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This proposal is making Scrappy(SeCure Rate Assuring Protocol with PrivacY),
a new scheme with strong privacy for Privacy State Token.
Scrappy is a rate-limiter the same as Privacy Pass, but this restants to the timing correlation attack.
Also, Scrappy works as E2E (between users and web service) in the hot paths (i.e., sign and verify),
so that the issuer does not need to receive high access from users.
Note
Although Scrappy mainly assumes the user has a unique resource in the hardware device (in particular, the TPM),
we can use other unique resources, the same as the Trust Token API.
Preventing abusive activities caused by adversaries accessing online services at a rate exceeding that expected by websites has become an ever-increasing problem. CAPTCHAs and SMS authentication are widely used to provide a solution by implementing rate limiting, although they are becoming less effective, and some are considered privacy-invasive. In light of this, many studies have proposed better rate-limiting systems that protect the privacy of legitimate users while blocking malicious actors. However, they suffer from one or more shortcomings: (1) assume trust in the underlying hardware and (2) are vulnerable to side-channel attacks.
Motivated by the aforementioned issues, this paper proposes Scrappy: SeCure Rate Assuring Protocol with PrivacY. Scrappy allows clients to generate unforgeable yet unlinkable rate-assuring proofs, which provides the server with cryptographic guarantees that the client is not misbehaving. We design Scrappy using a combination of DAA and hardware security devices. Scrappy is implemented over three types of devices, including one that can immediately be deployed in the real world. Our baseline evaluation shows that the end-to-end latency of Scrappy is minimal, taking only 0.32 seconds, and uses only 679 bytes of bandwidth when transferring necessary data. We also conduct an extensive security evaluation, showing that the rate-limiting capability of Scrappy is unaffected even if the hardware security device is compromised.
This proposal is making Scrappy(SeCure Rate Assuring Protocol with PrivacY),
a new scheme with strong privacy for Privacy State Token.
Scrappy is a rate-limiter the same as Privacy Pass, but this restants to the timing correlation attack.
Also, Scrappy works as E2E (between users and web service) in the hot paths (i.e., sign and verify),
so that the issuer does not need to receive high access from users.
Note
we can use other unique resources, the same as the Trust Token API.
Reference
Scrappy:
https://www.ndss-symposium.org/ndss-paper/scrappy-secure-rate-assuring-protocol-with-privacy/
Privacy State Token:
https://developers.google.com/privacy-sandbox/protections/private-state-tokens?hl=en
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