# **Middleware Architectures 2**

**Lecture 5: Security** 

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## **Overview**

- Security Concepts
- Transport Level Security
- JSON Web Token
- OAuth 2.0
- OpenID


## **Web Service Security Concepts**

## • Securing the client-server communcation

- Message-level security
- Transport-level security

### Ensure


- Authentication verify a client's identity
- Authorizaton rights to access resources
- Message Confidentiality keep message content secret
- Message Integrity message content does not change during transmission
- Non-repudiation proof of integrity and origin of data



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### Data on the Web



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
## **Authentication and Authorization**

- Authentication
  - verification of user's identity
- Authorization
  - verification that a user has rights to access a resource
- Standard: HTTP authentication
  - HTTP defines two options
    - → Basic Access Authentication
    - → Digest Access Authentication
  - They are defined in
    - → RFC 2616: Hypertext Transfer Protocol HTTP/1.1
    - → RFC 2617: HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication
- Custom/proprietary: use of cookies

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## **Basic Access Authentication**



### Realm

- an identifier of the space on the server (~ a collection of resources and their sub-resources)
- A client may associate a valid credentials with realms such that it copies authorization information in requests for which server requires authentication (by WWW-Authenticate header)

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## **Basic Access Authentication – Credentials**

### Credentials

- credentials are base64 encoded
- the format is: username:password

```
# to encode in linux
echo "novak:heslo" | base64

bm92YWs6aGVzbG8K

# and to decode
echo "bm92YWs6aGVzbG8K" | base64 -d # use capital "D" in OS X

novak:heslo
```

### Comments

- When TLS is not used, the password can be read
- An attacker can repeat interactions

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# **Digest Access Authentication**

- RFC 2617 Basic and Digest Access Authentication
  - No password between a client and a server but a hash value
  - Simple and advanced mechanisms (only server-generated nonce value replayattacks or with client-generated nonce value)
- Basic Steps
  - 1. Client accesses a protected area

```
1 | > GET / HTTP/1.1
```

2. Server requests authentication with WWW-Authenticate

3. Client calculates a response hash by using the realm, his/her username, the password, and the quality of protection (QoP) and requests the resource with authorization header

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
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## **Overview**

- SSL and TLS
  - SSL and TLS is used interchangeably
  - SSL 3.0 developed by Netscape
  - IETF standardization of SSL 3.0 is TLS 1.0
    - $\rightarrow$  TLS 1.0 is upgrade of SSL 3.0
  - Due to security flaws in TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1 and TLS 1.2 were created
- TLS layer



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## **TLS Services**

### Encryption

- Peers must agree on ciphersuite and keys
- This is achieved by **TLS handshake**

#### Authentication

- Peers can authenticate their identity
  - → The client can verify that the server is who it is claimed to be
  - → Achieved by "Chain of Trust and Certificate Authoritites"
  - $\rightarrow$  The server can also verify the client


### Integrity

- TLS provives message framing mechanism
- Every message is signed with Message Authentication Code (MAC)
  - → MAC hashes data in a message and combines the resulting hash with a key (negotiated during the TLS handshake)
  - ightarrow The result is a message authentication code sent with the message

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### **TLS Handshake Protocol**



#### TLS Handshake

56 ms: ClientHello, TLS protocol version, list of ciphersuites, TLS options

84 ms: ServerHello, TLS protocol version, ciphersuite, certificate

112 ms: RSA or Diffie-Hellman key exchange

140 ms: Message integrity checks, sends encrypted "Finished" message

168 ms: Decrypts the message, app data can be sent

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## **Key Exchange**

- RSA key exhange(Rivest–Shamir–Adleman)
  - The client generates a symetric key
  - The client encrypts the key with the server's public key
  - The client sends the encrpyed key to the server
  - The server uses its private key to decrypt the symetric key

### RSA critical weekness

- The same public-private key pair is used to:
  - → authenticate the server (the server's private key is used to sign and verify the handshake)
  - $\rightarrow$  encrypt the symetric key
- When an attacker gets hold of the server private key
  - $\rightarrow$  It can decrypt the entire session

### Diffie-Hellman key exhange

- Client and server can negoriate shared secret without its explicit communication
  - $\rightarrow$  Attacker cannot get the key
- Reduction of risk of compromising of the past communications
  - → New key can be generated as part of every key exchange
  - → Old keys can be discarded

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# **TLS and Proxy Servers**

- TLS Offloading
  - Inbound TLS connection, plain outbound connection
  - Proxy can inspect messages
- TLS Bridging
  - Inbound TLS connection, new outbound TLS connection
  - Proxy can inspect messages
- End-to-End TLS (TLS pass-through)
  - TLS connection is passed-through the proxy
  - Proxy cannot inspect messages
- Load balancer
  - Can use TLS offloading or TLS bridging
  - Can use TLS pass-through with help of Server Name Indication (SNI)

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### **Overview**

- JSON Web Token (JWT)
  - Open standard (RFC 7519)
  - Mechanism to securely transmit information between parties as a JSON object.
  - Can be verified and trusted as it is digitally signed.
- Basic concepts
  - Compact
    - $\rightarrow$  has a small size
    - → can be transmitted via a URL, POST, HTTP header.
  - Self-contained
    - $\rightarrow$  payload contains all required user information.

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## **Use of JWT**

## Authentication

- After user logs in, following requests contain JWT token.
- Single Sign On widely uses JWT nowadays

## • Information Exchange

- Signature ensures senders are who they say they are.
- Message integrity signature calculated using the header and the payload.

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### **JWT Structure**

### <header>.<payload>.<signature>

### Header

- Contains two parts, the type of the token (JWT) and the hashing algorithm being used (e.g. HMAC, SHA256, RSA).

```
{
    "alg": "HS256",
    "typ": "JWT"
}
```

### Payload

- Contains the claims, i.e. statements about an entity (e.g. user).
- Can be registered, public and private
- Registered and public should be defined in IANA JSON Web Token Registry

```
{
   "sub": "1234567890",
   "name": "John Doe",
   "admin": true
}
```

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## **JWT Structure (Cont.)**

### Signature

- Signed encoded header, encoded payload and a secret.
- For example, signature using HMAC SHA256 algorithm

```
HMACSHA256(
   base64UrlEncode(header) + "." +
   base64UrlEncode(payload),
   secret)
```

### Example


- JWT is a three Base64-URL strings separated by dots

eyJhbGci0iJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.
eyJzdWIi0iIxMjM0NTY30DkwIiwibmFtZSI6IkpvaG4
gRG9lIiwiaXNTb2NpYWwi0nRydWV9.
4pcPyMD09olPSyXnrXCjTwXyr4BsezdI1AVTmud2fU4

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## How to use JWT



- 1. User sends username and password
- 2. Server verifies user, creates JWT token with a secret and a expiration time
- 3. Server sends JWT token back to the Browser
- 4. Browser sends JWT token on subsequent interations

#### **Notes**

- → Authorization header does not behave the same as cookies!
- → JWT should not contain secrets (passwords) as it can be read (on the client or if non-https connection is used)

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  - Client-side Web Apps
  - Server-side Web Apps
- OpenID

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
## Motivation

- Cloud Computing Software as a Service
  - Users utilize apps in clouds
    - → they access **resources** via Web browsers
    - $\rightarrow$  they store their data in the cloud
    - $\rightarrow$  Google Docs, Contacts, etc.
  - The trend is that SaaS are open
    - → can be extended by 3rd-party developers through APIs
    - $\rightarrow$  attract more users  $\Rightarrow$  increases value of apps
  - Apps extensions need to have an access to users' data
- Need for a new mechanism to access resources
  - Users can grant access to third-party apps without exposing their users' credentials

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## When there is no OAuth



- Users must share their credentials with the 3rd-party app
- Users cannot control what and how long the app can access resources
- Users must trust the app
  - In case of misuse, users can only change their passwords

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### OAuth 2.0 Protocol

## OAuth Objectives

- users can grant access to third-party applications
- users can revoke access any time
- supports:
  - → client-side web apps (implicit grant),
  - → server-side apps (authorization code), and
  - $\rightarrow$  native (desktop) apps (authorization code)

## History

- Initiated by Google, Twitter, Yahoo!
- Different, non-standard protocols first: ClientLogin, AuthSub
- OAuth 1.0 first standard, security problems, quite complex
- OAuth 2.0 new version, not backward compatibile with 1.0

## • Specifications and adoption

- OAuth 2.0 Protocol №
- OAuth 2.0 Google Support ♥

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## **Terminology**

- Client
  - a third-party app accessing resources owned by **resource owner**
- Resource Owner (also user)
  - a person that owns a resource stored in the resource server
- Authorization and Token Endpoints
  - endpoints provided by an authorization server through which a resource owner authorizes requests.
- Resource Server
  - an app that stores resources owned by a resource owner
  - For example, contacts in Google Contacts
- Authorization Code
  - a code that a **client** uses to request **access tokens** to access resources
- Access Token
  - a code that a **client** uses to access resources

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  - Server-side Web Apps
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## **Client-side Web Apps**

## • Simplified version of OAuth 2.0 protocol

- JavaScript/AJAX apps running in a browser
- Apps that cannot easily "remember" app state
- limited number of interactions

### Architecture

- User-agent processes a javascript/HTML code from the client
- No need of authorization code

## Basic Steps

- A client redirects a user agent to the authorization endpoint
- A resource owner grants an access to the client
  - $\rightarrow$  or he/she rejects the request
- Authorization server provides an access\_token to the client
- Client access the resource with the access\_token
- When the token expires, client requests a new token

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
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### **Demo – List of Contacts**

## Display your Google contacts

- this demo requests authorization from you to access your Google contacts using client-side OAuth 2.0 protocol and then displays the contacts below. In order to transfer access\_token from authorization window, it stores the access\_token in a cookie.
- access\_token
- Show contacts or revoke access

## **Client-side Web Apps Protocol**



# Redirection - Step 1

- Methods and Parameters
  - Methods: GET or POST
  - example authorazation endpoint url (Google):
    https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/auth
  - query string parameters or application/x-www-form-urlencoded
    - $\rightarrow$  client\_id *id* of the client that was previously registered
    - → redirect\_uri an URI that auth. server will redirect to when user grants/rejects
    - $\rightarrow$  scope string identifying resources/services to be accessed
    - → response\_type type of the response (token or code)
    - → **state** (optional) state between request and redirect
  - Example
    - 1 | https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/auth?
    - client\_id=621535099260.apps.googleusercontent.com&
    - redirect\_uri=http://w20.vitvar.com/examples/oauth/callback.html&
    - 4 scope=https://www.google.com/m8/feeds&
    - 5 response\_type=token

## Callback – steps 4 and 5

- Resource owner grants the access
  - authorization server calls back redirect\_uri
  - client parses URL in JavaScript (Step 5)
    - → extracts access\_token and expires\_in (by using window.location.hash)
  - Example:
    - 1 https://w20.vitvar.com/examples/oauth/callback.html#
    - 2 access\_token=1/QbZfgDNsnd&
    - 3 expires\_in=4301
- Resource owner rejects the access
  - authorization server calls back redirect\_uri with query string
     parameter error=access\_denied
  - Example:
    - 1 | hhttp://w20.vitvar.com/examples/oauth/callback.html?
    - 2 error=access denied

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
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
# **Accessing Resources – Step 6**

- Request
  - client can access resources defined by scope
  - resources' URIs defined in a particular documentation
  - Example Google Contacts
    - → to access all users' contacts stored in Google
    - → scope is https://www.google.com/m8/feeds
  - Query string parameter oauth\_token
    - 1 | curl https://www.google.com/m8/feeds/contacts/default/full? 2 | oauth token=1/dERFd34Sf
  - HTTP Header Authorization
    - 1 | curl -H "Authorization: OAuth 1/dERFd34Sf"
      2 | https://www.google.com/m8/feeds/contacts/default/full
  - The client can do any allowed operations on the resource
- Response
  - *− Success −* **200 o**K
  - Error 401 Unauthorized when token expires or the client hasn't performed the authorization request.

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
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# Server-side Web Apps

- Additional interactions
  - server-side code (any language), the app can maintain the state
  - additional interactions, authorization code
- Architecture
  - Client at a server requests, remembers and refresh access tokens
- Basic steps
  - Client redirects user agent to the authorization endpoint
  - Resource owner grants access to the client or rejects the request
  - Authorization server provides **authorization code** to the client
  - Client requests access and refresh tokens from the auth. server
  - Client access the resource with the access token
  - When the token expires, client refreshes a token with refresh token
- Advantages
  - Access tokens not visible to clients, they are stored at the server
  - more secure, clients need to authenticate before they can get tokens

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# Redirection - Step 1

- Methods and Parameters
  - same as for client-side app, except response\_type must be code
- Example
  - https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/auth?

  - client\_id=621535099260.apps.googleusercontent.com&
    redirect\_uri=http://w20.vitvar.com/examples/oauth/callback.html&
  - scope=https://www.google.com/m8/feeds&
  - response\_type=code

## Callback + Access Token Request - steps 4, 5

### Callback

- authorization server calls back redirect\_uri
- client gets the code and requests access\_token
- example (resource owner grants access):

```
http://w20.vitvar.com/examples/oauth/callback.html?code=4/P7...
```

- when user rejects  $\rightarrow$  same as client-side access

### Access token request

- POST request to token endpoint
  - → example Google token endpoint:

### https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/token

```
POST /o/oauth2/token HTTP/1.1
Host: accounts.google.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

code=4/P7q7W91a-oMsCeLvIaQm6bTrgtp6&
client_id=621535099260.apps.googleusercontent.com&
client_secret=XTHhXh1S2UggvyWGwDk1EjXB&
redirect_uri=http://w20.vitvar.com/examples/oauth/callback.html&
grant_type=authorization_code
```

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## Access Token (cont.)

- Access token response
  - Token endpoint responds with access\_token and refresh\_token

- Refreshing a token
  - POST request to the token endpoint with grant\_type=refresh\_token and the previously obtained value of refresh\_token

```
POST /o/oauth2/token HTTP/1.1
Host: accounts.google.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

client_id=21302922996.apps.googleusercontent.com&
client_secret=XTHhXh1SlUNgvyWGwDk1EjXB&
refresh_token=1/6BMfW9j53gdGImsixUH6kU5RsR4zwI9lUVX-tqf8JXQ&
grant type=refresh token
```

Accessing a resource is the same as in the client-side app

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
# **OpenID Protocol**

- Motivation many user accounts
  - users need to maintain many accounts to access various services
  - multiple passwords problem
- Objectives
  - allows apps to utilize an OpenID provider
    - $\rightarrow$  a third-party authentication service
    - $\rightarrow$  federated login
  - users have one account with the OpenID provider and use it for apps that support the provider
- OpenID providers
  - it is a protocol, anybody can build a provider
  - Google, Yahoo!, Seznam.cz, etc.
- Specification
  - OpenID Protocol ₫

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## **Interaction Sequence**



- Discovery discovery of a service associated with a resource
- XRDS eXtensible Resource Descriptor Sequence
  - format for discovery result
  - developed to serve resource discovery for OpenID
  - Web app retrieves endpoint to send login authentication requests

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# **Login Authentication Request – Step 5**

- Example Google OpenID provider
  - https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id
  - ?openid.ns=http://specs.openid.net/auth/2.0
  - &openid.return\_to=https://www.example.com/checkauth &openid.realm=http://www.example.com/

  - &openid.assoc\_handle=ABSmpf6DNMw
  - &openid.mode=checkid setup
- **Parameters** 
  - **− ns** − *protocol version (obtained from the XRDS)*
  - mode type of message or additional semantics (checkid\_setup indicates that interaction between the provider and the user is allowed during *authentication)*
  - return to callback page the provider sends the result
  - realm domain the user will trust, consistent with return to
  - assoc handle "log in" for web app with openid provider
  - \* Not all fields shown, check the OpenID spec for the full list of fields and their values

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# **Login Authentication Response – Step 8**

- User logins successfully
  - http://www.example.com/checkauth
    - ?openid.ns=http://specs.openid.net/auth/2.0
  - &openid.mode=id res

  - &openid.mode=id\_res &openid.return\_to=http://www.example.com:8080/checkauth &openid.assoc\_handle=ABSmpf6DNMw &openid.identity=https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id/id=ACyQatiscWvwqs4UQV\_L
  - Web app will use identity to identify user in the application
  - response is also signed using a list of fields in the response (not shown in the listing)
- User cancels
  - http://www.example.com/checkauth
    ?openid.mode=cancel

  - &openid.ns=http://specs.openid.net/auth/2.0
  - \* Not all fields shown, check the OpenID spec for the full list of fields and their values

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