

YANGKEUN YUN

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DOCTORAL STUDIES

UCLA Anderson School of Management, 2021 to present
Ph.D. Candidate in Economics
Expected Completion Date: June 2026

References:

Professor John Asker
UCLA Department of Economics
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Professor Nico Voigtländer
UCLA Anderson School of Management
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Professor Will Rafey
UCLA Department of Economics
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Professor Romain Wacziarg
UCLA Anderson School of Management
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PRIOR EDUCATION

M.A. Economics, Seoul National University, 2019
B.A. Economics & Public Administration, Kyunghee University, 2015

FIELDS

Industrial Organization, Environmental Economics, Economic History

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Winter, Summer 2025 Teaching assistant for MBA Global Trends, UCLA
Winter 2024 Teaching assistant for MBA Managerial Economics, UCLA
Spring 2023 Teaching assistant for MBA Macroeconomics, UCLA

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

2024-2025 Research assistant for Prof. Romain Wacziarg
2023-2024 Research assistant for Prof. Paola Giuliano
2022-2025 Research assistant for Prof. Nico Voigtländer
2022-2023 Research assistant for Prof. Will Rafey

HONORS, SCHOLARSHIPS, AND FELLOWSHIPS

2025-2026 Price Center Research Grant, UCLA
2025-2026 Dissertation Year Award, UCLA
2023-2025 Global Research Award, Center for Global Management, UCLA
2023-2024 Societal Impact Research Grant, Center for Impact, UCLA
2023 Best Presentation Award, Proseminar in Economic History, UCLA
2022 Diversity Fellowship, Environmental & Energy Economics Summer School, UC Berkeley
2021-2026 Anderson Fellowship, UCLA
2020 Second Prize in Student Paper Award, iHEA

2019 Best Thesis Award, Seoul National University

JOB MARKET PAPER

Navigating the Commons

Abstract: Open-access commons often suffer from excessive entry and investment, leading to persistent inefficiencies. Yet most models of common-pool resources abstract from firm dynamics, even though unrestricted entry, exit, and investment can amplify externalities. This paper develops a model of firm dynamics in which firms strategically interact through congestion and stock depletion. I estimate the model using data from the 19th-century American whaling industry, an unregulated global commons. Simulating the estimated model, I propose a tractable framework for designing optimal regulation in complex, real-world settings. Results show that per-unit taxes alone cannot jointly regulate harvest levels and industry structure. When paired with state-dependent lump-sum fees, the policy internalizes externalities from the mix of firm sizes and productivities, aligning private incentives with social costs. Welfare effects vary substantially with technology, demand, and whale regeneration, underscoring the need for adaptable regulation.

WORKING PAPER

Water Investment and Pricing (with Will Rafey)

PRESENTATIONS

2025-2026 Southern Economic Association Annual Meeting; CU Environmental and Resource Economics Workshop; Econometric Society World Congress

2024-2025 European Association of Young Economists; Southern Economic Association Annual Meeting; Lewis Lab Graduate Student Workshop (University of Manchester)

2023-2024 Society for Economic Dynamics Annual Meeting; Econometric Society North American Summer Meeting; International Industrial Organization Conference; Southern Economic Association Annual Meeting; Royal Economic Society Annual Conference; Northeastern Universities Development Consortium; Economics Graduate Student Conference (Washington University in St. Louis)

2022-2023 LSE Environment Day; Mountain West Economic History Conference (Utah State University)

Last updated: September 2025