AMJ_articles.bib

@article{9984685620141201,
Abstract = {One key responsibility of leaders involves crafting and communicating two types of messages--visions and values--that help followers understand the ultimate purpose of their work. Although scholars have long considered how leaders communicate visions and values to establish a sense of purpose, they have overlooked how these messages can be used to establish a shared sense of purpose, which is achieved when multiple employees possess the same understanding of the purpose of work. In this research, we move beyond the traditional focus on leader rhetoric and individual cognition to examine leader rhetoric and shared cognition. We suggest that a specific combination of messages--a large amount of vision imagery combined with a small number of values--will boost performance more than other combinations because it triggers a shared sense of the organization's ultimate goal, and, in turn, enhances coordination. We found support for our predictions in an archival study of 151 hospitals and an},
Author = {Carton, Andrew M. and Murphy, Chad and Clark, Jonathan R.},
ISSN = {00014273},
Journal = {Academy of Management Journal},
Keywords = {ORGANIZATIONAL performance, LEADERSHIP, COMMUNICATION in organizations, ORGANIZATIONAL goals, EMPLOYEES, PLANNING, RHETORIC, PSYCHOLOGY, COGNITIVE psychology, PSYCHOLINGUISTICS},
Number = {6},
Pages = {1544 - 1570},
Title = {A (BLURRY) VISION OF THE FUTURE: HOW LEADER RHETORIC ABOUT ULTIMATE GOALS INFLUENCES PERFORMANCE.},
Volume = {57},
URL = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=99846856&site=ehost-live},
Year = {2014},
}

@article{9984686620141201,
Abstract = {Using a multidimensional framework of CEO temporal focus (the degree to which CEOs characteristically devote attention to perceptions of the past, present, and future), we propose that a company's rate of new product introduction (NPI) is predicted by a CEO's focus on each of the three distinct time frames in interaction with environmental dynamism. Based on a longitudinal (from 1996 to 2003) analysis of 221 firms in 19 industries, we show that, in stable environments, new products are introduced faster in firms headed by CEOs with high past focus, high present focus, and low future focus. In dynamic environments, new products are introduced faster in firms headed by CEOs with low past focus, high present focus, and high future focus. These findings demonstrate how CEO temporal attentional bias shapes the rate of NPI. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]},
Author = {Sucheta, Nadkarni and Jianhong, Chen},
ISSN = {00014273},
Journal = {Academy of Management Journal},
Keywords = {CHIEF executive officers, NEW product development, TRENDS, BUSINESS cycles, MULTIDIMENSIONAL scaling, LONGITUDINAL method, TIME perception, CONFIRMATORY factor analysis},
Number = {6},
Pages = {1810 - 1833},
Title = {BRIDGING YESTERDAY, TODAY, AND TOMORROW: CEO TEMPORAL FOCUS, ENVIRONMENTAL DYNAMISM, AND RATE OF NEW PRODUCT INTRODUCTION.},
Volume = {57},
URL = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=99846866&site=ehost-live},
Year = {2014},
}

@article{9984686520141201,
Abstract = {In an effort to comprehend activism toward corporations, scholars have proposed the concept of corporate opportunity structure, or the attributes of individual firms that make them more (or less) attractive as activist targets. We theorize that the personal values of the firm's elite decision makers constitute a key element of this corporate opportunity structure. We specifically consider the political ideology--conservatism versus liberalism--of the company's CEO as a signal for employees who are considering the merits of engaging in activism. To test of our theory, we examine the formation of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender employee groups in major companies in the period 1985-2004, when the formation of such groups was generally perceived to be risky for participants. Using CEOs' records of political donations to measure their personal ideologies, we find strong evidence that the political liberalism of CEOs influences the likelihood of activism. We also find that CEOs' ide},
Author = {Briscoe, Forrest and Chin, M. K. and Hambrick, Donald C.},
ISSN = {00014273},
Journal = {Academy of Management Journal},
Keywords = {CHIEF executive officers, ECONOMIC elites, LGBT employees, EMPLOYEES, IDEOLOGY, ACTIVISTS, CONSERVATISM, LIBERALISM, SOCIAL movements, POLITICAL activity},
Number = {6},
Pages = {1786 - 1809},
Title = {CEO IDEOLOGY AS AN ELEMENT OF THE CORPORATE OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE FOR SOCIAL ACTIVISTS.},
Volume = {57},
URL = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=99846865&site=ehost-live},
Year = {2014},
}

@article{9984685820141201,
Abstract = {Senior leaders increasingly embed paradoxes into their organization's strategy, but struggle to manage them effectively. To better understand how they do so, I compared in-depth qualitative data from six top management teams exploring and exploiting simultaneously. The results informed a model of dynamic decision making in which strategic paradoxes can be effectively engaged. The details of this dynamic decision-making model extend and complicate our understanding of managing paradoxes by depicting dilemmas and paradoxes as interwoven, explicating a consistently inconsistent pattern of addressing tensions, and framing both differentiating and integrating practices as necessary for engaging paradox. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]},
Author = {Smith, Wendy K.},
ISSN = {00014273},
Journal = {Academy of Management Journal},
Keywords = {DECISION making, SENIOR leadership teams, QUALITATIVE research, STRATEGIC business units, ORGANIZATIONAL commitment, ORGANIZATIONAL structure, PARADOX, ORGANIZATIONAL aims & objectives, DILEMMA},
Number = {6},
Pages = {1592 - 1623},
Title = {DYNAMIC DECISION MAKING: A MODEL OF SENIOR LEADERS MANAGING STRATEGIC PARADOXES.},
Volume = {57},
URL = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=99846858&site=ehost-live},
Year = {2014},
}

@article{9984686320141201,
Abstract = {We contribute to the research on organizational accounts by examining the role of different framing languages and the credibility of the frame articulator on justifying controversial organizational actions. Drawing on regulatory focus theory and the literature on source credibility, we develop novel arguments as to how a gains-versus-nonlosses framing and the perceived credibility of the speaker influence stakeholder responses, as well as how the effectiveness of these aspects is influenced by context. We test our arguments using data on the framing of the adoption of "poison pills" by U.S. firms between 1983 and 2008. Using content analysis and an event study, we find that a gains framing aligned with the dominant institutional logic leads to a positive stock market reaction, while statements emanating from speakers with potentially self-serving interests negatively affect the stock market reaction. Our findings further show that the effectiveness of framing and source credibility ar},
Author = {Rhee, Eunice Y. and Fiss, Peer C.},
ISSN = {00014273},
Journal = {Academy of Management Journal},
Keywords = {REGULATORY focus theory, POISON pills (Securities), FINANCIAL market reaction, STAKEHOLDERS, EVENT study (Finance), CONSOLIDATION & merger of corporations, FRAMES (Social sciences), TRUTHFULNESS & falsehood, CONTENT analysis (Communication), UNITED States},
Number = {6},
Pages = {1734 - 1758},
Title = {FRAMING CONTROVERSIAL ACTIONS: REGULATORY FOCUS, SOURCE CREDIBILITY, AND STOCK MARKET REACTION TO POISON PILL ADOPTION.},
Volume = {57},
URL = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=99846863&site=ehost-live},
Year = {2014},
}

@article{9984686020141201,
Abstract = {Based on a three-year inductive study of one organization's implementation of radical organizational change, we examine the critical role played by middle managers' judgments of the legitimacy of their top managers as change agents. Our analysis revealed middle managers' shifting judgments of the change agents' legitimacy that arose with their emotional reactions and produced rising resistance to the change effort. Our inductive model illustrates the dynamic, relational, and iterative relationships among change recipients' legitimacy judgments of change agents and arising emotional reactions in various phases of planned change, which explain recipients' emergent resistance to the change effort. Our model allows us to contribute to theory on radical organizational change, resistance to change, and legitimacy judgments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]},
Author = {Quy Nguyen, Huy and Corley, Kevin G. and Kraatz, Matthew S.},
ISSN = {00014273},
Journal = {Academy of Management Journal},
Keywords = {ORGANIZATIONAL legitimacy, ORGANIZATIONAL change, MIDDLE managers, CHANGE agents, EMOTIONS (Psychology), RESISTANCE to change, SENSEMAKING theory (Communication)},
Number = {6},
Pages = {1650 - 1680},
Title = {FROM SUPPORT TO MUTINY: SHIFTING LEGITIMACY JUDGMENTS AND EMOTIONAL REACTIONS IMPACTING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RADICAL CHANGE.},
Volume = {57},
URL = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=99846860&site=ehost-live},
Year = {2014},
}

@article{9984686420141201,
Abstract = {Although past studies have paid considerable attention to firms' reputations, few have investigated the actions that firms take following a reputation-damaging event. We identify firms involved in financial earnings restatements and examine whether naming a successor CEO with specific qualities serves to signal the seriousness of a firm's efforts to restore its reputation. Using theories of market signaling, we argue that attributes of successor CEOs significantly influence the reactions of key external constituencies. In particular, firms with more severe restatement tend to name successors who have prior CEO or turnaround experience and a more elite education. The naming of such successors results in more positive reactions from the stock market, financial analysts, and mass media. We argue that these attributes send messages to stakeholders and the broader public about the CEO's credibility and the firm's efforts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]},
Author = {GOMULYA, DAVID and BOEKER, WARREN},
ISSN = {00014273},
Journal = {Academy of Management Journal},
Keywords = {RESTATEMENT of corporate earnings, EXECUTIVE succession, CORPORATE image, BRAND repair, INFORMATION theory in economics, CORPORATE turnarounds, MASS media, BUSINESS analysts, STAKEHOLDERS},
Number = {6},
Pages = {1579 - 1785},
Title = {HOW FIRMS RESPOND TO FINANCIAL RESTATEMENT: CEO SUCCESSORS AND EXTERNAL REACTIONS.},
Volume = {57},
URL = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=99846864&site=ehost-live},
Year = {2014},
}

@article{9984685520141201,
Abstract = {An introduction is presented in which the editor discusses various reports within the issue on topics including evolving practices in corporate governance, the use of structural elaboration theory to show how new institutional logics benefit powerful chief executive officers, and the study of managers in their leadership role.},
Author = {Tihanyi, Laszlo and Graffin, Scott and George, Gerard},
ISSN = {00014273},
Journal = {Academy of Management Journal},
Keywords = {CORPORATE governance, CHIEF executive officers, LEADERSHIP},
Number = {6},
Pages = {1535 - 1543},
Title = {RETHINKING GOVERNANCE IN MANAGEMENT RESEARCH.},
Volume = {57},
URL = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=99846855&site=ehost-live},
Year = {2014},
}

@article{9984686220141201,
Abstract = {Although the vast majority of U.S. firms follow a policy of pay secrecy, research provides a limited understanding of its overall utility to organizations. Building on signaling theory, we develop and test a model of the incentive and sorting effects of pay secrecy--a pay communication policy that limits employees' access to pay-related information and discourages the discussion of pay issues--under varying pay-for-performance (PFP) system characteristics. Results of a multiround laboratory simulation largely support the proposed moderated-mediation model. They indicate that pay secrecy has an adverse impact on individual task performance that is mediated by PFP perceptions, amplified when pay determination criteria are relative (as opposed to absolute), and attenuated when performance assessment is objective (as opposed to subjective). Results also indicate that pay secrecy has a similar adverse effect on participant continuation intentions (mediated through PFP perceptions, amplifie},
Author = {Belogolovsky, Elena and Bamberger, Peter A.},
ISSN = {00014273},
Journal = {Academy of Management Journal},
Keywords = {PAY for performance, INFORMATION theory in economics, SIMULATION methods & models, JOB performance, BUSINESS enterprises, TASK performance, ORGANIZATIONAL commitment, SECRECY, MEDIATION (Statistics), UNITED States},
Number = {6},
Pages = {1706 - 1733},
Title = {SIGNALING IN SECRET: PAY FOR PERFORMANCE AND THE INCENTIVE AND SORTING EFFECTS OF PAY SECRECY.},
Volume = {57},
URL = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=99846862&site=ehost-live},
Year = {2014},
}

@article{9984685920141201,
Abstract = {The upper echelons of publicly traded family firms can comprise family members and non-family members. Due to ownership and control factors, family members often wield significant influence in the upper echelons. If non-family members lack sources of influence, they may exhibit lower participation. Limited participation by non-family members lowers access to and integration of knowledge from non-family members, thus lowering the ability to devise strategic actions that increase performance. Drawing on the structural basis of power, we set out that greater equality in structural power (or compensation, status, and representation) across family and non-family top management team members increases performance in family firms. Moreover, we posit that this relationship is stronger under increasing environmental dynamism and higher governance performance, but weaker under the presence of a founder CEO. Using a sample of 231 publicly traded family firms, representing 1,934 firm-year observat},
Author = {Patel, Pankaj C. and Cooper, Danielle},
ISSN = {00014273},
Journal = {Academy of Management Journal},
Keywords = {SENIOR leadership teams, FAMILY-owned business enterprises, ORGANIZATIONAL performance, POWER (Social sciences), ENDOGENEITY (Econometrics), ORGANIZATIONAL governance, ORGANIZATIONAL structure, DECISION making, EQUALITY},
Number = {6},
Pages = {1624 - 1649},
Title = {STRUCTURAL POWER EQUALITY BETWEEN FAMILY AND NON-FAMILY TMT MEMBERS AND THE PERFORMANCE OF FAMILY FIRMS.},
Volume = {57},
URL = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=99846859&site=ehost-live},
Year = {2014},
}

@article{9984686120141201,
Abstract = {We conduct an exploratory qualitative comparative case analysis of the S&P 1500 firms with the aim of elaborating theory on how corporate governance mechanisms work together effectively. To do so, we integrate extant theory and research to specify the bundle of mechanisms that operate to mitigate the agency problem among publicly traded corporations and review what previous research has said about how these mechanisms combine. We then use the fuzzy-set approach to qualitative comparitive analysis (QCA) to explore the combinations of governance mechanisms that exist among the S&P 1500 firms that achieve high (and not-high) profitability. Our findings suggest that high profits result when CEO incentive alignment and monitoring mechanisms work together as complements rather than as substitutes. Furthermore, they show that high profits are obtained when both internal and external monitoring mechanisms are present. At the same time, however, monitoring mechanisms evidently combine in compl},
Author = {Misangyi, Vilmos F. and Acharya, Abhijith G.},
ISSN = {00014273},
Journal = {Academy of Management Journal},
Keywords = {CORPORATE governance, AGENCY theory, SUBSTITUTION (Economics), SENIOR leadership teams, CHIEF executive officers, STOCKHOLDERS, COMPARATIVE studies, FUZZY sets, META-analysis},
Number = {6},
Pages = {1681 - 1705},
Title = {SUBSTITUTES OR COMPLEMENTS? A CONFIGURATIONAL EXAMINATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS.},
Volume = {57},
URL = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=99846861&site=ehost-live},
Year = {2014},
}

@article{9984686720141201,
Abstract = {This study builds on structural elaboration theory by developing a model to explain the adoption of board structures that appear to conform to the prevailing institutional logic, but which in fact contradict it. We test our theory with the case of CEO-only board structures, a formal increase in board independence that prior research has shown to lead to greater CEO entrenchment rather than increased shareholder value. Using an event history analysis of the Fortune 250 over a 27-year period, we examine three mechanisms that drive its adoption: executive interests, executive power, and elaboration opportunities. We show that the CEO-only structure is more likely to occur in firms in which a higher proportion of insiders predate the CEO, and in which the CEO has greater formal power and agenda control. We also find that powerful CEOs are more likely to realize the structural change following institutional opportunities, such as the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX), and organizational cont},
Author = {Joseph, John and Ocasio, William and McDonnell, Mary-Hunter},
ISSN = {00014273},
Journal = {Academy of Management Journal},
Keywords = {OUTSIDE directors of corporations, CHIEF executive officers, CORPORATE governance, ORGANIZATIONAL structure, STOCKHOLDER wealth, ORGANIZATIONAL performance, CORRELATION (Statistics), UNITED States, UNITED States. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002},
Number = {6},
Pages = {1834 - 1858},
Title = {THE STRUCTURAL ELABORATION OF BOARD INDEPENDENCE: EXECUTIVE POWER, INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS, AND THE ADOPTION OF CEO-ONLY BOARD STRUCTURES IN U.S. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE.},
Volume = {57},
URL = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=99846867&site=ehost-live},
Year = {2014},
}

@article{9984685720141201,
Abstract = {Although considerable research has focused on employee reactions to organizational justice, far less research has examined why managers adhere to rules of justice in the first place. Taking a proactive approach to organizational justice, we address this void by examining managerial motives for adhering to distributive, procedural, informational, and interpersonal rules of justice on a day-to-day basis. Results of an experience-sampling study of 90 managers who completed daily surveys over a three-week period revealed that both "cold" cognitive (i.e., effecting compliance, identity maintenance, and establishing fairness) and "hot" affective (i.e., high positive affect and low negative affect) motives were associated with managerial adherence to justice rules. Moreover, "cold" motives were more strongly associated with justice rule adherence for justice dimensions over which managers perceived less discretion, while "hot" motives were more strongly associated with justice rule adherence},
Author = {Scott, Brent A. and Garza, Adela S. and Conlon, Donald E. and You Jin, Kim},
ISSN = {00014273},
Journal = {Academy of Management Journal},
Keywords = {EXECUTIVES -- Psychology, EMPLOYEES -- Attitudes, ORGANIZATIONAL justice, COMPLIANCE, FAIRNESS, DISTRIBUTIVE justice, PROCEDURAL justice, AFFECT (Psychology), MOTIVATION (Psychology)},
Number = {6},
Pages = {1571 - 1591},
Title = {WHY DO MANAGERS ACT FAIRLY IN THE FIRST PLACE? A DAILY INVESTIGATION OF "HOT" AND "COLD" MOTIVES AND DISCRETION.},
Volume = {57},
URL = {http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=99846857&site=ehost-live},
Year = {2014},
}