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Incentivize GRG holding by non-pool operators through staking and operators sharing pop rewards.
Motivation
Currently, GRG is a token targeted for token operators, who are required to hold certain amounts in order to unlock premium features. Normal GRG holders do not have a monetary incentive in holding the token unless they want to become an operator.
Specification
Give the pool operator the possibility of creating staking pools, then letting the users stake. Calculate GRG holding for slashing condition calculations based on staked GRGs instead of on pool operators' GRG balance.
Rationale
The proposed model would share the pool operators' pool reward with the pool's stakers. Furthermore, the current GRG-based slashing condition would incentivize network effects pushed from the pool operator's ability to leverage on community-staked tokens in order to meet the theoretical maximum reward ratio.
Notes
This RBIP becomes particularly relevant with the growth in unitary value of GRG, as the emerging pools operators will be able to leverage on the community for maximizing their rewards, while their pools are still small.
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered:
Summary
Incentivize GRG holding by non-pool operators through staking and operators sharing pop rewards.
Motivation
Currently, GRG is a token targeted for token operators, who are required to hold certain amounts in order to unlock premium features. Normal GRG holders do not have a monetary incentive in holding the token unless they want to become an operator.
Specification
Give the pool operator the possibility of creating staking pools, then letting the users stake. Calculate GRG holding for slashing condition calculations based on staked GRGs instead of on pool operators' GRG balance.
Rationale
The proposed model would share the pool operators' pool reward with the pool's stakers. Furthermore, the current GRG-based slashing condition would incentivize network effects pushed from the pool operator's ability to leverage on community-staked tokens in order to meet the theoretical maximum reward ratio.
Notes
This RBIP becomes particularly relevant with the growth in unitary value of GRG, as the emerging pools operators will be able to leverage on the community for maximizing their rewards, while their pools are still small.
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: