



## D. Security Management

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# Overview

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
- ❖ Security requirements asks **key security questions** of the system
  - ❖ What assets to be protected?
  - ❖ Which threats can compromise/damage the assets?
  - ❖ What are the means to mitigate those threats?
- ❖ Security management aims to **resolve those questions**
  - ❖ Define security objectives and potential threats
  - ❖ Carry out security risk assessment (w.r.t. assets)
  - ❖ Implement security solutions and monitoring

# Terminology

Term	Meaning
Risk	The potential for an unwanted or adverse <b>outcome</b> resulting from an incident, event, or occurrence, as determined by the <b>likelihood (or the potential)</b> that a particular threat will exploit a particular vulnerability, with the associated consequences.
Vulnerability	A characteristic or specific <b>weakness</b> that renders an organization or asset (such as information or information system) open to exploitation by a given threat or susceptible to a given hazard.
Exploitation	A technique to breach the security of a network or information system in <b>violation</b> of security policy.
Threat	A circumstance or event (including accidental and non-human related) that has or indicates the <b>potential</b> to exploit vulnerabilities and to adversely impact (create adverse consequences for) organizational operations, organizational assets (including information and information systems), individuals, other organizations, or society.
Asset	A person, structure, facility, information, and records, information technology systems and resources, materials, process, relationships, or reputation allowing entities (e.g., individuals, businesses and governments) to achieve social, economic, and other objectives of <b>value</b> .

# Threats in Security

also for Dependability and Survivability



# IT Security Management

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- ❖ IT security management aims to achieve and maintain **appropriate levels** of confidentiality, integrity and availability of the system
- ❖ In addition, it also look at accountability, authenticity, reliability, and **other security objectives**

# IT Security Management

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
- ❖ Related **tasks** for IT security management include

# IT Security Management

IT Security management is one of the IT system management tasks

Dependability and Security

Dependability is also a significant aspects of IT system management



Security

# Security Standards

- ❖ ISO 27000 Security Standards
  - ❖ About 36 standards<sup>1</sup>
  - ❖ Widely used, but not public
- ❖ NIST Security Framework
  - ❖ Publicly available
  - ❖ Broadly reviewed by government and industry professionals
  - ❖ E.g., SP800 series
    - ❖ E.g., SP800-12: Computer security handbook
    - ❖ E.g., SP800-14: Generally accepted security principles & practices etc.

# Security Standards

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
- ❖ IS management
  - ❖ ISO27001 – information security management systems – requirements
  - ❖ ISO27002 – Code of practice for information security management
  - ❖ ISO27003 – information security management system implementation guidance
  - ❖ ISO27007 – guidelines for information security management systems
  - ❖ SP800-14 – generally accepted principles and practices for securing IT systems
  
- ❖ Security measurement
  - ❖ ISO27004 – information security management – measurement
  - ❖ SP800-55 – performance measurement guide for information security

# Security Standards

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- ❖ Security risk management
  - ❖ ISO27005 – information security risk management
  - ❖ SP800-30 – guide for conducting risk assessments
  - ❖ SP800-37 – guide for applying the risk management framework to federal information systems: a security life cycle approach
  
- ❖ Incident management
  - ❖ ISO27035 – Security incident management
  - ❖ SP800-61 – computer security incident handling guide

# Security Management Process




# Security Risk Assessment

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
- ❖ Typical system includes **many** assets
  - ❖ Confidential data, user details, operational policies etc
- ❖ It is **infeasible** to examine the risk of all the assets due to *limited resources*
- ❖ To use the best security risk assessment approach given the organisation's resources
  - ❖ **Baseline:** use the “industry best practice”
    - ❖ Implementing standard security and safeguards against common threats
  - ❖ **Informal:** conduct informal, pragmatic/practical risk analysis
  - ❖ **Formal:** assess the security risk using formal structured process
  - ❖ **Combined:** combinations of other approaches

# ISO27001



# ISO27001 Timeframe

❖ Rough estimate



# NIST SP800-30

- NIST SP800-30 outlines 9 risk assessment activities



# Risk Treatment

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- ❖ Different actions can be taken for identified risks
  - ❖ **Risk acceptance**
    - ❖ Understand the risk but will not act on it
  - ❖ **Risk avoidance**
    - ❖ Take actions to prevent this risk from happening
  - ❖ **Risk transfer**
    - ❖ Shift the risk to other assets, processes or organisations
    - ❖ E.g., outsourcing to other organisations, get insurance etc
  - ❖ **Reduce consequence**
    - ❖ Implement security controls
    - ❖ E.g.,
  - ❖ **Reduce likelihood**
    - ❖ Implement security controls
    - ❖ E.g.,

# Quiz

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❖ Discuss with your peers

1. What are some main differences between ISO27001 and NIST SP800-30?
2. How can we say that system *A* is more secure than system *B*?
3. What are the hurdles of automating the security risk assessment/analysis?

# IT Security Management

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- ❖ Related tasks for IT security management include
  - ❖ Specification of security objectives, strategies and policies
  - ❖ Determine organisational IT security requirements
  - ❖ Security threat assessments of IT assets and risks
  - ❖ Specification of appropriate security methods
  - ❖ Implementation and maintenance of security methods
  - ❖ Security awareness program and adoption
  - ❖ Detection and prevention of security incidents

# Security Assessment

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❖ Some key questions to answer in security assessment are:

- ❖ How to represent and capture various **attack scenarios**?
  - ❖ What kinds of attacks are applicable?
  - ❖ How can these attacks be carried out?
  - ❖ How do we measure their impact on the system?
- ❖ How to select the **best security solutions** and controls?
  - ❖ What is the best security practice for the given attack scenario?
  - ❖ What is the best security solution given these constraints?

# Security Assessment

- ❖ Three main approaches
  - 1. Test on a real network
  - 2. Test on a duplicated real network
    - ❖ E.g., Emulation
  - 3. Model-based Security Assessment
  - 4. etc


# Use of Security Models

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- ❖ Security models can be used to provide a **systematic approach** to assess the security of systems
- ❖ Security models are one aspect of the security assessment, which requires 3M
  - ❖ **Security Measures** : To collect required information
  - ❖ **Security Metrics** : To represent the analysis results
  - ❖ **Security Models** : To capture security information of the system

# Security Measurement


- ❖ What do we want to measure?
  - ❖ Vulnerabilities and their scores
    - ❖ Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE)
    - ❖ Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) Base Score (BS): e.g., 9 out of 10.
  - ❖ Reachability
    - ❖ Nmap (network mapping)
    - ❖ Network Configurations (e.g., access control by firewalls)
  - ❖ Mitigations
    - ❖ Detection (Intrusion Detection, Vulnerability Identification, ...)
    - ❖ Countermeasure (Patch, firewall rules changes, ...)



# Security Metrics




- ❖ What can we measure?
  - ❖ Qualitative Analysis (Metrics)
    - ❖ Mincuts (Attack countermeasure scenarios)
    - ❖ Importance Measures
    - ❖ ...
  - ❖ Quantitative Analysis (Metrics)
    - ❖ Probability of Attacks
    - ❖ Adversary's viewpoint
      - ❖ Cost of Attack
      - ❖ Return on Attack (ROA)
    - ❖ Defender's Viewpoint
      - ❖ Risk = Prob.\*Impact
      - ❖ Security Investment Cost
      - ❖ Return on Investment (ROI)
      - ❖ ...




# Security Metrics



❖ Other way to categorise security metrics:



# Security Models



## Security Models

### Tree based

Attack Trees

Defense Trees

...

Attack Countermeasure  
Trees (ACT)\*

### Graph based


Attack  
Graphs

...

### Hybrid


Hierarchical Attack  
Representation  
models (HARMs)

# Security Models



- ❖ Security models can...
  - ❖ Capture and analyse attack scenarios
  - ❖ Perform automated security analysis
  - ❖ Compute optimal countermeasures
  - ❖ Use various security metrics

# Security Model Lifecycle




# Attack Graphs

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- ❖ Similar technique to ATs (covered in CITS1003)
- ❖ Unlike ATs, AGs may have cyclic dependencies or merged states
  - ❖ State transition information
  - ❖ Order of events
  - ❖ Etc.

# Attack Graphs




## Vulnerabilities:

- ftp\_rhosts
- rsh
- sshd\_BoF
- local\_BoF

## Vulnerabilities:

- ftp\_rhosts
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- local\_BoF



# Attack Graphs

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
- ❖ Many variants of the AGs
  - ❖ Logical AGs, Bayesian AGs, Multiple prerequisite AGs, etc...
- ❖ There are tools available to generate AGs
  - ❖ NuSMV
  - ❖ RedSeal (commercial)
  - ❖ Skybox (commercial)
  - ❖ Cauldron (commercial)
  - ❖ CyGraph

# What type do you use?

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- ❖ Depends on various factors
  - ❖ What metrics can I use?
  - ❖ How efficient is the security assessment?
  - ❖ What tools are available?
  - ❖ What type of attacks can it model?
  - ❖ Which systems can I use the model?
  - ❖ Etc...

# Evolution of Security Models



# Limitations

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- ❖ Scalability issues
  - ❖ The generation of full attack models and evaluation of all possible attack scenarios exhibit a **state-space explosion**
- ❖ Dynamic adjustment (Adaptability) issues
  - ❖ A change in the network system causes **updates** in the security model
- ❖ Automating security decisions and countermeasure selections issues
  - ❖ Requires intelligent security **decision making** and **real-time** adaptation and deployment of security solutions.

# Limitations

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- ❖ To address the scalability issues
- ❖ Adopt new modelling techniques
  - ❖ E.g., using hierarchy, etc...
- ❖ Implement efficient generation and evaluation algorithms
  - ❖ E.g., heuristic, dynamic programming solutions, etc...
- ❖ Anything else?
  - ❖ E.g., subgraph evaluation, parallel computing

# Limitations

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- ❖ To address the dynamic adjustment issues
- ❖ Capture dynamic changes using the model
  - ❖ E.g., use of temporal graphs
- ❖ Real-time change detection mechanisms
  - ❖ E.g., real-time IDS, system logging etc...
- ❖ Develop dynamic security metrics for evaluations
  - ❖ E.g., identifying persistent vulnerability etc...
- ❖ Anything else?

# Limitations

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- ❖ To address the automation issues
- ❖ Develop intelligent security analysis modules
  - ❖ E.g., use of AI, machine learning etc...
- ❖ Pool of countermeasures for implementations
  - ❖ E.g., security awareness, easy security solution adoption methods etc...
- ❖ Secure system architecture planning and implementation
  - ❖ E.g., security forecast, prediction, attacker profiling etc...
- ❖ Anything else?

# Summary

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- ❖ There are **various** security standards and frameworks internationally accepted as a common practice
  - ❖ E.g., ISO and NIST security standards and frameworks
- ❖ They provide detailed **procedures** for organisations to follow, in order to assess the security posture of their systems
- ❖ Many steps are involved, so security administrators should ensure that each step is done **carefully and complete**
- ❖ Use of **automated tools** can speed up the process, as well as avoiding any human errors

# Additional Items

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- ❖ Security standards and framework
  - ❖ ISO: <http://standards.iso.org/ittf/PubliclyAvailableStandards/>
  - ❖ ISO: <http://www.iso27001security.com/index.html>
  - ❖ NIST: <https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework>
- ❖ Penetration testing
  - ❖ Pentesmonkey (<http://pentestmonkey.net/>)
  - ❖ Metasploit (<https://www.metasploit.com/>)
  - ❖ Metasploit online course (<https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/>)
- ❖ Security models
  - ❖ Kordy, Barbara, Ludovic Piètre-Cambacédès, and Patrick Schweitzer. "DAG-based attack and defense modeling: Don't miss the forest for the attack trees." *Computer science review* 13 (2014): 1-38.
  - ❖ Hong, Jin B., et al. "A survey on the usability and practical applications of graphical security models." *Computer Science Review* 26 (2017): 1-16.
  - ❖ Visualisation (note: videos are not working): <https://visualisation.trespass-project.eu/>