.
31705.697816: <6> [<c0341e8c>] (sock_has_perm+0x58/0xd4) from \
[<c033ed10>] (security_socket_getsockopt+0x14/0x1c)
31705.707534: <6> [<c033ed10>] (security_socket_getsockopt+0x14/0x1c) \
from [<c0745c18>] (sys_getsockopt+0x34/0xa8)
31705.717343: <6> [<c0745c18>] (sys_getsockopt+0x34/0xa8) from \
[<c0106140>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x30)
31705.726193: <0> Code: e59832e8 e5933058 e5939004 ebfac736 (e5953000)
31705.732635: <4> ---[ end trace 22889004dafd87bd ]---
Change-Id: I79c3fb525f35ea2494d53788788cd71a38a32d6b
Signed-off-by: Satya Durga Srinivasu Prabhala <satyap@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Osvaldo Banuelos <osvaldob@codeaurora.org>
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