Update README.md

Co-authored-by: Brian Ginsburg <7957636+bgins@users.noreply.github.com>
Signed-off-by: Brooklyn Zelenka <be.zelenka@gmail.com>

README.md

@@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ This is not a concern when simply delegating since presumably the recipient agen
 
 _UCAN does not have any special protection against person-in-the-middle (PITM) attacks._
 
-Were a PITM attack successfully performed on a UCAN delegation, the proof chain would contain the attacker's DID(s). It is possible to detect this scenario and revoke the relevant UCAN but does require special inspection of the topmost `iss` field to check if it is the expected DID. Therefore, it is strongly RECOMMENDED to only delegate UCANs to agents that are both trusted and authenticated and over secure channels.
+If a PITM attack was successfully performed on a UCAN delegation, the proof chain would contain the attacker's DID(s). It is possible to detect this scenario and revoke the relevant UCAN but this does require special inspection of the topmost `iss` field to check if it is the expected DID. Therefore, it is strongly RECOMMENDED to only delegate UCANs to agents that are both trusted and authenticated and over secure channels.
 
 # 7. Related Work and Prior Art