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Fix #37: Add cross-origin leaks, hijacking browsing history #38

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Sep 4, 2017
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Fix #37: Add cross-origin leaks, hijacking browsing history #38

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7 changes: 7 additions & 0 deletions index.bs
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -95,6 +95,13 @@ the device environment. Potential privacy risks include:
- Cross-device communication. A simple broadcast communication method can
use device screen or camera LED flashes to broadcast messages read
out with an Ambient Light Sensor in a close by device.
- Cross-origin leaks. Light emitted from the screen can be reflected back to
the sensor from nearby reflective surfaces. Malicious sites can embed
resources from different origins and scale the content to display
particular pixels to allow distinguish the contents, pixel by pixel.
- Hijacking browsing history. Styling visited links to allow distinguish the
light levels associated with visited and unvisited links i.e. visited
links styled as a block of black screen; white for unvisited.

To mitigate these Ambient Light Sensor specific threats, user agents should
use one or both of the following mitigation strategies:
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11 changes: 10 additions & 1 deletion index.html
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Expand Up @@ -1431,7 +1431,7 @@
<div class="head">
<p data-fill-with="logo"><a class="logo" href="https://www.w3.org/"> <img alt="W3C" height="48" src="https://www.w3.org/StyleSheets/TR/2016/logos/W3C" width="72"> </a> </p>
<h1 class="p-name no-ref" id="title">Ambient Light Sensor</h1>
<h2 class="no-num no-toc no-ref heading settled" id="subtitle"><span class="content">Editor’s Draft, <time class="dt-updated" datetime="2017-08-21">21 August 2017</time></span></h2>
<h2 class="no-num no-toc no-ref heading settled" id="subtitle"><span class="content">Editor’s Draft, <time class="dt-updated" datetime="2017-08-29">29 August 2017</time></span></h2>
<div data-fill-with="spec-metadata">
<dl>
<dt>This version:
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -1570,6 +1570,15 @@ <h2 class="heading settled" data-level="3" id="security-and-privacy"><span class
<p>Cross-device communication. A simple broadcast communication method can
use device screen or camera LED flashes to broadcast messages read
out with an Ambient Light Sensor in a close by device.</p>
<li data-md="">
<p>Cross-origin leaks. Light emitted from the screen can be reflected back to
the sensor from nearby reflective surfaces. Malicious sites can embed
resources from different origins and scale the content to display
particular pixels to allow distinguish the contents, pixel by pixel.</p>
<li data-md="">
<p>Hijacking browsing history. Styling visited links to allow distinguish the
light levels associated with visited and unvisited links i.e. visited
links styled as a block of black screen; white for unvisited.</p>
</ul>
<p>To mitigate these Ambient Light Sensor specific threats, user agents should
use one or both of the following mitigation strategies:</p>
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