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Are we vulnerable for the " PuTTY SSH handshake heap overflow" ? #79
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FauxFaux
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"Add an assortment of extra safety checks." Direct cherry-pick of svn://svn.tartarus.org/sgt/putty@9896
For the stable release, probably, although it is being built with compiler checks which should make it harder to exploit. I've released the supposed fix as p0.62-t014, just in case. |
Sigh, a new release from trunk, with /everything/ in. I'm not convinced I'm ready to do that yet. |
FauxFaux
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"Fix an array-size bug in modmul, and add some tests for it." svn://svn.tartarus.org/sgt/putty@9977
FauxFaux
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The bignum code has two representations of zero, since bn_restore_invariant (and the many loops that duplicate it) leaves a single zero word in a bignum representing 0, whereas the constant 'Zero' does not have any data words at all. Cope with this in bignum_cmp. (It would be a better plan to decide on one representation and stick with it, but this is the less disruptive fix for the moment.) svn://svn.tartarus.org/sgt/putty@9996 Conflicts: sshbn.c
FauxFaux
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Another couple of memory leaks. svn://svn.tartarus.org/sgt/putty@9988
FauxFaux
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I've backported all the fixes listed mentioned in the 0.63 release, however I'm not convinced these are actually all the security fixes, just all the ones identified. vuln-modmul, vuln-signature-stringlen, vuln-bignum-division-by-zero, private-key-not-wiped I will endeavour to get an alpha or beta of p0.63-t016 or so out soon(!). |
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Hi,
As found on bugtraq on http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2013/Aug/26:
PuTTY versions 0.62 and earlier - as well as all software that
integrates these versions of PuTTY - are vulnerable to an integer overflow
leading to heap overflow during the SSH handshake before authentication,
caused by improper bounds checking of the length parameter received from the
SSH server.
Are we vulnerable?
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