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[Tor Trac #28525]: Make tor_addr_is_internal_() aware of RFC 6598 (Carrier Grade NAT/Large Scale NAT) IPv4 Ranges #529
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Pull Request Test Coverage Report for Build 3149
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Using an anonymous mmap() is a good way to get pages that we can set kernel-level flags on, like minherit() or madvise() or mlock(). We're going to use that so that we can make uninheritable locked pages to store PRNG data.
I don't know how this got here, but this kind of a wrapper only belongs in a header file.
Some of the code for getting a random value within a range wants to be shared between crypto_rand() and the new crypto_fast_rng() code.
Patch from Mangix. Closes part of ticket 29026.
Closes ticket 29026; patch from Mangix.
This is the second part of refactoring the random-int-in-range code.
test_crypto.c is pretty big; it wouldn't hurt to split it up some more before I start adding stuff to the PRNG tests.
This module is currently implemented to use the same technique as libottery (later used by the bsds' arc4random replacement), using AES-CTR-256 as its underlying stream cipher. It's backtracking- resistant immediately after each call, and prediction-resistant after a while. Here's how it works: We generate psuedorandom bytes using AES-CTR-256. We generate BUFLEN bytes at a time. When we do this, we keep the first SEED_LEN bytes as the key and the IV for our next invocation of AES_CTR, and yield the remaining BUFLEN - SEED_LEN bytes to the user as they invoke the PRNG. As we yield bytes to the user, we clear them from the buffer. Every RESEED_AFTER times we refill the buffer, we mix in an additional SEED_LEN bytes from our strong PRNG into the seed. If the user ever asks for a huge number of bytes at once, we pull SEED_LEN bytes from the PRNG and use them with our stream cipher to fill the user's request.
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For the ticket here.