# Test theory test on Game Theory



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#### **Task description**

- Positions of the game are integers in  $[1\mathinner{.\,.} (day + month + year)]$ , players move in turns
  - Eloise-Abelard-etc.
- Moves (for both players) are (+n) where n is the maximal integer in  $[1\ldots(year)]$  such that the next position is in the admissible range  $[1\ldots(day+month+year)]$ ; for example, if day.month.year is 24.04.1961, then a player can move from position 12 to the next position 1973 (i.e., n=1961), but from position 1234 to 1989 (i.e., n=755).
- A player wins and the play stops as soon as the player moves to the final position day + month + year.

#### 1. Game as a finite position game (FPG). Answer



Our game could be defined as  $G=\left(P_{E},P_{A},M_{E},M_{A},F_{E},F_{A}
ight)$ , where

- ullet  $P_E$  and  $P_A$  are disjoint finite sets of positions for Eloise and Abelard,
- $M_E\subseteq P_E imes (P_E\cup P_A)$  and  $M_A\subseteq P_A imes (P_E\cup P_A)$  are admissible moves of Eloise and Abelard,
- $F_E\subseteq (P_E\cup P_A)$  and  $F_E\subseteq (P_E\cup P_A)$  are disjoint final positions (where Eloise and Abelard won already respectively)

Given parameters day=9, month=3, year=2000:

- $P_E = \{(p, E) : p \in \mathbb{Z} \land p \in [1; 2012]\}$
- $P_A = \{(p, A) : p \in \mathbb{Z} \land p \in [1; 2012]\}$
- $\bullet \hspace{0.5cm} M_E = \{(p_e,p_a): p_e \in P_E \wedge p_a \in P_A \wedge \exists max(n): n \in [1;2000] \wedge n + \\ p \leq 2012, p \in p_e \}$

- $egin{aligned} oldsymbol{M}_A &= \{(p_a, p_e): p_e \in P_E \land p_a \in P_A \land \exists max(n): n \in [1;2000] \land n + p \leq 2012, p \in p_a \} \end{aligned}$
- $F_E = \{(2012, A)\}$
- $F_A = \{(2012, E)\}$

Sets of the final positions simply states in what position should be current player to win the game. A, E says who should turn next move from this position.

### 2. General definition of winning strategy for a player in FPG. Answer

A winning strategy for a player  $X \in \{E,A\}$  is any subset of  $S_X \subseteq M_X$  such that every move leads the player to the winning position from the set of winning positions  $W_X$  for a player. In other words, every move from  $M_X$  leads to the position  $p \notin W_{\overline{X}}$ .

$$S_X = \{(p,q) \in M_X : q \in F_X\} \cup \{(p,q) \in M_X : \nexists x \in P_X : (q,x) \in S_X\}$$

## 3. Description in the set-theoretic terms backward induction for Eloise and computing all initial game positions where Eloise has a winning strategy. Answer

Eloise has a winning strategy in a position p if and only if:

- $p \in F_E$  or
- $\bullet \ \exists (p,q) \in M_E : p \notin F_E \wedge \forall (q,x) \in M_A : x \in W_E$

Now, compute the all initial positions where Eloise has a winning strategy:

 $P_i=\{(p,E):p\in\mathbb{Z},p\in[1,2012)\}$  - set of initial positions. Next step is to apply backward induction:

- $\bullet \ \ W_E^0=\emptyset$
- $W_E=\emptyset$   $W_E^1=\{(p,E): p\in \mathbb{Z}, p\in [12,2012)\}$

So, resulting set according to the task is following:  $W_E = \{(p,E) : p \in \mathbb{Z}, p \in [12,2012)\}$ , because any move of Eloise ((p,E),(2012,A)) will lead to  $p' \in F_E$  since she turns first. All other positions do not satisfy Eloise's winning strategy constraints, hence we need only one backward step.

## 4. List all initial game positions where Abelard has a winning strategy. Answer

\*Let Abelard choose the initial position.

• 
$$W_A^0 = \emptyset$$


• 
$$W_A^1 = \{(p, A) : p \in \mathbb{Z}, p \in [12, 2012)\}$$

So, winning positions for Abelard:  $W_A = \{(p,A): p \in \mathbb{Z}, p \in [12,2012)\}$ . Since Eloise turns first it takes one move to get into position from  $W_A^1$ . So, due to Eloise's first move appropriate set of initial positions for winning strategy of Abelard will be:  $W_A^l = \{(p,E): p \in \mathbb{Z} \land p \in [1;12)\}$ .

#### 5. Definition and sketch for extensive form of a game. Answer

A game (with complete information) in extensive form is a directed labeled tree (infinite maybe, but in our case finite) where

- the root is the initial position, nodes are positions, and the leaves are final positions;
- positions specify turns, all edges are moves by participating players according to their turns;
- all final positions are marked (by a vector of) individual payoffs for each player.



Remark: payoffs presented as

Abelard: Eloise

## 6. Definition and list of all plays of the game in the extensive form that are Pareto optimal. Answer $\equiv$

A play S is *Pareto optimal* if there is no any play S' such that  $\pi(S') \geq \pi(S)$  holds componentwise and  $\pi_X(S') > \pi_X(S)$  for some player X of the game. In Pareto optimal play the deviant player may increase its payoff.

There are 3 game from left to right as mentioned on the picture in the 5th question. See if it's Pareto optimal:

$$S_1 o \pi_A(S_2) < \pi_A(S_1)$$
,  $\pi(S_3) = \pi(S_1)$ , so it's Pareto optimal.

$$S_2 o \pi_E(S_1) < \pi_E(S_2)$$
,  $\pi_E(S_3) < \pi_E(S_2)$ , so it's Pareto optimal.

$$S_3 o\pi_A(S_2)<\pi_A(S_3)$$
 ,  $\pi(S_1)=\pi(S_3)$ 

Finally, all the games are Pareto optimal.



### 7. Definition and list of all plays of the game in the extensive form that are Nash equilibrium. Answer

Play  $S=(S_A,S_B,...)$  is acceptable for a player X in A,B, etc. if  $\pi_X(S) \geq \pi_X(S_{X:S_X'})$  for any legal strategy's  $S_X'$  of the player X. Nash equilibrium is any play that is acceptable for all players.

All the plays acceptable by Eloise, because Abelard gives only left only one strategy to her. Play 2 is not acceptable by Abelard, he could increase the payoff simply changing strategy. But contrary to play 1 and 3. Hence plays 1 and 3 are Nash equilibrium.

### 8. Definition and representational of the game in normal form. Answer

Two players' game in the normal form is 2-dimensional finite table (matrix) where

- · rows correspond to the strategies of the first player,
- columns correspond to the strategies of the second player,
- each row and each column produce a play and their intersection cell contains vector of individual payoffs.

Let rows will be for the Abelard's strategies, and columns for the Eloises' ones. Hence

	+n	+0
+11-p	1:-1	not a play
+[122011]	-1:1	not a play
+2012	not a play	1:-1

Where n in admissible range, p is in range [0, 10].