Alliances: What Are They and Why Form Them?

POSC 3610 - International Conflict

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Goal for Today

 $\label{thm:continuous} \textit{Define alliances, why states form them, and the drawbacks they have.}$

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What is an Alliance?

Alliances are formal written agreements signed:

- by official representatives of
- at least two independent states, that
- include promises to aid a partner or remain neutral in case of conflict.

What is an Alliance?

Some features of alliances:

- Anticipatory
- Typically unconcerned with cases of civil war or coup threats
- Non-binding
- Either bilateral or multilateral

Typology of Alliances

We have a typology of alliances contingent on data source.

- Correlates of War [CoW] (Gibler, 2009)
- Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions [ATOP] (Leeds et al., 2002)

CoW Typology

- Defense
- Neutrality
- Nonaggression
- Entente


Roughly Three-Quarters of the State System Has At Least One Active Alliance

The percentage of the state system membership with at least one alliance plummeted after World War I and spiked during World War II.



Data: Correlates of War Alliances Data (v 4.1)


No Country Has Signed More Alliances in the Post-Napoleon History of the World Than Russia



Data: Correlates of War Alliances Data (v. 4.1)

The Number of Active Alliances for the U.S. and Russia, 1816-2012






Country Russia United States of America


Data: Correlates of War Alliances Data (v. 4.1)

Almost Half (49.5%) of Alliances Are Primarily Defensive



Data: Correlates of War Alliances Data (v 4.1)


Few Alliances Are Primarily Ententes or Neutrality Pacts, but Those Pledges Appear in Defense and Non-Aggression Pacts



ATOP Typology

- Offense
- Neutrality
- Nonaggression
- Defense
- Entente

ATOP and CoW Alliance Data Have Quite a Few Differences, Beyond the Category for Offense



Data: ATOP (v 3.0) and CoW (v. 4.1). Note: temporal domains standardized from 1816-2003.

Why Form Alliances?

Traditional argument: states use alliances for security.

Quick way of aggregating capabilities toward some adversary.

This led to the familiar balancing/bandwagoning debate.

- Balancing: join weaker side to stop domination
- Bandwagoning: join stronger side to join in spoils of domination

Why Form Alliances?

Walt's balance of threat theory offers small refinement here.

- States balance against perceived threat, not power.
- Power is instrumental to threat.

Sources of threat:

- Offensive power
- Proximity
- Aggregate capabilities
- Offensive intentions

Better View of Alliance Formation

States seek an optimal trade-off between security and autonomy.

- Weaker states seek security from stronger states against perceived threats
- Stronger states trade security commitments for policy gains elsewhere.
- The weaker state concedes some autonomy for security.

Would square well with patterns we observe:

- U.S.-Kuwait/Saudi Arabia.
- Marshall Plan in NATO

Better View of Alliance Formation

States A and B generally form an alliance to signal to State C.


- Assume: B and C have some divisive issue, for which A supports B.
- And: alliances are costly to form (i.e. transaction, opportunity) and costly to break (i.e. reputation, audience).

Therefore: A and B form a costly alliance when:

- A and wants to better empower B/deter C.
- Alliances are relatively inexpensive to form.
- Alliances are costly to break.



Figure 1: Marriage of John I, King of Portugal and Philippa of Lancaster



Evaluating a Regression Analysis

I mention there are three things to do when evaluating a regression analysis.

- 1. Know (however, general) the data used.
- 2. Know what the objects in the regression table are saying.
- 3. Know what the regression table *isn't* saying.

Lai and Reiter's (2000) Data

The first step is to know what the variables used are supposed to capture.

- Dependent variable: states are allied (Y/N)
 - CoW alliances and ATOP alliances

Analysis is from older data.

- CoW domain (1816-1992)
- ATOP domain (1816-1944)

Lai and Reiter's (2000) Data

Lai and Reiter have three hunches about what explains alliance formation.


- Regime similarity
 - Joint democracy
 - Polity difference (i.e. testing for "cats and dogs" effect)
- 2. Cultural similarity/homophily
 - Joint religion/ethnicity/language
- 3. Shared threat
 - Conflict relations (i.e. severity of recent MIDs)
 - General threat level (i.e. number of MIDs in past 10 years)
 - Common enemy (i.e. if both sides fought against same state)

Additional notes:

- More controls: distance, major power, learning (i.e. regarding past alliances)
- Unit of analysis: dyad-year.

Probit Results of Dyadic Alliance Formation





Model • CoW Alliances (1816-1992) • ATOP Alliances (1816-1944)

Reproduction of Table II in Gibler and Sarkees (2004). Note: Controls for distance, major power, learning, and ally lags excluded for presentation.

Careful Interpretation of Significance

Some conclusions about who forms alliances:

- Democracies form alliances with each other.
- Culturally similar states form alliances with each other.
- More threatened states form alliances; enemies don't.

Conclusion

- Classifiable into offense/defense, non-aggression, neutrality, entente.
- Alliances constitute a security-autonomy trade-off.
- Homophily (in institutions/culture) and shared sense of threat are important correlates of alliance formation.

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