Middleware Architectures 2 Lecture 2: Browser Networking

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


- Browser Networking
 - -XHR
- Security Mechanisms
- JSON and JSONP

Browser Networking


Browser

- Platform for fast, efficient and secure delivery of Web apps
- Many components
 - → parsing, layout, style calculation of HTML and CSS, JavaScript execution speed, rendering pipelines, and **networking stack**
- When network is slow, e.g. waiting for a resource to arrive
 - \rightarrow all other steps are blocked



Connection Management

- Network socket management and optimization
 - Socket reuse
 - Request prioritization
 - Protocol negotiation
 - Enfocring connection limits
- Socket manager
 - Sockets organized in pools (connection limits and security constraints)
 - origin = (protocol, domain, port number)



Network Security

- No raw socket access for app code
 - Prevents apps from initiating any connection to host
 - For example port scan, connect to mail server, etc.
- Network security
 - Connection limits
 - → protect both client and server from resource exhaustion
 - Request formatting and response processing
 - → Enforcing well-formed protocol semantics of outgoing requests
 - → Response decoding to protect user from malicious servers
 - TLS negotiation
 - → TLS handshake and verification checks on certificates
 - → User is warned when verification fials, e.g. self-signed cert is used
 - Same-origin policy
 - → Constraints on requests to be initiated and to which origin

Mashups

- Web application hybrid
 - App uses APIs of two or more applications
- Types
 - Data mashup integration/aggregation of data (read only)
 - Service mashup more sophisticated workflows (read, write)
 - Visualization involves UI
 - → For example, third-party data displayed on the Google map
- Client-Server View
 - client-side mashups (in a browser)
 - → JavaScript, Dynamic HTML, AJAX, JSON/JSONP
 - server-side mashups
 - *→ server-side integration of services and data*
 - \rightarrow Any language

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
XMLHttpRequest (XHR)

- Interface to utilize HTTP protocol in JavaScript
 - standardized by Web Applications WG ♂ at W3C
 - basis for AJAX
 - → Asynchronous JavaScript and XML
- Typical usage
 - 1. Browser loads a page that includes a script
 - 2. User clicks on a HTML element
 - it triggers a JavaScript function
 - 3. The function invokes a service through XHR
 - same origin policy, cross-origin resource sharing
 - 4. The function receives data and modifies HTML in the page

XHR Interface – Key Methods and Properties


- Method and properties of XHR object
 - open, opens the request, parameters:
 method method to be used (e.g. GET, PUT, POST),
 url url of the resource,
 asynch true to make asynchronous call,
 user, pass credentials for authentication.
 - onReadyStateChange JavaScript function object, it is called when readyState changes (uninitialized, loading, loaded, interactive, completed).
 - send, abort sends or aborts the request (for asynchronous calls)
 - status, statusText HTTP status code and a corresponding text.
 - responseText, responseXML response as text or as a DOM document (if possible).
 - − onload − event listener to support server push.
- See XMLHttRequest (W3C) ☑, or XMLHttRequest (Mozilla reference) ☑ for a complete reference.

How XHR works



- Browser Networking
- Security Mechanisms
 - Scripting Attacks
 - Cross-origin Resource Sharing Protocol (CORS)
- JSON and JSONP


Same Origin Policy



- JavaScript code can only access resources on the same domain
 - XHR to GET, POST, PUT, UPDATE, DELETE
 - Browsers apply same origin policy
- Solutions
 - JSON and JSONP (GET only)
 - Cross-origin Resource Sharing Protocol (CORS)

Why Same Origin Policy?

• Without the same origin policy, the following POST would be possible



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Scripting Attacks


- Intruders make users perform action that has side effects on their resources
- Intruders inject malicious code to Web pages

Roles in Security Scenarios

- Alice, Bob
 - → Normal users, usually Alices wants to send a message to Bob or Alice accesses a Bob's site.
- -Eve
 - \rightarrow A user with bad intentions, usually a passive attacker.
- Mallory
 - → An active attacker, usually sends a link to a page with malicious code.

Recall: State management in HTTP

- Request-response interaction with cookies
 - Session is a logical channel maintained by the server



Communication in a session; server identifies the session through the information in the cookies.


- Stateful Server
 - Server remembers the session information in a server memory
 - Server memory is a non-persistent storage, when server restarts the memory content is lost!

Cross-site Request Forgery (CSRF)

- Exploits a trust of a website in a user's browser
- Scenario
 - 1. Mallory sends a link to Alice (in an email, in a chat, etc.)
 - The link points to a page that has HTML code with hrefs to Alice's private resources
 - For example, to perform an action on Alice's account, it is possible to use img like this:
 - 1 |
 - 2. Alice loads the page in her browser
 - Alice is authenticated to the bank's website, the browser sends Alice's authentication cookies with the request.
- Issues and Prevention
 - The bank site vilotes REST, i.e. overloading of GET for making actions
 - The bank should check HTTP referer header
 - It is a "blind" attack, Mallory does not see the result
 - To perform POST, current browsers today use CORS protocol

Cross-site Scripting Attack (XSS)

• Exploits a trust of a user in a website



• Example Scenario

- 1. An attacker injects a code to a page
- 2. A users executes the code in his/her browser's session
- 3. The code provides information (cookies) to the attacker
- 4. The attacker uses the cookies to access the user's data

XSS Examples

- Twitter in Sep 2010
 - Injection of JavaScript code to a page using a tweet
 - You posted following tweet to Twitter

```
1 There is a great event happening at
2 http://someurl.com/@"onmouseover="alert('test xss')"/
```


- Twitter parses the link and wraps it with <a> element

- Other example: Google Contacts

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
- Increasing number of mashup applications
 - client-side mashups involving multiple sites
 - mechanism to control an access to sites from within JavaScript
- Allow for cross-site HTTP requests
 - HTTP requests for resources from a different domain than the domain of the resource making the request.
- W3C Recommendation
 - see Cross-origin Resource Sharing
 - Browsers support it
 - → see HTTP Access Control & at Mozilla

CORS Protocol – GET



- Read-only resource access via HTTP GET
- Headers:
 - **−** Origin − *identifies the origin of the request*
 - Access-Control-Allow-Origin defines who can access the resource
 - either the full domain name or the wildcard (*) is allowed.

CORS Protocol – other methods and "preflight"



- Preflight request queries the resource using OPTIONS method
 - requests other than GET (except POST w/o payload) or with custom headers
 - A browser should run preflight automatically for any XHR request meeting preflight conditions
 - The browser caches responses according to Access-Control-Max-Age

- Browser Networking
- Security Mechanisms
- JSON and JSONP

Recall: JSON

- JSON = JavaScript Object Notation
 - Serialization format for data representation
 - Very easy to use in JavaScript
 - \rightarrow no need to use a parser explicitly
 - Also great support in many programming environments
- Key constructs

- A complete grammar see JavaScript Object Notation

del Proposition

□ A complete grammar see JavaScript Object Notation
□ A complete grammar see JavaScript Object O

JSON in JavaScript

• Native data format

```
// data needs to be assigned
var data = { "people" : ["tomas", "peter", "alice", "jana"] };

// go through the list of people
for (var i = 0; i < data.people.length; i++) {
   var man = data.people[i];
   // ... do something with this man
}</pre>
```

- Responses of service calls in JSON
 - Many support JSON, how can we load that data?
- Example Request-Response

JSONP

- Service that supports JSONP
 - allows to specify a query string parameter for a wrapper function to load the data in JavaScript code
 - otherwise the data cannot be used in JavaScript
 - → they're loaded into the memory but assigned to nothing
- Example

- A kind of workaround for the same origin policy
 - only GET, nothing else works obviously

loadData({ "people" : ["tomas", "peter", "alice", "jana"] });

- no XHR, need to load the data through the dynamic <script> element

JSONP in JavaScript

• JSONP example

- loads JSON data using JSONP by dynamically inserting <script> into the current document. This will download JSON data and triggers the script.

```
var TWITTER URL = "http://api.twitter.com/1/statuses/user timeline.json?" +
2
       "&screen name=web2e&count=100&callback=loadData";
   // this needs to be loaded in window.onload
    // after all document has finished loading...
    function insertData() {
        var se = document.createElement('script');
        se.setAttribute("type","text/javascript");
        se.setAttribute("src", TWITTER URL);
        document.getElementsByTagName("head")[0].appendChild(se);
10
        // And data will be loaded when loadDta callback fires...
11
    }
12
13
    // loads the data when they arrive
14
15
    function loadData(data) {
        // we need to know the the structure of JSON data that is returned
16
        // and code it here accordingly
17
        for (var i = 0; i < data.length; i++) {</pre>
18
             data[i].created at // contains date the tweet was created
19
20
             data[i].text // contains the tweet
22
```