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Providing internal objects database IDs as resource IDs are a potential security risk.
To minimize this risk all ResourceIDs that will be published to the clients needs to be obfuscated, such that a client won't be able to access a different object just by incrementing the ID. In addition any invalid ID provided by the client should be logged in a special fraud-detection log with the clients IP.
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered:
Would this really tighten the security? In which cases?
If someone hacks onto the 2nd tier node and gains direct access from the data base, this counter measure does not matter at all.
So the attack vector would be through the API.
Through sloppy programming (by not checking if the object belongs to the user)
If the JWT Token security failed. Algorithm has been hacked
If TLS Layer has been hacked and a JWT Token has been captures through a man in the middle access. Because of the ownership check this could damage the data of the user in question.
Though I currently doubt that the possible attack vectors would happen and that an open science project would not be of any interest to a hacker, this measure would tighten the security level an additional bit.
Providing internal objects database IDs as resource IDs are a potential security risk.
To minimize this risk all ResourceIDs that will be published to the clients needs to be obfuscated, such that a client won't be able to access a different object just by incrementing the ID. In addition any invalid ID provided by the client should be logged in a special fraud-detection log with the clients IP.
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: