Middleware Architectures 2

Lecture 5: Security

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Overview

- Security Concepts
- Transport Level Security
- JSON Web Token
- OAuth 2.0
- OpenID


Web Service Security Concepts

• Securing the client-server communcation

- Message-level security
- Transport-level security

Ensure


- Authentication verify a client's identity
- Authorizaton rights to access resources
- Message Confidentiality keep message content secret
- Message Integrity message content does not change during transmission
- Non-repudiation proof of integrity and origin of data



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Data on the Web



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
Authentication and Authorization

- Authentication
 - verification of user's identity
- Authorization
 - verification that a user has rights to access a resource
- Standard: HTTP authentication
 - HTTP defines two options
 - → Basic Access Authentication
 - → Digest Access Authentication
 - They are defined in
 - → RFC 2616: Hypertext Transfer Protocol HTTP/1.1
 - → RFC 2617: HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication
- Custom/proprietary: use of cookies

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Basic Access Authentication



Realm

- an identifier of the space on the server (~ a collection of resources and their sub-resources)
- A client may associate a valid credentials with realms such that it copies authorization information in requests for which server requires authentication (by WWW-Authenticate header)

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Basic Access Authentication – Credentials

Credentials

- credentials are base64 encoded
- the format is: username:password

```
# to encode in linux
echo "novak:heslo" | base64

bm92YWs6aGVzbG8K

# and to decode
echo "bm92YWs6aGVzbG8K" | base64 -d # use capital "D" in OS X

novak:heslo
```

Comments

- When TLS is not used, the password can be read
- An attacker can repeat interactions

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Digest Access Authentication

- RFC 2617 Basic and Digest Access Authentication
 - No password between a client and a server but a hash value
 - Simple and advanced mechanisms (only server-generated nonce value replayattacks or with client-generated nonce value)
- Basic Steps
 - 1. Client accesses a protected area

```
1 | > GET / HTTP/1.1
```

2. Server requests authentication with WWW-Authenticate

3. Client calculates a response hash by using the realm, his/her username, the password, and the quality of protection (QoP) and requests the resource with authorization header

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
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Overview

- SSL and TLS
 - SSL and TLS is used interchangeably
 - SSL 3.0 developed by Netscape
 - IETF standardization of SSL 3.0 is TLS 1.0
 - \rightarrow TLS 1.0 is upgrade of SSL 3.0
 - Due to security flaws in TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1 and TLS 1.2 were created
- TLS layer



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TLS Services

Encryption

- Peers must agree on ciphersuite and keys
- This is achieved by **TLS handshake**

Authentication

- Peers can authenticate their identity
 - → The client can verify that the server is who it is claimed to be
 - → Achieved by "Chain of Trust and Certificate Authoritites"
 - \rightarrow The server can also verify the client


Integrity

- TLS provives message framing mechanism
- Every message is signed with Message Authentication Code (MAC)
 - → MAC hashes data in a message and combines the resulting hash with a key (negotiated during the TLS handshake)
 - → The result is a message authentication code sent with the message

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TLS Handshake Protocol



TLS Handshake

56 ms: ClientHello, TLS protocol version, list of ciphersuites, TLS options

84 ms: ServerHello, TLS protocol version, ciphersuite, certificate

112 ms: RSA or Diffie-Hellman key exchange

140 ms: Message integrity checks, sends encrypted "Finished" message

168 ms: Decrypts the message, app data can be sent

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Key Exchange

- RSA key exhange(Rivest–Shamir–Adleman)
 - The client generates a symetric key
 - The client encrypts the key with the server's public key
 - The client sends the encryyed key to the server
 - The server uses its private key to decrypt the symetric key

RSA critical weekness

- The same public-private key pair is used to:
 - → authenticate the server (the server's private key is used to sign and verify the handshake)
 - \rightarrow encrypt the symetric key
- When an attacker gets hold of the server private key
 - \rightarrow It can decrypt the entire session

Deffie-Hellman key exhange

- Client and server can negoriate shared secret without its explicit communication
 - → Attacker cannot get the key
- Reduction of risk of compromising of the past communications
 - → New key can be generated as part of every key exchange
 - → Old keys can be discarded

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TLS and Proxy Servers

- TLS Offloading
 - Inbound TLS connection, plain outbound connection
 - Proxy can inspect messages
- TLS Bridging
 - Inbound TLS connection, new outbound TLS connection
 - Proxy can inspect messages
- End-to-End TLS (TLS pass-through)
 - TLS connection is passed-through the proxy
 - Proxy cannot inspect messages
- Load balancer
 - Can use TLS offloading or TLS bridging
 - Can use TLS pass-through with help of Server Name Indication (SNI)

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Overview

- JSON Web Token (JWT)
 - Open standard (RFC 7519)
 - Mechanism to securely transmit information between parties as a JSON object.
 - Can be verified and trusted as it is digitally signed.
- Basic concepts
 - Compact
 - \rightarrow has a small size
 - → can be transmitted via a URL, POST, HTTP header.
 - Self-contained
 - \rightarrow payload contains all required user information.

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Use of JWT

Authentication

- After user logs in, following requests contain JWT token.
- Single Sign On widely uses JWT nowadays

• Information Exchange

- Signature ensures senders are who they say they are.
- Message integrity signature calculated using the header and the payload.

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JWT Structure

<header>.<payload>.<signature>

Header

- Contains two parts, the type of the token (JWT) and the hashing algorithm being used (e.g. HMAC, SHA256, RSA).

```
{
    "alg": "HS256",
    "typ": "JWT"
}
```

Payload

- Contains the claims, i.e. statements about an entity (e.g. user).
- Can be registered, public and private
- Registered and public should be defined in IANA JSON Web Token Registry

```
{
   "sub": "1234567890",
   "name": "John Doe",
   "admin": true
}
```

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JWT Structure (Cont.)

Signature

- Signed encoded header, encoded payload and a secret.
- For example, signature using HMAC SHA256 algorithm

```
HMACSHA256(
   base64UrlEncode(header) + "." +
   base64UrlEncode(payload),
   secret)
```

Example


- JWT is a three Base64-URL strings separated by dots

eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.
eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY30DkwIiwibmFtZSI6IkpvaG4
gRG9lIiwiaXNTb2NpYWwiOnRydWV9.
4pcPyMD09olPSyXnrXCjTwXyr4BsezdI1AVTmud2fU4

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How to use JWT



- 1. User sends username and password
- 2. Server verifies user, creates JWT token with a secret and a expiration time
- 3. Server sends JWT token back to the Browser
- 4. Browser sends JWT token on subsequent interations

Notes

- → Authorization header does not behave the same as cookies!
- → JWT should not contain secrets (passwords) as it can be read (on the client or if non-https connection is used)

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 - Server-side Web Apps
- OpenID

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
Motivation

- Cloud Computing Software as a Service
 - Users utilize apps in clouds
 - → they access **resources** via Web browsers
 - \rightarrow they store their data in the cloud
 - \rightarrow Google Docs, Contacts, etc.
 - The trend is that SaaS are open
 - → can be extended by 3rd-party developers through APIs
 - \rightarrow attract more users \Rightarrow increases value of apps
 - Apps extensions need to have an access to users' data
- Need for a new mechanism to access resources
 - Users can grant access to third-party apps without exposing their users' credentials

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When there is no OAuth



- Users must share their credentials with the 3rd-party app
- Users cannot control what and how long the app can access resources
- Users must trust the app
 - In case of misuse, users can only change their passwords

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OAuth 2.0 Protocol

OAuth Objectives

- users can grant access to third-party applications
- users can revoke access any time
- supports:
 - → client-side web apps (implicit grant),
 - → server-side apps (authorization code), and
 - \rightarrow native (desktop) apps (authorization code)

History

- Initiated by Google, Twitter, Yahoo!
- Different, non-standard protocols first: ClientLogin, AuthSub
- − OAuth 1.0 − first standard, security problems, quite complex
- OAuth 2.0 new version, not backward compatibile with 1.0

• Specifications and adoption

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Terminology

- Client
 - a third-party app accessing resources owned by **resource owner**
- Resource Owner (also user)
 - a person that owns a resource stored in the resource server
- Authorization and Token Endpoints
 - endpoints provided by an authorization server through which a resource owner authorizes requests.
- Resource Server
 - an app that stores resources owned by a resource owner
 - For example, contacts in Google Contacts
- Authorization Code
 - a code that a **client** uses to request **access tokens** to access resources
- Access Token
 - a code that a **client** uses to access resources

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Client-side Web Apps

• Simplified version of OAuth 2.0 protocol

- JavaScript/AJAX apps running in a browser
- Apps that cannot easily "remember" app state
- limited number of interactions

Architecture

- User-agent processes a javascript/HTML code from the client
- No need of authorization code

Basic Steps

- A client redirects a user agent to the authorization endpoint
- A resource owner grants an access to the client
 - \rightarrow or he/she rejects the request
- Authorization server provides an access_token to the client
- Client access the resource with the access_token
- When the token expires, client requests a new token

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
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Demo – List of Contacts

Display your Google contacts

- this demo requests authorization from you to access your Google contacts using client-side OAuth 2.0 protocol and then displays the contacts below. In order to transfer access_token from authorization window, it stores the access_token in a cookie.
- access_token
- Show contacts or revoke access

Client-side Web Apps Protocol



Redirection - Step 1

- Methods and Parameters
 - Methods: GET or POST
 - example authorazation endpoint url (Google):
 https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/auth
 - query string parameters or application/x-www-form-urlencoded
 - \rightarrow client_id *id* of the client that was previously registered
 - → redirect_uri an URI that auth. server will redirect to when user grants/rejects
 - \rightarrow scope string identifying resources/services to be accessed
 - → response_type type of the response (token or code)
 - → **state** (optional) state between request and redirect
 - Example
 - 1 | https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/auth?
 - client_id=621535099260.apps.googleusercontent.com&
 - redirect_uri=http://w20.vitvar.com/examples/oauth/callback.html&
 - 4 | scope=https://www.google.com/m8/feeds&
 - 5 response_type=token

Callback – steps 4 and 5

- Resource owner grants the access
 - authorization server calls back redirect_uri
 - client parses URL in JavaScript (Step 5)
 - → extracts access_token and expires_in (by using window.location.hash)
 - Example:
 - 1 https://w20.vitvar.com/examples/oauth/callback.html#
 - 2 access token=1/QbZfgDNsnd&
 - 3 expires_in=4301
- Resource owner rejects the access
 - authorization server calls back redirect_uri with query string
 parameter error=access_denied
 - Example:
 - 1 | hhttp://w20.vitvar.com/examples/oauth/callback.html?
 - 2 error=access denied

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
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
Accessing Resources – Step 6

- Request
 - client can access resources defined by scope
 - resources' URIs defined in a particular documentation
 - Example Google Contacts
 - → to access all users' contacts stored in Google
 - → scope is https://www.google.com/m8/feeds
 - Query string parameter oauth_token
 - curl https://www.google.com/m8/feeds/contacts/default/full?
 oauth token=1/dERFd34Sf
 - HTTP Header Authorization
 - curl -H "Authorization: OAuth 1/dERFd34Sf"
 https://www.google.com/m8/feeds/contacts/default/full
 - The client can do any allowed operations on the resource
- Response
 - *− Success −* **200 o**K
 - Error 401 Unauthorized when token expires or the client hasn't performed the authorization request.

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
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Server-side Web Apps

- Additional interactions
 - server-side code (any language), the app can maintain the state
 - additional interactions, authorization code
- Architecture
 - Client at a server requests, remembers and refresh access tokens
- Basic steps
 - Client redirects user agent to the authorization endpoint
 - Resource owner grants access to the client or rejects the request
 - Authorization server provides **authorization code** to the client
 - Client requests access and refresh tokens from the auth. server
 - Client access the resource with the access token
 - When the token expires, client refreshes a token with refresh token
- Advantages
 - Access tokens not visible to clients, they are stored at the server
 - more secure, clients need to authenticate before they can get tokens

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Redirection - Step 1

- Methods and Parameters
 - same as for client-side app, except response_type must be code
- Example
 - https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/auth?

 - client_id=621535099260.apps.googleusercontent.com&
 redirect_uri=http://w20.vitvar.com/examples/oauth/callback.html&
 - scope=https://www.google.com/m8/feeds&
 - response_type=code

Callback + Access Token Request - steps 4, 5

Callback

- authorization server calls back redirect_uri
- client gets the code and requests access_token
- example (resource owner grants access):

```
http://w20.vitvar.com/examples/oauth/callback.html?code=4/P7...
```

- when user rejects \rightarrow same as client-side access

Access token request

- POST request to token endpoint
 - → example Google token endpoint:

https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/token

```
POST /o/oauth2/token HTTP/1.1
Host: accounts.google.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

code=4/P7q7W91a-oMsCeLvIaQm6bTrgtp6&
client_id=621535099260.apps.googleusercontent.com&
client_secret=XTHhXh1S2UggvyWGwDk1EjXB&
redirect_uri=http://w20.vitvar.com/examples/oauth/callback.html&
grant_type=authorization_code
```

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Access Token (cont.)

- Access token response
 - Token endpoint responds with access_token and refresh_token

- Refreshing a token
 - POST request to the token endpoint with grant_type=refresh_token and the previously obtained value of refresh_token

```
POST /o/oauth2/token HTTP/1.1
Host: accounts.google.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

client_id=21302922996.apps.googleusercontent.com&
client_secret=XTHhXh1SlUNgvyWGwDk1EjXB&
refresh_token=1/6BMfW9j53gdGImsixUH6kU5RsR4zwI9lUVX-tqf8JXQ&
grant type=refresh token
```

Accessing a resource is the same as in the client-side app

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
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OpenID Protocol

- Motivation many user accounts
 - users need to maintain many accounts to access various services
 - multiple passwords problem
- Objectives
 - allows apps to utilize an OpenID provider
 - \rightarrow a third-party authentication service
 - \rightarrow federated login
 - users have one account with the OpenID provider and use it for apps that support the provider
- OpenID providers
 - it is a protocol, anybody can build a provider
 - Google, Yahoo!, Seznam.cz, etc.
- Specification

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Interaction Sequence



- Discovery discovery of a service associated with a resource
- XRDS eXtensible Resource Descriptor Sequence
 - format for discovery result
 - developed to serve resource discovery for OpenID
 - Web app retrieves endpoint to send login authentication requests

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Login Authentication Request – Step 5

- Example Google OpenID provider
 - https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id
 - ?openid.ns=http://specs.openid.net/auth/2.0
 - &openid.return_to=https://www.example.com/checkauth &openid.realm=http://www.example.com/

 - &openid.assoc_handle=ABSmpf6DNMw
 - &openid.mode=checkid setup
- **Parameters**
 - **− ns** − *protocol version (obtained from the XRDS)*
 - mode type of message or additional semantics (checkid_setup indicates) that interaction between the provider and the user is allowed during *authentication)*
 - return to callback page the provider sends the result
 - realm domain the user will trust, consistent with return to
 - assoc handle "log in" for web app with openid provider
 - * Not all fields shown, check the OpenID spec for the full list of fields and their values

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Login Authentication Response – Step 8

- User logins successfully
 - http://www.example.com/checkauth
 - ?openid.ns=http://specs.openid.net/auth/2.0
 - &openid.mode=id res

 - &openid.mode=id_res &openid.return_to=http://www.example.com:8080/checkauth &openid.assoc_handle=ABSmpf6DNMw &openid.identity=https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id/id=ACyQatiscWvwqs4UQV_L
 - Web app will use identity to identify user in the application
 - response is also signed using a list of fields in the response (not shown in the listing)
- User cancels
 - http://www.example.com/checkauth
 ?openid.mode=cancel

 - &openid.ns=http://specs.openid.net/auth/2.0
 - * Not all fields shown, check the OpenID spec for the full list of fields and their values

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