

## LAB 7: DATABASE SECURITY

### PART 1: Basics of MySQL

I set up mysql inside the docker container. I then created a database: labdb as seen in figure 1.

```
mysql> CREATE DATABASE labdb;
mysql> K, 1 row affected (0.01 sec)
```

```
mysql> SHOW DATABASES;
+-----+
| Database |
+-----+
| information_schema |
| labdb      |
| mysql      |
| performance_schema |
| sys        |
+-----+
5 rows in set (0.00 sec)
```

*Figure 1: Creating labdb*

In this database we create a table student with 5 rows of values inserted. The resulting table looks as seen in figure 2.

```
mysql> SELECT * FROM student;
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| Student_ID | Name | Username | Password | Salt |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| 1 | Sowmya | sowmya@neu.edu | test | e09cff39-9 |
| 2 | User2 | user2@test.neu.edu | 123 | e7396e74-9 |
| 3 | User3 | user3@test.neu.edu | Abc | eb951c1c-9 |
| 4 | User4 | user4@test.neu.edu | qwerty | ee8d110b-9 |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
4 rows in set (0.00 sec)
```

*Figure 2: Initial student table*

### PART 2: Attribute Encryption

Here we protect the stored username and password of the users. Username is encrypted using AES algorithm (128 bit by default) with 'P@assw0rd!' as key string and password is first salted and then generated a SHA-2 checksum of length 512 bit. The resultant student table is as shown in figure 3.

```
mysql> DROP TABLE student;
Query OK, 0 rows affected (0.03 sec)

mysql> ALTER TABLE new_student RENAME TO student;
Query OK, 0 rows affected (0.05 sec)

mysql> SELECT * FROM student;
+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| Student_id | Name | Username | Password |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| 1 | Sowmya | {ff5E[04c9 | fa092d978e8dd732898b8b3ac32036ea00b15f3d6588cd71ae030dbfb9356b84bd1c4f6a98a05e86b03c2119fd5604f2144b302fbf246d9971a7f8ea2027e1cd | e09cff39-9 |
| 2 | User2 | @&>3xi#M0$I }D# | 2add81fdf790e2b287dd1bf4225a559ab1af5e3b8abe980ab1143439cb9e0580040780dfa9c71cf1427ef79570133e957bbe66bb84ac1c4146d7406bcb65037a | e7396e74-9 |
| 3 | User3 | @z`@&1KR#M0$I }D# | 5c29e0dbe3ceb7b3299278724184c5d099b89e4884060665bf4539569f1c11596793bdd257a3c7f2825f734fbeda6731f27bcd945fa581f7a7eab79a99a8291 | eb951c1c-9 |
| 4 | User4 | oJ80Fp4@#M0$I }D# | 60889110895f966a89c64b36e4fa24e8b9995e05f750b9fc70f22ee2229f30ffb994fcfc8cb4fe518d2ea7babb3d25ad2910429c1c537726b24c4c0ae0777115 | ee8d110b-9 |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+
4 rows in set (0.00 sec)

mysql>
```

*Figure 3: Encrypted Student table*

### PART 3: Database Access Control

We create total of 3 roles: admin, operator, developer to access student table of labdb database. Admin role has all the permission granted for the table and the user ad1 (password: admin) is created and then assigned to this role.

Operator role has only create view and show view permissions granted and the user op1 (password: operator) is then created and assigned to this role. We can verify this by logging into the database as op1 user and try to insert any values into the student table. This action will be denied as seen in figure 4.

Developer role has select, insert, delete, update permissions granted and the user dev1 (password: developer) is then created and assigned to this role as seen in figure 5.

```
mysql> INSERT INTO student VALUES (5, 'test2', 'test@husky.neu.edu', 'test2', (SELECT LEFT(UUID(), 10)));
ERROR 1142 (42000): INSERT command denied to user 'op1'@'localhost' for table 'student'
mysql>
```

*Figure 4*

```

mysql> CREATE ROLE 'developer';
Query OK, 0 rows affected (0.01 sec)

mysql> GRANT SELECT, INSERT, DELETE, UPDATE ON labdb.student TO 'developer';
Query OK, 0 rows affected (0.01 sec)

mysql> CREATE USER 'dev1' IDENTIFIED BY 'developer';
Query OK, 0 rows affected (0.00 sec)

mysql> SET PASSWORD FOR 'dev1' = 'developer';
Query OK, 0 rows affected (0.01 sec)

mysql> GRANT 'developer' TO 'dev1';
Query OK, 0 rows affected (0.01 sec)

mysql>

```

Figure 5: Creating developer role

## PART 4: Database Hardening

We export the database using the sql file: employees.sql into the empty employeesdb. We then harden the employees table using the same approach used for the student table. We encrypt ssn, username, bank\_acc using aes algorithm using the key string: P@ssw0rd! and salted the passwords and generated a SHA-2 (512 bit) checksum. The resulting employees table is as seen in figure 7.

Command used: >UPDATE employees SET ssn = aes\_encrypt(ssn, 'P@ssw0rd!'), username = aes\_encrypt(username, 'P@ssw0rd!'), password = sha2(concat(password, salt), 512), acc\_no = aes\_encrypt(bank\_acc, 'P@ssw0rd!');

```

mysql> ALTER TABLE employees ADD COLUMN salt VARCHAR(10);
Query OK, 0 rows affected (8.94 sec)
Records: 0 Duplicates: 0 Warnings: 0

mysql> UPDATE employees SET salt = SUBSTRING(SHA1(RAND()),1,10);
Query OK, 300024 rows affected (54.74 sec)
Rows matched: 300024 Changed: 300024 Warnings: 0

mysql> SELECT * FROM employees limit 10;

```

emp_no	birth_date	first_name	last_name	gender	hire_date	ssn	username	password	bank_acc	salt
10001	1953-09-02	Georgi	Facello	M	1986-06-26	353-53-6425	GeorgiFacello@ia5130.edu	34d178db-cdb	971027976806300	6170761501
10002	1964-06-02	Bezalel	Simmel	F	1985-11-21	589-2-3488	BezalelSimmel@ia5130.edu	34d178db-cdb	729540196926835	a6af4cc0cb
10003	1959-12-03	Parto	Bamford	M	1986-08-28	671-31-5629	PartoBamford@ia5130.edu	34d178db-cdb	734617084948920	695ac29447
10004	1954-05-01	Chirstian	Koblick	M	1986-12-01	865-63-6186	ChirstianKoblick@ia5130.edu	34d178db-cdb	484464864697739	602f5b4b42
10005	1955-01-21	Kyoichi	Maliniak	M	1989-09-12	162-94-2962	KyoichiMaliniak@ia5130.edu	34d178db-cdb	218473099375584	b2715b0230
10006	1953-04-20	Anneke	Preusig	F	1989-06-02	610-16-9979	AnnekePreusig@ia5130.edu	34d178db-cdb	638970933518344	2a8321cd77
10007	1957-05-23	Tzvetan	Zielinski	F	1989-02-10	491-45-8431	TzvetanZielinski@ia5130.edu	34d178db-cdb	539435400198618	f9f5adfac7
10008	1958-02-19	Saniya	Kalloufi	M	1994-09-15	824-59-5124	SaniyaKalloufi@ia5130.edu	34d178db-cdb	780264231171704	38486a88a0
10009	1952-04-19	Sumant	Peac	F	1985-02-18	768-30-2326	SumantPeac@ia5130.edu	34d178db-cdb	283014985996312	35845673ad
10010	1963-06-01	Duangkaew	Piveteau	F	1989-08-24	239-49-7759	DuangkaewPiveteau@ia5130.edu	34d178db-cdb	74282267200092	1642068f83

```

10 rows in set (0.01 sec)

```

Figure 6: Adding salt column.

```
mysql> SELECT * FROM employees limit 10;
```

emp_no	birth_date	first_name	last_name	gender	hire_date	ssn	username	bank_acc	salt	password
10001	1953-09-02	Georgi	Facello	M	1986-06-26	\S }	!IR\##h"\$%&(v	95e48d2ce9c8c7a5029ad5ffb2d589665c2bc5565c2d2775a1b8b17bb11e8a18fa		
10002	1964-06-02	Bezalel	Simmel	F	1985-11-21	[IQ^Bvh	h"\$%&(v	b940eaa5b3b3a2fd0bc77704b4b075aa2d91bdc9fa5349df96f47cd0632f9c5b8137		
10003	1959-12-03	Parto	Bamford	M	1986-08-28	o'1[ft				
10004	1954-05-01	Christian	Koblick	M	1986-12-01	ftIuPtj^	h&<u>"m	df796932b63799b8d0307a106be78735b152085d607bc69061dc604dad		
10005	1955-01-21	Kyoichi	Maliniak	M	1989-09-12	c<l E	BG-m"bx2ING	3c02029b4bae3db01abeb6f05f7c72e0b0ed184f19a110022a8e9efa7ee24c		
10006	1953-04-20	Anneke	Preusig	F	1989-06-02	SMD#r9b	PR="N+h"\$%&(v	b34903a3c04759f6fce911ed49be413c546889d2f33ee300cd7e0b8459e9c8aa22		
10007	1952-04-19	Sumant	Peac	F	1985-02-18	T\$7T	*n2Q^7^q812,	ef01ae2168fbf30a7ab279372b683889ecd2484e3f899f153a4cfe61266c3f23		
10008	1958-02-19	Saniya	Kalloufi	M	1994-09-15	q				
10009	1952-04-19	Sumant	Peac	F	1985-02-18	T\$7T	*n2Q^7^q812,	ef01ae2168fbf30a7ab279372b683889ecd2484e3f899f153a4cfe61266c3f23		
10010	1963-06-01	Duangkaew	Piveteau	F	1989-08-24	GD\$B	Ty8:"	d7409f9f283c40a01649e52508ab7cea41fce05b54631035a96ed5699ac5eb4f86f8c4418b5cc5b5ca7ace8e711a67c14b6a36c8bd3208b83758123f265d09b		

10 rows in set (0.01 sec)

Figure 7: Updated employees table

## PART 6: Automatic encryption

To automate the above encryption for student table before insertion, we create a trigger `encrypt_data`. We can verify this works by inserting another row into the table and check if it is encrypted as seen in figure 8.

```
mysql> INSERT INTO student VALUES (5, 'User5', 'user5@test.neu.edu', 'xyz', (SELECT LEFT(UUID(), 10)));
Query OK, 1 row affected (0.03 sec)
```

```
mysql> select * from student;
```

Student_id	Name	Username	Password
1	Sowmya	{ffsE[4c9	fa092d978e8dd732898b8b3ac32036ae00b15f3d6588cd71ae030dbfb9356b84bd1c4f6a98a0e586b03c2119fd5604f2144b302fbf246d9971a
2	User2	&3xi#M\$I	2add81dfd790e2b287dd1bf4225a559ab1af5e3b8abe980ab1143439cb9e0580040780dfa9c71cf1427ef79570133e957bbe66bb84ac1c146d7406bcb
3	User3	z~&1KR#M\$I	5c29e0dbe3ceb7b3299278724184c5d099b89e4884060665bf4539569f1c11596793bdd257a3c7f2825f734fbda6731f27bcd945fa581f7a7eab79a9
4	User4	oJ8DFp4M\$I	60889110895f966a89c64b36e4fa24e8b9995e05f750b9fc7022e2229f30fffb994fcfc8cb4fe518d2ea7babb3d25ad2910429c1c537726b24c4c0ae0
5	User5	Zp^Ea#M\$I	3d6d0a62828f702003fe862bb0654ab2f575823518013c49f49b339423ad7c7d904fdce2b364ed39d47e507aa1627c8a98b086e28f20fe624347e41ff1

5 rows in set (0.00 sec)

Figure 8: Automated Encryption

**Docker container:** docker pull sowmyashreebv/db\_security:team8

## QUESTIONS:

**1. What is Role Based Access Control? What are the benefits of RBAC? List other authorization models.**

Role Based Access Control is an authorization model where the permission and privileges are granted to a user based on the role that user is assigned to. By using this model, it is possible to provide access at granular level and hence can enforce principle of least-privilege making the



system more secure. It is possible to ensure that the access to sensitive info can be tightly controlled hence reducing the risk of breaches. Also, it reduces workload to administer and change permission to the user whenever necessary (ex: change in designation/new hire) by granting/removing roles.

Other authorization models include: Discretionary Access control where the access depends upon the identity of the user (Linux systems), Mandatory Access Control (SELinux) where the access is controlled based on the assigned security labels, Attribute Based Access Control where access depends on the attributes and of the user environmental conditions.

## **2. What are some attacks on passwords? How to defend against such attacks?**

1. Brute Force Attack: Brute force attack takes a trial-and-error approach to guess the password where a computer program is used to try all possible password combination up to a specified length. If performed as an online attack we can defend by enforcing a limit on login retries. But this is usually performed as an offline attack, hence, to defend against it, secure storing of passwords needs to be available. Since this attack is resource intensive, using of strong/long passwords can make the attack difficult.

2. Dictionary Attack: Dictionary attack allows hackers to employ a program which cycles through a list of common words. An easy way to prevent such attacks is ensure stronger passwords and change of passwords regularly and to employ exponential back-off policy.

3. Rainbow Tables: It uses a database of possible passwords and their pre-computed hashes. With the assumption that more than one password can generate the same hash, it is not necessary for the attacker to know what the original password was. Salt, which are random data passed into the hash function along with the plain text, can easily avoid rainbow table attacks.

## **3. Write a short description on Bcrypt, Scrypt and Argon2 and PBKDF2 algorithms.**

Bcrypt: is a hashing algorithm based on blowfish cipher. It uses large salt by default and performs key stretching wherever necessary. Hence it is protected against rainbow table attack. It is memory hardening i.e it employs a cost factor which increases the amount of work/resources necessary to compute the hash exponentially.

Scrypt: is a key derivation function. It is computationally expensive, slow and memory intensive i.e the algorithm requires large amounts of resources to execute the hash. Like Bcrypt it also uses large salt and cost factor. Hence it is immune to brute force attacks and rainbow table attack. It is more commonly used for cryptocurrency mining.

Argon2: Argon2 is a secure password hashing algorithm. It is designed to have both a configurable runtime as well as memory consumption. Therefore, we can determine how long it takes to hash a password and how much memory is required. It consists of 3 parameters: time cost (/ iteration rounds, similar to cost factor of bcrypt ), a memory cost, which defines the memory usage and a parallelism degree, which defines the number of parallel threads. It is immune to GPU cracking attacks and its version Argon2i is also resistant to side-channel attacks.

PBKDF2: PBKDF2 (Password-Based Key Derivation Function) utilizes a pseudorandom function, such as hash-based message authentication code, to the given text or password along with a salt value this process is repeated several times to produce an encrypted key. The computational work that generates this encrypted key makes it difficult to crack the password. The number of computations needed to generate this key has increased as the processing (CPU) speed has increased. Adding a salt to the password reduces the ability to use precomputed hashes (rainbow tables) for attacks. Generally, a salt length of 68 -128 bits is used in this standard.

#### **4. Explain how passwords are stored in Linux. (location, encryption algorithm, salt, and file permissions).**

In Linux, passwords are stored in /etc/passwd file. The file permission is 644 i.e every user has the permission to read this file but only root/ user with root privileges has the permission to right into it. In this file, each row corresponds to one user and each field in a row is delimited by ‘:’

Format: <Username>:<Encrypted password>:<User ID) >:<Group ID>:<user info>:<User home directory>:<Login shell>

If the Encrypted password has ‘\$’ in it then the password hash is stored in /etc/shadow file. This file has the default permission set to 600 i.e it can be accessed only by root/ users with root privilege.

Format: <Username>:<Password hash>:< Last password change>:<min password age >:<max password age>:<warning period >:<inactivity period>:<expiration date>

The password filed in this is of the format \$id\$salt\$hashed where \$id is the encryption algorithm used (each hashing algorithm is assigned an id), \$salt is a random string appended to password, \$hashed is the password hash.