# YANGKEUN YUN

yangkeun.yun.phd@anderson.ucla.edu yangkeunyun.github.io

#### **DOCTORAL STUDIES**

UCLA Anderson School of Management, 2021 to present

Ph.D. Candidate in Economics

Expected Completion Date: June 2026

#### **References:**

Professor John Asker Professor Nico Voigtländer

UCLA Department of Economics UCLA Anderson School of Management

johnasker@econ.ucla.edu nico.v@anderson.ucla.edu

Professor Will Rafey Professor Romain Wacziarg

UCLA Department of Economics UCLA Anderson School of Management

rafey@ucla.edu wacziarg@ucla.edu

#### PRIOR EDUCATION

M.A. Economics, Seoul National University, 2019

B.A. Economics & Public Administration, Kyunghee University, 2015

#### **FIELDS**

Industrial Organization, Environmental Economics, Economic History

## TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Winter, Summer 2025 Teaching assistant for MBA Global Trends, UCLA

Winter 2024 Teaching assistant for MBA Managerial Economics, UCLA

Spring 2023 Teaching assistant for MBA Macroeconomics, UCLA

#### RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

2024-2025 Research assistant for Prof. Romain Wacziarg

2023-2024 Research assistant for Prof. Paola Giuliano

2022-2025 Research assistant for Prof. Nico Voigtländer

2022-2023 Research assistant for Prof. Will Rafey

#### HONORS, SCHOLARSHIPS, AND FELLOWSHIPS

2025-2026 Price Center Research Grant, UCLA

2025-2026 Dissertation Year Award, UCLA

2023-2025 Global Research Award, Center for Global Management, UCLA

2023-2024 Societal Impact Research Grant, Center for Impact, UCLA

2023 Best Presentation Award, Proseminar in Economic History, UCLA

2022 Diversity Fellowship, Environmental & Energy Economics Summer School, UC Berkeley

2021-2026 Anderson Fellowship, UCLA

2020 Second Prize in Student Paper Award, iHEA

## JOB MARKET PAPER

Navigating the Commons

This paper examines long-run resource allocation in the commons. Firms strategically enter, exit, and invest while accounting for resource dynamics and changing market conditions. These actions generate congestion and stock depletion that individual firms have no incentive to internalize. I estimate the model using data from the 19th-century American whaling industry, an unregulated global commons. I then introduce a framework that sets policy instruments equal to marginal social damages at the efficient allocation. Results show that combining Pigouvian per-unit taxes with lump-sum license fees achieves the long-run social optimum. In contrast, a single instrument cannot jointly regulate harvest levels and industry structure. Welfare effects vary substantially with technology, demand, and whale regeneration.

#### **WORKING PAPER**

Water Investment and Pricing (with Will Rafey)

### **PRESENTATIONS**

- 2025-2026 Southern Economic Association Annual Meeting; CU Environmental and Resource Economics Workshop; Econometric Society World Congress
- 2024-2025 European Association of Young Economists; Southern Economic Association Annual Meeting; Lewis Lab Graduate Student Workshop (University of Manchester)
- 2023-2024 Society for Economic Dynamics Annual Meeting; Econometric Society North American Summer Meeting; International Industrial Organization Conference; Southern Economic Association Annual Meeting; Royal Economic Society Annual Conference; Northeastern Universities Development Consortium; Economics Graduate Student Conference (Washington University in St. Louis)
- 2022-2023 LSE Environment Day; Mountain West Economic History Conference (Utah State University)

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