Middleware Architectures 2

Lecture 5: Security

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Modified: Mon Apr 26 2021, 10:03:06 Humla v0.3

Overview

- Security Concepts
- Transport Level Security
- JSON Web Token
- OAuth 2.0
- OpenID


Web Service Security Concepts

• Securing the client-server communcation

- Message-level security
- Transport-level security

Ensure


- Authentication verify a client's identity
- Authorizaton rights to access resources
- Message Confidentiality keep message content secret
- Message Integrity message content does not change during transmission
- Non-repudiation proof of integrity and origin of data



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Data on the Web



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
Authentication and Authorization

- Authentication
 - verification of user's identity
- Authorization
 - verification that a user has rights to access a resource
- Standard: HTTP authentication
 - HTTP defines two options
 - → Basic Access Authentication
 - → Digest Access Authentication
 - They are defined in
 - → RFC 2616: Hypertext Transfer Protocol HTTP/1.1
 - → RFC 2617: HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication
- Custom/proprietary: use of cookies

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Basic Access Authentication



Realm

- an identifier of the space on the server (~ a collection of resources and their sub-resources)
- A client may associate a valid credentials with realms such that it copies authorization information in requests for which server requires authentication (by WWW-Authenticate header)

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Basic Access Authentication – Credentials

Credentials

- credentials are base64 encoded
- the format is: username:password

```
# to encode in linux
echo "novak:heslo" | base64

bm92YWs6aGVzbG8K

# and to decode
echo "bm92YWs6aGVzbG8K" | base64 -d # use capital "D" in OS X

novak:heslo
```

Comments

- When TLS is not used, the password can be read
- An attacker can repeat interactions

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Digest Access Authentication

- RFC 2617 Basic and Digest Access Authentication
 - No password between a client and a server but a hash value
 - Simple and advanced mechanisms (only server-generated nonce value replayattacks or with client-generated nonce value)
- Basic Steps
 - 1. Client accesses a protected area

```
1 | > GET / HTTP/1.1
```

2. Server requests authentication with WWW-Authenticate

3. Client calculates a response hash by using the realm, his/her username, the password, and the quality of protection (QoP) and requests the resource with authorization header

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
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Overview

- SSL and TLS
 - SSL and TLS is used interchangeably
 - SSL 3.0 developed by Netscape
 - IETF standardization of SSL 3.0 is TLS 1.0
 - \rightarrow TLS 1.0 is upgrade of SSL 3.0
 - Due to security flaws in TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1 and TLS 1.2 were created
- TLS layer



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TLS Services

Encryption

- Peers must agree on ciphersuite and keys
- This is achieved by **TLS handshake**

Authentication

- Peers can authenticate their identity
 - → The client can verify that the server is who it is claimed to be
 - → Achieved by "Chain of Trust and Certificate Authoritites"
 - \rightarrow The server can also verify the client


Integrity

- TLS provives message framing mechanism
- Every message is signed with Message Authentication Code (MAC)
 - → MAC hashes data in a message and combines the resulting hash with a key (negotiated during the TLS handshake)
 - ightarrow The result is a message authentication code sent with the message

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TLS Handshake Protocol



TLS Handshake

56 ms: ClientHello, TLS protocol version, list of ciphersuites, TLS options

84 ms: ServerHello, TLS protocol version, ciphersuite, certificate

112 ms: RSA or Diffie-Hellman key exchange

140 ms: Message integrity checks, sends encrypted "Finished" message

168 ms: Decrypts the message, app data can be sent

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Key Exchange

- RSA key exhange(Rivest–Shamir–Adleman)
 - The client generates a symetric key
 - The client encrypts the key with the server's public key
 - The client sends the encryyed key to the server
 - The server uses its private key to decrypt the symetric key

RSA critical weekness

- The same public-private key pair is used to:
 - → authenticate the server (the server's private key is used to sign and verify the handshake)
 - \rightarrow encrypt the symetric key
- When an attacker gets hold of the server private key
 - \rightarrow It can decrypt the entire session

Deffie-Hellman key exhange

- Client and server can negoriate shared secret without its explicit communication
 - → Attacker cannot get the key
- Reduction of risk of compromising of the past communications
 - → New key can be generated as part of every key exchange
 - → Old keys can be discarded

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TLS and Proxy Servers

- TLS Offloading
 - Inbound TLS connection, plain outbound connection
 - Proxy can inspect messages
- TLS Bridging
 - Inbound TLS connection, new outbound TLS connection
 - Proxy can inspect messages
- End-to-End TLS (TLS pass-through)
 - TLS connection is passed-through the proxy
 - Proxy cannot inspect messages
- Load balancer
 - Can use TLS offloading or TLS bridging
 - Can use TLS pass-through with help of Server Name Indication (SNI)

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Overview

- JSON Web Token (JWT)
 - Open standard (RFC 7519)
 - Mechanism to securely transmit information between parties as a JSON object.
 - Can be verified and trusted as it is digitally signed.
- Basic concepts
 - Compact
 - \rightarrow has a small size
 - → can be transmitted via a URL, POST, HTTP header.
 - Self-contained
 - \rightarrow payload contains all required user information.

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Use of JWT

Authentication

- After user logs in, following requests contain JWT token.
- Single Sign On widely uses JWT nowadays

• Information Exchange

- Signature ensures senders are who they say they are.
- Message integrity signature calculated using the header and the payload.

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JWT Structure

<header>.<payload>.<signature>

Header

- Contains two parts, the type of the token (JWT) and the hashing algorithm being used (e.g. HMAC, SHA256, RSA).

```
{
    "alg": "HS256",
    "typ": "JWT"
}
```

Payload

- Contains the claims, i.e. statements about an entity (e.g. user).
- Can be registered, public and private
- Registered and public should be defined in IANA JSON Web Token Registry

```
{
    "sub": "1234567890",
    "name": "John Doe",
    "admin": true
}
```

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JWT Structure (Cont.)

Signature

- Signed encoded header, encoded payload and a secret.
- For example, signature using HMAC SHA256 algorithm

```
HMACSHA256(
   base64UrlEncode(header) + "." +
   base64UrlEncode(payload),
   secret)
```

Example


- JWT is a three Base64-URL strings separated by dots

eyJhbGci0iJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.
eyJzdWIi0iIxMjM0NTY30DkwIiwibmFtZSI6IkpvaG4
gRG9lIiwiaXNTb2NpYWwi0nRydWV9.
4pcPyMD09olPSyXnrXCjTwXyr4BsezdI1AVTmud2fU4

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How to use JWT



- 1. User sends username and password
- 2. Server verifies user, creates JWT token with a secret and a expiration time
- 3. Server sends JWT token back to the Browser
- 4. Browser sends JWT token on subsequent interations

Notes

- → Authorization header does not behave the same as cookies!
- → JWT should not contain secrets (passwords) as it can be read (on the client or if non-https connection is used)

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 - Server-side Web Apps
- OpenID

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
Motivation

- Cloud Computing Software as a Service
 - Users utilize apps in clouds
 - → they access **resources** via Web browsers
 - \rightarrow they store their data in the cloud
 - \rightarrow Google Docs, Contacts, etc.
 - The trend is that SaaS are open
 - → can be extended by 3rd-party developers through APIs
 - \rightarrow attract more users \Rightarrow increases value of apps
 - Apps extensions need to have an access to users' data
- Need for a new mechanism to access resources
 - Users can grant access to third-party apps without exposing their users' credentials

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When there is no OAuth



Users must share their credentials with the 3rd-party app

user accesses the resource using its credentials

- Users cannot control what and how long the app can access resources
- Users must trust the app
 - In case of misuse, users can only change their passwords

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OAuth 2.0 Protocol

OAuth Objectives

- users can grant access to third-party applications
- users can revoke access any time
- supports:
 - → client-side web apps (implicit grant),
 - → server-side apps (authorization code), and
 - \rightarrow native (desktop) apps (authorization code)

History

- Initiated by Google, Twitter, Yahoo!
- Different, non-standard protocols first: ClientLogin, AuthSub
- − OAuth 1.0 − first standard, security problems, quite complex
- OAuth 2.0 new version, not backward compatibile with 1.0

Specifications and adoption

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Terminology

- Client
 - a third-party app accessing resources owned by **resource owner**
- **Resource Owner** (also user)
 - a person that owns a resource stored in the resource server
- Authorization and Token Endpoints
 - endpoints provided by an authorization server through which a resource owner authorizes requests.
- Resource Server
 - an app that stores resources owned by a resource owner
 - For example, contacts in Google Contacts
- Authorization Code
 - a code that a **client** uses to request **access tokens** to access resources
- Access Token
 - a code that a **client** uses to access resources

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Client-side Web Apps

• Simplified version of OAuth 2.0 protocol

- JavaScript/AJAX apps running in a browser
- Apps that cannot easily "remember" app state
- limited number of interactions

Architecture

- User-agent processes a javascript/HTML code from the client
- No need of authorization code

• Basic Steps

- A client redirects a user agent to the authorization endpoint
- A resource owner grants an access to the client
 - \rightarrow or he/she rejects the request
- Authorization server provides an access_token to the client
- Client access the resource with the access_token
- When the token expires, client requests a new token

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
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Demo – List of Contacts

• Display your Google contacts

- this demo requests authorization from you to access your Google contacts using client-side OAuth 2.0 protocol and then displays the contacts below. In order to transfer access_token from authorization window, it stores the access_token in a cookie.
- access_token
- Show contacts or revoke access

Client-side Web Apps Protocol



Redirection - Step 1

- Methods and Parameters
 - Methods: GET or POST
 - example authorazation endpoint url (Google):
 https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/auth
 - query string parameters or application/x-www-form-urlencoded
 - \rightarrow client_id *id* of the client that was previously registered
 - → redirect_uri an URI that auth. server will redirect to when user grants/rejects
 - \rightarrow scope string identifying resources/services to be accessed
 - → response_type type of the response (token or code)
 - → **state** (optional) state between request and redirect
 - Example
 - 1 | https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/auth?
 - client_id=621535099260.apps.googleusercontent.com&
 - redirect_uri=http://w20.vitvar.com/examples/oauth/callback.html&
 - 4 scope=https://www.google.com/m8/feeds&
 - 5 response_type=token

Callback – steps 4 and 5


- Resource owner grants the access
 - authorization server calls back redirect_uri
 - client parses URL in JavaScript (Step 5)
 - → extracts access_token and expires_in (by using window.location.hash)
 - Example:
 - 1 https://w20.vitvar.com/examples/oauth/callback.html#
 - 2 access_token=1/QbZfgDNsnd&
 - 3 expires_in=4301
- Resource owner rejects the access
 - authorization server calls back redirect_uri with query string
 parameter error=access_denied
 - Example:
 - 1 | hhttp://w20.vitvar.com/examples/oauth/callback.html?
 - 2 error=access denied


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Accessing Resources – Step 6

- Request
 - client can access resources defined by scope
 - resources' URIs defined in a particular documentation
 - Example Google Contacts
 - → to access all users' contacts stored in Google
 - → scope is https://www.google.com/m8/feeds
 - Query string parameter oauth_token
 - 1 | curl https://www.google.com/m8/feeds/contacts/default/full? 2 | oauth token=1/dERFd34Sf
 - HTTP Header Authorization
 - 1 | curl -H "Authorization: OAuth 1/dERFd34Sf"
 2 | https://www.google.com/m8/feeds/contacts/default/full
 - The client can do any allowed operations on the resource
- Response
 - *− Success −* **200 o**K
 - Error 401 Unauthorized when token expires or the client hasn't performed the authorization request.





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Server-side Web Apps

- Additional interactions
 - server-side code (any language), the app can maintain the state
 - additional interactions, authorization code
- Architecture
 - Client at a server requests, remembers and refresh access tokens
- Basic steps
 - Client redirects user agent to the authorization endpoint
 - Resource owner grants access to the client or rejects the request
 - Authorization server provides **authorization code** to the client
 - Client requests access and refresh tokens from the auth. server
 - Client access the resource with the access token
 - When the token expires, client refreshes a token with refresh token
- Advantages
 - Access tokens not visible to clients, they are stored at the server
 - more secure, clients need to authenticate before they can get tokens

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Server-side Web Apps Protocol Authorization Endpoint Client **Token Endpoint** (authorization server) server-side code (authorization server) client initiates the flow by pointing the resource owner's dialog is usually presented to user only user agent to authorization once (not in subsequent requests) endpoint. dialog window authorization server presents a dialog to user to grant access to specified resources. auth. server informs resource server to open access with access_token and expires_in authorization server calls redirect_url specified in the by using the authorization code, request. The request contains results about the client requests access_token and authorization and the authorization code Resource refresh token Server client can access the resource within time period specified in expires_in client refreshes access_token resource server responds with HTTP 401 Unauthorized when access token expires

Redirection - Step 1

- Methods and Parameters
 - same as for client-side app, except response_type must be code
- Example
 - https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/auth?

 - client_id=621535099260.apps.googleusercontent.com&
 redirect_uri=http://w20.vitvar.com/examples/oauth/callback.html&
 - scope=https://www.google.com/m8/feeds&
 - response_type=code

Callback + Access Token Request - steps 4, 5

Callback

- authorization server calls back redirect uri
- client gets the code and requests access_token
- example (resource owner grants access):

```
http://w20.vitvar.com/examples/oauth/callback.html?code=4/P7...
```

- when user rejects \rightarrow same as client-side access

Access token request

- POST request to token endpoint
 - → example Google token endpoint:

https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/token

```
POST /o/oauth2/token HTTP/1.1
Host: accounts.google.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

code=4/P7q7W91a-oMsCeLvIaQm6bTrgtp6&
client_id=621535099260.apps.googleusercontent.com&
client_secret=XTHhXh1S2UggvyWGwDk1EjXB&
redirect_uri=http://w20.vitvar.com/examples/oauth/callback.html&
grant_type=authorization_code
```

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Access Token (cont.)

- Access token response
 - Token endpoint responds with access_token and refresh_token

- Refreshing a token
 - POST request to the token endpoint with grant_type=refresh_token and the previously obtained value of refresh_token

```
POST /o/oauth2/token HTTP/1.1
Host: accounts.google.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

client_id=21302922996.apps.googleusercontent.com&
client_secret=XTHhXh1SlUNgvyWGwDk1EjXB&
refresh_token=1/6BMfW9j53gdGImsixUH6kU5RsR4zwI9lUVX-tqf8JXQ&
grant_type=refresh_token
```

Accessing a resource is the same as in the client-side app

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
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OpenID Protocol

- Motivation many user accounts
 - users need to maintain many accounts to access various services
 - multiple passwords problem
- Objectives
 - allows apps to utilize an OpenID provider
 - \rightarrow a third-party authentication service
 - $\rightarrow \textit{federated login}$
 - users have one account with the OpenID provider and use it for apps that support the provider
- OpenID providers
 - it is a protocol, anybody can build a provider
 - Google, Yahoo!, Seznam.cz, etc.
- Specification

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Interaction Sequence



- Discovery discovery of a service associated with a resource
- XRDS eXtensible Resource Descriptor Sequence
 - format for discovery result
 - developed to serve resource discovery for OpenID
 - Web app retrieves endpoint to send login authentication requests

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Login Authentication Request – Step 5

- Example Google OpenID provider
 - https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id
 - ?openid.ns=http://specs.openid.net/auth/2.0
 - &openid.return_to=https://www.example.com/checkauth &openid.realm=http://www.example.com/

 - &openid.assoc_handle=ABSmpf6DNMw &openid.mode=checkid setup
- **Parameters**
 - **− ns** − *protocol version (obtained from the XRDS)*
 - mode type of message or additional semantics (checkid_setup indicates that interaction between the provider and the user is allowed during *authentication)*
 - return to callback page the provider sends the result
 - realm domain the user will trust, consistent with return to
 - assoc handle "log in" for web app with openid provider
 - * Not all fields shown, check the OpenID spec for the full list of fields and their values

Login Authentication Response – Step 8

- User logins successfully
 - http://www.example.com/checkauth
 - ?openid.ns=http://specs.openid.net/auth/2.0
 - &openid.mode=id res

 - &openid.mode=id_res &openid.return_to=http://www.example.com:8080/checkauth &openid.assoc_handle=ABSmpf6DNMw &openid.identity=https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id/id=ACyQatiscWvwqs4UQV_L
 - Web app will use identity to identify user in the application
 - response is also signed using a list of fields in the response (not shown in the listing)
- User cancels
 - http://www.example.com/checkauth
 ?openid.mode=cancel

 - &openid.ns=http://specs.openid.net/auth/2.0
 - * Not all fields shown, check the OpenID spec for the full list of fields and their values