

# **Optimism Upgrade 16 Security Review**

### **Auditors**

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### 1 About Spearbit

Spearbit is a decentralized network of expert security engineers offering reviews and other security related services to Web3 projects with the goal of creating a stronger ecosystem. Our network has experience on every part of the blockchain technology stack, including but not limited to protocol design, smart contracts and the Solidity compiler. Spearbit brings in untapped security talent by enabling expert freelance auditors seeking flexibility to work on interesting projects together.

Learn more about us at spearbit.com

#### 2 Introduction

Optimism is a fast, stable, and scalable L2 blockchain built by Ethereum developers, for Ethereum developers. Built as a minimal extension to existing Ethereum software, Optimism's EVM-equivalent architecture scales your Ethereum apps without surprises. If it works on Ethereum, it works on Optimism at a fraction of the cost.

*Disclaimer*: This security review does not guarantee against a hack. It is a snapshot in time of optimism according to the specific commit. Any modifications to the code will require a new security review.

#### 3 Risk classification

Severity level	Impact: High	Impact: Medium	Impact: Low
Likelihood: high	Critical	High	Medium
Likelihood: medium	High	Medium	Low
Likelihood: low	Medium	Low	Low

#### 3.1 Impact

- High leads to a loss of a significant portion (>10%) of assets in the protocol, or significant harm to a majority
  of users.
- Medium global losses <10% or losses to only a subset of users, but still unacceptable.</li>
- Low losses will be annoying but bearable--applies to things like griefing attacks that can be easily repaired or even gas inefficiencies.

#### 3.2 Likelihood

- High almost certain to happen, easy to perform, or not easy but highly incentivized
- · Medium only conditionally possible or incentivized, but still relatively likely
- · Low requires stars to align, or little-to-no incentive

#### 3.3 Action required for severity levels

- Critical Must fix as soon as possible (if already deployed)
- High Must fix (before deployment if not already deployed)
- · Medium Should fix
- Low Could fix

## 4 Executive Summary

Over the course of 4 days in total, Op Labs engaged with Spearbit to review the optimism protocol, specifically the scripts/deploy/VerifyOPCM.s.sol file at commit 731280...fd60 and that it verifies the src/L1/OPContractsManager.sol contract at commit 54c19f...4a3a6. In this period of time a total of 3 issues were found.

#### **Summary**

Project Name	Op Labs	
Repository	optimism	
Commits	731280fd60 and 54c19f4a3a6	
Scope	scripts/deploy/VerifyOPCM.s.sol and src/L1/OPContractsManager.sol	
Type of Project	Infrastructure, L2	
Audit Timeline	Jul 9 to Jul 14	

#### **Issues Found**

Severity	Count	Fixed	Acknowledged
Critical Risk	0	0	0
High Risk	0	0	0
Medium Risk	1	0	1
Low Risk	1	0	1
Gas Optimizations	0	0	0
Informational	1	0	2
Total	3	0	3

## 5 Findings

#### 5.1 Medium Risk

#### **5.1.1 Blueprints and implementations are only checked for** OPContractsManagerDeployer

Severity: Medium Risk

Context: VerifyOPCM.s.sol#L189-L199, OPContractsManager.sol#L1937-L1945

**Description:** There are four contracts alongside OPContractsManager itself:

- OPContractsManagerGameTypeAdder.
- OPContractsManagerUpgrader.
- OPContractsManagerDeployer.
- OPContractsManagerInteropMigrator.

Each contract has an immutable contractsContainer address that points to OPContractsManagerContractsContainer, which stores the Blueprints and Implementations struct.

The VerifyOPCM.s.sol script fetches the blueprint and implementation addresses in the OPContractsManager contract by calling its blueprints() and implementations() functions:

```
/// @notice Returns the blueprint contract addresses.
function blueprints() public view returns (Blueprints memory) {
    return opcmDeployer.blueprints();
}

/// @notice Returns the implementation contract addresses.
function implementations() public view returns (Implementations memory) {
    return opcmDeployer.implementations();
}
```

However, as seen from above, these two functions fetch the Blueprints and Implementatiosn struct from only OPContractsManagerDeployer. This means all subsequent checks in the script only check the blueprints and implementations for OPContractsManager and OPContractsManagerDeployer. The other three contracts could have a different contractsContainer address, resulting in different blueprint and implementation addresses, and the script would still pass.

**Recommendation:** The script should check the implementation and blueprint addresses for all four contracts instead. Alternatively, all four contracts could be checked to have the same contractsContainer address.

**Optimism:** Acknowledged, this will be fixed in a future upgrade. For Upgrade 16, the contractsContainer address will be manually checked to be the same for all four contracts.

Spearbit: Acknowledged.

#### 5.2 Low Risk

#### 5.2.1 Immutable variables are not checked

Severity: Low Risk

Context: VerifyOPCM.s.sol#L326-L333

**Description:** In the VerifyOPCM.s.sol script, the \_verifyOpcmContractRef() function does not check the value of immutable variables to ensure they are correct.

As such, the OPCM's superchainConfig, protocolVersions, superchainProxyAdmin and upgradeController addresses could be wrong and the script would still pass.

**Recommendation:** Modify the script to ensure immutable variables are checked as well.

Optimism: Acknowledged. As part of our current process, immutable variables are manually checked to be

correct.

Spearbit: Acknowledged.

#### 5.3 Informational

#### **5.3.1** OPContractsManager never upgrades the ProtocolVersions contract

Severity: Informational

Context: OPContractsManager.sol#L1710-L1713

**Description:** In OPContractsManager, the Implementations struct contains the implementation address for the ProtocolVersions contract:

```
/// @notice The latest implementation contracts for the OP Stack.
struct Implementations {
   address superchainConfigImpl;
   address protocolVersionsImpl;
```

However, the ProtocolVersions contract is never actually upgraded to the latest implementation address in the OPCM. This can be seen as protocolVersionsImpl is never used anywhere in the contract.

**Recommendation:** Similar to the SuperchainConfig contract, the OPCM should check the current implementation of ProtocolVersions and upgrade it if it isn't already upgraded.

Optimism: Acknowledged. Spearbit: Acknowledged.