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docs: clarify language about censor threshold as one third + 1 #11843

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May 2, 2022
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docs: clarify language about censor threshold as one third + 1 #11843

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2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion x/gov/spec/01_concepts.md
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Expand Up @@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ If a delegator does not vote, it will inherit its validator vote.
* If the delegator votes after its validator, it will override its validator
vote with its own. If the proposal is urgent, it is possible
that the vote will close before delegators have a chance to react and
override their validator's vote. This is not a problem, as proposals require more than 2/3rd of the total voting power to pass before the end of the voting period. If more than 2/3rd of validators collude, they can censor the votes of delegators anyway.
override their validator's vote. This is not a problem, as proposals require more than 2/3rd of the total voting power to pass before the end of the voting period. Because as little as 1/3 + 1 validation power could collude to censor transactions, non-collusion is already assumed for ranges exceeding this threshold.

### Validator’s punishment for non-voting

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