


# 6. Software Security



# What you need today

## ❖ Kali VM

- ❖ You will need to install OWASP DependencyCheck
- ❖ <https://github.com/jeremylong/DependencyCheck>
- ❖ 

```
mvn -s settings.xml install -DskipTests=true
```
- ❖ 

```
./cli/target/release/bin/dependency-check.sh --out . --scan ./src/test/resources
```
- ❖ The install takes some time, so it will be good to pre-download it.

## ❖ Things we do today

- ❖ Software Dependency Analysis

# Software Security

- ❖ Nowadays almost all applications utilize the internet for functionalities
  - ❖ Getting updates
  - ❖ Checking user requests
  - ❖ Saving states of the applications etc.
- ❖ No point drawing a line between application and web security
  - ❖ We now have web application security!
- ❖ We will look at both developing software applications issues and some examples of malicious software

## Issues

- ❖ Many possible security vulnerabilities for a software system, depending on:
  - ❖ Requirements (missing, misunderstood, features not securely implemented)
  - ❖ Design
  - ❖ Implementation language/library issues
  - ❖ Subsystem interactions/issues
  - ❖ Network environment issues
  - ❖ (Lack of) testing/vulnerability analysis
  - ❖ Other factors

# Software Development


- ❖ Common specifications of software development process
  - ❖ ISO 12207 – Systems and software engineering – software life cycle processes.
  - ❖ The current version is 2017\*, but the list remains the same.
  - ❖ There are no explicit security related tasks.
  
- Business or mission analysis
- Stakeholder needs and requirements definition
- Systems/Software requirements definition
- Architecture definition
- Design definition
- System analysis
- Implementation
- Integration
- Verification
- Transition
- Validation
- Operation
- Maintenance
- Disposal

# SLC - Organisation

- ❖ Many different SLC methodologies:
  - ❖ **Waterfall** – single series of steps
  - ❖ **Iterative** – multiple iterations, one feature at a time
  - ❖ **Spiral** – requirements or functions analysed for risks, developed as prototype, integrated into whole
  - ❖ **MS SDL** (MS Security Development Lifecycle) – Microsoft methodology
  - ❖ **Team Software Process** (TSP) – framework with set of processes, used with Personal Software Process (PSP) and CMMI
  - ❖ **Agile** methodologies – e.g. Test-driven development (TDD): gather user stories, generate reasonable and prioritized set of features, then cycle (per feature) of develop tests, implement, refactor design if needed
  - ❖ **Touchpoints** – from Gary McGraw
    - ❖ <http://www.swsec.com/resources/touchpoints/>

# Other Approaches

- ❖ OWASP Software Assurance Maturity Model (SAMM)
- ❖ Building Security In Maturity Model (BSIMM)



SAMM

<https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/analytics/knowledge-base/how-to-approach-secure-software-development/>



BSIMM

# Security in Design – Architectural Level (1)

## ❖ Security Architectural Patterns

### ❖ Single-Access Point Pattern

- ❖ single point of entry into system

### ❖ Check Point Pattern

- ❖ centralised enforcement of authentication and authorisation

### ❖ Role Pattern

- ❖ disassociation of users and privileges

### ❖ Distrustful Composition

- ❖ decompose multi-function systems to reduce attack surface

### ❖ Privilege Separation


- ❖ Reduce the amount of code that works with increased privilege level

### ❖ Defer to Kernel

- ❖ Use existing user verification functionality within kernel to avoid reinventing decision control


```
/* Our product has
multiple layers of Security */
if (isAuthorised(user)) {
    if (isAuthorised(user)) {
        if (isAuthorised(user)) {
            access_data();
        }
    }
}
```

# Our System




# Single-Access Point Pattern

- ❖ System should have single point of entry
  - ❖ Common to all incoming requests
  - ❖ All users must pass through it
  - ❖ Any unauthorised requests of any other component of the system are directed to this point
- ❖ Example: Java Enterprise Edition (EE) – supports with declarative security implemented through web container




# Check Point Pattern

- ❖ Centralises and enforces authentication and authorisation
- ❖ Single mechanism determines if access (or ability to grant access) to particular resource is proper
- ❖ Matches user with **level of security** allowed
- ❖ May be **multiple** check points
- ❖ Java EE supports with Java Authentication and Authorisation Service (JAAS)
- ❖ Pluggable Authentication Module (PAM) also supports this pattern




# Role Pattern

- ❖ Disassociation of users and their **privileges**
- ❖ Avoid an un-manageable rats' nest of combinations
- ❖ User assigned one or more roles
- ❖ Role assigned one or more privileges
- ❖ Supports easier management
- ❖ Java EE supports through declarative security model
  - ❖ Can specify in XML deployment descriptors
- ❖ Found in other large software systems (e.g. Oracle)




# Distrustful Composition

- ❖ Normally, functionality accumulates within modules, leaving large modules with multiple functionality and possibly multiple interfaces and/or attack surfaces
- ❖ Pattern: decompose multi-function systems to **reduce** the **attack surface**
  - ❖ Small cohesive units have less vulnerabilities by providing a smaller attack surface
  - ❖ Small, modular units can be better isolated and tested




# Privilege Separation

- ❖ Reduce the amount of code that works with increased privilege level
- ❖ Specific instance of Distrustful Composition
- ❖ Uses pre-authentication and post-authentication states
  - ❖ Pre-authentication: before undergoing authentication, client or responding server process are given no privilege
  - ❖ Post-authentication, privilege is introduced, but not directly given to the client
- ❖ Uses privileged parent process as monitor and less-privileged child process as worker



# Defer to Kernel

- ❖ Use **existing** user verification functionalities within **kernel** to avoid reinventing decision control
  - ❖ Avoid re-implementing work that the kernel already can do
  - ❖ The kernel has proven, existing security features and has been analysed more thoroughly than new code




# General Design Patterns Relevant to Software Security

## ❖ Two Examples:

- ❖ Façade (fa-saad)
- ❖ Proxy

# Facade Design Pattern (1)

- ❖ Facade pattern provides an **unified** interface to a complex subsystem
- ❖ Example: JDBC interface requires client to use three major Java classes: Connection, Statement and ResultSet
- ❖ Could generate a **single** facade class, so that client can access that class, and that class deals with the actual detail work through the three classes, as well as providing an additional point of security




# Facade Design Pattern (2)

- ❖ Not only simplifies class structure (from client view) and guides user, but limits what client can do with the complex subsystem
- ❖ Facade can help implement *Single Access Point* and *Check Point* security patterns

# Proxy Design Pattern (1)

- ❖ Used to provide **varying degrees** of access and instantiation on demand to varying clients
- ❖ Proxy acts as a *reference* to the real object
- ❖ Many networking systems use proxy classes to protect actual server classes from **direct contact** and **security issues**
- ❖ Proxy controls access to object, may be responsible for **creating/deleting** it



# Proxy Design Pattern (2)

- ❖ Proxy can help implement a security layer:
  - ❖ Authentication
  - ❖ Authorisation
  - ❖ Filtering requests
  - ❖ Auditing/Logging

# Software Testing

- ❖ Involves good software engineering principles regarding testing
- ❖ Involves security mindset, principles, and consideration
- ❖ Two possible results of a test
  - ❖ Positive test – no problem found
    - ❖ Only validates that software works for specified test cases
    - ❖ Doesn't mean there aren't defects lurking outside of the tested areas/aspects
  - ❖ Negative test – problem found
    - ❖ One negative test result is sufficient to show that defects exist

# Software Testing

- ❖ Levels of testing
  - ❖ Unit testing
  - ❖ Integration testing
  - ❖ System testing
  - ❖ Acceptance testing
- ❖ Good testing done by multiple testers that are not developers for that code
  - ❖ Often independent quality assurance (QA) group
  - ❖ Exception: unit testing is done by developers

# Software Testing

## ❖ **Unit Testing (Module testing)**

- ❖ debuggers, tracers
- ❖ done by programmers as they develop (hopefully continuously)

## ❖ Advantages

- ❖
- ❖

## ❖ Disadvantages

- ❖

# Software Testing

## ❖ **Integration Testing**

- ❖ communication between modules
- ❖ start with one module, then add incrementally

## ❖ **Advantages**

- ❖
- ❖

## ❖ **Disadvantages**

- ❖
- ❖
- ❖

# Software Testing

## ◆ **System Testing**

- ◆ manual procedures, restart and recovery, user interface
- ◆ real data is used
- ◆ users involved

## ◆ **Advantages**

- ◆
- ◆

## ◆ **Disadvantages**

- ◆
- ◆

# Software Testing

## ❖ **Acceptance Testing**

- ❖ user-prepared test data
- ❖ Verification Testing, Validation testing, Audit Testing

## ❖ **Advantages**

- ❖
- ❖
- ❖
- ❖
- ❖

## ❖ **Disadvantages**

- ❖
- ❖

# Software Testing

- ❖ Two testing types

- ❖ White Box Testing

- ❖ Assume access to source code

- ❖ Performed by examining logic flow through code

- ❖ Black Box Testing

- ❖ Assume no access to source code

- ❖ Performed by testing with expected and unexpected input, examining output and side effects

- ❖ Two aspects of security testing:

- ❖ Testing **security mechanisms** in system to ensure that their functionality is properly implemented

- ❖ Part of testing general system functionality

- ❖ Test authentication, authorization, access control, etc.

- ❖ Performing **risk-based security testing**, motivated by understanding and simulating the approach of a likely attacker

- ❖ Not considered part of general functionality testing

- ❖ Testing misuse cases to see if they have been prevented

# Software Testing

## ❖ In general:

1. Decide how much security is needed
2. Carry out automated testing
3. Test at every stage
4. Make a test plan
5. All system components are tested

# Software Dependency

- ❖ We reuse code and APIs made available to use.
- ❖ Not many projects are built from scratch.
- ❖ Managing application dependencies is a challenging task.
- ❖ Attackers can use this information to discover vulnerabilities.

“ A newer approach used by the attackers involves compromising the update site for several industrial control system (ICS) software producers. ”

The screenshot of the ICS-CERT website shows the following details:

- Header:** SIS Intranet <http://www.internasei.cmu.edu/>
- Logo:** ICS-CERT Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team
- Navigation:** HOME, ABOUT, IC SJWG, INFORMATION PRODUCTS, TRAINING, FAQ
- Content:** Alert (ICS-ALERT-14-176-02A)  
ICS Focused Malware (Update A)  
Original release date: June 27, 2014 | Last revised: July 01, 2014  
Print, Tweet, Send, Share
- Footer:** Legal Notice, More Alerts

# DependencyCheck

❖ demo



# DependencyCheck

```
(base) [jin@kali:~/test]
└$ DependencyCheck/cli/target/release/bin/dependency-check.sh --out . --scan vulnerable-node
Picked up _JAVA_OPTIONS: -Dawt.useSystemAAFontSettings=on -Dswing.aatext=true
[INFO] Checking for updates
[INFO] Skipping NVD check since last check was within 4 hours.
[INFO] Skipping RetireJS update since last update was within 24 hours.
[INFO] Skipping Hosted Suppressions file update since last update was within 2 hours.
[INFO] Skipping Known Exploited Vulnerabilities update check since last check was within 24 hours.
[INFO] Check for updates complete (9 ms)
[INFO]
```

The screenshot shows a web browser window with the title "Dependency-Che x". The address bar displays "file:///home/jin/test/dependency-check-report.html". The page content is a dependency check report from "DEPENDENCY-CHECK".

**DEPENDENCY-CHECK**

Dependency-Check is an open source tool performing a best effort analysis of 3rd party dependencies; false positives and false negatives may exist in the analysis performed by the tool. Use of the tool and with regard to the analysis or its use. Any use of the tool and the reporting provided is at the user's risk. In no event shall the copyright holder or OWASP be held liable for any damages whatsoever arising out of the use of this software.

[How to read the report](#) | [Suppressing false positives](#) | Getting Help: [github issues](#)

[Sponsor](#)

**Project:**

Scan Information ([show all](#)):

- dependency-check version: 8.3.2-SNAPSHOT
- Report Generated On: Wed, 2 Aug 2023 12:14:22 +0800
- Dependencies Scanned: 14 (14 unique)
- Vulnerable Dependencies: 3
- Vulnerabilities Found: 20
- Vulnerabilities Suppressed: 0
- ...

**Summary**

Display: [Showing Vulnerable Dependencies \(click to show all\)](#)

Dependency	Vulnerability IDs	Package	Highest Severity	CVE Count	Confidence	Evidence Count
<a href="#">bootstrap.js</a>		<a href="#">pkg:javascript/bootstrap@3.3.6</a>	MEDIUM	7		3
<a href="#">bootstrap.min.js</a>		<a href="#">pkg:javascript/bootstrap@3.3.6</a>	MEDIUM	7		3
<a href="#">jquery.js</a>		<a href="#">pkg:javascript/jquery@1.11.1</a>	MEDIUM	6		3

**Dependencies (vulnerable)**

# Additional Items

## ◊ Agile

- ◊ MS SDL: [https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-dc-10/Sullivan\\_Bryan/BlackHat-DC-2010-Sullivan-SDL-Agile-wp.pdf](https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-dc-10/Sullivan_Bryan/BlackHat-DC-2010-Sullivan-SDL-Agile-wp.pdf)
- ◊ SAFECODE: [http://www.safercode.org/publication/SAFECODE\\_Agile\\_Dev\\_Security0712.pdf](http://www.safercode.org/publication/SAFECODE_Agile_Dev_Security0712.pdf)

## ◊ US CERT: security requirements engineering

- ◊ <https://www.us-cert.gov/bsi/articles/best-practices/requirements-engineering/security-requirements-engineering>

## ◊ OWASP SAMM: Software Assurance Maturity Model

- ◊ [https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP\\_SAMM\\_Project](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_SAMM_Project)

## ◊ OWASP Dependency Check

- ◊ <https://owasp.org/www-project-dependency-check/>