COEP reflection #7948
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COEP reflection #7948
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Original proposal: whatwg#7912 WPT tentative tests: web-platform-tests/wpt#34141 - /html/cross-origin-embedder-policy/reflection-unsafe-none.tentative.https.any.js - /html/cross-origin-embedder-policy/reflection-credentialless.tentative.https.any.js - /html/cross-origin-embedder-policy/reflection-require-corp.tentative.https.any.js
domenic
added
addition/proposal
domenic
approved these changes
May 23, 2022
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Thanks for this quick review! I will follow the normal new feature path: w3ctag > request-for-position > blink-intent > chrome-security-review. I will be back in ~1-2 weeks when everything is completed. |
This was referenced May 31, 2022
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Closing per w3ctag/design-reviews#742 (comment), although I'm very sad about this; it's silly that we can't just reflect HTTP headers into JS for some weird reason. |
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Original proposal
#7912
Description
This adds:
It reflects the environment's cross-origin-embedder-policy's value.
Security/Privacy
It is already possible to deduce the value returned by the API, by making a
fetchtoward a known cross-origin URL responding with the request's cookies and no CORS header.It is costly, but theoretically polyfillable. As such, it should be a security/privacy no-op.
Motivation
Depending on the Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy value, not every iframe/subresources can be loaded inside the document. If this reflection API is provided, 3rd party scripts can take better decisions. They can implement fallbacks.
In particular, for trying Anonymous Iframe, Google DisplayAds, needs a way to know the COEP policy. The Ads's script could this way be able to decide in between inserting a normal or an anonymous iframe.
At least two implementers are interested (and none opposed):
Tests are written and can be reviewed and commented upon at:
Implementation bugs are filed:
(See WHATWG Working Mode: Changes for more details.)
/webappapis.html ( diff )